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Heading Into Winter, Propane Sales Look To Repeat 2014 Results

Summary Propane distributors like Suburban Propane and AmeriGas Partners count on the next few months for substantially all their income. With propane supply near all-time highs, wholesale prices have fallen through the floor. Consumers look to benefit this year, but pricing spreads indicate a repeat of 2014 results. The early indicative data for propane distributors such as Suburban Propane (NYSE: SPH ) and AmeriGas Partners (NYSE: APU ) is a mixed bag heading into the incredibly important winter season. This period running from November-March of each year is an incredibly stressful time for these propane distributors, who derive substantially all of their operating income during the winter heating season. The first hurdle for these companies is the weather. The chance of a deep winter chill currently looks decent for some areas of the United States and mediocre for the rest . Most meteorologists forecast above average temperatures for the Northeast, with below average temperatures for much of the Southeast and East Coast. As the South and Midwest form the largest markets for propane, these forecasts end up being a mixed bag and are hard to call as solidly favorable in one direction or another. (click to enlarge) * Source: EIA.gov From a market perspective, available supply of propane continues to peak well above long-term historical averages, due to the significant bounce in production of the commodity from ever-increasing domestic production. Shortages that were widespread in many markets in 2014 seem unlikely to repeat themselves this time around. This excessive supply has brought wholesale and residential propane prices down, yielding what should be solidly lower prices going into this year’s heating season for consumers. This is a bright spot for those that count on propane to heat their homes, but what does it mean for propane distributors? Fixed Margin Pressures Usually, low propane prices provide a boost for propane distributors like Suburban Propane and AmeriGas Partners. All else equal, low propane costs increase the demand for their products and protects against customers switching to alternatives, such as heating oil or electricity. With propane and other alternative heating fuels more commonly used among rural homes with lower annual incomes, these consumers are much more cost sensitive to price changes than the heating markets served by traditional utilities. Propane distributors, while keeping that fact in mind, still try to maintain a fixed spread between the wholesale and residential cost of propane. This is where they can derive their profit, and we can see the results of that in a comparison from 2014 to 2015 below. (click to enlarge) Trying to protect this fixed margin per gallon is why we see the current market situation in propane today with resiliently high residential propane prices. While wholesale propane prices are down 46% from a year ago according to EIA data, skirting along at $0.50/gallon in 2015 from $0.93 gallon in 2014. Residential prices have remained stubbornly high in the meantime, and are only down 19% year/year. In my opinion, wholesale prices in the U.S. cannot fall much further, so this year will be as good as it can get for propane consumers. At these prices, it is barely worth it for producers to ship, store, and market it for sale. Look for propane exports to increase, as unlike natural gas, propane is more easily shipped abroad for sale, and these price declines make exporting increasingly attractive. (click to enlarge) Heating oil, a chief competitor of propane, looks more profitable going into the winter of 2015/2016. The profit spread is up, but heating oil is primarily used in the Northeast , where it heats nearly 30% of all households. If we remember our 2015 weather forecast data, this area is at this point expected to be a little warmer than usual. The demand may not simply be there for the product compared to 2014. Conclusion With margin spreads down and supply up, propane producers are counting on a chilly winter to drive some additional demand to make up the difference. Without old man winter swirling up some unexpected cold, investors should expect operating income flat to slightly down from 2014 levels. Suburban Propane has the most opportunity for surprise earnings upside over 2014 due to its heating oil exposure, but only if the Northeast comes in much colder than expected. Heating oil is set up to be better currently year/year, and with supply running at long-term averages, a cold shock in the Northeast could drive significant demand for the company.

OGE Energy – Should Investors Buy The Dip?

Summary OGE Energy has suffered lately due to its ownership interest in Enable Midstream Partners. This weakness is likely to remain in place in the short term, but the regulated utility business will bolster earnings. Compared to partner CenterPoint Energy, OGE Energy looks to be the more attractive deal currently. OGE Energy (NYSE: OGE ) is another pseudo-utility option for investors, with both a regulated electric business and an equity ownership interest in master limited partnership Enable Midstream Partners (NYSE: ENBL ). The regulated business does substantially most of its business in Oklahoma, serving nearly one million customers throughout the state (including Oklahoma City). Power is provided through the company’s ownership of 6.8GW of mixed electric generation. By peak capacity, OGE Energy has more production available at its natural gas facilities, however in general the company has relied on its coal-fired units for baseload generation due to cost advantages. The equity ownership in Enable and how it came to be is an interesting one. Enable was founded by OGE Energy, ArcLight Capital Partners, and CenterPoint Energy (NYSE: CNP ) ( prior research by myself on CenterPoint is available here on SeekingAlpha ) in 2013. CenterPoint has a majority interest through the limited partner units, but both parties have equal management ownership rights. CenterPoint and OGE Energy elected to spin-off Enable from Centerpoint in April of 2014 to raise capital, while also swapping their common stock ownership to subordinated to appease prospective investors. As I cautioned investors in October when I wrote on CenterPoint, while exposure to midstream operations has been a trend in many utilities lately and can boost the earnings growth, such operations can also bring volatility to the stock price. In the time since that research was published under two months ago, Enable has fallen over 30%, now down 45% over the past six months. This has dragged both CenterPoint and OGE Energy down along with it, compared to a relatively boring performance for the utility sector as a whole over the same timeframe. Is it time to go bottom fishing for a deal in either of these two names? Historical Results For The Utility Business (click to enlarge) I’ve stripped out the results for OGE Energy’s utility assets above, so this is purely the results from the regulated utility segment. Revenue growth has been solid for the company, primarily due to Oklahoma’s relatively favorable economic profile compared to the rest of the country. Oklahoma City and other large cities have seen sizeable inflows of interstate migration, and charge-offs have been low due to below average unemployment and better than average median household incomes. Operating margins, however, have contracted. This is primarily due to increased depreciation and amortization expenses, stemming from additional assets being placed into service throughout the period. Capital expenditures have been quite high, even excluding the midstream pipeline infrastructure, from 2011-2013. This has moderated somewhat in 2014/2015, but further ramp-up is likely in the coming years. The reason for that is the company’s coal power plant exposure. From 2015-2019, the company estimates it has over $1B in capex costs directly related to bringing these coal power plants into emissions and regulatory compliance, while also converting two to natural gas where it deemed upgrades unfeasible. (click to enlarge) * OGE Energy Investor Presentation, EEI 2015 Like many Midwestern utilities that have traditionally used coal as a primary source of power generation, OGE Energy has been engaged in a lengthy dance with federal and state regulators. It recently won a one year extension for compliance for Mercury Air Toxic Rules (through April 2016) and lost many filings and appeals over the EPA’ Federal Implementation Plan, which it tried to push all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. While these costs will be eventually passed along to utility customers and likely recovered, this recovery will take time and the burden of the costs over the next several years will likely dent short-term cash flow. The likely cash flow shortfalls in the coming years will be a continuation of recent trends. OGE Energy has raised $1B in net debt since 2011, but managed to minimize the impact of this by using proceeds from the spin-off of Enable as an offset. Given the current market appetite for Enable common units being weak at best, it is unlikely management will elect to sell any of its currently held units to the public to raise cash. To pay for 2016-2019 capex, investors should expect the company to turn back to the credit markets again, making good use of its solid credit ratings. While OGE Energy is already paying $150M in annual interest expense, its leverage ratios remain low (roughly 2.7x net debt/EBITDA on 2015 full year expectations). Conclusion Enable’s results are the wildcard here. In my opinion, if you’re willing to shop for or own OGE Energy, you should also be willing to buy CenterPoint Energy, and vice versa. While CenterPoint trades cheaper at 7.9x ttm EV/EBITDA compared to OGE Energy’s 9.7x, I think the risk/reward favors OGE Energy still. You’re getting a lower levered player with a higher quality regulated business. However, in the end, you might end up with both company’s assets anyway as I think OGE Energy and CenterPoint are ripe for a merger. Both management teams already work closely together due to their interests in the Enable entity, and tying the companies’ fates together makes economic sense. The joined company would enjoy further diversification and the companies operate right next door to one another geographically. Utility consolidation has been an ongoing trend, and a merger here is one of the more obvious remaining moves among smaller utility names in my opinion.

Dynegy: Too Early To Buy

Summary Dynegy shares have been cut in half in 2015 as investors run for the exits. While metrics are improving, the company still doesn’t generate significant operational cash flow. Additionally, I have concerns over whether cash flow problems have impacted the company’s ability to properly maintain its assets. It’s still to early to buy. If you really want a piece of this company, buy the preferred shares instead. Dynegy (NYSE: DYN ) is a holding company that owns a large portfolio of power generation assets throughout the United States, with a heavy concentration of these assets located in the Northeast and Midwest. The company operates regulated utility operations while also competing in the wholesale electric business, where it provides electricity to utilities, power marketers, and industrial customers. Unlike traditional regulated utilities that are the sole source of power for their customers, the wholesale market pits many players against each other in the name of driving down costs. Dynegy operates approximately 26GW of generation assets, with the vast majority of production evenly split between modern combined cycle natural gas plants and legacy coal plants. In acquiring and developing these assets, the company has had both an interesting and volatile past. Dynegy emerged from bankruptcy in 2012 with a little help from the renowned Carl Icahn , only to make a $6.25B acquisition (12.4GW) of coal and gas-fired assets from Duke Energy (NYSE: DUK ) and Energy Capital Partners just a few short years later in 2014. While the debt load may appear large given the company’s size and recent bankruptcy, the acquisition was viewed favorably by most ratings agencies in regards to improving earnings by acquiring some retail regulated business. However, this debt didn’t come cheap – weighted average interest rate of the debt was 7.18%, quite high given our current position in the interest rate cycle. Operating Results (click to enlarge) As one of the largest merchant energy providers using natural gas, you might expect operating results to have been a little bit more favorable than this post-bankruptcy. There are some sparks of improvement for investors to grab on to, such as improving gross margins. The retail Duke Energy/Energy Capital Partner assets have improved the company’s margin profile, and spark spread improvements due to collapsing natural gas prices have also boosted margins. SG&A expenses have also grown quite slowly, indicative of the scale that is present in many utilities. Bigger is generally better in this sector. Like the income statement, cash flow generation hasn’t been much better. Dynegy generated negative operational cash flow in 2013 and 2012, and was only generated marginal cash flow in 2014. 2015 is set to be a better year, but the company still struggles to generate enough cash to sustain itself. Through this point in 2015, the company has barely spent any money at all on capital expenditures ($500M over three and a half years). Even after taking into account the change in the business from the acquisition, this still seems woefully low. Great Plains Energy (NYSE: GXP ), another company with heavy coal exposure and nearly identical enterprise value, has averaged $600-800M in annual capital expenditures. I’m not sure I buy into just $130M in capex to support the company’s 16 power plants in 2014. This company is a long way away from supporting itself from a cash flow perspective, never mind instituting a dividend that can be healthily supported. I do like the company’s natural gas operations. Citing industry trends, management itself notes that it expects ~50GW of coal power plants to be phased out of markets that Dynegy competes in due to a variety of factors, such as falling natural gas prices, increased capital expenditure requirements, and burdensome regulatory costs. However, I can’t help but feel this leads to a negative in and of itself as well. This bullishness on natural gas generation seems to run contrary to the assets picked up from the Duke Energy deal, as a sizeable (roughly 40%) portion of those assets were coal-fired. Duke Energy has been reluctant and slow to shift generation away from coal, and while these were non-core assets for Duke Energy (the company has decided to focus on its East Coast operations), Duke Energy management wouldn’t have taken a poor deal just to dispose of these assets. Conclusion Dynegy is too early in the turnaround stage for me to recommend it, and it is too early to go bottom fishing, despite the stock getting halved in price in 2015. While I’m not going to call it a short (I would have six months ago), the company is still years away from being what investors want in a utility: consistent cash flows, a healthy dividend, and a fair valuation. The preferred issue is probably the better play here if you’re deeply interested in the company. The preferred currently yields 8.49%, and is convertible into 2.58 shares of Dynegy if you choose to later on. At $59.22/preferred share at this point, if this thing ever does recover, you’ll be sitting pretty and will have been paid a healthy dividend to boot while you wait.