Tag Archives: investment

Metaphors And The Message: Searching For Deeper Understanding Of Investment Information

Metaphors have a powerful impact on shaping our thoughts and on what information we consider important. The machine metaphor is often used in describing economies and markets and as such, often depicts them in an unfairly positive light. For a number of different reasons, the ecology metaphor is more useful and appropriate for long term investors. By paying attention to the metaphors used, curious investors can gain a great deal of insight about the related content. One of the more interesting and unsettling experiences I’ve had was scuba diving at night. This combined an activity (scuba diving) for which I had only a beginner’s skill with an environment (pure darkness) that was challenging. The most unnerving aspect of the experience was only being able to see what was in the narrow cone of light from my flashlight; I had no peripheral vision in the darkness. While there were plenty of interesting things to see ahead of me, I also wanted to avoid damaging the coral inadvertently and I definitely wanted to avoid anything potentially dangerous. This example serves as a good illustration of how metaphors fundamentally shape our view of the world. “Metaphors govern the way we think about issues,” according to Gary Klein in Sources of Power. Klein elaborates, “It [metaphor] structures our thinking. It conditions our sympathies and emotional reactions … It governs the evidence we consider salient and the outcomes we elect to pursue.” Much like a flashlight in dark water avails us only a very limited view, so too do our mental models and associated metaphors only shine light on relatively narrow expanses of reality. Given the power of metaphor to “structure our thinking” and “govern the evidence we consider salient,” it behooves us to scrutinize the metaphors we embrace in order to think about the right things and evaluate the right evidence. Do the metaphors cast wide beams of light or narrow ones? When do they cast light on important matters and when do the leave important considerations in the dark? Because it is so commonly applied to the economy and markets, the metaphor of machine is particularly interesting to investigate. Unfortunately, the machine metaphor breaks down (sorry!) in a number of situations and this has very significant implications for investing and risk management. We find evidence of the machine metaphor throughout business and investment communications. A company may be “grinding through” some challenges or an economy may be “running smoothly” or “running like clockwork.” In addition, the concept of momentum (which also stems from the physical sciences) is frequently used to characterize economies and markets. We find evidence in statements like, “the economy is humming along” or “the economy has strong momentum.” When we examine such statements carefully, however, we can gain insights into the breadth and direction of the “light beam” of the metaphor. For example, when I think of something as having momentum, I think of a semi tractor trailer flying down a mountain highway. The relevant principles behind momentum in this case come from the physical sciences. The constant and universal force of gravity exerts its pull on the truck. Since momentum is conserved (i.e., it persists until affected by an outside force), an outside force is required to change it. From this perspective, there is little about the notion of momentum that accurately describes what happens in an economy. For one, economic growth is not a “constant and universal force” like gravity is. It depends on a lot of things all of which change over time. Secondly, economic “momentum” is not conserved. An economy can, and frequently does, speed up or slow down largely due to factors within the economic system and not due exclusively to external factors. As a result, the simple use of the word “momentum” invokes a metaphor (physical sciences, loosely machines) that shapes how we think about the economy and in most cases in an unduly positive light. While the machine metaphor is often used in regards to economic output, so too is it applied to economic risks. For example, the Fed has talked of raising interest rates in order to “keep the economy from overheating,” just as one would apply brakes in a car to slow it down. In addition, The Fed has communicated goals of increasing rates when unemployment reaches a certain level, which invokes the image of a thermostat turning off the heat when a room hits the desired temperature. In both cases, the economy has proven far more dynamic and unpredictable than the Fed’s machine metaphor would suggest. Even with these inadequacies, however, the machine metaphor often performs well enough in periods of stability. The real problems arise over longer periods of time when stability is not a good baseline assumption. What is normal is that over time, significant disruptions occur and these events often violate the assumptions under which machines normally operate. In the physical world, extreme events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are well known disruptive events. In the economy, events such as geopolitical crises and rapid credit tightening are similarly disruptive. One of the most important qualities to understand about such disruptive events is that they aren’t predictable. As John Lewis Gaddis notes in The Landscape of History , “Poincare had been right; some things are predictable and some are not.” These types of events are not predictable namely because of complexity. While we can understand some of the preconditions for such events, there are just too many variables all interacting with one another. As Nassim Taleb noted in his book, Antifragile , “With complex systems, interdependencies are severe – you need to think in terms of ecology.” This insight goes a long way in explaining the biggest weakness of the machine metaphor: When disruptive events happen, the assumptions of smooth machine operation are often violated. An electric motor can run well in a dry environment, with normal temperatures, safe from disturbances, and with a reliable power source. However, if any one of these requirements change, the motor is likely to not run nearly as well or to not run at all. Taleb’s insight also goes a long way towards identifying a more robust metaphor, that of ecology. Gaddis corroborates this finding when observing that, “Historians have a web-like sense of reality, in that we see everything as connected in some way to everything else.” In this way, historians are especially well placed to piece together multiple variables often connected in surprising ways. In suggesting that, “History is arguably the best method of enlarging experience,” Gaddis is also effectively endorsing the ecology metaphor as the biggest flashlight with the widest beam. How can investors make use of this? First, investors can use metaphors to “enlarge their experience” and thus prepare their minds in the process. Think of the nuclear incident at Fukushima. The emergency power generators kept the cooling pumps working beautifully – right up until they were flooded by the tsunami. Normal operating conditions were violated. In a similar vein, investors can invoke the ecology metaphor to inquire as to how the environment might change and as to what wild things can happen or have happened that can cause serious problems? Among such possibilities, the massively interconnected and highly leveraged international finance system could certainly freeze up again. Inflation is not a problem now, but certainly could be an issue before the end of a long investment horizon. Fiscal deficits and high debt burdens also suggest a future of higher taxes. None of this is to say these things will absolutely happen. It is to say, however, that they are distinctly possible and if they do happen, normal operating conditions for conventional investment strategies are likely to be violated with significantly negative consequences for investors. This is essentially the same thing as developing situational awareness and is analogous to developing a tornado watch methodology. Second, investors can make sure to align their investment horizon with the most compatible metaphor(s). If one has a very long investment horizon, then one should manage his/her portfolio to withstand all of the crazy things that can happen over a very long period of time. As a guide, Taleb observes that “Nature likes to overinsure itself.” He even goes so far as to say that, “The secret of life is antifragility.” As a result, long term investors should focus first on avoiding devastating losses because the problem with fragility is that it “has a ratchetlike property – irreversability of damage.” By this logic, avoiding large exposures to assets that can plummet in value in certain situations and using insurance when it’s cheap make sense. Importantly, long term investors should remain firmly focused on the long term and the big picture. In other words, don’t manage relative performance day to day, quarter to quarter, or even over three year periods. They just aren’t long enough to provide useful perspective. As a reminder, the Fed last raised rates over eight and a half years ago, the ten year Treasury bonds currently yield under two percent (a threshold it never breached during the entirety of the Great Depression) and the Fed has increased its balance sheet over $3.5 trillion (over $30,000 per US household) since the beginning of 2008. Individually and collectively these conditions are not even remotely normal in the broader context of financial history and therefore provide an exceptionally poor basis of expectations for long term investors. In short, things are likely to change and quite possibly change dramatically over a long investment horizon. An avoidable mistake is to assume you can just plod along and indefinitely defer preparations for a very different future. Third, it’s useful to consider the fact that since metaphor is such a powerful force in shaping our view of the world, people often use it as a tool to mold our perceptions. Government officials, media talking heads, business leaders, and even investment managers may have incentives to tell a story or to persuade more than to inform. The pernicious consequence for investors as that people so motivated don’t even need to risk giving bad information; they can simply employ inappropriate metaphors. In fact, this may very well be the reason why we hear momentum used so frequently in describing economies and markets – because the metaphor itself creates an unduly positive perception. The main antidote to this reality is to scrutinize metaphors as being part of the message. On this note, twice in two days this week I’ve heard the suggestion of the S&P 500 hitting 3,000. I find this especially interesting because it seems to employ a gambling metaphor. Long term investors should be interested in valuations, fundamentals, risks, and tradeoffs. Specific targets for the S&P 500 aren’t really relevant to their process. More specifically, there is absolutely no reason why anyone should use record highs as the standard for long term investing. Alternatively, hitting 3,000 does sound like hitting the lottery and therefore suggests a gambling metaphor. Insofar as this is the case, long term investors can recognize such messages as being directed to a different group of people and as one devoid of salient information for them. By the same token, some discussions obviously employ the ecology metaphor which is more appropriate for long term investors. Gene Frieda, of Moore Europe Capital Management, provided a good example in a recent piece in the Financial Times . In writing that, “The roots of the recent return of financial market volatility are not in fundamental factors, but rather reflect the Tower of Pisa-like financial architecture that has grown in the wake of the global financial crisis,” Frieda is explicitly describing the fragile (Tower of Pisa-like) nature of the financial system and its relevance as an important environmental factor affecting volatility. In observing that, “Renewed volatility is forcing market participants to recognize just how much the structure of financial markets has changed since 2008,” he is recognizing how the nature of financial markets has evolved due to the interactions of participants with each other and with a different environment. Finally, Frieda notes that, “The cut in market liquidity creates an illusion of underlying strength to market rallies when some of the strength is a function of worsening market depth. To the extent investors and policy makers judge the strength of fundamentals by the behavior of asset markets, this has created a false sense of security – about the robustness of the US recovery and eurozone resilience to new shocks.” In doing so, he is clearly accounting for the possibility of disruption. In conclusion, it is difficult enough to get one’s arms around the investment environment when overwhelmed with massive amounts of information and distracted by countless cross-currents. As such, metaphor can be a useful and practical tool in distilling overwhelming detail into digestible nuggets of insight. But metaphors also have important limitations — which curious investors can use to their advantage. For one, investors can calibrate communications by the metaphors used to achieve a deeper understanding of the message. Further, investors can, and should, be selective in focusing on metaphors that align best with their investment philosophy and goals and importantly, to avoid those that are not well aligned. (click to enlarge) Disclosure: The author has no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) The author wrote this article themselves, and it expresses their own opinions. The author is not receiving compensation for it. The author has no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Here Is Why The S&P 500 Should Not Be The Barometer Of Investor Success

Summary The S&P 500 and the Dow are often quoted on TV and by various media outlets when providing updates on the stock market. By doing this, the media is implicitly suggesting to investors that these indexes represent how the market is actually performing. Trouble is that not everyone has the same definition of “the market” and not every investor has a portfolio that is structured like “the market” – and probably for good. Benchmarks to gauge the performance should be consistent with actual portfolio strategies as opposed to using a widely recognized stock market index, such as the S&P 500 index. Far too often, individual investors measure the success of their investment portfolios, or the effectiveness of their financial advisors, relative to the performance of a well-known stock market index such as the S&P 500 Index (“S&P 500”) or the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (“Dow”). While it is important for investors to have a tool to measure the success of an investment strategy against, it can be very misleading, and often misguided, if an investor chooses an index as their tool that is not consistent with their risk tolerance or investment objectives. For example, the S&P 500 and the Dow are often quoted on TV and by various media outlets when providing updates on the stock market. By doing this, the media is implicitly suggesting to investors that these indexes represent how the market is actually performing. Trouble is that not everyone has the same definition of “the market” and not every investor has a portfolio that is structured like “the market” – and probably for good reason . In an Investment News article entitled, ” When underperforming the S&P 500 is a good thing ” (sign-up required), author Jeff Benjamin claims that investors have become programmed to dwell on the performance of a few high-profile benchmarks. Benjamin goes on to state that, “…a truly diversified investment portfolio should have returned less than 5% in 2014. It was that kind of year. Any advisor who generated returns close to the S&P was taking on way too much risk, and should probably be fired.” The suggestion of having the financial advisor fired may be extreme, especially if an investor has instructed their advisor to build a portfolio to try and provide performance consistent with, or superior to, the S&P 500 ( or the Dow ) and recognizes the potential risk associated with that type of strategy. However, most investors do not have this large of a risk appetite and appreciate the benefits of diversification to help deal with market volatility if and when it occurs. To this end, many of the growth-oriented investors that we speak with at Hennion & Walsh are interested in portfolios that are managed to help deliver a reasonable return while also providing for some downside protection. As a result, investors generally do not have that large of a percentage of their portfolio assets allocated to the one asset class associated with these two stock market indexes. This asset class is U.S. Large Cap. To this end, Michael Baker of Vertex Capital Advisors stated in the same previously mentioned article that, “The S&P 500 really just represents one asset class – large cap stocks…and most investors only have about 15% allocated to large cap stocks.” Having all of their investment portfolios allocated to one single asset class, such as U.S. large cap, would have rewarded investors well since the last major market crash hit bottom in March of 2009. However, this does not mean that this will always be the case going forward nor has it been the case historically. The chart below from First Clearing shows the annual returns of several asset classes from 2000 to 2014. A quick review of this chart will show how well U.S. large cap stocks have performed since 2009. Since the media focuses on U.S. large cap indexes, investors have thus been constantly reminded of how well “the market,” or more specifically U.S. large cap stocks, has done for the past 5 years. By further reviewing this chart, however, investors are also reminded that this is not always the case. U.S. large cap stocks suffered significant losses in 2008 and 2002 and additional losses in 2000 and 2001. Additionally, while large cap stocks finished in the top half of asset class performance in each of the past four years, they have only achieved this ranking once over the eleven years prior to 2011. Asset Class Returns (2000 – 2014) (click to enlarge) Source: First Clearing, LLC, 2015. Asset allocation cannot eliminate the risk of fluctuating prices and uncertain returns. Past performance is not indicative of future results. This chart is provided for illustrative purposes only and is not indicative of any specific investment. Asset class performance data based on representative indexes. You cannot invest directly in an index. Individual investment results will vary. The data assumes the reinvestment of all income and dividends and does not account for taxes and transaction costs. On the other hand, this chart attempts to illustrate the value of asset allocation with the asset class box named “Asset Class Blend” which is simply an equal weighting of all of the asset class indexes included on the chart. While I am not suggesting that such a blend is appropriate for all investors or all market environments and would likely include more asset classes and sectors to make the chart more comprehensive, the results shown in this chart still certainly demonstrate the potential benefits of diversification in down and/or volatile markets. Not inclusive of the potential fees for the implementation of each respective strategy or associated tax implications, $1,000,000 invested in large cap stocks in 2000 would have been worth $1,866,218 at the end of 2014. Conversely, the same $1,000,000 invested in this particular asset class blend strategy in 2000 would have been worth $2,831,257 at the end of 2014 based upon the annual returns listed in this Asset Class Returns table. $1,000,000 Investment Comparison from 2000 – 2014 (click to enlarge) Data source: Asset Class Returns (2000 – 2014) chart shown above in this post . Chart source: First Clearing, LLC, 2015. Asset allocation cannot eliminate the risk of fluctuating prices and uncertain returns. Past performance is not indicative of future results. This chart is provided for illustrative purposes only and is not indicative of any specific investment. Asset class performance data based on representative indexes. You cannot invest directly in an index. Individual investment results will vary. The data assumes the reinvestment of all income and dividends and does not account for taxes and transaction costs. As a result, it is imperative that investors are honest with themselves about their true tolerance for risk. If they are truthful to themselves, their risk appetite should not change based upon the current directional performance of “the market.” If an investor is not comfortable assuming the risk of “the market” or a single asset class, such as U.S. large cap, in all market environments, then they should consider the following: 1. Building ( or maintaining ) a diversified portfolio, incorporating a variety of asset classes and sectors, consistent with their tolerance for risk, investment timeframe and financial goals. 2. Utilize a benchmark to gauge the performance of their investment strategy that is consistent with (1) above as opposed to using a widely recognized stock market index, such as the S&P 500, that may not be relevant, and is likely very unhelpful, to them. 3. Try to not make critical portfolio decisions based on short term performance results but rather consider longer term performance results relative to their own overall financial goals. 4. Avoid the temptation of being influenced by media reports on general market performance to measure the success of their own investment portfolios, or the effectiveness of their respective financial advisors. Disclosure: The author has no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) The author wrote this article themselves, and it expresses their own opinions. The author is not receiving compensation for it. The author has no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Critiquing Klarman

Seth Klarman wrote a very good piece for the FT yesterday on the 12 things he’s learned from Warren Buffett. Only an idiot would disagree with Klarman so, like any good idiot, I wanted to write my own version/critique of Klarman’s thoughts: 1. Value investing works. Buy bargains. CR here – Yes, value investing works. I embrace value investing where appropriate . But it’s also tremendously difficult. As Buffett has stated on several occasions, you’re probably better off not trying to do what he does. You’re better off buying low fee index funds. More importantly, you should think of “investing” as your primary source of income. The thing most people call investing is actually a reallocation of savings. Treat it like savings and avoid the gambler mentality that leads so many astray. 2. Quality matters, in businesses and in people. Better quality businesses are more likely to grow and compound cash flow; low quality businesses often erode and even superior managers, who are difficult to identify, attract, and retain, may not be enough to save them. Always partner with highly capable managers whose interests are aligned with yours. CR here – Couldn’t agree more. As Buffett has stated, surround yourself with people who are smarter than yourself. If you’re me, just surround yourself with other people. 3. There is no need to overly diversify. Invest like you have a single, lifetime “punch card” with only 20 punches, so make each one count. Look broadly for opportunity, which can be found globally and in unexpected industries and structures. CR here – I think this is great advice in your personal life. I always talk about how real “investments” are made in our primary source of income. Don’t diversify there. Do one thing and do it well. Your savings, however, should be treated like savings. Diversify it broadly across many asset classes so it protects you from purchasing power loss and permanent loss, but don’t take so much risk here that it creates instability in your ability to plan for your financial future. 4. Consistency and patience are crucial. Most investors are their own worst enemies. Endurance enables compounding. CR here – Brilliant. You are own worst enemy. Educate yourself, create a process/plan and get out of the way. 5. Risk is not the same as volatility; risk results from overpaying or overestimating a company’s prospects. Prices fluctuate more than value; price volatility can drive opportunity. Sacrifice some upside as necessary to protect on the downside. CR here – Risk is the potential that we won’t meet our financial goals. Most of us don’t need to waste time looking at individual firms that have already been scoured by the smartest investment bankers and investment managers on Earth. If we beat inflation and do so without creating excessive permanent loss risk then we are beating most of the people engaged in the investment world. 6. Unprecedented events occur with some regularity, so be prepared. CR here – In other words, diversify so that you protect yourself not only from the unknown, but from your own stupidity. 7. You can make some investment mistakes and still thrive. CR here – you won’t just make some mistakes. You will make consistent mistakes. The goal is to engage in a strategy that exposes you to high probability of positive outcomes. Losses are part of the process. Learn from them and improve the odds of your future processes. 8. Holding cash in the absence of opportunity makes sense. CR here – as Buffett says, think of cash like a call option. A little bit of cash provides you with flexibility, permanent loss protection and the ability to contribute consistently to a broader plan. Your savings portfolio needs to be fed. Feed it consistently so it gets nice and fat. 9. Favour substance over form. It doesn’t matter if an investment is public or private, fractional or full ownership, or in debt, preferred shares, or common equity. CR here – think macro, not micro. Different asset classes are a function of differing legal structures and behaviors. When pieced together correctly they should complement one another even if they don’t always agree with one another. 10. Candour is essential. It’s important to acknowledge mistakes, act decisively, and learn from them. Good writing clarifies your own thinking and that of your fellow shareholders. CR here – in other words, write a financial site where you critique people who are much smarter than you are. 11. To the extent possible, find and retain like-minded shareholders (and for investment managers, investors) to liberate yourself from short-term performance pressures. CR here – if your investment manager doesn’t eat his own cooking then maybe they shouldn’t be cooking for you. 12. Do what you love, and you’ll never work a day in your life. CR here – don’t do what you love. Do something other people will love you for doing. Good capitalists serve themselves best by serving others.