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The Folly Of Forecasts

The new year has arrived, which means hangovers, doomed resolutions to lose weight, and a host of forecasts from the gurus in the financial media. I’m not sure which will cause more suffering. The attention investors give to market forecasts remains one of the great mysteries of human psychology. The evidence is overwhelming that no one possesses the ability to consistently call the direction of the stock market, bond yields, or currency rates. Yet every year the media invites experts to do what we know they can’t do. And every year investors listen to them, act on their recommendations and suffer the consequences . One reason this is allowed to go on is that forecasters are celebrated when they’re right but rarely held accountable for their bad calls. So last year I clipped several articles that included forecasts for 2014 so we could evaluate how accurate they turned out to be. Let’s start with the Outlook 2014 by CIBC World Markets, which included the following forecasts for equities, bonds and currencies: “US equities are hardly cheap given their run-up in 2013, but the Canadian market would appear to have more room to run … Within the equity market, what hasn’t played well in the past few years should now outperform. That includes equities tied to global growth rather than low interest rates, such as base metals and energy stocks.” The yield on 10-year Government of Canada bonds will rise from 2.68% in early December 2013 to 2.95% by the end of 2014. The Canadian dollar will strengthen modestly and the USD would end the year at about $1.05 CAD. Swing and a miss, strike three. All of these forecasts were dead wrong: US stocks outperformed Canada again, thanks in part to a very strong US dollar that closed the year near $1.16 CAD. The sectors forecast to outperform were the biggest flops in an otherwise strong market: base metals (using the BMO S&P/TSX Equal Weight Global Base Metals ETF as a proxy) were down about 10% on the year, and energy stocks (based on the iShares S&P/TSX Capped Energy ETF ) fell closer to 17%. And if you shortened your bond duration based on CIBC’s prediction of rising rates, well, that didn’t work out either: the yield on 10-year Canadas had fallen to 1.81% by December 30. The worst of the rest Next up: the Chief Investment Officer of Sun Life Global Investments, who shared his 2014 forecasts with Advisor’s Edge . He predicted the TSX would be in negative territory by the end of the year: “Stay away from Canada; we see a lot more headwinds continuing on.” Despite those headwinds, the broad Canadian market returned about 10% on the year. The CIO went on to encourage investors to invest more in Europe and emerging markets (both lagged North America significantly in 2014), reduce their bond allocations (bonds had their best year since 2011), and declared that “dividend stocks will continue to pay off” (several popular dividend-focused ETFs in Canada and the US underperformed the broad market). The forecasts from the US media were just as dismal. A survey of gurus by Business Insider resulted in a consensus forecast of 1,949 for the S&P 500 by the end of 2014: the index closed the year at 2,060, higher than all but one expert’s opinion. Over at the Motley Fool , investors were urged to shorten their bond exposure (oops, long bonds were up about 20%) and told that “Europe is particularly attractive” (for US investors, European stocks fell about 6%). Tune them out I don’t want to imply that these forecasters got everything wrong. On the contrary, some were dead on by predicting stable short-term interest rates, another strong year for US stocks, and weakness in commodity prices. Many others were half right – like those that got the direction right, but not the magnitude or the timing. But in any diverse collection of forecasts, many will turn out to be right simply by random chance. The lesson here is not that forecasts are always inaccurate: if they were, you could become wealthy being a contrarian. The point is that they’re worse than useless, as they are wrong far more often than they’re right. The only rational response is to ignore them all. Instead of listening the gurus this year, try a different tactic. Build a portfolio with a mix of stocks and bonds based on your ability, willingness and need to take risk. On the equity side, hold Canadian, US, international and emerging markets stocks at all times, and don’t try to guess which will be next year’s winner. With your fixed income, choose bonds or GICs according to your time horizon and your tolerance for volatility, not based on where you think interest rates will be next year. So listen to the talking heads if you must, but remember William Bernstein’s advice in Rational Expectations : “Don’t even think about trying to extrapolate macroeconomic, demographic, and political events into an investment strategy. Say to yourself every day, ‘I cannot predict the future, therefore I diversify.’”

High Quality Stocks In Developed Markets

This article is based on the working paper we published on ssrn. The working paper can be accessed by clicking here . The risk of paying too high a price for good quality stocks – while a real one – is not the chief hazard confronting the average buyer of securities. Observation over many years has taught us that the chief losses to investors come from the purchase of low quality securities at times of favourable business conditions. – Benjamin Graham It’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. – Warren E. Buffett As the above two quotes reflect, the idea of buying high quality stocks has been around for quite some time. However, it has gained renewed momentum over the past few years driven by spectacular crashes experienced subsequent to the technology boom and during the global financial crisis. This is also reflected in academic research. Over the last few years, several academics have weighed in on the quality factor and many papers have been written trying to identify criteria for defining high quality stocks. Further, as it is becoming widely accepted as an anomaly, quality is now being designated by many researchers as a fifth factor explaining investment returns in addition to the four widely accepted factors, namely beta, size, momentum, and value. This development is in sync with our long held belief that quality is a distinct investment style. This paper is related to a large literature as a number of studies have explored returns to factors such as profitability, relationship between accounting and economic profits, and leverage. Robert Novy-Marx (2013) showed that stocks with high gross profitability as measured by gross profits to assets, outperform. Chan, et. al. (2006) shows that difference between accounting earnings and cash flows is negatively associated with future returns. George and Hwang (2010) shows that stocks with low leverage have high alpha. In this paper, we discuss the investment returns of a simple quantitative process from selecting high quality stocks. We believe that in valuing high quality stocks, market participants systematically underestimate the duration of competitive advantage such that the valuation premium assigned isn’t sufficient to account for the difference between the business value creation potential of a high quality business as compared to the average business. Indeed, a basket of high quality stocks generates significantly superior investment returns compared to publicly traded benchmarks and does so with significantly lower risk. Section 1. High Quality Stocks – The Multi-Act Way At Multi-Act, we have spent in excess of fifteen years developing and perfecting our process of identifying high quality stocks. Our internal research process assigns every company followed by us a quality rating, referred to as ‘Grade’. There are several components of our process some of which lend themselves to quantitative modelling while others don’t. A crucial component of our classification of a business as high quality is the existence of “sustainable” competitive advantage, a component that does not lend itself to quantitative modelling. It is important to note that the existence of competitive advantage and sustainability of this competitive advantage are the most important criteria in our classification of a business as quality. This is driven by our assertion that much of the investment returns that accrue to investors from quality factor depend on the ability of the business to persist with its supernormal returns on capital which in turn depends on its ability to keep competition at bay. Given our inability to model this component, we believe that our manually selected list of quality businesses will likely generate superior risk-adjusted performance as compared to the quantitatively selected basket that is discussed here. Section 2. Quality Factors There are some key characteristics of a high quality business. A high quality business generates superior returns on capital – stronger the competitive advantage, lesser the impact of competition, higher the returns on capital. Returns on capital of such businesses tend to be persistently fat. Further, such businesses have a very healthy relationship between their accounting profits and their economic profits. Finally, we like our high quality businesses to possess good balance sheets such that financial risk isn’t a significant factor driving our investment returns or risk. Source: MAEG As shown in Exhibit 1, Multi-Act’s process of classification of a business as a high quality business includes three characteristics that lend them to quantitative analysis. Note that our research process utilizes a multiplicity of measures within each characteristic. However, for the sake of simplicity, we have chosen one measure to represent each quality characteristic. For the purposes of this paper, we measure returns on capital by return on equity (RoE). Fat return on equity indicates existence of competitive advantage and the persistence of this variable suggests sustainability of the competitive advantage. It is important to keep in mind that it is possible for the management of a company to manage its return on equity. To the extent that earnings are manipulated, they will impact return on equity as well. Further, return on equity is also affected by corporate transactions including buybacks, acquisitions, restructuring, etc. To ensure that the earnings component of the return on equity is not a result of financial creativity, we use a quality of earnings factor namely free cash flow over earnings (FCF/EPS). Over the years, we have found that this measure helps us filter out companies with suspect accounting numbers. Finally, we measure financial safety by net debt over free cash flow (ND/FCF). This measure indicates the number of years of free cash flow that is needed to repay the debt. Table 1 provides summary statistics on each of the quality factors by country. Section 3. Data and Quality Factors Data Sources Our data sample consists of 5,262 companies covering 23[1] countries between 1997 and 2013. The 23 markets correspond to countries contained in the MSCI World Developed Index as of December 31, 2013. All data including fundamentals and price data are from Factset Global data feed with returns calculated in USD with currency risk hedged away. We utilize fundamental data reported anywhere in calendar year t-1 in April of calendar year t such that there is a minimum of three month lag from the end of the fiscal year of the company. Table 2 provides summary statistics on number of companies and market capitalization by country. Since the cash flow data is available from 1989 and some of our fundamental variables require minimum five-year data availability, our sample could start at the earliest from 1994. However, given the limited number of companies which satisfied our data requirements, our model starts from 1997. Section 4. Methodology Before proceeding with our calculations, we perform two exclusions, firstly for size and secondly for suitability and data applicability. We exclude all companies with market capitalization less than USD 1 billion. This number is deflated at 6% p.a. for years prior to 2013. The objective of this exclusion is to minimize size factor’s contribution to our investment returns. Further, we exclude some industries that in our assessment do not lend themselves to existence of sustainable competitive advantages[2]. This is not to say that there cannot be a business with sustainable competitive advantage in these industries. However, it is our assessment that the probability of finding a business with sustainable competitive advantage in these industries is significantly lower. Further, calculating cash flow data presents a practical problem with some of these industries, especially in the case of banking and insurance businesses where cash flow is affected by changes to loans, investments, and deposits and thus loses its sanctity. Accordingly, we have excluded these industries from our samples. We calculate quality factors discussed earlier for all the remaining stocks in our data sample. We then apply absolute cutoffs, levels that a business must meet in order to qualify as a high quality business. Businesses that meet these cutoffs are then sorted by their market capitalization in a descending order. Finally, we select fifty of the largest businesses from all qualifying businesses as our quality basket. Using the characteristics above, we create a basket of fifty high quality stocks every year and test the performance of the basket so created over a period of seventeen years, from 1997 to 2013. Section 5. Risk and Returns of the Quality Basket We now turn our attention to risk and returns of high quality stocks. Figure 1 shows the performance of the high quality stocks basket on a net basis[3] as compared to that of MSCI World Developed market index. Given that we selected our high quality stocks basket from a universe of all companies from developed markets, we consider this index to be the appropriate benchmark. The high quality stocks basket generated compounded annual return of 7.4% as compared to 4.3% for MSCI World Developed index. What is more, annualized standard deviations of monthly returns were lower for the high quality stocks basket at 12.6% as compared to 16.1% for the benchmark index. Over the same time frame, S&P 500 generated returns of 5.3% p.a. with annualized standard deviation of 15.8%. (click to enlarge) High Quality Stocks – Investment Returns to Quality, Net Figure 2 shows performance of the high quality stocks basket on a gross basis[4] as compared to that of the benchmark index. The high quality stocks basket generated compounded annual return of 9.4% as compared to 6.6% for the benchmark index. The annualized standard deviations of returns were lower for the high quality stocks basket at 12.7% as compared to 16.1% for the benchmark index. Over the same time frame, S&P 500 generated returns of 7.3% p.a. with annualized standard deviation of 16.0%. (click to enlarge) High Quality Stocks – Investment Returns to Quality, Gross Figure 3 shows drawdown[5] profiles of the high quality stocks basket and of the benchmark index. Clearly, the high quality stocks basket is significantly less risky when compared to MSCI World Developed index as drawdowns aren’t only shallower; recovery to peak is quicker as well. We estimate the high quality stocks basket’s relative risk to be 55%[6] of that of the benchmark index. (click to enlarge) High Quality Stocks – Drawdowns for High Quality Stocks Section 6. Risk and Returns of MAEG’s “Manual” Quality Basket As stated earlier, a key component of our high quality stocks selection process does not lend itself to modelling. In this section, we analyze performance of our actual quality basket, a basket that has to pass through our human analytical rigor as well as our systematic process. We refer to this basket as the 100% list. Figure 4 shows performance of the 100% list of high quality stocks on a net basis[7] as compared to that of the benchmark index. The 100% list of high quality stocks generated compounded annual return of 13.5% as compared to 4.3% for benchmark index. The annualized standard deviations of returns were lower for the 100% index of high quality stocks at 14.8% as compared to 16.1% for the benchmark index. Over the same time frame, S&P 500 generated returns of 5.3% p.a. with annualized standard deviation of 15.8%. $100 invested in April of 1997 in MAEG’s 100% index of high quality stocks would have grown to almost $883 by June 2014 as compared to $206 in MSCI World Developed Index and $245 in S&P 500 Index. (click to enlarge) High Quality Stocks – Investment Returns to MAEG’s High Quality Index, Net Figure 5 shows drawdown profiles of the 100% index of high quality stocks and of the benchmark index. Clearly, the 100% Index of high quality stocks is significantly less risky when compared to MSCI World Developed index as drawdowns aren’t only shallower; recovery to peak is quicker as well. We estimate the quality basket’s relative risk to be 57% of that of the benchmark index. (click to enlarge) High Quality Stocks – Drawdowns for MAEG’s High Quality Index Summary Multi-Act’s definition of high quality stocks includes quantitative as well as qualitative variables with sustainability of competitive advantage being a key factor. A simple three factor quantitative process for selecting high quality stocks outperforms the publicly traded benchmarks and does so with lower risk. MAEG’s manually selected list of high quality stocks – 100% Index – generated substantially superior performance even when compared to the performance of quantitatively selected high quality stocks. Table 1. Comparison of Quality Measures This table shows average quality measures by country for the investment universe as well as for the quality basket. Each year, we calculate averages for the three quality measures for the investment universe selected after making size-based and industry-based exclusions and for the quality basket comprised of fifty stocks. We utilize fundamental data reported anywhere in calendar year t-1 in April of calendar year t such that there is a minimum of three month lag from the end of the fiscal year of the company. This table reports the average of each year’s equal-weighted average of quality measures between 1997 and 2014. High Quality Stocks – Countrywise Quality Factors Table 2. Number of Companies and Market Capitalization This table shows yearly average of total number of companies and yearly average of market capitalization for the investment universe as well as for the quality basket, by country. High Quality Stocks – Descriptive Statistics References Novy-Marx, Robert (2013), “The Other Side of Value: The Gross Profitability Premium,” Journal of Financial Economics Chan, K., Chan, L.K.C., Jegadeesh, N., Lakonishok, J. , (2006), “Earnings quality and stock returns,” Journal of Business George, Thomas J., and C.Y. Hwang (2010), “A Resolution of the Distress Risk and Leverage Puzzles in the Cross Section of Stock Returns,” Journal of Financial Economics [1] The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. [2] Following industries were excluded for the purposes of this paper: Aluminum, Steel, Pharmaceuticals: Generic, Pharmaceuticals: Major, Pharmaceuticals: Other, Financial Conglomerates, Investment Banks/Brokers, Life/Health Insurance, Major Banks, Multi-Line Insurance, Property/Casualty Insurance, Real Estate Investment Trusts, Regional Banks, Specialty Insurance, Biotechnology, Apparel/Footwear Retail, Major Telecommunications, Electronics/Appliance Stores, and Specialty Stores. [3] Excluding dividends. [4] Inclusive of dividends. [5] The peak-to-trough decline during a specific record period of an investment, fund or commodity. A drawdown is usually quoted as the percentage between the peak and the trough. (Source: Investopedia) [6] Worst drawdown of the quality basket is 35% while that of the benchmark index is 54%. The relative risk is estimated as log(1-35%)/log(1-54%) = 55%. At 55% of the benchmark’s risk, relative risk of the quality basket is about half that of the benchmark index. What this means is that it takes about two back-to-back losses of 35% to produce one 55% loss. For more on this, refer http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc141013.htm [7] Excluding dividends.

Resolve To Focus On Goals Rather Than Results In 2015

Results, results, results. We frequently hear that we should focus on results. More often than not, focusing on results is a waste of time. Because it is looking in the rear-view mirror, rather than the windshield. Someone asked me today what I thought of Janet Yellen as head of the Federal Reserve. I found this hard to answer. Even though Chairperson Yellen has been in the job since February, her job as lead policy-setter has almost no short-term ramifications. It takes quarters – not months – to see the results of those policy decisions. Even after a year in office, it is very difficult to render an opinion on her performance as Fed leader. The fantastic 5% growth in the U.S. economy last quarter has much more to do with what happened before she took office – in fact, years of policy setting before she took office – than what has happened since she became the top Fed governor. We often forget what the word “results” means. It is the outcome of previous decisions. Results tell us something about decisions that happened in the past. Sometimes, far into the past. We all can remember companies where looking backward all looked well, right up until the company fell off a cliff. Circuit City. Brach’s Candy. Sun Microsystems. Further, “results” are impacted dramatically by things outside the control of management, such as: Changes in interest rates (or no changes when they remain low) Changes in oil prices (which have been dramatically lower over the last 6 months) Changes in investor expectations and the overall stock market (which has been on a record-setting bull run) Inflation expectations (which remain at historical lows) Expectations about labor rates (which remain low, despite trends toward higher minimum wages) Technology advances (including rapid mobile growth in apps, beacons, payments, etc.) We too often forget that last quarter’s (or even last year’s) results are due to decisions made months before. Gloating, or apologizing, about those results has little meaning. Results, no matter how recent, are meaningless when looking forward. Decisions made long ago caused those results. “Results” are actually unimportant when investing for the future. What really matters are the decisions being made today, which can cause future results to be wildly different – better or worse. What we need to focus upon are these current decisions and their ability to create future results: What are the goals being set for next year – or better yet, for 2020? What are the trends upon which goals are being set? How are future goals aligned to major trends? What are the future expected scenarios, and how are goals being set to align with those scenarios? Who will be the likely future competitors, and how are goals being set make sure the organization is prepared to compete with the right companies? Far too often, management will say, “We just had great results. We plan to continue executing on our plans, and investors should expect similar future results.” But that makes no sense. The world is a fast-changing place. Past results are absolutely no indicator of future performance. For 2015 and beyond, investors (and employees, suppliers and communities sponsoring companies) should resolve to hold management far more accountable for future goals and the process used to set those goals. That Amazon.com maintains a valuation far higher than its historical indicates it should, primarily because it is excellent at communicating key trends it watches, future scenarios it expects and how the company plans to compete as it creates those future scenarios. In the 1981 Burt Reynolds’ movie ” The Cannonball Run ,” a character begins a trans-country auto race by ripping the rear-view mirror from his car and throwing it out the window. “What’s behind me is not important,” he proudly states. This should be the 2015 resolution of investors and all leaders. Past results are not important. What matters are plans for the future and future goals. Only by focusing on those can we succeed in creating growth and better results in the time to come.