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Crude Oil Price Prospects As Seen By Market-Makers

Summary Oil-price ETFs provide a quick look at expectations for change prospects in Crude Oil commodity prices. Market-maker hedging in these ETFs provide an overlay in terms of their impressions of likely big-money client influences on Oil-based ETF prices. But is there a broader story in price expectations for natural gas? And for ETFs in NatGas, following the same line of reasoning? Change is coming, so is Christmas But in what year? Expert oil industry analyst Richard Zeits in his recent article points out how long prior crude oil price recovery cycles have taken, with knowledgeable perspectives as to why. Still, there is also a suggestion that differences could exist in the present situation. Past cruise-ship price experiences of Crude Oil investors on their VLCC-type vessels have marveled at how long it takes to “change course and speed” in an industry so huge, complex, and geographically pervasive. To expect the navigating agility of an America’s Cup racer is wholly unrealistic. Yet some large part of the industry’s present supply-demand imbalance is being laid at the well-pad of new technology and aggressive new players in the game. In an effort to explore the daisy chain of anticipations that may ultimately be reflected by a persistent directional change in the obvious scorecard of COMEX/ICE market quotes, let’s step back a few paces from the supply~demand balance of commercial spot-market commodity transactions to the futures markets on which are based ETF securities whose prospects for price change attract investors in such volume that ETF markets require help from professional market-makers to commit firm capital to temporary at-risk positions that provide the buyer~seller balance permitting those transactions to take place. But that happens only after the market pros protect their risked capital with hedges in the derivative markets of futures and options, which doing so, quite likely provide some much lesser fine-tuning back into the price contemplations back up the ladder that brought us down to this level of minutia. So where to start? Mr. Zeits regularly asserts that his analyses are not investment recommendations, so securities prices are typically unmentioned, and left to the reader’s cogitation. We will start at the other end, where you can be assured that our thinking is in strong agreement with Mr.Z at his end. We convert (by unchanging, logical systemic means, established well over a decade ago) the market-makers [MMs] hedging actions into explicit price ranges that reflect their willingness to buy price protection than to have their perpetual adversaries in (and of) the marketplace take their capital (perhaps more brutally) from them. Using Richard Z’s list of Oil ETFs, here is a current picture of what the MM’s hedging actions now indicate are the upside price changes possible in the next few (3-4) months that could hurt them if their capital was in short positions. The complement to that, price change possibilities to the downside, could be a yin to the upside move’s yang, but we have found better guidance for the long-position investor’s concern in the actual worst-case price drawdowns during subsequent comparable holding periods to the upside prospects. So this map presents the upside gain potentials on the horizontal scale in the green area at the bottom, with the typical actual downside risk exposure experiences on the vertical red risk scale on the left. The intersection of the two locates the numbered ETFs listed in the blue field. (used with permission) Here’s the cast of characters: [1] is United States Brent Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: BNO ) and PowerShares DB Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: DBO ); [2] is ProShares Ultra Bloomberg Crude Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: UCO ); [3] is United States Short Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: DNO ); [4] is United States 12 month Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: USL ); [5] is ProShares Ultra Short Bloomberg Crude Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: SCO ); and [6] is the iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Price Index ETN (NYSEARCA: OIL ). Here is how they differ from one another: All are ETFs except for OIL, an ET Note with trivially higher credit risk and possible slight ultimate transaction problems. All except BNO are based on West Texas Intermediate [wti] crude oil availability and product specs, BNO is based on Brent (North Sea oil) quotes, directly influenced by ex-USA supply and demand balances. Most prices are at spot or most immediate futures price quotes, but USL is an average of the nearest-in-time 12 months futures quotes. All are long-posture investments except for SCO and DNO which are of inverse [short] structure. Both UCO and SCO are structured to have ETF movements daily of 2x the long or short equivalent unleveraged ETFs. What is the Reward~Risk map telling us? For conventional long-position investors, items down and to the right in the green area are attractive, to the extent that their 5 to 1 or better tradeoffs of upside potentials to bad experiences (after similar forecasts) are competitive to alternative choices. The closer any subject is to the lower-left home-plate of zero risk, zero return, the less attractive it is to those not traumatized by bunker mentality. SCO, the 2x leveraged short of WTI crude has a +20% upside with a -16% price drawdown average experience with similar forecasts in the past 5 years. It is a slightly better reward than a bet on a long position in Brent Crude and DNO, whose +18% upside is coupled with only -2% drawdowns. SCO’s minor return advantage over DNO comes largely from its leverage which is responsible for its large risk exposure. The same is true for UCO. USL’s trade-off risk advantage over OIL comes largely from smaller volatility in the 12-month average of futures prices that it tracks, rather than only the “front” or near expiration month. Here are the historical details and the current forecasts behind the map. The layout is in the format used daily in our topTen analysis of our 2,000+ ranked population of stocks and ETFs. For further explanation, check blockdesk.com . (click to enlarge) Conclusion In general, this map suggests that we still have ahead of us some further price declines as crude oil equity investors (via ETFs) see advantages in short structures. The spread between WTI crude price and Brent crude may be as narrow now as is likely in the next few months, given BNO’s relative attractiveness here. This analysis will be followed shortly by a parallel on those ETFs focused on Natural Gas and alternative energy fuels.

The Security I Like Best: Cash

The five year bull market has pushed stock market valuations again into extreme territory. In John Hussman’s recent commentary ‘Hard-Won Lessons and the Bird in the Hand’, he said: Meanwhile, the S&P 500 is more than double its historical valuation norms on reliable measures (with about 90% correlation with actual subsequent 10-year market returns), sentiment is lopsided, and we observe dispersion across market internals, along with widening credit spreads. These and similar considerations present a coherent pattern that has been informative in market cycles across a century of history – including the period since 2009. None of those considerations inform us that the U.S. stock market currently presents a desirable opportunity to accept risk. we presently estimate prospective S&P 500 10-year nominal total returns of less than 1.4% annually . Investors are being offered the choice between a quite large and easily captured bird in the hand, or two ailing, elusive and possibly imaginary birds in the bush. The S&P 500 isn’t the only asset class with dismal projected future returns. Rob Arnott’s ‘Research Affiliates’ group estimates 10-year expected real returns for the major asset classes. Very few asset classes have expected returns greater than 2%. Arnott estimates U.S. Large Cap stocks at less than 1%: (click to enlarge) From Jeremy Grantham’s 3rd Quarter 2014 Letter to Shareholders ‘Bubble Watch Update’, And make no mistake about it, a world in which cash rates average 0% from here on out is a fairly hellish one. It is our belief that investors get paid for taking unpleasant risks. That compensation is in the form of a risk premium over the “risk-free” rate, and while there are no truly risk-free assets out there, T-Bills are a good enough approximation for many purposes. If that rate is going to be zero real, stocks, bonds, real estate, and everything else investors have in their toolkit should have their expected returns fall as well. In that world there are likely to be no assets priced to deliver as much as 5% real, and the expected return to a 65% stock/35% bond portfolio would drop from 4.7% real to about 3.4% real. I use these projected returns from investors such as Arnott, Jeremy Grantham, Hussman, and myself to generate my own asset allocation. The allocation to a particular asset class depends on its projected return against other assets (chiefly expected future inflation), and the asset volatility. My current allocation consists of: HealthyWealthyWiseProject – Current Asset Allocation (This allocation spreadsheet is kept on the Wealthy page of the website) At 21% of the portfolio, cash is currently my largest single asset class. Cash returns are, as we know, lousy; the little that one can get in liquid instruments inevitably being lower than the toll extracted by inflation. And the long-term returns on cash are terrible, lagging behind every asset class and investment strategy this side of setting money on fire. Still, cash is an option to buy value cheaply in the future. It’s premium price is inflation. Cash is worth holding because it is dry powder which gives the owner options. That optionality varies, of course, based on your view of how richly valued assets are, but it is always there. I note that Jeremy Grantham reported a 17% cash position in the 3rd Quarter. Again from Jeremy Grantham: As always, the prudent investor [..] should definitely recognize overvaluation, factor in regression to the mean, and calculate the longer-term returns that result from this process. More easily, such prudent investors can use our seven-year numbers, which have a decent long-term record measured when we have viewed markets as overpriced, as we believe they are today. A Note on the Presidential Cycle We’ve entered the third year of Obama’s presidency. Presidential Year 3 has been by far the most bullish historically. The average total return in year one has been 8 percent followed by 9.8 percent (Year 2), 21.7 percent (Year 3) and 12 percent (Year 4). Third-year stats have been especially impressive. The return has historically been more than double the average return in either years one and two and the S&P has finished down only once. There’s no guarantee that these aren’t just random patterns, but it’s often thought that third-year gains are a result of stimulus being added to the economy as Election Day approaches. It seems like a good time to prime the pump to put voters in a better mood. Jeremy Grantham respects the Presidential Cycle, and believes the Fed will engineer a fully fledged bubble (S&P 500 over 2250) before a very serious decline. The takeaway is – enjoy this last hurrah while it lasts, with an eye toward increasing your cash position as the year progresses.

In Defense Of iShares MSCI Emerging Markets Minimum Volatility ETF

Summary I recently profiled several emerging market low-volatility ETFs and selected EEMV for my own personal portfolio. Last year, another Seeking Alpha author wrote a detailed analysis highlighting the drawbacks of EEMV. This piece considers those drawbacks in light of EEMV’s 3-year performance and also examines the role of the fund in one’s portfolio. Introduction In a previous article , we studied the performance of three low-volatility emerging market (EM) ETFs: EGShares Low Volatility EM Dividend ETF (NYSEARCA: HILO ), PowerShares S&P Emerging Markets Low Volatility Portfolio (NYSEARCA: EELV ) and iShares MSCI Emerging Markets Minimum Volatility (NYSEARCA: EEMV ). We found that all three low-volatility EM ETFs delivered lower volatility than the benchmark iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (NYSEARCA: EEM ) over the past two years, but with wildly disparate returns. EEMV did the best out of the three funds, with a 20.64% return, while EELV returned 8.87%. Also, both funds beat EEM (6.23%). On the other hand, HILO was by far the worst fund with a total return performance of -9.53%. I decided to select EEMV for my own portfolio as it had better sector diversification, greater allocation towards low P/E countries, and the lowest expense ratio out of all the ETFs. In April 2013, around one and a half years after the inception of EEMV, Seeking Alpha author Investment Therapist wrote a detailed analysis that was critical of EEMV for the following four reasons: The methodology of EEMV is constructed without a return focus. Historical volatility is not the best way to obtain low future volatility. EEMV is underdiversified and overconcentrated in low-volatility, high-dividend names, which may underperform in a bull market. The low volatility of EEMV will not protect the fund from a financial crisis. With another 1.5 years under its belt since the date of that article, this fund is now over three years old. This article seeks to address some of the criticisms raised by Investment Therapist in light of the EEMV’s three year performance, and also examines the role of the fund in one’s portfolio. While I disagree with some of his statements, this piece aims not to be combative, but is intended to both clarify my own thinking and to stimulate discussion with the broad readership of Seeking Alpha. 1. The methodology of EEMV is constructed without a return focus. Investment Therapist writes: Basically, the portfolio is being created with an emphasis on volatility and NOT return opportunities. It should go without saying that most rational investors are primarily focused on potential Rewards relative to Risk, and not solely focused on Risk (volatility). By focusing on volatility, the portfolio is created with no outlook on the future return opportunities of the stocks within the portfolio. Investment Therapist is basically saying that volatility has no relationship with future return. However, volatility is a validated factor for alpha. In an April 2012 article by Robeco Asset Management entitled “The volatility effect in emerging markets”, authors Blitz, Pang and Vliet found that from 1988 to 2010, EM stocks that showed lower volatility or lower beta outperformed those with higher volatility or higher beta on a risk-adjusted basis. After adjusting for differences in market beta, the “top-minus-bottom” 1-factor alpha spread between the highest and lowest quintiles of stocks ranked in terms of volatility was determined to be -8.8% per annum. Ranking stocks in terms of beta produced similar results that were less strong (1-factor alpha spread = -5.4%), but still statistically significant. Similar analysis conducted with size, value and momentum (re)confirmed that these premia also operated in emerging markets. Based on the 1-factor alphas, the authors found that the low-volatility premium was much larger than the size premium, comparable to the value premium, but smaller than the momentum premium. Low-volatility stocks also tend to be larger and more mature companies, which could possibly predispose them towards value rather than growth exposure. Was the low volatility premium simply due to an increased exposure to the value factor? To address this, the authors calculated 3-factor and 4-factor alphas for their sample. They found that the 3-factor alphas were very similar to the 1-factor alphas, indicating that exposures to size or value do not explain the higher returns of low-volatility or low-beta stocks in the study. Only the 4-factor alphas were slightly lower, indicating that low-volatility stocks may have indirectly benefited by also showing momentum characteristics (NB: riddle me that!). Therefore, it seems that selecting for low-volatility has been a robust factor for achieving higher risk-adjusted returns. 2. Historical volatility is not the best way to obtain low future volatility. In Robeco’s study of emerging market stocks, the authors stated that “Past risk is again strongly predictive for future risk”. However, Investment Therapist writes: If choosing stocks with low historical volatility and/or low correlations is such a great way of creating a “Minimum Volatility Portfolio,” then why are there over 10 Emerging Market mutual funds that have lower 1-year and Since Inception (of EEMV) volatility than EEMV? Focusing on historical volatility clearly doesn’t produce a portfolio with the lowest volatility. The funds with lower volatility than EEMV focus on the valuation of stocks (determining a stock’s intrinsic value), which EEMV does not since returns are not an input into the construction of the ETF portfolio. Investment Therapist is saying that funds (presumably mutual funds) with a focus on value managed to achieve lower volatility than EEMV over 1-year or since inception (1.5 years). As EEMV is now 3 years old, we can do a longer test of its realized volatility. Note that I shall be using EEM as a benchmark rather than mutual funds as I believe that is a fairer comparison. The graph below shows the 30-day volatility for EEMV and EEM over the past 3 years. EEMV 30-Day Rolling Volatility data by YCharts The results show that EEMV has consistently managed to obtain lower volatility than EEM over the past 3 years. Therefore, it seems that the fund does succeed at producing lower volatility compared to the benchmark. Just for interest, I also report the 2-year volatility and beta values for three EM low-volatility funds (EEMV, EELV and HILO), three EM value funds ( EVAL , PXH , TLTE ), and EEM. The 2-year return of the funds is also shown for comparison. Data are from InvestSpy . Volatility Beta Return EEMV 12.90% 0.81 3.90% EELV 13.30% 0.81 -2.00% HILO 15.30% 0.89 -15.90% Average 13.83% 0.84 -4.67% (NASDAQ: EVAL ) 25.00% 0.57 -5.20% (NYSEARCA: PXH ) 17.90% 1.06 -9.30% (NYSEARCA: TLTE ) 14.70% 0.82 -1.60% Average 19.20% 0.82 -5.37% EEM 16.90% 1.06 -1.40% Interestingly, we find that the three EM value funds actually had higher volatility than the benchmark EEM. Therefore, for passively-managed emerging markets ETFs at least, it seems that value stocks did not possess lower volatilities. 3. EEMV is underdiversified and overconcentrated in low-volatility, high-dividend names, which may underperform in a bull market. Investment Therapist writes: With correlations now coming down and higher yielding investments now approaching the status of “overcrowded trade,” I expect (my opinion) that the same high tracking error that came with the fund on the upside performance will also cause this fund to experience strong pains should a bull market in Emerging Markets form. Overall, once the strong performance over the fund’s very short tenure is examined deeper, it can be seen that the strong stylized bias towards the value-oriented, low-volatility names were a tail-wind to the fund. I do agree with Investment Therapist here. Low-volatility names tend to exist in more mature, stable industries that have a lower capacity for growth. In our previous article, we saw that EEMV was actually more pricey than EEM in terms of its valuation metrics (table reproduced below, data from Morningstar , value metrics are forward-looking). EEMV EEM Price/Earnings 15.69 12.76 Price/Book 1.86 1.49 Price/Sales 1.51 1.14 Price/Cash Flow 7.38 4.91 Dividend yield % 2.81 2.56 Projected Earnings Growth % 10.97 11.76 Historical Earnings Growth % 5.06 -1.68 Sales Growth % -15.60 -13.79 Cash-flow Growth % 6.36 7.85 Book-value Growth % -26.56 -21.57 Since EEMV’s inception, there have been at least two mini-bull markets where EEM climbed by 20% or more. Let’s see how EEMV and its “opposite fund”, the PowerShares S&P Emerging Markets High Beta Portfolio (NYSEARCA: EEHB ), performed over these two time periods. Jun 1st, 2012 to Jan 1st, 2013 EEM Total Return Price data by YCharts Feb 1st, 2014 to Sep 1st, 2014 EEM Total Return Price data by YCharts We can see that in both mini-bull runs, EEMV underperformed the benchmark EEM, while EEHB outperformed. Therefore, I agree with Investment Therapist’s assertion that EEMV would likely underperform EEM in a future bull market. But we should also consider this question: what was the purpose of the low-volatility fund in the first place? No one should have expected such a fund to keep pace with a roaring bull. Instead, a low-volatility fund’s aim should be to reduce equity risk (to a certain extent), resulting in higher risk-adjusted returns. The following table shows the 20-month return, volatility, beta, and maximum drawdown of EEMV, EEHB and EEM (data from InvestSpy ). Volatility Beta Max draw. Return EEMV 13.7% 0.86 -15.90% 7.80% EEHB 25.0% 0.62 -29.90% -12.90% EEM 18.0% 1.16 -18.90% -5.60% We can see that the recent struggles of EM markets has caused EEHB to significantly underperform. EEHB had higher volatility and also greater maximum drawdown over the past 20 months compared to EEMV or EEM. (Note that the beta values are with respect to S&P500 and therefore may n to be applicable). So am I saying to go for high volatility/beta in bull markets, and low volatility/beta in bear markets? Hardly. The first reason is that no one can reliably predict when the next bull or bear market will arrive. The second reason is that if you were to pick a factor to tilt towards in a bull market, wouldn’t you rather choose momentum [such as PowerShares DWA Emerging Market Momentum Portfolio (NYSEARCA: PIE )], which is an academically validated factor for outperformance, rather than high-volatility, an academically validated factor for underperformance? All in all, I don’t think that buying-and-holding EEMV is an inherently flawed decision. This is particularly true for the investor who wants some exposure to emerging markets, but are afraid that they can’t handle the higher volatility of emerging markets. However, for investors with a higher risk tolerance I would recommend also buying PIE and PXH to take advantage of momentum and value premia as well, and for better diversification over the entire market cycle (one could also achieve better diversification by holding EEM). 4. The low volatility of EEMV will not protect the fund from a financial crisis. Investment Therapist writes: Bonds will behave much differently than stocks, even during a financial crisis. A portfolio of stocks, however, wavered during the most recent financial crisis and the lack of “diversification” was made evident. There is no fundamental research proving that this type of optimization would work at the Stock Selection level since a portfolio of stocks behave more similarly than two unique strategies like Bonds and Stocks. I do completely agree with Investment Therapist on this. Low volatility stocks are still stocks, and will move (more or less) as other stocks do. Therefore, investors in EEMV should not expect the fund to hold up during a recession (like a bond would). But again, an investor should be asking the same question: what was the purpose of the low-volatility fund in the first place? What a low-volatility fund will do is to perform better than a neutral or a high-volatility fund during a correction or a bear market. Indeed, (backtested) data shows that MSCI EM Minimum Volatility Index, the underlying index for EEMV, dropped “only” -41.97% in 2008, while the MSCI EM index dropped -53.18%. In more recent and actual data, EEMV held up better than EEM in the September swoon that hit emerging markets this year (strangely, so did EEHB). EEM Total Return Price data by YCharts Conclusion Investment Therapist’s article contained some criticisms on EEMV that, while technically correct, should not unduly worry the investor who recognizes the role and limitations of a low-volatility fund in their portfolio. Yes, EEMV will likely underperform EEM in a bull market and will also likely underperform bonds during a bear market. However, what EEMV will deliver is lower volatility compared to EEM, which is great from a psychological point of view, as well as higher risk-adjusted returns or “alpha” (as long as the low-volatility premium persists, which I will assume to be the case until evidence points otherwise). However, one cautionary note that I will echo Investment Therapist on is that low-volatility stocks are becoming more expensive. Therefore, I recommend that investors with higher risk tolerances should also consider holding EM value funds such as PXH or EM momentum funds such as PIE to harvest other alternative sources of alpha.