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How Rebalancing Can Help Improve Earnings Quality And Lower Multiples

By Jeremy Schwartz A key process driving the WisdomTree earnings-weighted Index approach is a rebalancing process that refreshes constituent weights based on changes in Earnings Stream® and relative value. In earnings-weighted indexes, changes at the rebalance are made based on each stock’s relative price appreciation compared to its relative earnings growth: Companies whose stock prices increased compared to their peers’ while their earnings decreased compared to their peers’ would typically see reduced weight in the WisdomTree Earnings Indexes. In a market cap-weighted index, the only driver of weight is the relative change in market capitalization, which is usually driven by the stock price. Companies whose stock prices fell while their earnings were flat or grew would typically see increased weight in the WisdomTree Earnings Indexes. Companies that have not been profitable on a cumulative basis over the previous four quarters are removed to ensure the continued focus on earnings-generating stocks-one element that improves the quality of the basket by removing more speculative, unprofitable ventures. Weight is also shifted to the relatively more profitable companies and those that have seen highest earnings growth. One way to gauge the impact of the rebalance process is to look at the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, essentially the price of the Index divided by its earnings per share before and after the rebalance. Below we show the P/E multiples across market segments. As will be shown, the rebalance can have a large impact on a portfolio’s P/E ratio. U.S. Equity Index Estimated 12-Month P/E Ratios* (as of 11/30/14) (click to enlarge) For definitions of terms and indexes in the chart, visit our glossary . A Lower P/E Ratio Approach: Even prior to the 2014 rebalance, each earnings-weighted Index exhibited a lower P/E ratio than its market capitalization-weighted counterpart. After the rebalance, the P/E ratios dropped even more significantly compared to these benchmarks. This is a key benefit of the annual rebalance process that forces the discipline of reweighting to the fundamental value of the underlying constituents in the Index. Multiples Contracted Anywhere between 7% and 40% across All Indexes: The WisdomTree SmallCap Earnings Index saw multiples contract the greatest at approximately 40%. WisdomTree requires each constituent of its earnings family to demonstrate profitability. This addresses the problem seen in the Russell 2000 Index -namely, a high index-level P/E ratio that is due to index-level earnings being depressed by constituents with negative earnings-by eliminating firms that have had negative earnings over the prior 12 months. Since there are more constituents in small-cap indexes that have delivered negative earnings over the prior 12 months than there are in large-cap indexes, this effect is more pronounced within this size segment. Rebalance Track Record-Consistency in Raising Return on Equity (ROE) Now that we have studied the impact of the rebalance on lowering P/E multiples, we will show the impact of the rebalance in helping to raise the “quality” of the earnings Indexes, measured by the ROE. Post-Rebalance Raising ROE and Improving Quality (click to enlarge) For definitions of terms and indexes in the chart, visit our glossary. This chart illustrates how the rebalance has raised the ROE across four WisdomTree Earnings Indexes. In the 2014 rebalance, for example, the ROE of the WisdomTree SmallCap Earnings Index before and after the rebalance was 7.43% and 11.97%, respectively. As the bull market in equities carries on, it becomes ever more important to pay attention to the underlying valuations and market fundamentals. Above we show how the rebalance both lowered the P/E ratios of each WisdomTree Earnings Index and raised the ROE, a key metric of quality. We believe these are attractive attributes of market exposures, made even more important by the continued gains in the market we have seen in recent years. Important Risks Related to this Article Investments focusing on certain sectors and/or smaller companies increase their vulnerability to any single economic or regulatory development. Jeremy Schwartz, Director of Research As WisdomTree’s Director of Research, Jeremy Schwartz offers timely ideas and timeless wisdom on a bi-monthly basis. Prior to joining WisdomTree, Jeremy was Professor Jeremy Siegel’s head research assistant and helped with the research and writing of Stocks for the Long Run and The Future for Investors. He is also the co-author of the Financial Analysts Journal paper “What Happened to the Original Stocks in the S&P 500?” and the Wall Street Journal article “The Great American Bond Bubble.”

Short-Term VIX Futures Products Should Be Avoided Until Better Opportunities Arise

All four major VIX short-term futures ETPs are negative over the past six months. Backwardation has occurred much more frequently in the past three months. The VIX is signaling a lack of direction in the market. In this article, my main theme will be what the VIX futures are saying about the market and why you should be patient. We will take a look at some popular VIX ETFs such as the ProShares Ultra VIX Short-Term Futures ETF (NYSEARCA: UVXY ), the ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures ETF (NYSEARCA: SVXY ), the VelocityShares Daily Inverse VIX Short-Term ETN (NASDAQ: XIV ), and the iPath S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures ETN (NYSEARCA: VXX ). As you can see below, VIX futures have been in backwardation quite frequently, especially when compared to 2012, 2013, and the beginning of 2014. Last month, I published an article that recommended a shift in focus from the pure contango and backwardation strategy to the percentage of backwardation strategy. You can view that article here . I continue to recommend this strategy given the current market conditions. (click to enlarge) Over the past three years, we have enjoyed a relatively subdued VIX. Historically, this is not abnormal in a bull market. However, as seen in the chart below, these periods (within the last 25 years) have only lasted, at most, about five years. (click to enlarge) Chart obtained from Yahoo! Finance by Nathan Buehler If you have followed my past publications, you know I take an optimistic view towards the U.S. economy. I continue to be concerned about the level of debt and liabilities within the U.S. government. It seems, as a global economy, debt has become an acceptable part of the budget. Living beyond your means for a long period of time will eventually have consequences. When those consequences will affect the economy is when politicians begin to address the problem. I don’t see that happening anytime in the near future. The Federal Reserve has undoubtedly, in my opinion, been the number one driver of the VIX for the past five years. Through massive amounts of monetary stimulus and an ever reassuring tone, it has encouraged the market to record highs. My takeaway from current events is that the Federal Reserve will continue to support the market and the U.S. economy at any cost. I expect to see low rates for the foreseeable future unless inflation begins to run over the proposed targets. The current VIX is signaling a lack of direction in the market. There is uncertainty surrounding U.S. monetary policy going forward. When will rates rise and by how much are common questions being discussed. Global growth has been revised downward several times. Investors are unsure if the U.S. can continue to sustain growth in these challenging conditions. This is exactly what the VIX is intended to measure, uncertainty and fear. It is currently right on target. Both UVXY and VXX have outperformed their inverse counterparts over the past three months. This is especially positive for VXX considering it does not have the leverage that UVXY provides. This is something we have not seen, for a prolonged period of time, since 2011. All four instruments are negative over the past six months. As of 2/6/2015, VXX was down less than 1% over the same time period. (click to enlarge) Chart made by Nathan Buehler using historical VIX data obtained from the CBOE As you can see from the data above, over the past 11 years, we have only seen backwardation drop below -10% (significantly) five times. Given the current global economic outlook, I would not be surprised to see the VIX futures testing a -10% backwardation level sometime in 2015. When uncertainty in the VIX presents itself, the best tool to have in your investing portfolio is patience. Sometimes you will have missed opportunities, or feel that way, until you are rewarded for waiting patiently. You only need one correct trade a year in the VIX to outperform the major benchmarks. I have been extremely cautious over the last several months and it has paid off. Nothing has presented enough potential reward to balance the current risk. These back and forth swings in the market only decay the value of short-term ETPs (pro and inverse). My strategy has always been to short the VIX once “extreme” levels are breached. Different periods of economic activity dictate different levels of “extreme”. This strategy can be executed through purchasing inverse products, shorting pro-VIX products, options, or a combination. Please see my library and Instablog for more information on specific strategies. My current recommendation is to avoid all the short-term VIX-related products until a better opportunity presents itself. None of these products are buy-and-hold investments. If you have any questions or are new to trading the VIX, please view my library of articles to gain a better understanding of your risks. As 2015 progresses, I will continue to publish updates on the VIX futures and its related ETPs. I highly appreciate you reading and hope you find this information helpful in your investing decisions. Disclosure: The author has no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) The author wrote this article themselves, and it expresses their own opinions. The author is not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). The author has no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Assessing High-Income Covered Call CEFs

Summary Covered call CEFs provided an average income of about 8.5% with risks only slightly greater than the S&P 500. In general, during the recent strong bull market, most covered call CEFs lagged the S&P 500 on a risk-adjusted basis. Since 2007, covered call CEFs have consistently outperformed the covered call ETF (PBP) on a risk-adjusted basis. As an income-focused investor, I’m a fan of covered call Closed End Funds (CEFs) and have written several articles on Seeking Alpha discussing their risks and rewards. For this article, I reviewed my previous analyses and selected ten of best-performing CEFs that delivered good returns at a reasonable risk (as measured by volatility). However, before I launch into the results of the analysis, I will provide a quick tutorial for the investors that may not be familiar with covered calls. The basic idea of investing in covered calls is simple. An investor will buy a stock and write (that is sell) a call option against their stock position. Since the investor owns the stock, the position is termed “covered.” The call option will give the buyer the right (but not the obligation) to purchase the stock at an agreed upon price (called the strike price) any time before the expiration date of the option. For this right, the call buyer pays a premium to the writer (the investor who sells the option). If the price of the stock increases above the strike price before the expiration date, then the option buyer may “call away” the stock from the writer, that is, the writer is forced to sell the stock at the strike price. If the price of the stock does not increase above the strike price, then the option expires worthless and the writer can pocket the premium. Thus, covered calls are a way to receive additional income but in return, the writer sacrifices some of the upside potential of the stocks. In a strong bull market, you would expect the covered call strategy to under-perform the S&P 500 because many of the best performing stocks will be “called away.” But during a correction, the premiums provide a buffer to limit losses so, theoretically, writing covered calls should decrease volatility. This is not always true since volatility is dependent on the specific strategy implemented by the writer. Although simple in principle, actually implementing a profitable covered call strategy is not that easy. The investor must not only select a suitable stock but must also select the option to write and when to close or rollover positions. My favorite way to add covered calls to my portfolio is via CEFs because they are actively managed and provide excellent distributions. However, as with most CEFs, you may experience higher volatility due to the active management coupled with the fact that CEFs may sell at a premium or discount to Net Asset Value (NAV). The covered call CEF investors should also understand some of the unique aspects associated with Return of Capital (ROC). Return of capital has a bad connotation because it is usually associated with a fund literally returning part of the capital you invested. This would be bad and result in a decrease in NAV. However, the exact definition of ROC depends on complex accounting and tax rules. For example, if a fund receives a premium from writing a call, this premium cannot be booked as income until the option either expires or is closed out. In addition, in a bull market, the fund manager may decide to not sell stocks that have greatly appreciated but instead use income that he has accumulated on his balance sheet to pay the distribution. In both these cases, part of the distribution may be labeled as ROC but it is not destructive. My rule of thumb is that ROC is not destructive as long as the NAV continues to increase. Another important metric for CEF investors is the Undistributed Net Investment Income (UNII). As the name implies, this is the amount of income that has not yet been distributed. A positive UNII means that he funds has some reserves that can be used for distributions in the future. On the other hand, a negative UNII indicates that the fund has dipped into reserves to make up for a short fall in income. A small positive or negative UNII is usually not very significant. However, if the UNII is negative and is large relative to the distributions, this could be a red flag that the distributions may not be sustainable in the future. The ten CEFs that I selected are summarized below. I apologize in advance if I did not include your favorite covered call funds. However, I welcome comments from readers on funds that have performed well. It should also be noted that some of my favorite covered call CEFs, like Nuveen’s Enhanced Premium and Income (DPO) were recently merged with other funds so were not included in the analysis. BlackRock Enhanced Equity Dividend (NYSE: BDJ ). This CEF sells for a 10.5% discount, which is slightly smaller than its 3-year average discount of 11.2%. The portfolio consists of 94 holdings, invested primarily in large cap equities from the United States. The stock selection criteria is focused on equities that pay dividends. Options are written on about 50% of the portfolio. In 2008, the price of the fund dropped about 17%. This fund does not utilize leverage and has an expense ratio of 0.9%. The fund has a distribution rate of 6.9%, paid primarily from income and ROC. The ROC appears to be non-destructive since the NAV has increased over the past year and the UNII is small. BlackRock Enhanced Capital and Income (NYSE: CII ) . This is the oldest covered call CEF with an inception date of 2004. It currently sells at a discount of 7.6%, which is a smaller discount than the 3-year average discount of 8.5%. This fund is relatively concentrated, with only 75 holdings that are primarily (83%) U.S companies. The fund managers have a flexible mandate and can invest in all size companies but most are medium to large cap. The price of this fund dropped 36% in 2008. The fund typically writes options on about 50% of the portfolio. The fund does not use leverage and has an expense ratio of 0.9%. The distribution is 8.2% with a significant portion of the distribution coming from ROC but the ROC appears to be non-destructive since the NAV has increased over the past year and the UNII is small. Eaton Vance Enhanced Equity Income (NYSE: EOI ). This fund sells at a 7.2% discount, which is smaller than the 3-year average discount of 10.2%. This fund contains 42 large cap holdings, all from the United States and writes options on about 50% of the portfolio. The price of this fund lost about 26% in 2008. The fund does not use leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.1%. The distribution is currently 7.5% funded primarily from short term gains and ROC. The ROC appears to be non-destructive since the NAV has increased over the past year. However, the UNII is negative and relatively large with respect to the distribution size, creating some concern on the sustainability of the distribution. Eaton Vance Enhanced Equity Income II (NYSE: EOS ). This sister fund to EOI sells at a discount of 5.6%, which is smaller than its 3-year average discount of 9%. The fund has 88 large and mid-cap holdings, all from the United States. The fund writes options on 50% of the portfolio, does not use leverage, and has an expense ratio of 1.1%. The fund lost about 32% in 2008. The distribution is currently 7.6% funded primarily from long and short term gains with some ROC. The ROC appears to be non-destructive since the NAV has increased over the past year. However, as with EOI, the UNII is negative and relatively large with respect to the distribution size, creating some concern on the sustainability of the distribution. This fund is highly correlated (90%) with EOI. Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Buy-Write Income (NYSE: ETB ). This CEF sells for a discount of 2.3%, which is smaller than the 3-year average discount of 5.7%. The portfolio consists of 183 holdings, with 100% domiciled in the United States. The fund writes calls on almost all of the assets. The price of this fund only dropped 19% in 2008. The name “tax-managed” means that the fund managers try to minimize the tax burden by periodically selling stocks that have incurred losses and replacing them with similar holdings. This strategy has the effect of reducing or delaying taxable gains. The fund does not use leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.1%. The distribution is 8.2%, funded primarily from ROC. The ROC appears to be non-destructive over the past year but the UNII is large compared to the distribution, which is a concern. Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Buy-Write Opportunities (NYSE: ETV ). This CEF sells at a discount of 3.2%, which is smaller than the 3-year average discount of 6.3%. This is a large fund with 208 holdings, all from the United States. About 60% of the holdings are from S&P 500 stocks and the other 40% are from NASDAQ stocks. The fund writes options on about 85% of the portfolio. The price of this fund dropped 30% in 2008. The fund does not use leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.1%. The current distribution is 9.1% funded primarily by non-destructive ROC. The ROC appears to be non-destructive over the past year but the UNII is large compared to the distribution, which is a red flag. Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Global Buy-Write Opportunities (NYSE: ETW ) . This CEF sells at a discount of 4.8%, which is less than the 3-year average discount of 9.2%. This is a large fund with 457 holdings, with 55% from U.S. firms. After the United States, the largest holdings are from Europe. The fund utilizes index options that cover most of the value of the portfolio. The price of this fund dropped 33% in 2008. The fund does not use leverage and the expense ratio is 1.1%. The distribution is 9.9% paid primarily from ROC. Over the past year, some of the ROC may have been destructive as evidenced by the decrease in NAV and relatively large UNII. Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Dividend Equity Income (NYSE: ETY ). This CEF sells for an 8.3%% discount, which is slightly smaller than the 3-year average discount of 10.3%. The fund has 65 holdings, all from the United States. The fund typically writes options on the S&P 500 index rather than individual stocks. The price of this fund dropped 25% in 2008. The fund does not use leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.1%. The distribution is 8.9%, paid primarily from income and ROC. The ROC appears to be non-destructive over the past year but the UNII is relatively large compared to the distribution, which is a concern. Voya Global Advantage and Premium Opportunity (NYSE: IGA ). This CEF sells at a discount of 8.4%, which larger than the 3-year average discount of 6.9%. The fund has 110 holdings, with 60% from the U.S. and the rest from Europe and Asia. The fund hedges currency risks and sells options on 50% to 100% of the portfolio value. The price of this fund dropped 35% in 2008. It does not use leverage and has an expense ratio of 1%. This distribution is 9.7%, funded primarily from ROC. Some of the ROC may have been destructive over the last year since the NAV decreased. However, the UNII is positive, which is a good sign. Cohen & Steers Global Income Builder (NYSE: INB ). This CEF sells at a small discount of 0.5%, which is smaller than the 3-year average discount of 5%. The portfolio has 227 holdings, with 90% in equity and 11% in other income focused securities such as preferred stock. About 55% of the holdings are domiciled in the United States with the rest diversified globally among many different countries. This is one of the few covered call CEFs that use leverage (currently about 19% leverage). The expense ratio is 1.8% and the distribution is 9.5%, paid primarily with ROC. Over the past year some of the ROC may have been destructive as evidenced by the decrease in NAV and the relatively large negative UNII. For reference I also included the following funds in the analysis: SPDR S&P 500 (NYSEARCA: SPY ). This ETF tracks the S&P 500 index and has an ultra-low expense ratio of 0.09%. It yields 1.8%. SPY will be used to compare covered call funds to the broad stock market. PowerShares S&P 500 BuyWrite (NYSEARCA: PBP ). This is the only ETF that is liquid and has a history that goes back to 2007. It tracks the CBOE S&P 500 BuyWrite Index, which measures the return received by buying the 500 stocks in the S&P Index and selling a succession of one-month, near-the-money S&P 500 index call options. The fund has an expense ratio of .75% and yields 5.1%. This ETF was launched in December of 2007 so its data does not quite span the entire bear-bull cycle. Assuming equal weight, a portfolio of these CEFs averages 8.5%, which satisfies my desire for high income. But total return and risk are as important to me as income so I plotted the annualized rate of return in excess of the risk free rate (called Excess Mu in the charts) versus the volatility for each of the component funds. I used a look-back period from October 12, 2007 (the market high before the bear market collapse) to 5 February, 2015. The Smartfolio 3 program was used to generate the plot shown in Figure 1. Note that this plot is based on price and not on the NAV of the funds. NAV is a valuable metric for some analyzes but for risk and return I prefer price since it is the metric that determines actual profits and losses. (click to enlarge) Figure 1. Risk versus reward over bear-bull cycle Figure 1 illustrates that the covered call CEFs have had a large range of returns and volatilities over the bear-bull cycle. To better assess the relative performance of these funds, I calculated the Sharpe Ratio. The Sharpe Ratio is a metric, developed by Nobel laureate William Sharpe that measures risk-adjusted performance. It is calculated as the ratio of the excess return over the volatility. This reward-to-risk ratio (assuming that risk is measured by volatility) is a good way to compare peers to assess if higher returns are due to superior investment performance or from taking additional risk. In Figure 1, I plotted a red line that represents the Sharpe Ratio associated with SPY. If an asset is above the line, it has a higher Sharpe Ratio than SPY. Conversely, if an asset is below the line, the reward-to-risk is worse than SPY. Similarly, the blue line represents the Sharpe Ratio of PBP. Some interesting observations are evident from the figure. The passively managed PBP had a volatility much less than the S&P 500. However, the PBP return was also small resulting in a risk-adjusted performance that was worse than any of the CEFs. Covered call CEFs are a volatile asset class, with volatilities slightly greater than the S&P 500. This might surprise some since covered calls are touted to reduce volatility. However, this is the nature of CEFs. As amply illustrated by the plot, the actively managed covered call CEFs are substantially more volatile than the passive covered call ETF. On a risk-adjusted basis, only a few covered call CEFs (ETV, ETB, and CII) was able to outperform the S&P500 on a risk-adjusted basis. Most of the CEFs had risk-adjusted performance that was greater than PBP but less than SPY. Of the CEFs, the worst performance was booked by BDJ. The most volatile CEF was INB, likely due to the global exposure of this fund. I next wanted to assess the degree of diversification you might receive from purchasing multiple covered call funds. To be “diversified,” you want to choose assets such that when some assets are down, others are up. In mathematical terms, you want to select assets that are uncorrelated (or at least not highly correlated) with each other. I calculated the pair-wise correlations associated with the covered call funds. I also included SPY to assess the correlation of the funds with the S&P 500. The data is presented in Figure 2. (click to enlarge) Figure 2. Correlations over the bear-bull cycle The figure illustrates what is called a correlation matrix. The symbols for the covered call CEFs are listed in the first column on the left side of the figure along with SPY and PBP. The symbols are also listed along the first row at the top. The number in the intersection of the row and column is the correlation between the two assets. For example, if you follow EOS to the right for two columns you will see that the intersection with CII is 0.770. This indicates that, over the bear-bull period, EOS and CII were 77% correlated. Note that all assets are 100% correlated with themselves so the diagonal of the matrix are all ones. The last two row of the matrix allows us to assess the correlations of the CEFs with PMB and SPY. There are several observations from the correlation matrix. Many of the covered call CEFs are relatively highly correlated (greater than 80%) with SPY. Thus if you have an equity portfolio that mimics the S&P 500, then you may want to purchase the covered call CEFs that are the least correlated with SPY If your portfolio is more esoteric and does not reflect the S&P 500, you are free to select any the covered call funds. Generally, it is OK to purchase more than one of the CEFs if they are not highly correlated with each other. However, it pays to check the pair-wise correlation before you make a final decision. For example, you would not want to purchase both EOS and EOI since these two CEFs are almost 90% correlated. Somewhat surprising, the covered calls CEFs are only moderately correlated with PBP. In fact, the CEFs are more correlated with SPY than they are with PBP. My next step was to assess this portfolio over a shorter timeframe when the S&P 500 was in a strong bull market. I chose a look-back period of 3 years, from February 2012 to the present. The data is shown in Figure 3. The S&P 500 was in a rip roaring bull market over this timeframe and the covered call CEFs had a tough time keeping pace. However, both EOI and EOS were able to book the same risk-adjusted performance as SPY. The leaders over the bear-bull cycle (ETV, ETV, and CII) also performed well but fell short of the SPY performance. All the CEFs were able to outperform PBP on risk-adjusted basis. (click to enlarge) Figure 3. Risks versus rewards over past 3 years As a final test, I used the last 12 months as a look-back period and the results are shown in Figure 4. Over this period, the risks versus reward were similar to the 3 year period except that none of the CEFs were able to match SPY. The data is tightly bunched between the PBP and SPY lines. The best performers were EOS, EOI, and CII. The Voya fund, IGA, lagged during this period. (click to enlarge) Figure 4. Risks versus rewards over past 12 months Bottom Line Over all the time periods of the analysis, covered call CEFs have outperformed their ETF cousin on a risk-adjusted basis but have not been able to consistently beat the S&P 500. This is not surprising given the strong bull market since 2009. Covered call CEFs have offered good distributions but return of capital and the negative UNII associated with many of these funds is a concern. I am a fan of covered call CEFs and believe they have a place in income-oriented retirement portfolios, but they are not for the faint hearted. Also, discounts have been narrowing so my tendency is to wait for better bargains before making new investments. However, no one knows what the future will hold, so investors looking for enhanced income should give these funds serious consideration. Disclosure: The author is long ETW, INB. (More…) The author wrote this article themselves, and it expresses their own opinions. The author is not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). The author has no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.