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Beware Of Convertible Bond Funds

Summary Convertible CEFs offer appealing distributions but their overall performance has not been great. Convertible CEFs have been more volatile than either high yields bonds or the general stock market. CHY has been the best performing CEF but it is now selling at a premium which reduces its attractiveness. As a retiree, I am continually looking for sources of high income but I also don’t want to court excessive risk. This search led me to consider Convertibles Closed End Funds (CEFs). I wrote an article about a year ago that reviewed the reward-versus-risk benefits of this asset class. This article updates the previous article to see how convertible funds have fared over the past year. However, before jumping into the analysis, I will recap some of the characteristics of convertible securities. A “convertible security” is an investment, usually a bond or preferred stock that can be converted into a company’s common stocks. A company will typically issue a convertible security to lower the cost of raising money. For example, many investors are willing to accept a lower payout because of the conversion feature. The conversion formula is fixed and specifies the conditions that will allow the holder to convert into common stock. Therefore the performance of a convertible is heavily influenced by the price action of the underlying stock. As the stock prices approaches or exceeds the “conversion price” the convertible tends to act more like an equity. If the stock price is far below the conversion price, the convertible acts more like a bond or preferred share. Convertible CEFs usually contain a mixture of convertible securities and high yield bonds. The attraction of convertible CEFs is that they offer upside potential with some protection on the downside. Granted that with a portfolio of high yield bonds and convertibles the downside protection is limited (as evidenced by severe losses in 2008). However, over the long run, the fund manager seeks to obtain the “sweet spot” between fixed income and equity that will enable him to outperform his peers. The funds that were analyzed in my previous article are summarized below. All these funds have histories that go back to at least 2007 but in this analysis, I concentrated on near term performance. I will touch on long term risk and rewards at the end of the article. AGIC Convertible and Income (NYSE: NCV ). This CEF sells for a premium of 6.4%, which is similar to the premium a year ago. Over a 3 year period, the premium has averaged 7.5%. The fund has a portfolio of 127 holdings, consisting of 57% convertible securities and 40% high yield bonds. The price of this fund dropped 57% in 2008 but rebounded an amazing 143% in 2009. The fund utilizes 31% leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.2%. The distribution is a high 12.1%, which is received from income with no return of capital (NYSE: ROC ) over the past year. Due to the high payout ratio, the fund tends to invest in lower quality securities that provide higher yield. AGIC Convertible and Income II (NYSE: NCZ ). This CEF sells for a high premium of 13.3%, which is the same as a year ago. Over a 3 year period, the fund sold at an average premium of 10.7%. The portfolio contains 126 holdings, consisting of 57% convertibles securities and 41% high yield bonds. This fund uses a similar investment strategy as its sister fund NCV. The price of this fund plummeted 61% in 2008 but rocketed 145% in 2009. The fund utilizes 31% leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.2%. The distribution is a high 12%, which is generated by income with no ROC over the past year. As with its sister fund, NCZ has migrated to lower quality securities to maintain the high distribution. Calamos Convertible and High Yield (NASDAQ: CHY ). This fund sells at premium of 4.6%, which is much different than a year ago when the fund sold at a discount of 6.3%. Over that past 3 years, the fund has sold at an average discount of 3.6%. The portfolio has 277 holding, consisting of 59% convertibles and 36% high yield bonds. About 15% of the holdings are investment grade. The price of this fund only dropped 27% in 2008 and it rebounded 51% in 2009. The fund uses 28% leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.5%. The distribution is 8.2%, which consists of mostly income with a small amount of ROC over the past year. The fund tends to focus on higher quality convertibles that are selling near the conversion price, making this fund more equity-like. Calamos Convertible Opportunities and Income (NASDAQ: CHI ). This CEF sells for a premium of 1%, which is similar to the 1.3% premium of a year ago. Over the past 3 years, the fund has sold on average at a small discount of 0.1%. The portfolio has 276 holdings, consisting of 52% convertibles and 41% high yield bonds. This fund uses a similar investment strategy as its sister fund CHY. The price of the fund dropped 35% in 2008 and rebounded 67% in 2009. The fund utilizes 28% leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.5%. The distribution is 8.6%, comprised of income with some ROC over the past year. Advent Claymore Convertible and Income (NYSE: AVK ). This CEF sells for a discount of 11.1%, which is a larger discount than the 9.8% discount of a year ago. Over the past 3 years, the discount has averaged 7.9%. The fund’s portfolio has 308 holdings, consisting of 65% convertibles and 27% high yield bonds. About 12% of the securities are from firms based outside of the United States and 12% are investment grade. The fund uses 3 quantitative models to identify convertibles and bonds that have an attractive reward to risk. The price of the fund dropped 47% in 2008 and rebounded 56% in 2009. The fund utilizes 37% leverage and has an expense ratio of 2%. The distribution is 6.7% consisting primarily of income and ROC. Recently the ROC has been about 40% of the distribution. The Net Asset Value (NYSE: NAV ) has been dropping so some of the ROC appears to have been destructive. Advent Claymore Convertible Securities and Income (NYSE: AGC ). This CEF sells for a large discount of 14.9%, which is a larger discount than the 10.6% of a year ago. Over the past 3 years, the discount has averaged 10.2%. The fund has 316 holdings with 64% in convertible securities, 28% in high yield bonds. About 22% of the securities are from firms domiciled outside of the United States. Like its sister fund AVK, AGC uses quantitative models to select securities. The price of the fund dropped 56% in 2008 and gained 58% in 2009. The fund uses a high 41% leverage and has a high expense ratio of 3.1%. The distribution is 8.7%, consisting primarily of income, and ROC. Recently over 50% of the distribution has been ROC, some of which has likely been destructive. As a reference, I compared the performance of the convertible CEFs to the following Exchange Traded Funds (NYSEMKT: ETF ). SPDR S&P 500 (NYSEARCA: SPY ) . This ETF is a proxy for the overall stock market and contains all 500 stocks in the S&P 500. It has and expense ratio of only 0.09% and yields 1.8%. iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bonds (NYSEARCA: HYG ). This ETF is a proxy for the high yield bond market. The fund holds over 1,000 high yield bonds, has an expense ratio of 0.5% and yield 5.7%. SPDR Barclay’s Capital Convertible Bond (NYSEARCA: CWB ) . This is the largest and most liquid convertible bond ETF. The fund was launched in 2009 so does not have any history during the bear market years and was not included in my original analysis. The fund holds about 100 convertible bonds with 67% in non-investment grade. The ETF has an expense ratio of 0.4% and yielded 4.5% over the past year. To determine how these funds have fared over the past 12 months I used the Smartfolio 3 program. The results are shown in Figure 1 where the rate of return in excess of the risk free rate (called Excess Mu on the charts) is plotted against volatility. (click to enlarge) Figure 1: Reward and Risk over past 12 months The figure indicates that there has been a wide range of returns and volatilities associated with convertibles CEFs. For example, CHY had the highest return but also had a high volatility. Was the increased return worth the increased volatility? To answer this question, I calculated the Sharpe Ratio for each fund. The Sharpe Ratio is a metric, developed by Nobel laureate William Sharpe that measures risk-adjusted performance. It is calculated as the ratio of the excess return over the volatility. This reward-to-risk ratio (assuming that risk is measured by volatility) is a good way to compare peers to assess if higher returns are due to superior investment performance or from taking additional risk. On the figure, I also plotted a red line that represents the Sharpe Ratio of SPY. If an asset is above the line, it has a higher Sharpe Ratio than the S&P 500, which means it has a higher risk-adjusted return. Conversely, if an asset is below the line, the reward-to-risk is worse than the S&P 500. Similarly, the blue line represents the Sharpe Ratio associated with high yield bonds. Some interesting observations are apparent from the plot. The past 12 months has not been kind to most convertible funds, with only two of the CEFs (CHI and CHY) able to book positive returns. Convertible bonds CEFs have been very volatile, with volatilities greater than the overall stock market and high yield bonds. The large fluctuations in the price of the CEFS was likely driven by both the nature of the asset class and the fact that CEFs are inherently volatile due to leverage and premium/discount variations. As you would expect, the stock market outperformed all the convertible funds. However, CHY came close in risk-adjusted performance. The convertible bond ETF was less volatile than the CEFs. With the exception of CHY, CWB outperformed all the CEFs on a risk-adjusted basis. Several convertible funds (CWB, CHI, and CHY) had better risk-adjusted performance than high yield bonds. However, high yield bonds had a better return with less volatility than the other CEFs in the analysis. If you are considering investing in these asset classes, it is a good idea to assess how much diversification you might receive if you purchase more than one fund. To be “diversified,” you want to choose assets such that when some assets are down, others are up. In mathematical terms, you want to select assets that are uncorrelated (or at least not highly correlated) with each other. I calculated the pair-wise correlations associated with the convertible funds. I also included SPY and HYG to assess the correlation of the funds with other asset classes. The data is presented in Figure 2. (click to enlarge) Figure 2. Correlation over past 12 months The figure illustrates what is called a correlation matrix. The symbols for the funds are listed in the first column on the left side of the figure along with SPY. The symbols are also listed along the first row at the top. The number in the intersection of the row and column is the correlation between the two assets. For example, if you follow CHY to the right for three columns you will see that the intersection with CHI is 0.751. This indicates that, over the past year, CHY and CHI were 75%% correlated. Note that all assets are 100% correlated with themselves so the values along the diagonal of the matrix are all ones. The last row of the matrix allows us to assess the correlations of the funds with SPY. There are several observations from the correlation matrix. As you might expect, pairs from the same family had relatively high correlations: CHI and CHY were correlated 75%, AGC and AVK were correlated 69%, and NCV and NCZ were correlated 85%. Across families the pair-wise correlations among the CEFs were moderate. CWB was highly correlated with SPY (89%). The CEFs were only moderately correlated with SPY. Similarly, the CEFs were also moderately correlated with HYG. Overall, you receive reasonable diversification is you purchase convertibles CEFs from different families. The convertible funds were also not highly correlated with high yield bonds or the general stock market. However, if you have a general equity portfolio, CWB does not offer substantial diversification. With the exception of CHY, convertible CEFs have not been good performers over the past 12 months. However, I typically have a longer investment horizon than one year so I wanted to see how well these funds performed over the entire bear-bull cycle. So for a final assessment, I re-ran the analysis from October 12, 2007 (the high of the market before the bear market began) to the present. The results are shown in Figure 3 (click to enlarge) Figure 3: Reward and Risk over bear-bull cycle As shown in the figure, convertible funds generally had a much improved performance when we considered the entire bear-bull cycle. With the exception of AVK and AGC, the CEFs outperformed high yield bonds on a risk-adjusted basis. CHY was even able to best SPY by a small amount. Bottom Line So where does this analysis leave us? CHY has clearly been the best performer for the periods analyzed. This is likely one of the reasons this CEF is selling at a premium. However, I generally do not like to purchase funds at a premium so for myself I would hold off on purchasing until the premium dissipated. Although NCZ and NCV have performed well in the past, their recent performance has left much to be desired. I see no reason to pay large premiums for these funds. I may be missing something so I welcome reader’s feedback. AGC and AVK are selling at large discounts but both have significantly lagged in performance so I could not recommend them. Bottom line is that under the current conditions, I would beware of convertible CEFs. If you are a risk tolerant investor who want to add this asset class to your portfolio, my advice would be to wait for a better entry point. Disclosure: The author has no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) The author wrote this article themselves, and it expresses their own opinions. The author is not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). The author has no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Centrica’s Dividend Cut – How Should Shareholders React?

This week I was mildly surprised to see that Centrica ( OTCPK:CPYYF ) ( OTCPK:CPYYY ) (which I’ve owned since 2012) had cut its final dividend as part of a plan to rebase the dividend some 30% below its previous level. It wasn’t a complete surprise given the recent collapse in the price of oil, but it’s the sort of event which demands some sort of reaction. As I see it, shareholders have three main options: Panic sell: Break out in a cold sweat, curse Centrica’s management and place a sell order immediately. Do nothing: Be mildly miffed, but do nothing with the intention of holding the shares “forever”. Weekend review: Wait for the weekend and then review the company again in order to decide whether to keep holding, start selling or perhaps even buy more if the price drops enough. Reaction option 1: Panic sell If you’ve been reading this blog for a while, you’ll know that I am not a fan of panic selling, especially when it relates to an established, successful company like Centrica . Sure, panic sell an AIM-listed micro-cap mining company that operates in some country you’ve never heard of, but Centrica? I’ve written about this before, but in my view panic selling a defensive dividend payer like Centrica is like selling a buy-to-let property because its rental income drops for a year or two. Typically, rent will drop because there’s a void period, i.e. a period where one tenant leaves and another can’t be found immediately. The property sits empty for a few months and so rental income for the year is lower. Panic selling in that situation would mean putting the house up for sale immediately at a knock down price, perhaps 20% below its true market value, just to get rid of the place. To me that is just crazy. It locks in a massive capital loss just because income has dropped a little bit for a little while. The property is still there, its basic ability to generate an income is no different, and in time the income may well bounce back to where it “should” be. The same could easily be said of Centrica or any other defensive dividend payer. The same sort of situation led investors to sell Aviva (NYSE: AV ) after it cut its dividend in 2013, causing them to miss out when the share price rebounded massively shortly after (a roller coaster ride which I went through myself). Reaction option 2: Do nothing Now, this is much closer to my heart. I like to be efficient, i.e. to minimise the amount of work I need to do (which my wife describes as “lazy”). The minimum amount of work in this situation is to simply do nothing at all. In fact, this is a popular strategy which generally falls under the banner of “buy and hold”. A good example of the buy and hold approach is the High Yield Portfolio strategy (HYP) developed by Stephen Bland, which has its spiritual home on the Motley Fool bulletin boards. With HYP, defensive dividend payers are bought with attractive yields and then left untouched for all eternity, and “tinkering” with the portfolio is a definite no-no. While this sounds more attractive to me than panic selling, and is for the most part a fairly sensible strategy if you’re buying the right sort of companies, it isn’t for me. I don’t like the idea that I would buy a company in 2010 and still be holding it in 2030 without ever having thought about whether it was worth holding on to. When a company is first bought, it is analysed to make sure it’s a defensive dividend payer. At the same time, its share price is analysed to make sure the yield is sufficiently good. So, if it makes sense to check those things when the shares are bought, why does it make sense to never check them again? What if the company goes down the pan, never to recover? Surely, at some point it makes sense to move on and buy another company that is far more successful? Or what if the company does okay, but the share price doubles or triples, dropping the dividend yield to well below the market rate? Wouldn’t it make sense in that case to lock in those excess capital gains by selling? The proceeds could be reinvested into another, equally solid company but with a more attractive valuation and dividend yield? That’s not to say buy and hold isn’t a good strategy. It can be, but only for those who really do never ever want to make any investment decisions ever again, or at least no more than once every few years. For me that is far too boring and leaves far too many potential returns on the table. So, while I think doing nothing is probably much better than panic selling, I’m not going to stick with Centrica forever and ever, regardless of how it performs. I want something in between those two extremes. Reaction option 3: Weekend review And so we come to my preferred approach, which is the weekend review. The idea with a weekend review is to take the middle path between an emotionally driven knee-jerk reaction on the one hand and a complete absence of reaction on the other. It may seem odd to wait for the weekend, but there are good reasons for doing so: The markets are closed so you can’t see the price ticking lower ever few seconds and you can’t execute a trade immediately, which means you can concentrate on doing a good review without distraction It will usually be a day or so since the original unpleasant results were announced so you will have had time to calm down (although if you get upset by bad news, you’re probably not diversified enough), which should help you to think more clearly Once the weekend rolls around you would just sit down and do a thorough review of the company (Centrica in this case) using its latest results and its latest share price (using this investment spreadsheet if you like). In my case, as a defensive value investor I would be looking to see: Defensiveness: Is Centrica still a relatively defensive dividend payer (despite the dividend cut), with reasonable medium- and long-term growth prospects? Value: Is the valuation still attractive, given the company’s slower growth rate and reduced dividend? Here are Centrica’s results up to and including the dividend cut: The profits are a bit jerky but the general trend is upward, although of course there are no guarantees for the future. At 255p, the company and its shares have the following metrics, which I have compared against the FTSE 100: Growth: 10-year revenue/earnings/dividend growth rate = 8% (FTSE 100 = 1%) Quality: 10-year growth quality (consistency) = 79% (FTSE 100 = 54%) Value: PE10 ratio (price to 10-year average earnings) = 11.3 (FTSE 100 at 6,850 = 14.4) Income: Dividend yield = 4.7% (FTSE 100 = 3.4%) Profitability: ROCE = 12.4% (using post-tax profit) (FTSE 100 = 10%) By those metrics, the company still has a better track record than the market average and its share price is still more attractively valued than the market by a considerable margin. After looking at the numbers, I reviewed the company’s operations and its market, and I think it is by no means clear how Centrica will perform in the medium to long term. The oil price is uncertain, the political situation is uncertain, and the economy is uncertain. However, this degree of uncertainty is entirely normal as the future is almost always uncertain. Rather than try to predict an uncertain future, my approach is to defend against it instead. I think the best way to defend against an uncertain future is build a highly diversified portfolio of successful, established, dividend paying companies, and then for the most part to let them get on with it. On that basis, I will be holding on to Centrica for now, despite the dividend cut. Editor’s Note: This article discusses one or more securities that do not trade on a major exchange. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks.

TransCanada Corporation: Long-Term Value From Growth Projects And MLP Drop-Downs

TransCanada has $45 billion of commercially secured projects and $50 billion of projects under evaluation. Drop-downs to TCP represent efficient capital plan. Energy East stakeholder agreement could serve as catalyst. TransCanada Corporation (NYSE: TRP ) owns several key natural gas pipelines, power generation, and natural gas storage assets in North America. The company owns and operates about 42,000 miles of natural gas pipelines and 406 Bcf of storage capacity. In addition, TRP has 11,800 MW of power generation operations in place and under development across hydro, gas, nuclear, and coal. We believe that TRP’s organic developments, aside from Keystone XL, multi-billion portfolio of commercially secured projects, and ability to deploy capital into attractive new projects provide for about 15% upside from current prices. Due to TRP’s large scale and expansive network, the firm has access to some of the most attractive growth projects, which we think are not accounted for in the stock’s current valuation. Currently, TransCanada has $45 billion of commercially secured projects and $50 billion of projects under evaluation. In particular, we think that the new long-term contracts for ANR and higher capacity prices for Ravenswood signal positive developments that would benefit long-term earnings. The ANR Pipeline is one of the largest natural gas pipelines in North America, connecting Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio with supply in Texas, Oklahoma, and the Gulf of Mexico. We would note that the new contracts demonstrate ANR’s quality even during times of low commodity prices. On the power generation side, Ravenswood Generating Station is a 2,480 MW power plant located in Queens, NY that has the capability to serve 21% of New York City’s peak load. In addition, the plant possesses advanced technology that can be used to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions. We believe that drawn-out Keystone XL process poses headlines risk that is currently depressing TRP’s valuation. On Monday, the Department of State restarted the national interest review on the Keystone XL projects. Despite these efforts, the White House is expected to veto the project and the House and Senate are not expected to reach the two-thirds super-majority needed to override the veto. We feel that current sentiments pose a buying opportunity for longer term investors given the company’s other prospects. We also think stakeholder agreements for Energy East would serve as a catalyst for TRP. In the most recent quarter, TransCanada filed for US government approval for the construction and operation of the Energy East Pipeline and terminal facilities with the National Energy Board. The firm is proposing a marine terminal near Cacouna, Quebec, which could impact the beluga whale population. We believe that a successful agreement regarding the impact on wildlife will likely be reached by quarter-end. In addition, we are pleased that the company completed a successful binding open season for the $600 million Upland Pipeline. The proposed pipeline would begin near the northwestern North Dakota oil hub of Williston and go north into Canada about 200 miles. It would transport up to 300,000 Bpd of oil, connecting with other pipelines including Energy East. We would also highlight TransCanada management’s statement that the decline in commodity prices have not had any impact on TRP’s cash flows. In terms of valuation, we believe that the highlighted growth projects combined with the capacity for over $1 billion in annual drop-downs to TC PipeLines, L.P. (NYSE: TCP ), should allow TRP to be re-rated to a 20x forward multiple, more in-lined with peers, Enbridge (NYSE: ENB ) and Fortis (OTCPK: FRTSF ). In the meantime, investors are paid a 3.6% dividend to wait for the projects to be developed. Disclosure: The author has no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) The author wrote this article themselves, and it expresses their own opinions. The author is not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). The author has no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.