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Why Do Individual Investors Underperform?

Bonds, dividend investing, ETF investing, currencies “}); $$(‘#article_top_info .info_content div’)[0].insert({bottom: $(‘mover’)}); } $(‘article_top_info’).addClassName(test_version); } SeekingAlpha.Initializer.onDOMLoad(function(){ setEvents();}); Barry Ritholtz posted a good video discussing whether mutual fund managers are skilled or not. I am not going to discuss the points made in that video, however, it did get me thinking about something. I have found that most mutual funds are closet index funds. That is, the vast majority of mutual funds are not engaged in any sort of strategic asset allocation that differentiates them sufficiently from highly correlated index funds. So, your average XYZ Large Cap fund will tend to have a 85%+ correlation to the S&P 500, but it will charge a much higher fee. Over time this will degrade performance since the mutual fund is basically picking 100-200 stocks inside of a highly correlated 500 stock index and charging you a recurring high fee over time. Vangaurd has shown on multuple occasions that it’s fees, not asset picking skill, that drives underperformance. But what’s interesting about these mutual funds is that even though they can’t beat their index they do tend to beat the average individual investor. This has been well documented in research pieces ( such as this one ), but we also know it’s true thanks to investor surveys like the AAII asset allocation survey. Over the last 30 years AAII has maintained a record of individual investor asset allocations and over this period the average allocation has been: Stock/Stock Funds: 60% Bonds/Bond Funds: 16% Cash: 24% What stands out there is the cash position. Of course, “cash” is a bit of a misnomer in a brokerage account because “cash” is usually just T-Bills. The kicker is, cash (or short-term bonds) has been a big drag on performance over the last 30 years. The AAII investor with an average 24% cash position generated just a 8.4% annualized return relative to a 9.1% return for the average investor who invested that 24% in a bond aggregate (your standard 60/40). And keep in mind that this is before accounting for all the inefficiencies documented in the aforementioned research. The interesting point here is that most professional money managers don’t hold a lot of cash at all times. The latest data from ICI showed that the average equity fund had just 3.5% cash. Since bonds and stocks just about always beat cash over a 30 year period we know that the average individual investor with a 24% cash position MUST, by definition, do worse than even the closet indexing professionals. This doesn’t mean the closet indexers are “skilled”. It just means they benefit from being in the game more. Basically, you can’t score if you aren’t even on the field and while closet indexing mutual funds are worse at scoring than their benchmark, they score more often than individuals because the individuals spend too much time out of the game. So, the question is, why do individual investors tend to hold so much cash? I have a few guesses: Individuals are inherently short-term in their thinking because they know, intuitively, that their financial lives are a series of short-terms inside of a long-term. This short-term perspective is a totally rational reaction to uncertain financial markets. A high cash balance provides the ultimate sense of certainty. This is a silly perspective, however, because informed market participants know that financial asset market returns tend to become more predictable over longer periods of time. This does not mean, however, that we should necessarily apply the textbook idea of the “long-term” to our portfolios as this isn’t always consistent with our actual financial lives. This short-term thinking leads most investors to churn their accounts, pay high fees and pay high taxes. Again, it’s an attempt to create certainty in an inherently uncertain financial world. But the attempt to take control in the short-term generally results in lots of detrimental activity that hurts performance. I tend to be prefer a cyclical timeframe because it captures the best of both worlds – it can be tax and fee efficient without taking the irrational textbook “long-term” perspective. This raises a more interesting question. Can this behavior be fixed? I’m not so certain. In a world where we’re prone to thinking in the short-term the idea of “long-term” and even medium term investing is very difficult for most people to maintain. But what it does show is that more investors need to be aware of their behavioral biases and understand the basic arithmetic of asset allocation . You might not become a global macro asset allocation expert, but you can avoid making many of the short-term mistakes that lead to this disparity in performance. Sources: Share this article with a colleague

How To Assess Competitive Dynamics When Making Investment Decisions

Competitive pressures are present in almost every industry. These pressures lower returns on capital and could lower future investment returns. Finding companies with sustainable competitive advantages can aid investors in generating higher investment returns. Competitive advantages can be broken down into various buckets to assess which attributes directly affect industry competition. Overview & Introduction: In the following write-up, I hope to outline a succinct process on analyzing the competitive dynamics of an industry and/or firm and why those dynamics matter for investing. Competitive dynamics play an utmost role for those investments that are long-term and “buy and hold” in nature so analyzing those dynamics correctly is paramount to achieving attractive returns. Concepts: Before one can discuss the role of competitive dynamics, why these dynamics matter to investments needs to be established. First, investment returns over longer periods of time are more affected by per period returns due to compounding. Using the following formula, one can see how higher return investments only start showing large differences further out in time. (click to enlarge) The first graph shows the difference in ending notional value of $100 compounded over 20 time periods at rates of 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. The second graph shows the notional difference between the ending values of 20% compounded vs. the same amount compounding at 5%. It can be easily seen that the difference is rising exponentially over time. While this fact is very well known within the investment community, I am pointing it out for a reason different than most other discussions. Just like in investment returns for a portfolio of financial assets such as stocks or bonds, corporations benefit from compounding in the same way. As such, investors should prefer those companies that are able to invest in high return projects. Firms that generate returns on projects far above their cost of obtaining the capital to invest in those projects are said to generate economic profit(s). In all but a few circumstances, a company that is able to invest in high return projects over a long period of time will generate more economic profit than a company that is investing in low return projects. This idea, however, clashes with a basic tenet of firm theory in classical economics: excess economic profits are competed away in the long-run. Competition: Investors prefer to own firms that can invest in projects with high returns on capital. To illustrate this with an example, imagine owning a lemonade stand that costs $500 to start-up and generates $100 in after-tax profits. Now compare that to a newspaper route that costs $1000 to start-up but generates $150 in after-tax profits. In the second example, you generate 50% more profit but require double the investment to do it. A rational investor would prefer to invest in the lemonade stand (or two) rather than invest in the newspaper route. The issue for investors is that capitalism and the free market pushes down returns on capital. Investments with high returns draw new capital to them in hopes of generating those returns and competitive market forces will try to ‘compete’ away those returns. Classical economics sums it up as firms will generate economic profit in the short-run but in a perfectly competitive market, those firms will generate zero economic profit in the long-run. The Importance of Returns on Invested Capital: An investor is left with a difficult task: find firms that generate high returns on capital but are able to do so despite the free market constantly trying to compete away those high returns. While many industries and firms exhibit the more perfect competition estimated by economic textbooks, the real world is not as cut and dry. Persistence of Returns on Invested Capital In fact, there is relatively decent empirical evidence that there is a persistence of industries and firms to generate economic profits which are not inevitably competed away. In a study done by Credit Suisse, they examined changes in returns on invested capital over five year periods from 1985 to 2013. Each business was placed in quartiles with Q4 being the highest return on capital businesses and Q1 being the lowest. The values are calculated at the end of each five year period. The table of those results is presented below. This table is empirically showing that there is a persistence of high returns and that those returns are not the result of chance. The two most important boxes to examine are column 4, row 4 (Q4, Q4) and column 1, row 1 (Q1, Q1). If returns on capital were merely the result of chance, the probability of any company shifting from one quartile to another would be 25%. This table shows that this is not true, as the probability for a top quartile business to stay there five years later is 51% and the chance for that top quartile company to stay in the top half is almost 80%. By the same token, 56% of those businesses that were in the bottom quartile remained in the bottom quartile five years later. Simply put, good businesses tend to remain good businesses and poor businesses tend to remain poor businesses. Drivers of Returns on Capital Before one can get into the sustainability of high returns on capital driven by competitive advantages, it would be useful to examine the underpinnings of returns on capital. Breaking down the measurement of return on capital to its singular components will make it easier to understand and conceptualize the different competitive advantages and how they link back to a company’s ability to generate high returns on capital. Return on Invested Capital is calculated as Net Operating Profit after tax (NOPAT) divided by the firm’s equity and debt. For this example, I am ignoring any short-term funding attributed to suppliers or employees and all funding of a firm’s assets is provided by debt and equity. The ROIC calculation can be broken down into its separate parts, similar to the DuPont method for estimating return on equity. Note that cross multiplication of the terms on the right side will result in the left. A further adjustment can be made in this example since the only funding of the firm is from equity and debt. Given that assets must equal debt plus equity, in this example the last term is equal to one. This reduces the return on invested capital allocation [A] into two parts: the margin on sales [B] and asset turnover [C]. When discussing possible attributes and characteristics that drive sustainable returns on capital, those attributes must cause an industry or firm to be able to sell their services at a very high margin or to use their assets extremely efficiently. Porter’s Five Forces The topic of competitive analysis is not a new one and has been studied by many individuals, the most well-known being Michael Porter of Harvard University. He surmised his thoughts on competitive strategy into his Porter’s Five Forces. The rest of this write-up will modify some of the forces he discusses and relates them specifically to those which I believe affect a company’s ability to generate sustainable returns on invested capital. Competitive Analysis: To summarize, investors want to own high return businesses that can generate those returns sustainably, which is a problem since free market competition tries to drive those returns down. Given empirical evidence that some companies have seen sustainable returns on invested capital over long periods of time, developing a list of attributes that contribute to sustainable returns on capital would improve investment selection and future returns. The list below summarizes six of the most important attributes that, in my opinion, affect a company’s competitive advantage. This list is not exhaustive but instead reflects the most important attributes that I believe contribute to strong competitive advantages. The order of this list is in no relation to how strong I believe each attribute is to generating a specific competitive advantage. Low cost provider/producer Patents and governmental privileges Governmental and other agency regulation Brands Network effects High switching costs Low cost provider/producer The first attribute that contributes to a competitive advantage would be that of the low cost producer/provider. This is the only attribute on the list that explicitly focuses on the asset turnover [C] aspect of the ROIC calculation, large due to the fact that low cost producers tend to minimize margins and maximize asset productivity. The most obvious example of this would be Wal-Mart (NYSE: WMT ). Wal-Mart generates 5% operating margins but almost 20% returns on invested capital due to high asset turnover. Wal-Mart can do this through its massive scale and productivity, driving down their cost of procuring goods. The core competitive advantage of Wal-Mart is to be the low cost retailer. I view this attribute as the most transitory one as technological change can quickly bring about a new low cost producer. A company that pitches itself as THE low cost producer needs to make that message known to its customer and the firm must be continually investing to lower their costs and maintain that competitive advantage. Patents and governmental privileges This is a very obvious strong competitive advantage as a patent on a product creates a legal barrier to prevent substitutes from taking market share. However, a single patent does not offer significant competitive advantages as that patent will eventually expire. Instead, a company with multiple patents, for example a drug portfolio with many patents staggered over time with more in the pipeline, is a better example of a company that uses patents to create a competitive advantage. Another form of competitive advantage is the trademark, which will closely relate to the discussion on brands. Unlike patents, trademarks can potentially be infinite in length and confer a legal right to the owner to be the sole user of that brand. As an example, the logo for Pepsi soda is very valuable to PepsiCo (NYSE: PEP ) because the company has spent billions in advertisement dollars to build up brand preferences in consumers. If PepsiCo did not have a trademark on the logo and its blue can, businesses could essentially generate look-alike cans that share the likeness of the Pepsi logo and make money selling that soft drink to consumers that thought it was a Pepsi product. This concept explains why counterfeit goods exist. The government, by conferring these rights of a trademark to a company, are essentially giving incumbent branded goods companies a potential barrier to entry that prevents potential competition. Governmental and other Agency Regulation While some forms of governmental regulation minimize a company’s ability to generate sustainable returns (SIFI designations for large cap banks and price regulations on utilities come to mind), more often than not rules and regulations created by the government limit competition and help build competitive moats for some businesses. A good example of this is the beer distribution system in the US. Following the end of Prohibition, not all of the regulations were removed. One of the regulations regarding distribution of beer in the US remained and this three-tiered distribution model helped large brewers take significant market share and economic profits over last few decades. In the US, beer cannot be sold from a brewery directly to a retailer or a restaurant/bar. All beer in the US must be first sold to a wholesaler and then the retailer or bar. Many of these distributors were then controlled by the big brewers such as Molson, Anheuser-Busch and Coors. These factors greatly reduced competition in the sale of beer in the US giving incumbents are competitive advantage. Another example of local regulation that prevents competition would be the requirement for certain spirits to be distilled and aged in certain geographic locations to be branded as specific types of spirits. In the UK, Scotch whiskey can only be labeled and sold as such if it is produced following specific regulations, one of which is that it must be distilled and aged in Scotland. Similarly, brandy can only be called cognac if the production follows stringent legal requirements. These legislative hurdles prevent new competition from entering specific industries. Brands Brands are one of the best known competitive advantages a company can acquire but are also one of the most overused terms when discussing a company’s competitive advantages. In my opinion, to be a true brand, it must either create high switching costs for the customer and/or fundamentally change the spending behavior of the customer. Just because a company pitches its brand as one does not mean the brand provides value to the business that owns it. The Coke (NYSE: KO ) brand is a simple example for the high switching costs brands can create. A consumer who enjoys the attributes of a Coke (taste, level of carbonation, level of caffeine, etc.) has a cost to searching out and switching to a new soft drink or other beverage. The risk of drinking a beverage one may not enjoy is enough for most people to pay the premium Coke charges for its soft drinks. The value of a brand is signified in the financial statements by gross margins. I view it as the opposite of Wal-Mart in terms of which factor, [B] or [C], drives ROIC for the business. Great brands allow a business to sell a good that has very inexpensive inputs at a very high price, in large part due to the logo placed upon the product. Many investors may argue that Ford (NYSE: F ), GM (NYSE: GM ) and Toyota (NYSE: TM ) have strong brands but with gross margins between 8-13%, I would argue that Auto OEMs do not have strong brand names. Compare those gross margins to a company like Louis Vuitton (LVMH), which generate a gross margin of 64.7% in FY2014. Clearly, consumers of LVMH goods are willing to pay up for the brands they sell given such a high gross margin. Network Effects Network effects are externalities that are created as more people use a product. This can also create high switching costs for users of some products as the network becomes more valuable and useful the more users that use it. Some examples of companies with network effects are the credit card networks Visa (NYSE: V ) and MasterCard (NYSE: MA ). As more users carry Visa or MasterCard branded cards, more merchants will accept them and more banks will clear through those networks. This creates a significant barrier to entry given new entrants will have an increasingly difficult time shifting consumers over to a new card. New cards may be cheaper to use but have little value since very few merchants would accept them and very few banks would clear transactions over those networks. Similar to other competitive aspects on this list, strong network effects typically confer high margins to those companies that exhibit that attribute. As such, operating margins at both Visa and MasterCard are over 60%, suggesting extremely strong network effects. High-switching Costs The last attribute that can give a company a distinct competitive advantage would be an aspect of the business that creates high switching costs. High switching costs prevent a customer from moving away from a good or service once they have begun using it or have installed it. Additionally, high switching costs could be created by a good that contributes a significant amount of the important attributes of a finished good but is just a fraction of the cost of the end good. An example of the first type of switching costs would be the financial services payment processors such as Fidelity National Services (NYSE: FNF ), Fiserv (NYSE: FIS ), and Jack Henry & Associates (NASDAQ: JKHY ). These companies sell the back-end technical support for banks to provide payment processing and other technology solutions such as mobile banking. Given each bank’s workflow is based around the services and technology provided by these firms, the cost to switch to a different provider can be significantly high. These costs prevent the banks from switching away from these companies, providing them with significant competitive advantages and high returns on capital. The second type of high switching costs has to do with products that have high value to the end users but make up a small percentage of the end good’s total input cost. A good example of this business would be the flavors companies such as International Flavors & Fragrances (NYSE: IFF ) and Givaudan. These companies produce the ingredients that companies like Kraft (NASDAQ: KRFT ) and General Mills (NYSE: GIS ) use in their end products. Yoplait yogurt has a distinct taste and texture that consumers have known and prefer if they are a consumer of the brand. However, the input costs of some of the important ingredients that develop that Yoplait taste and texture are often just a small percentage of the total cost of General Mills producing that good. Because of the potential for consumer backlash should General Mills switch ingredients (recall the New Coke issue in the 1980s) and risk lowering sales and profits, General Mills has little incentive to switching suppliers given the relatively high switching costs. This confers a competitive advantage to specialty ingredient suppliers like IFF. Conclusion: To summarize, investors want to own high return businesses that can generate those returns sustainably which is a problem since free market competition tries to drive those returns down. By examining a business’s competitive advantages, investors can screen for investments that generate attractive returns over very long periods of time. Editor’s Note: This article discusses one or more securities that do not trade on a major U.S. exchange. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks. Disclosure: I am/we are long V. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Predicting The Future Is Difficult

Neils Bohr, a Nobel prize-winning Danish physicist who made foundational contributions to the understanding of atomic structure and quantum theory, is credited to have once said: “Prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about the future.” While it sounds more like a ” Yogi-ism ,” the point made is interesting particularly as it relates to investing. I was reminded of this quote by a comment made on a recent post entitled “Bullish Or Bearish, What The Charts Say.” As I stated in that post: “I really don’t care much for the “bull/bear” debate that ensues on a daily basis as both camps are eventually wrong. When investing in the markets ‘it is, what it is’ and it is of very little use that some pundit or analyst was ‘right’ during the bull market if they never saw the bear market coming. The opposite is also true.” Predictions of the future are indeed very difficult, and yet individuals are challenged every day with doing precisely that. For traders, it is what the market, or a particular investment, will do in the next few minutes to days. For longer-term investors, those predictions move out to months or years. The problem is that humans generally suck at predicting the future, particularly when it comes to investing. This is clearly shown in Dalbar’s 2015 investor study in what they term the ” Guess Right Ratio .” To wit: “DALBAR continues to analyze the investor’s market timing successes and failures through their purchases and sales. This form of analysis, known as the Guess Right Ratio , examines fund inflows and outflows to determine how often investors correctly anticipate the direction of the market. Investors guess right when a net inflow is followed by a market gain, or a net outflow is followed by a decline. Unfortunately for the average mutual fund investor, they gained nothing from their prognostications. ” (click to enlarge) The inability of investors to correctly predict the future has had serious consequences for their portfolio both in the short and long term as shown by the two tables below. (click to enlarge) (click to enlarge) The massive underperformance over a 30-year span shows that investors, despite the best of intentions of being ” long term ” are saddled not only by poor predictions of the future, but also the ” emotional biases ” that drive accumulations and liquidations at the most inopportune times more commonly known as the “buy high/sell low” syndrome. Currently, it is ” predicted ” that the market will only rise from current levels as witnessed by a recent report from Brian Wesbury at First Trust: “Using a 4% 10-year discount rate gives us a ‘fair value’ calculation of 2,550 and it would take a 10-year yield north of 4.8% and no growth in corporate profits in Q2 for the model to suggest equities are fully valued.. .investors should be more tilted toward equities than they would normally be and we believe those that are should continue to enjoy attractive returns over at least the next couple of years. This bull has further to run .” However, Brian, like all humans, including me, are horrible predictors of future outcomes. As an example, this is what Brian predicted in July 2007 just before the largest financial crash since the ” Great Depression :” “The bottom line is that fears about the underlying health of the economy and financial markets are more about hypochondria than reality. The Fed is not tight, just less loose, the economy is strong, tax rates are low, and corporate earnings remain robust. Let’s not confuse indigestion and heartburn with the ‘big one. ‘” Or this in February of 2008 as the recession was in full swing: “None of this is an attempt to say that a recession is impossible. Recessions are always possible. But neither the policy pre-conditions, nor the data, suggest we are anywhere near a recession today. Current fears of a recession are premature .” Of course, it did turn out to be the “big one.” However, Brian, like all economists and analysts are using data to make future predictions that are highly subject to revisions in the future. This is the equivalent of trying to shoot a moving target while blindfolded riding a merry-go-round. While I am sure there is some trick shot artist that could nail such a feat on “America’s Got Talent,” for the mere mortal the odds of success are extremely low. The same problem that exists for individuals, also applies to ” professionals .” There are but a handful of investment managers that have consistently outperformed the ” market ” over long periods of time. But even that comment is a bit misleading as relative outperformance is of little consolation to investors when the market is down 30%, and the portfolio is down 29%. Did the manager outperform? Yes. Did the investor stick around? Probably not. But it is precisely this conversation that leads to a litany of articles promoting ” buy and hold ” investing. While ” buy and hold ” investing will indeed work over extremely long periods, investor success is primarily a function of time frames and valuation at the beginning of the period. Considering that most investors have about a 20-year time horizon until they reach retirement, the “when” becomes a critical component of future success. (click to enlarge) Of course, ” buy and hold ” commentary is mostly seen near fully mature “bull markets” as the previous bear market fades into distant memory. Eventually, despite the best of intentions, the markets will complete their full-market cycle and investors will head for the exits perpetuating the ” buy high/sell low ” syndrome. It is here that we find the VERY BEST predictor of future outcomes – past behavior. Psychology Today had a very interesting piece on this particular issue as it relates to violent crimes. But when it comes to investing, most individuals fit the requirements necessary to fulfill how they will behave in the future. Habitual behavior – (buy high/sell low) Short time intervals – (months or years, not decades) Anticipated situation aligns with the past situation that activated behavior. (bull vs. bear market) Behavior not extinguished by negative impact. (loss not great enough to deter future action) Person remains essentially unchanged. (speculator vs. saver) Person is fairly consistent (willingness to accept risk/avoid loss) Certainly, past behavior may not accurately predict the future behavior of a single individual. However, when it comes to the financial markets which is representative of the ” herd mentality ,” past behaviors are likely good indicators of future outcomes. Despite an ongoing litany of bullishly biased reports as markets push towards new highs, it should be remembered that markets only attain new highs about 5% of the time historically speaking. The other 95% of the time is recouping previous losses. (click to enlarge) Does this mean that you should sell everything and go to “cash?” Of course not. However, it does mean that as an investor you should critically analyze your past personal behavior during market advances AND declines. If you are like MOST investors , it is likely that you did exactly the opposite of what you should have. If that is the case, does it not make some sense to begin thinking about doing something different?