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Today’s Best Energy ETF Reward-To-Risk Tradeoff, As Seen By Market-Makers

Summary From a population of 35 actively traded, substantial, and growing Energy ETFs, this is a currently attractive addition to a portfolio where investing selections are made by risk-to-reward tradeoffs. We evaluate future near-term price gain prospects for quality, market-seasoned ETFs daily, based on the expectations of market-makers [MMs], drawing on their insights from client order flows. The analysis of our subject ETF’s price prospects is reinforced by parallel MM forecasts for each of the fund’s ten largest holdings. Qualitative appraisals of the forecasts are derived from how well the MMs have foreseen subsequent price behaviors following prior forecasts similar to today’s. The size of prospective gains, the odds of winning transactions, worst-case price drawdowns, and marketability measures are all taken into account. Today’s most attractive energy ETF… … is the Vanguard Energy ETF (NYSEARCA: VDE ) “The investment seeks to track the performance of a benchmark index. The fund employs an indexing investment approach designed to track the performance of the MSCI US Investable Market Index (IMI)/Energy 25/50, an index made up of stocks of large, mid-size, and small U.S. companies within the energy sector, as classified under the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). It attempts to replicate the target index by investing all, or substantially all, of its assets in the stocks that make up the index, holding each stock in approximately the same proportion as its weighting in the index. The fund is non-diversified.” (source: Yahoo Finance) The fund currently holds assets of $5.03 billion and has had a YTD price return of -0.51%. Its average daily trading volume of 301,960 produces a complete asset turnover calculation in 158 days at its current price of $105.71. Low liquidity is its principal limitation. Behavioral analysis of market-maker hedging actions undertaken while providing market liquidity for volume block trades in the ETF by interested major investment funds has produced the recent past (6-month) daily history of implied price range forecasts as pictured in Figure 1. Figure 1 (used with permission) The vertical lines of Figure 1 are a visual history of forward-looking expectations of coming prices for the subject ETF. They are NOT a backward-in-time look at actual daily price ranges, but the heavy dot in each range is the ending market quote of the day the forecast was made. What is important in the picture is the balance of upside prospects in comparison to downside concerns. That ratio is expressed in the Range Index [RI], whose number tells what percentage of the whole range lies below the then current price. Today’s Range Index is used to evaluate how well prior forecasts of similar RIs for this ETF have worked out. The size of that historical sample is given near the right-hand end of the data line below the picture. The current RI’s size in relation to all available RIs of the past 5 years is indicated in the small blue thumbnail distribution at the bottom of Figure 1. The first items in the data line are current information: the current high and low of the forecast range, and the percent change from the market quote to the top of the range, as a sell target. The Range Index is of the current forecast. Other items of data are all derived from the history of prior forecasts. They stem from applying a T ime- E fficient R isk M anagement D iscipline to hypothetical holdings initiated by the MM forecasts. That discipline requires a next-day closing price cost position be held no longer than 63 market days (3 months), unless first encountered by a market close equal to or above the sell target. The net payoffs are the cumulative average simple percent gains of all such forecast positions, including losses. Days held are average market rather than calendar days held in the sample positions. Drawdown exposure indicates the typical worst-case price experience during those holding periods. Win odds tells what percentage proportion of the sample recovered from the drawdowns to produce a gain. The cred(ibility) ratio compares the sell target prospect with the historical net payoff experiences. Figure 2 provides a longer-time perspective by drawing a once-a-week look from the Figure 1 source forecasts, back over two years. Figure 2 (used with permission) What does this ETF hold, to cause such price expectations? Figure 3 is a table of securities held by the subject ETF, indicating its concentration in the top ten largest holdings and their percentage of the ETF’s total value. Figure 3 (click to enlarge) (Source: Yahoo Finance) Figure 4 is a table of data lines, similar to that contained in Figure 1, for each of the top ten holdings of VDE. Figure 4 (click to enlarge) There is a shocking discontinuity, among knowledgeable investment appraisers, between the prospects of VDE and the prospects of the VDE fund’s holdings. MMs are making bets with firm capital that say the beliefs of the MM community are that VDE has no price downside from its present market quote and has an upside price change prospect of +7%. When prior forecasts for VDE like this have been made before, all (seven) of them were profitable, producing average gains of +8.1%. Further, the worst price drawdowns experienced in the average 24 market-day holding periods involved was only a bit worse than -½%. Seven prior experiences is a smallish sample, but because the price range forecast being implied by the hedging markets is quite extreme, a small sample is to be expected. And the sample of seven is much more than only one or two, which reason says to ignore. The forecast says that it is time for VDE’s price to soon turn around and start rising. Not to giant absolute amounts, but if prior history were duplicated +8%, even +7% achieved in 24 market days (about 5 weeks), when compounded 10+ times in a year, easily produces an annual rate of 100% or more. The forecast is not that VDE will repeat the gain ten times, but experience has shown that many other securities are frequently present with similar opportunities, or even better ones, throughout the course of a year. OK, so VDE may be an attractive bet, as it is being knowledgeably perceived. What in its fund holdings is supporting that notion? Nothing, among the history of forecasts for 60%+ of its holdings, the ten largest, listed in Figure 4. Well, to be fair, those ten stocks have average upside forecasts seen possible averaging +10%, so maybe. But in an average of more than 100 experiences for each of the ten stocks, (that’s over a thousand times altogether) from prior forecasts like today’s, the best they could do as a group was a – ½% loss. That’s not how credibility is built. And in the process, the ten averaged worst-case losses of about -10%. Losses which they recovered from less than half the time to achieve any profit, a 48% win rate. Ouch! Conclusion Our logic must be missing something. The hedging markets say that VDE could indeed go up in price by 7%, and any outfit short the ETF is justified in protecting against such a price move. But there is practically no credible history in the last five years of forecasts for the ten biggest VDE holdings to encourage confidence in their going up +10%, or even +7%. One solution to the perplexity is that what may be about to happen is not to be found in history. Many strange things happen in market movements. Quite possibly, the buying enthusiasm for VDE comes from a different investor group than the ones typically trafficking in the VDE’s ten big holdings. Perhaps individual investors, rather than institutional investors. After all, this is a Vanguard fund. Individuals may sense a turn in crude prices, a rise that would be welcomed by big-money managers, but has not yet provided the big guns with satisfactory conviction. Could the investing public be ahead of the big smart money? Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

High-Yield Bond CEFs Are Looking More Attractive These Days (Or Are They?)

Summary This article highlights five closed-end bond funds which have attractive yields, greater discounts than usual, and solid distribution histories. Starting around March 2015, many bond CEFs have seen significant sell-offs, in spite of stable NAVs creating large discounts, probably due to fears of rising interest rates. Fears of the Fed raising interest rates materially within the short term are now perceived by many as overdone. However, the energy sector continues to face some challenges, which ripple through to funds such as these, which invest in corporate debt in that industry. While global political uncertainties persist in many parts of the world (e.g., Ukraine, Greece, the Middle East), the financial markets seem to be taking that in their stride. First of all, you should already know something about closed-end funds, or “CEFs”. Otherwise, this article might not make much sense to you. I refer those of you who are unfamiliar with this investment category to one of the many excellent basic tutorials out there, for example this SA article or those on the Morningstar website . Especially important is to understand the difference between a CEF and an open-ended, or regular mutual fund or ETF, and how the share price of a CEF can trade at a discount or a premium to the actual inherent share value, or net asset value – and why it usually makes sense to buy funds which are trading at a discount instead of a premium. There are also several contributors to Seeking Alpha who have written some great articles about CEFs, for example Douglas Albo , George Spritzer , Reuben Gregg Brewer , Joe Eqcome (aka Robert A. Frank, CFA), Betalyst , and surely many others I do not yet know about. Actually, just about everything I know about CEF investing I learned from reading articles by these authors. As a classically trained musician, I do not have a background in financial matters. I am specifically interested in CEFs which invest in high-yielding bonds, because I had already been invested in the Brookfield High Income Fund Inc. (NYSE: HHY ) (before July 2014, when this was still one of the Helios family of funds, HIH, which later merged into one single fund) and because there were one or two other bond funds I wanted to compare with similar funds for a specific reason… but more about that later. There are also CEFs which invest in REITs and mREITs; some CEFs specialize in MLPs or utilities, while others invest in emerging markets or even specific countries (Mexico, Thailand, etc.) or industry sectors (healthcare, technology, etc.). While equity CEFs can enhance their returns by using different kinds of sophisticated option strategies, and sometimes dividend capture techniques, bond funds usually use leverage (i.e., they borrow money) in order to buy more bonds than they could without the leverage. Since the cost of borrowing is typically much lower for large investment firms than for private investors, the returns from the extra bond coupons they receive will more than pay for all the interest and other expenses that have to be paid for borrowing the money… especially in today’s ZIRP environment (ZIRP = “zero interest rate policy”). When rates go up, the value of a bond declines. Floating-rate loans and short-duration bond holdings can adjust better to rising rates, but long-term bonds can be affected more. So I used the Fund Screener on the well-known CEF website to pull up a list of funds which fulfill the following criteria: Monthly distribution payments; Distribution rate (i.e., yield on share price) of about 9% or higher; Discount of market price to NAV (“net asset value”) of about -9% or wider; Leverage no higher than 30%; Total assets of $200M or greater. This brought up about 25 out of more than 500 funds, some of which are equity CEFs which invest mainly in stocks, and some of which are bond funds which invest in… you guessed it!… corporate bonds and similar forms of corporate and government debt obligations, such as Treasuries and senior secured loans. I am also always on the lookout for other high-yielding investments, so the non-bond funds were also interesting to see. I added the option “YTD return on NAV” without a constraint, which gave me the same funds, but now with an additional column which I could sort in descending order by clicking on the header. Then, I examined the funds one by one and looked at the distribution history (i.e., whether or not distributions were cut or raised, and the breakdown in categories of income/long-term gains/short-term gains/return of capital) and the portfolio composition. As for the latter, I was most interested in two things: the breakdown of portfolio allocation by credit rating, and the breakdown by sector. If the fund invests globally, often there is a breakdown by country (usually the top ten). For more detailed information, you have to go to the website for the fund’s management (or sponsor) and pull up the most recent fact sheet and/or the last annual or semi-annual report. Usually, one source of information is never going to be enough, and this is one of the things that make investing (in anything) very “interesting” at times. I eventually narrowed my selection down to these five: Prudential Short Duration High Yield Fund (NYSE: ISD ) Prudential Global Short Duration High Yield Fund, Inc. (NYSE: GHY ) Babson Capital Global Short Duration High Yield Fund (NYSE: BGH ) Virtus Global Multi-Sector Income Fund (NYSE: VGI ) Brookfield High Income Fund Inc. (HHY, mentioned above) Actually, I knew about the first two already due to one of the Seeking Alpha readers who commented on my PGZ article (thanks, Bea!), but after seeing the widening discounts on these, I did a little more research to see whether this was a phenomenon isolated to those funds, or if it was something else that other funds were also experiencing, something generic to bond funds. The latter seems to be the case. There isn’t a lot of information out there about some of these bond funds, perhaps because they all tend to be thinly traded, so it pays to do some in-depth research by reading the literature, reports, and SEC filings you can find on each company’s website. All of the five selected funds have the following characteristics in common, in addition to being closed-end funds: They invest predominantly in bonds, as well as other forms of corporate and government debt (e.g., senior secured loans, or U.S. and global Treasury obligations); All invest mainly in assets in the USA; All have some global exposure in varying, but mostly smaller, proportions (HHY has very little global exposure; BGH, VGI, and GHY have more, of course); All use some degree of leverage, usually between 24% and 28%; All pay distributions on a monthly basis; All but HHY have relatively short track records, so they are somewhat riskier than funds which have been around longer. Some of the main differences are: Duration of bond holdings: Three of the five funds are concentrated in short-duration investments. Short-duration bonds typically have lower yields, but are less sensitive to interest rate hikes, and are considered to have the highest liquidity. Lack of liquidity is being perceived as a problem in the bond market these days, as Bill Gross has pointed out recently , so an investment in short-duration bonds should be more desirable in such an environment (read more about this here ); Credit quality of assets: While all of these funds do invest in “junk bonds”, there is considerable variation in the percentage of assets of higher credit quality. Of these five, only VGI has a substantial amount of assets rated as investment-grade (i.e., rated “BBB” or higher); Distribution histories and sources (i.e., tax characteristics): These can vary, although I selected funds which haven’t cut their distributions within the past several years. All but VGI do not have an element of return of capital (“ROC”), and that only since April 2015 (read more about that in the details for VGI below); Breakdown by country: The breakdown of individual global investments will vary according to percent of allocation and location; Breakdown by industry: Allocation to industry sectors is, of course, another big (and important) variable. Most bond funds saw significant declines in NAV over the latter part of 2014, especially if a significant portion of their portfolio was in energy-related or utilities-related assets. However, most of the NAVs of these funds seem to have stabilized across the board since January, although they haven’t all gone up to a great extent. But Mr. Market has taken a rather unfavorable view of these high-income investments lately, as we shall see from the following comparisons of market valuation versus net asset value. We have all heard of the “taper tantrum” which happened in May 2013. Back then, we saw a massive sell-off of these and similar other funds due to a knee-jerk reaction of investors to the announcement that QE (“quantitative easing”) would soon come to an end. Some investors with clear heads recognized the panic behind the sell-off and took advantage of what turned out to be a great buying opportunity. This time, I believe we are seeing a repeat of the “taper tantrum”, but in slow motion. Contrary to the first “taper tantrum”, where fear was the predominant motivation for the sell-off, there are very real issues this time, such as low oil prices and general weakness in the energy sector, which rippled through to some funds which have a high degree of exposure to that industry. Most of that took place in the latter half of 2014, but many people believe that we haven’t seen the end of it yet. They say “a picture is worth a thousand words” , so I’ll start out each fund’s résumé with a picture of the chart of the market price versus NAV beginning on January 1, 2015 until today (July 1, 2015) taken from the CEF website. Data presented below, unless otherwise indicated, was taken from the CEF website on July 1, 2015. All quoted material is copyrighted by the source named, and is used here under the assumption of the “fair use” provision of the DMCA . ISD – Prudential Short Duration High Yield Fund Fund sponsor’s website (click on the tab: “Closed-End Funds”) Description (from cefconnect.com) : “The Fund seeks high current income by investing primarily in a diversified portfolio of high yield fixed income instruments that are rated below investment grade or, if unrated, are considered by the investment subadviser to be of comparable quality.” From the latest Fact Sheet (3/31/2015): “The Fund seeks to provide a high level of current income by investing primarily in higher-rated, below investment-grade fixed income instruments. The Fund seeks to maintain a weighted average portfolio duration of three years or less and a weighted average maturity of five years or less.” NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: $17.61 52-wk. avg.: $18.03 52-wk. high: $18.80 52-wk. low: $17.50 Share price: (Source: CEF website) Current: $15.46 52-wk. avg.: $16.51 52-wk. high: $17.97 52-wk. low: $15.10 Discount/Premium to NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: -12.21% 52-wk. avg.: -8.39% 52-wk. high: -4.36% 52-wk. low: -14.16% Distribution: (Source: CEF website) Amount (monthly): $0.1225 Yield on market price (current): 9.51% Total Net Assets: $831.615M Effective leverage: 28.99% Total expense ratio: 1.52% YTD return on NAV: 3.68% YTD return on price: -3.71% Avg. daily shares traded: 142,000 Credit ratings of investments: (Source: CEF website) BBB: 2.90% BB: 45.50% B: 44.50% CCC: 6.6% Other: 0.50% Summary: The fund has operated since April 30, 2012 (source: Fund’s fact sheet). Regular distributions have been constant at $0.1225 per month. Special dividends of $0.1278 and $0.1156 were paid in January 2014 and 2015, in addition to the regular distributions. All distributions consisted of ordinary income, no long-term or short-term gains, and no return of capital. Other remarks: ISD and another fund, GHY, are both sponsored by Prudential Investments LLC. According to the information on the CEF website, there seems to be no significant allocation to assets in energy-related or utility-related sectors. But according to the semi-annual report of November 2014, available on the fund sponsor’s website, the total allocation to the energy sector for the period reported was about 5%. Maybe they have since reduced their energy exposure even more, but we will have to wait until the next annual report to find out. It was also remarked in the same report that being underweight in energy had a beneficial effect on the fund’s performance. At any rate, 5% is considerably less than most of the other funds’ allocations to energy. GHY – Prudential Global Short Duration High Yield Fund, Inc. Fund sponsor’s website : (click on the tab: “Closed-End Funds”) Description (from cefconnect.com) : “The Fund seeks a high level of current income through investing in high yield fixed income instruments of issuers located around the world, including emerging markets.” From the latest Fact Sheet (3/31/2015): “The Fund seeks to provide a high level of current income by investing primarily in higher-rated, below investment-grade fixed income instruments of issuers located around the world, including emerging markets. The Fund seeks to maintain a weighted average portfolio duration of three years or less and a weighted average maturity of five years or less.” NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: $17.20 52-wk. avg.: $17.74 52-wk. high: $18.81 52-wk. low: $17.09 Share price: (Source: CEF website) Current: $15.25 52-wk. avg.: $16.35 52-wk. high: $18.05 52-wk. low: $14.77 Discount/Premium to NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: -11.34% 52-wk. avg.: -7.80% 52-wk. high: -3.75% 52-wk. low: -14.03% Distribution: (Source: CEF website) Amount (monthly): $0.1250 Yield on market price (current): 9.84% Total Net Assets: $968.854M Effective leverage: 27.35% Total expense ratio: 1.61% (source: fund’s fact sheet) YTD return on NAV: 3.85% YTD return on price: -0.38% Avg. daily shares traded: 185,000 Credit ratings of investments: (Source: CEF website) A: 0.3% BBB: 3.7% BB: 42.3% B: 46.7% CCC: 4.5% Other: 0.5% Country breakdown: (Source: CEF website) USA: 66.0% UK: 4.3% Luxembourg: 4.0% Canada: 3.4% Germany: 3.2% France: 2.8% Netherlands: 2.3% Brazil: 2.0% Other: 10.0% Summary: The fund has operated since December 26, 2012 (source: Fund’s fact sheet). Distributions have been constant at $0.1250 per month. One special dividend of $0.2540 was paid in January 2015, in addition to the regular distributions. All distributions consisted of regular income, no long-term or short-term gains, and no return of capital. Other remarks: As with ISD, also managed by Prudential Investments LLC, there seems to be no sizable allocation to assets in energy-related or utility-related sectors. BGH – Babson Capital Global Short Duration High Yield Fund Fund sponsor’s website Description (from cefconnect.com) : “The Fund seeks a high level of current income with capital preservation through investment in high yield bonds, loans and other income-producing securities.” From the latest Fact Sheet (5/31/2015): “OBJECTIVE: The Fund’s primary investment objective is to seek as high a level of current income as Babson Capital determines is consistent with capital preservation. The Fund seeks capital appreciation as a secondary investment objective when consistent with its primary investment objective. STRATEGY: The Fund will invest at least 80% of its Managed Assets in corporate bonds, loans and other income-producing instruments that are rated below investment grade – The Fund may invest up to 50% of its Managed Assets in bonds and loans issued by foreign companies – The Fund will seek to maintain a weighted average portfolio duration of 3 years or less.” NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: $22.09 52-wk. avg.: $23.31 52-wk. high: $25.83 52-wk. low: $21.60 Share price: (Source: CEF website) Current: $19.93 52-wk. avg.: $21.81 52-wk. high: $24.51 52-wk. low: $19.51 Discount/Premium to NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: -9.78% 52-wk. avg.: -6.42% 52-wk. high: -2.71% 52-wk. low: -11.72% Distribution: (Source: CEF website) Amount (monthly): $0.1677 Yield on market price (current): 10.10% Total Net Assets: $596.578M Effective leverage: 25.80% Total expense ratio: 2.21% YTD return on NAV: 5.09% YTD return on price: 3.62% Avg. daily shares traded: 95,000 Credit ratings of investments: (Source: Fund’s fact sheet) Baa: 0.0% Ba: 9.9% B: 78.1% other: 11.4% Country breakdown: (Source: Fund’s fact sheet) USA: 59.5% UK: 20.4% Canada: 2.9% France: 2.2% Sweden: 1.7% Industry sector allocations: (Source: Fund’s fact sheet) Oil and Gas: 20.0% Healthcare, Education and Childcare: 8.7% Finance: 7.9% Automobile: 6.8% Retail Stores: 6.7% Chemicals, Plastics and Rubber: 5.6% Buildings and Real Estate: 4.3% Telecommunications: 3.7% Cargo Transport: 3.6% Containers, Packaging and Glass: 3.2% Portfolio composition: (Source: Fund’s fact sheet) 1st Lien Senior Secured Loans: 2.5% Senior Secured Bonds: 47.1% Senior Unsecured Bonds: 35.7% 2nd Lien Senior Secured Loans: 14.1% Cash and Accrued Income: 0.6% Summary: The fund has operated since October 26, 2012 (source: Fund’s fact sheet). Regular distributions have been constant at $0.1667 per month. One special dividend of $0.5873 was paid in January 2015, in addition to the regular distributions. All distributions consisted of regular income, some short-term gains, and no return of capital. Other remarks: Although the fund’s NAV has increased more since the beginning of the year relative to some of the others in this article, the 20% allocation to the oil & gas sector would make me a little nervous, should I choose to invest here. I also like the credit ratings of ISD and GHY assets better with a 50/50 mix of “B/BB”, rather than those of BGH, which are more concentrated in the “B” range. VGI – Virtus Global Multi-Sector Income Fund Fund sponsor’s website Description: “The Fund seeks to maximize current income while preserving capital by investing in a portfolio of fixed income securities of U.S. and non-U.S. issuers.” From the latest Fact Sheet (3/31/2015): “The fund seeks to generate high current income and total return by applying extensive credit research and a time-tested approach to capitalize on opportunities across undervalued sectors of the global bond markets. The portfolio seeks global diversification among 14 sectors in order to potentially increase return and manage risk. A team of investment professionals provides significant research depth across all sectors of the global bond markets.” NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: $17.96 52-wk. avg.: $18.68 52-wk. high: $19.92 52-wk. low: $17.20 Share price: (Source: CEF website) Current: $15.72 52-wk. avg.: $16.70 52-wk. high: $17.99 52-wk. low: $15.08 Discount/Premium to NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: -12.47% 52-wk. avg.: -10.61% 52-wk. high: -5.94% 52-wk. low: -13.70% Distribution: (Source: CEF website) Amount (monthly): $0.1560 Yield on market price (current): 11.91% Total Net Assets: $286.144M Effective leverage: 27.31% Total expense ratio: 2.13% YTD return on NAV: 5.27% YTD return on price: 6.21% Avg. daily shares traded: 41,000 Credit ratings of investments: (Source: Fund’s fact sheet) Aaa: 8.78% Aa: 5.42% A: 14.35% Baa: 31.43% Ba: 23.11% B: 10.96% Caa: 4.10% Other: 1.86% Asset Allocation (from the annual report as of December 31, 2014 – the Fact Sheet has a somewhat different breakdown according to fixed-income categories, which I won’t repeat here. However, it is worth noting that the allocation to mortgage-backed securities, as stated in the Fact Sheet, is more like 7.8% – non-agency CMBS and RMBS and other MBS, summed together): (Source: Fund’s annual report as of Dec. 31, 2014) Corporate Bonds and Notes: 69% Financials: 30% Energy: 15% Materials: 7% Others: 17% Loan Agreements: 10% Foreign Government Securities: 10% Mortgage-Backed Securities: 4% Asset-Backed Securities: 3% Preferred Stock: 3% Other (includes short-term investment): 1% Country breakdown: (Source: Fund’s annual report as of Dec. 31, 2014) United States: 47% Brazil: 6% Mexico: 5% Chile: 4% Luxembourg: 3% Cayman Islands: 2% Indonesia: 1% Other: 31% Summary: The fund has operated since February 23, 2012 (source: Fund’s fact sheet). Distributions started at 0.1170 at inception, and were raised to 0.1200 in July 2013 and raised again to 0.1300 in October 2014. In April 2015, the fund adopted a managed distribution policy, which again raised the distribution by 20% for a monthly amount of $0.1560. The managed distribution policy introduced an element of return of capital from an option overlay strategy (source: Yahoo Finance ). A special dividend of $0.2500 was paid in January 2015, in addition to the regular distributions. All distributions consisted of regular income, some short-term gains, and no return of capital until April 2015, when the option overlay strategy was implemented. Other remarks: The 15% allocation to energy-related assets is a little high, but is less than the 20% of BGH and close to the average of most high-yield bond funds’ allocations (source: a very recent Seeking Alpha article, ” High-Yield Bonds Remain Attractive Despite Risks And Concerns “; see item no. 4 close to the top): (…) energy is the largest sector in the U.S. high-yield corporate bond market, with roughly 16% weight in the BofA Merrill Lynch High Yield bond Index… However, the credit quality of VGI’s portfolio, with approx. 50% in investment-grade credit , stands out head and shoulders above all of the other funds presented here. It is worth noting that the fund raised its distribution amount twice before the managed distribution strategy was implemented in April 2015. This is also the only fund whose distributions (as of April 2015) contain any significant portion of ROC (“return of capital”) , due to the option overlay strategy used by the managed distribution policy. The percentage of the March 2015 distribution characterized as ROC was 44.5% , according to the fund’s Fact Sheet (p. 3). HHY – Brookfield High Income Fund Inc. Fund sponsor’s website Description: “The Fund seeks high current income by investing in high yield bonds, debentures and other debt instruments.” NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: $9.25 52-wk. avg.: $9.85 52-wk. high: $10.72 52-wk. low: $9.17 Share price: (Source: CEF website) Current: $8.21 52-wk. avg.: $9.22 52-wk. high: $10.55 52-wk. low: $8.10 Discount/Premium to NAV: (Source: CEF website) Current: -11.24% 52-wk. avg.: -6.48% 52-wk. high: -0.09% 52-wk. low: -12.15% Distribution: (Source: CEF website) Amount (monthly): $0.0750 Yield on market price (current): 10.96% Total Net Assets: $329.692M Effective leverage: 27.76% Total expense ratio: 1.75% YTD return on NAV: 1.77% YTD return on price: -3.02% Avg. daily shares traded: 76,000 Credit ratings of investments: (Source: CEF website) BBB: 4.8% BB: 26.60% B: 44.60% CCC: 13.20% Other + Not Rated: 10.80% Portfolio allocations: (Source: CEF website) Energy: 17.50% Basic Industry: 14.10% Telecommunications: 11.00% Media: 8.80% Leisure: 8.30% Services: 7.20% Healthcare: 7.10% Capital Goods: 5.10% Retail: 4.40% Automotive: 4.20% Summary: This fund has gone through several metamorphoses over the years, and was originally organized under the Morgan Keegan Bond Funds . These went through a very rough patch in 2007, and a lot of investors lost tons of money with them. Essentially, the funds had invested heavily in subprime mortgages, but misled the public to believe that the investments were much less risky corporate bonds and preferred stocks. After the financial crisis, when the Morgan Keegan funds lost most of their value, Brookfield Asset Management, Inc. acquired seven of these funds, salvaged what was left of their assets, and renamed these to make them the Helios family of closed-end funds (source: Maddox Hargett & Caruso ). In July 2014, Brookfield merged, or reorganized, the Helios funds into one single fund, which is HHY – Brookfield High Income Fund Inc. I was invested in one of the Helios funds, HIH , from August 2013 until just before the reorganization in July 2014, when I sold my shares for a nice profit. They raised distributions in December 2013, paid a special dividend, and the discount to NAV, which was around -9% or -10% shortly after the “taper tantrum” in May 2013, had practically disappeared by the time the shares were merged into HHY . I didn’t want to take any chances, so I waited to see what would happen after the reorganization was completed. I waited, and the NAV of HHY continued to decline through the latter half of 2014, along with most other bond funds. The most probable reason was the high allocation to corporate debt in the energy sector. The NAV has been recovering, although not as much as I would like. However, the discount has widened quite a bit, and I am now invested in HHY again. My previous experience with HIH makes me feel comfortable with this fund and its management. Other remarks: Energy asset allocations of HHY are fairly high at 17.5%, and about 24% of its assets have a credit rating of “CCC” or lower. The proportion of assets with “BB” credit rating or better is higher than that of BGH, but lower than those of ISD or GHY. Otherwise, these are my only caveats here. Conclusion The big question remains: Is it time to back up the truck in this sector, or should we wait a little longer to buy at even greater discounts and higher yields? I cannot answer that conclusively, as that would amount to market timing, and basically depends on the individual investor’s risk tolerance. As always, I consider a careful examination of the fundamentals of each fund to be much more important than just looking at yields or discounts. These facts can be found in the annual and semi-annual reports and the fact sheets on the individual websites. After doing the appropriate due diligence, your decisions will depend on the factors most important to your individual investment needs. Of these five funds, ISD and GHY , both funds managed by Prudential Investments LLC , have the largest trading volume, as well as the largest dollar amount of assets ($831.615M and $968.854M, respectively). This makes it much easier to build a position and to eventually unwind it later on, if necessary. Credit ratings of the portfolios are very similar for both funds, and are concentrated within the “BB” and “B” ratings. Both have current yields of slightly less than 10%, but discounts are approximately -12% and -11%, respectively. YTD return on NAV is a respectable 3.68% and 3.85%, respectively. Neither fund has significant exposure to the critical energy sector. BGH ‘s discount to NAV is “only” -9.78%, but has been as narrow as -2.71% in the past year. If market conditions improve, it might be the fastest of these funds to return to a narrower discount or even a premium in the short term. The NAV of BGH has appreciated proportionately higher than the other funds since January. Its discount is less wide than some of the other funds here, but it was much narrower back in January/February than it is now. Still, the yield is over 10%. The biggest caveat with BGH seems to me to be the 20% portfolio allocation in the oil & gas sector right now. A lot will depend on how the energy sector behaves with regard to this fund over the short- and mid-term future. VGI has one of the largest discounts to NAV here, a whopping yield of almost 12%, and the best credit ratings on its portfolio assets of the five funds presented here. How do they do it? Well, look at the fund’s managed distribution policy, which includes a fair portion of ROC (“return of capital”) in the distributions. If we take the distribution amount of $0.1300 from before April 2015, we would still have a yield of “only” 9.92% at today’s market price (the YTD high was on April 7, 2015, at a closing price of $17.26, so back then the yield would have been slightly lower – about 9%), which would still be quite attractive. But the intent of the fund’s management in implementing the option overlay strategy was to make the shares MORE attractive to investors, and as a result, to NARROW the discount. Looking at the chart today, it appears to have had just the opposite effect! NAV has declined a bit since April, so the question one should ask is whether the return of capital (“ROC”) is destructive to NAV, or if it has declined for other reasons. Looking at the chart since January, the discount had actually been narrowing, and it might even be much less today had they not introduced the managed distribution policy. But I think we shall have to wait out another quarter or so if we want to know exactly what is happening right now. The high portfolio credit ratings to me, however, compensate a great deal for any other shortcomings – real or perceived – and therefore, I would not be too hesitant to invest here. But people have differing opinions on what “good ROC” or “bad ROC” is, so your mileage may vary ( Hint: read Douglas Albo’s articles on ROC if you need help in that department, starting with this one and continuing here and here [NOTE: these are from the Fall of 2012, but the underlying theses are still valid] ). Except for VGI, the credit ratings of the four other funds are rather similar to each other, with very small allocations to investment-grade assets, if any, and approximately 50-75% invested in “BB” and “B” securities, and the rest “CCC” or unrated. The two Prudential funds, ISD and GHY, are notable for their lack of energy-related investments. Their assets are also almost all in either “BB” or “B” rated bonds – which is, of course, better than “CCC”, but still not investment-grade credit. HHY has the longest track record of any of the other funds, if you include the period of time when they were known as Helios funds, i.e., starting in 2008-2009 (we won’t talk about the time before that… they were totally different funds back then). It might be worth waiting a little to see whether the discounts and yields increase even more with some of these funds. However, I wouldn’t wait too long, because these funds do have a lot going for them, and I can’t see the discounts widening much more than they already have. Pay attention especially to the NAVs, because eventually, that is what Mr. Market will follow. Disclosure: I am long HHY , have no positions in any of the other funds mentioned here, but am keeping a watchful eye on all of them and might take a position in one or two of the others listed here in the near future, depending on how the NAVs and share prices develop. A lot will depend on how the energy sector does, too, with more than one of the funds substantially invested in that industry. Disclosure: I am/we are long HHY. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

PRIDX: A Good Way To Invest In High-Quality Small Caps

Summary A recent research study found that higher-quality smaller companies have outperformed higher-quality larger companies. PRIDX has generally outperformed its global small/mid cap benchmark. PRIDX has been experiencing fund inflows and strong relative strength. Overall Objective and Strategy The primary objective of the T. Rowe Price International Discovery Fund (MUTF: PRIDX ) is long term growth of capital through investments in common stocks of rapidly growing, small to medium-sized companies outside the U.S. They look for high-quality growth stocks that can compound returns beyond the typical one- or two-year time horizons of most investors. Smaller companies throughout the world can react relatively quickly to changes in the marketplace and the economy, which may give them an edge to capitalize on investment opportunities faster than their larger counterparts. The fund has a fairly high risk profile because of its investments in small caps and some less-developed countries. Aside from market risk, there are also risks associated with unfavorable currency exchange rates and political or economic uncertainty abroad. Fund Expenses PRIDX is a no-load fund. The expense ratio for PRIDX is 1.21% which is higher than I like, but not bad compared to other actively managed international small/mid cap funds. Minimum Investment PRIDX has a minimum initial investment of $2,500 in a taxable account, and $1,000 for a group IRA. Past Performance PRIDX is classified by Morningstar in the “Foreign Small/Mid Growth” or FR category. Compared with other mutual funds in this category, PRIDX has performed fairly well. These are the annual performance figures computed by Morningstar since 2007. 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 YTD PRIDX (%) 16.57 -49.93 55.69 20.47 -14.08 26.00 24.37 -0.43 10.80 Category (FR) 12.03 -49.02 49.24 23.04 -14.72 22.20 26.61 -5.40 9.75 Percentile Rank 34 58 17 77 31 11 60 15 56 Source: Morningstar Mutual Fund Ratings Lipper Ranking : Funds are ranked based on total return within a universe of funds with similar investment objectives. The Lipper peer group is International Small-Cap 1 Yr – #19 out of 168 funds 5 Yr – #31 out of 122 funds 10 Yr – #11 out of 67 funds Morningstar Ratings : Category is Foreign Small/Mid Growth Overall 5 Stars Out of 130 funds 3 Year – 4 Stars Out of 130 funds 5 Year – 4 Stars Out of 113 funds 10 Year – 5 Stars Out of 67 funds Fund Management Justin Thomson has managed the fund since August, 1998. He has an M.A. from the University of Cambridge. Regional Exposure (as of May 31, 2015) Europe 41.3% Pacific Ex-Japan 26.1% Japan 21.2% Latin America 2.7% North America 1.7% Middle East & Africa 1.0% Country Exposure (as of May 31, 2015) Japan 21.2% United Kingdom 15.7% China 8.4% Germany 5.8% India 4.1% France 3.4% Spain 3.4% South Korea 3.0% Australia 2.9% Switzerland 2.9% Comments PRIDX is a good way for individual investors to gain exposure to rapidly growing small/mid cap companies outside the U.S. It would be very difficult and costly for retail investors to purchase most of the stocks in this fund individually, given the complexities of foreign stock exchanges, currency conversions etc. I discovered PRIDX from a relative strength trend model run on the funds in the Citigroup 401K plan. PRIDX has recently popped up to the top of the list, and there are also signs that the fund has been attracting inflows lately. Here are some recent assets under management figures for PRIDX taken from the fundmojo web site: Feb. 2015 $3.53 Billion Mar. 2015 $3.88 Billion Apr. 2015 $4.12 Billion May 2015 $4.28 Billion I believe that if new money continues to flow into international small cap funds, it will boost the performance of the underlying stocks in the PRIDX portfolio. Back in January, hedge fund AQR and Tobias Moskowitz, a finance professor at Chicago’s Booth School of Business, published a research paper entitled ” Size Matters, If You Control Your Junk “. It found that small companies have outperformed larger companies when the quality of the companies is taken into account. Of course, it is well known that businesses with steady earnings greatly outperform highly speculative penny stocks. But when comparing companies in the same industry, the small, high-quality companies have outperformed larger, high-quality companies. I believe that PRIDX is a good way to invest globally in stocks of smaller, higher-quality companies. If it continues to attract inflows, this should benefit fund performance. Disclosure: I am/we are long PRIDX. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.