Tag Archives: left-banker

DMO’s Year-End Distribution Brings 2015 Yield To 14%

The closed-end fund, DMO, is the best opportunity in mortgage debt. Two distribution increases and two special distributions this year bring the fund’s 2015 yield to 14%. DMO has beaten ETF, ETN and mREIT comps on 2015 returns. I have been writing recently about Western Asset Mortgage Defined Opportunity Fund (NYSE: DMO ) ( here and here ) and have made clear that, in my opinion, DMO is the best current opportunity in mortgage debt. I’ve compared it to the 2x ETN, UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETN (NYSEARCA: MORL ), and the unleveraged ETF, iShares Mortgage Real Estate Capped ETF (NYSEARCA: REM ). DMO’s leverage (31%) falls between MORL’s 2x and REM’s unleveraged status. Some readers have considered those comparisons invalid because DMO is more like a mortgage REIT than those ETPs, which hold (or index to) a portfolio of mREITs. So, I’ve compared it to the largest mREITs, Annaly Capital Management Inc (NYSE: NLY ) and American Capital Agency (NASDAQ: AGNC ) as well. All four of these names have been very popular among income investors on Seeking Alpha and they continue to have their defenders relative to DMO. In my view the best comparison to DMO is PIMCO Dynamic Income Fund (NYSE: PDI ). Although PDI is not a pure-play mortgage debt fund, its portfolio is typically about two-thirds mortgage debt. Here are current charts for these tickers from Yahoo Finance. (click to enlarge) The chart includes prices for all and NAV for the closed-end fund, DMO and PDI. I am writing today to note that DMO announced its year-end distribution ($0.6498, ex-dividend 28 Dec), and that distribution will bring its 2015 distribution yield to something near 14%. This will be at least the fourth consecutive year that DMO has returned a 14% yield. For 2015, total distribution is down from the two previous years and yield is down from all three. The decreases relative to past years reflect the more modest special distributions this year. Note, however, that the regular distribution is up. There have been two regular distribution increases this year, which to me indicates a vote of confidence by DMO management that the fund will continue to generate strong income in coming years. Market price, NAV and the fund’s discount status have varied over the period, as we see in this chart. For the past two years, the fund’s price has remained in a channel between $24 and $25, so capital preservation has been strong, unlike many high-yield CEFs , which have seen marked declines over the period. A recent decline has taken DMO to the mid-$23 range. But as the first chart shows, that decline is much less than that experienced by any of the comps except PDI. The discount has been closing as investors seek safer refuges in the high-yield space, but it has still been dropping to near -4% on a regular cycle. Last week’s drop to -6.1% presented a buying opportunity. I’ll continue to look for discount drops and am planning to add to my position as they occur. Total return for the fund has been excellent as we see in this 5yr (click to enlarge) and this 1 yr chart from Ycharts . (click to enlarge) High yield income has been pummeled in recent weeks. DMO has held up to this reasonably well. Much of the bearish sentiment in debt and credit is extending from apprehensions over energy company debt. Clearly this does not apply to a mortgage debt fund. I’m hopeful that DMO, and other high yield investments that are not carrying energy debt, will bounce back in 2016. The long-promised gradual upward trend in interest rates is finally begun. This may adversely impact DMO and presents the most significant risk factor for the fund. If the increases are, in fact, gradual — and there is no reason to think they will not be — mortgage credit may be well positioned to handle the rising rates better than most high-yield categories.

Backtesting Smarter Beta: Do We Have A Winner?

Summary The smarter-beta strategy uses three smart-beta ETFs as sources for an investable portfolio that provides exposure to three risk-premia factors. The factors are low volatility, momentum and quality. In this article I report on a backtest of the strategy using data from the inception of the youngest of the three ETFs. I started an exercise to mine three of iShares smart-beta ETFs for investment ideas. My idea was to use the portfolios of the funds, which are designed to provide broad exposure to one of the risk-premia factors, as a source for devising and investable portfolio that provides exposure to all three factors. The three ETFs I selected are: iShares MSCI USA Minimum Volatility ETF (NYSEARCA: USMV ) iShares MSCI USA Momentum Factor ETF (NYSEARCA: MTUM ) iShares MSCI USA Quality Factor ETF (NYSEARCA: QUAL ) These are, as the names tell us, focused on low-volatility, momentum and quality factors. I refer you to my first article on the topic where I describe the methods and concepts in detail ( A Quest For The Smartest Beta ). Briefly, I compare the portfolios of the funds and select the equity positions that are held by all three. This is illustrated in the Venn Diagram to the right. I combine the stocks that overlap the portfolio holdings of all three funds in an equal-weighted portfolio. Readers have pointed out that I’m neglecting at least two important factors, value and size, which are also cards in the iShares ETF smart-beta deck. I looked into this ( Expanding The Smart Beta Filter: Does It Help? ) and concluded they offered no advantage over the three I selected. This was based on a very limited data set as I’ll describe, however. With access to earlier cycles for the funds’ portfolios it may be worth the effort to revisit this question as well. One feature of these funds is that their indexes are rebalanced twice annually, on the last business days of May and November. Until today, I was unable to do any sort of backtest. So, when I first introduced the concept in November I used the portfolio that was put into effect in June 2015 and looked at returns over the five-month period. At the end of November, I published a rebalanced portfolio ( Momentum, Quality and Low Volatility: Continuing the Quest for Smarter Beta ) and results for the full six-months of the ETFs’ rebalancing cycle. Those results were highly encouraging. Each time I wrote on the topic, I lamented not having access to historical portfolios for the funds to further explore performance. Then a sharp-eyed reader added a comment pointing out where those data were available (thanks again, ipaul66 ). So, I’ve downloaded holdings data going back to end-of-November rebalance for the inception of QUAL, the youngest of the three funds, in August 2013. I’ve also shown that the three funds together in an equal-weighted portfolio turned in a solid performance record vs. the broader market represented by the S&P 500 TR index (^SPXTR). I’ve included that portfolio in this analysis as a comparison. The backtest covers two years, still woefully short, but a huge improvement on six months. There are four six-month cycles with complete results. The most recent cycle began on the last day of November, so we have nothing meaningful from that as yet. CAGR Let’s start with the big result: CAGRs for each of the strategies. This table shows CAGRs for each six-month cycle for the smarter-beta portfolio (MQLV), the S&P 500 TR index, and the equal-weighted ETFs (3ETFsEqWt). Both the MQLV and the three ETFs beat the S&P 500. Only for the Dec 2013 through May 2014 cycle does the broader market outperform. Commutative and Cycle Returns The next chart shows cumulative return on $100,000 invested in the three strategies on December 1, 2013 through the November 29, 2015. (click to enlarge) And, for $100,000 invested at the beginning of each semi-annual rebalancing cycle: (click to enlarge) Conclusions and Caveats These results do support and validate the earlier finding. The smarter-beta strategy appears to be an effective filter that can add meaningful alpha relative to the broader market, or to equal-weighting the three source ETFs. I caution, however, that this is based on only two years’ history, and for a quarter of that period the smarter-beta strategy sharply under performed. The model is equal-weighted which may not be optimal and weighting needs a closer look. Having this two-year data set will give me the opportunity to explore other weighting strategies. This analysis makes no allowance for trading costs. One can often buy an S&P 500 index fund in a commission-free ETF. The three-ETF portfolio requires at most twice-yearly rebalancings for modest cost. The MQLV portfolios comprised 12 to 19 positions over the two years, so trading costs are significant, especially for smaller portfolios. If I introduce a 0.25% slippage factor (which allows for trading costs but not spread costs) the CAGR falls to 15.46% for a $100,000 portfolio, still beating the S&P 500 handily, but it does illustrate the cost of turnover. For a smaller portfolio, a larger slippage factor is required. For a $10K initial investment, 32 annual trades at $8/trade would be 2.56% and that much friction drops the CAGR to $10.17%. Even assuming the best interpretation of these results, the strategy generates substantial turnover and is only suitable for reasonably large portfolios (or for those who have accounts that provide free trades). I mention this because I have had commenters suggest they might try the strategy with only a small number of shares for each position. For the investor who is not interested in the turnover and trading this strategy will require, the equal-weighted portfolio of the three ETFs is an attractive alternative. That strategy did not turn in a single negative cycle, more than can be said for either the smart-beta portfolio or the S&P 500. Trading costs are modest with a maximum of 12 trades a year for the semi-annual rebalance, but even that may not be necessary as the ETFs do not vary much from on another over the course of a year or two. Comparing the two-year CAGR of 11.68% to 9.58% for the broad market would seem to indicate that the strategies being used in the MSCI indexes do in fact capture alpha from exposure to the risk-premia factors.

Tax-Free Income For Those Who Need It Most: California Municipal Bond CEFs

Summary California’s tax-free income investing is covered by 22 closed-end funds. These present a diverse array of offerings varying in distribution, leverage and all aspects of portfolio composition. In this article I take a look at all 22 of the funds. I look at municipal bond closed-end funds periodically and try to keep readers up to date on the category as changes occur . In doing so, I focus specifically on national funds because I feel it interests a broader audience than any single state fund. Being a Californian I do watch the California funds carefully, and the bulk of my muni bond fund holdings are California state funds. But I’ve not taken the time to write up my research in these funds because I thought the broad interest would not be there. I get frequent requests for coverage of state muni bond funds, especially the high-tax, high-population states, California and New York. So, with this effort, I’ll put together some of my results on California state municipal bond tax-free CEFs. These funds invest exclusively in California municipal bonds and are, therefore, exempt from both federal and state taxes. My fellow Californians appreciate how much it can add to the value of a fund’s distributions when you take away the tax bite from the country’s highest state tax levels. Several years ago, California allowed an exemption for the California portion of national muni bond funds, but as I understand current tax policy in order for a fund’s distributions to be exempt from California taxes, it must have at least 50% of its holdings from eligible California holdings. Why Single State Muni Bonds? Determining how much advantage one gets from federal and state tax-exempt income can be opaque. Fund sponsors and data aggregators tend to report tax-equivalent returns based on the highest marginal brackets. Few of us qualify at that level, so the reported (or should I say, advertised?) data is near meaningless. It is fairly straightforward to find a tax-equivalent return for federal taxes; one simply has to plug in the marginal rate for a simple calculation. But for state taxes it is more complex. For one thing federal and state marginal rate increments do not correspond. For another, in California at least, federal tax is a deductible, which means one has to adjust the income from the muni bonds to take the federal exemption into consideration. I am not even remotely a tax expert, but real tax experts at Eaton Vance have created an excellent calculator for determining tax equivalence for national and state tax funds based on an individual’s filing status and income level. To make it more useful, it includes equivalent yields not just for ordinary income, but for government bonds, for which interest is tax-exempt in California, qualified dividends, and long- and short-term capital gains. You can find this useful resource here . I know of nothing more comprehensive. I’ve run up a chart showing taxable equivalents for distribution yields of California muni bond funds. This only covers the case for married filing jointly status, so do check out the EV site for your precise situation. The California Municipal Bond CEFs A good thing about trying to get a handle on California muni bond CEFs is that there is a manageable number to deal with. There are 99 national funds which makes ferreting out comparative information not available from screeners and data aggregators a daunting task. I am not aware of any screeners that let me filter on important metrics like portfolio duration or credit quality or AMT percentage. For me, this mean filtering on metrics like discount status, distributions, Z-scores, maturity, leverage and the like to narrow the pool and then try to fill in the gaps. Things get overlooked with this approach and one of the advantages I’ve found from making my results public here is that some very knowledgeable readers will pass along some of their favorites that I overlooked using this approach. With only 22 funds for California munis, one can dig out these data manually with a reasonable investment of effort. Indeed, it’s worth listing all 22 of them here, along with some key characteristics of the funds. First, the funds: Alliance California Municipal Income Fund (NYSE: AKP ) Blackrock California Municipal Income Trust (NYSE: BFZ ) Blackrock California Municipal 2018 Term Trust (NYSE: BJZ ) MFS California Municipal Fund (NYSEMKT: CCA ) Eaton Vance California Municipal Income Trust (NYSEMKT: CEV ) Eaton Vance California Municipal Bond Fund II (NYSEMKT: EIA ) Eaton Vance California Municipal Bond Fund (NYSEMKT: EVM ) Blackrock Muniyield California Quality Fund, Inc. (NYSE: MCA ) Blackrock Muniholdings California Quality Fund, Inc. (NYSE: MUC ) Blackrock Muniyield California Fund, Inc. (NYSE: MYC ) Neuberger Berman California Intermediate Municipal Fund Inc (NYSEMKT: NBW ) Nuveen California Dividend Advantage Municipal Fund (NYSE: NAC ) Nuveen California Municipal Value Fund Inc (NYSE: NCA ) Nuveen California Municipal Value Fund 2 (NYSEMKT: NCB ) Nuveen California AMT-Free Municipal Income Fund (NYSE: NKX ) Nuveen California Dividend Advantage Municipal Fund 2 (NYSEMKT: NVX ) Nuveen California Select Tax Free Income Portfolio (NYSE: NXC ) Nuveen California Dividend Advantage Municipal Fund 3 (NYSEMKT: NZH ) Pimco California Municipal Income Fund II (NYSE: PCK ) Pimco California Municipal Income Fund (NYSE: PCQ ) Pimco California Municipal Income Fund III (NYSE: PZC ) Invesco California Value Municipal Income Trust (NYSE: VCV ) Sorted by market cap the category breaks down like this: (click to enlarge) Some of the funds at the right side of this chart can present liquidity issues. I tend to put limit, all-or-none orders in when I bid on CEFs. I was unable to buy EIA at terms that might not have been a problem for more liquid funds. Leverage is an important driver of high distribution income from muni bond funds. People will fret about leverage and the threat of rising rates, but that’s how these fund deliver better than 5% yields from such low yielding assets. For those who dread the thought, there are 4 minimally leveraged funds in the mix. (click to enlarge) The whole point of holding any income fund, taxable or tax-free, is, of course, income. So, what sort of income can we expect from the California muni bonds CEFs. Here is a chart of current distribution yields at market price and NAV. (click to enlarge) Note that the two high-yielding PIMCO funds at the left have market yields below their NAV distributions. This is, of course, a reflection of their premium valuations. For most of the remaining funds their discounts give a boost (albeit smallish right now) to their yields. So, let’s turn to discounts and premiums. Seventeen of the 22 funds currently hold a discount. True to PIMCO form, their 3 funds have premium valuations. This is a recurring story throughout fixed-income CEF space. PIMCO, by application of their secret sauce, manages to generate NAV yields appreciably above their peers. Investors respond by bidding the funds up into premium territory, reducing the yields from NAV, but keeping them above the pack at market price. Interestingly, the other premium funds are two low-yielding, low-leverage funds from Nuveen, NCA and NXC. BIZ, the fund with the skimpiest discount is the fund that carries the least leverage. It appears investors are willing to pay premium prices and accept lower distributions (see distributions chart above) to forego leverage. More than three-quarters of the funds have discounts, but for each of them the discount is shrinking. This is something one might infer from the RSI data above; a look at Z-scores for three months confirms it. (click to enlarge) Z-Score is a measure of how far the current discount/premium varies from the average discount/premium for a time period. A negative Z-score indicates that the discount has deepened relative to the mean. Not one of these funds has a negative Z-Score for the past three months. The most accessible way to approach the Z-statistic is to read it as the number of standard deviations the current value is above or below the mean for the period. Seventeen funds are more than a standard deviation away from the mean discount/premium. Thirteen are more than two standard deviations away, and one, NXC, is more than 3.5 standard deviations above its mean value. The message here, coupled with the RSI data at the top, is that now is not a timely entry point for California muni bond CEFs. For the record, here are the 6 and 12 month Z-scores using the same sort to facilitate comparisons. (click to enlarge) It was not so long ago that California muni bond funds were a great bargain. Deep discounts were the norm. Funds were discounted to the extent that it was possible to buy funds that were returning higher yields on market price than comparable national muni bond CEFs. What changed? To answer this we need to understand what was driving those bargains. Two California municipalities were in the news as bordering on bankruptcy. The larger of the two, Stockton, is a good size city and the press was full of doom and gloom for the fiscal condition of the Golden State. At time, I began writing about muni bond CEFs and numerous commenters referenced Stockton and put California in the same category as Puerto Rico on the at-risk scale. Predictably, holders of California CEFs jumped ship in droves. Bargains were the order of the day. At the time I argued that 1) California was in no worse fiscal condition than any other large, diverse and complex state; and 2) muni bond defaults were so rare as to be negligible. It took about a year or so, but investors have decided that California may not be so bad after all. What is worrisome to a less skittish CEF buyer is whether or not the current upsurge is an overreaction. I depend on my California muni CEFs for income but I am seriously considering taking profits here with an eye to coming back in when the prices compensate yet again in the next direction. That’s part of my recent interest in national muni bonds as I look for alternative income sources. Oh, what’s that I hear. Something about hand waving on that muni defaults comment? Ok, here’s some evidence from Oppenheimer’s year-end Chart Book comparing muni bond defaults to corporate defaults for BBB rated bonds. Next time you hear about how muni bonds are ready to crash and burn remember this chart: (click to enlarge) NAV Yield and Discount Trend As those who follow my work on munis are aware, I like to look at the relationship between NAV Yield and Discount/Premium. One factor that contributes to a fund finding its market discount or premium is yield on NAV. Investors tend to drive fund prices toward an equilibrium on market yield by price up funds with high NAV yields and pricing down funds with low NAV yields (see PIMCO discussion above for extreme examples). We can plot that relationship thusly: (click to enlarge) I’ve omitted the low leverage funds from this chart. The r2 is very high (0.88) indicating the strength of the relationship in this case. By this indicator funds that fall below the trendline tend to be better priced than those above it. It’s telling us to look closely at VCV, NZH, EVM, EIA, and perhaps, NAC. I’ll fit these funds into other metrics as I proceed. Portfolio Composition This raises the issue of portfolio compositions. Two components are of special interest in this regard: Duration and Credit Quality. This table is from Morningstar’s analyses of the funds. The effective durations are unadjusted and adjusted for leverage. Average weighted credit rating is based on Morningstar’s weightings which gives higher weight to lower quality bonds. It varies from what you might see elsewhere, but it is consistent from fund to fund, unlike what you might see elsewhere. It tends, like much of what Morningstar puts out, to present the most conservative case. (click to enlarge) I’ve included discount and distribution yield here to show relationships. I’ve also put in a column showing Morningstar’s category for each fund to point out how unreliable such categorizations can be. While BIZ, one of the two intermediate funds, does have the shortest adjusted duration, NCB, the other, is well into the upper middle of the pack. EIA, a long fund according to Morningstar has the shortest unadjusted duration and lags BIZ by a trivial 0.23 when adjusted for its leverage. But I digress, let’s go on to credit quality. I’ve sorted the table on credit quality. One might expect yield to reflect that sort but it doesn’t. PCK with a BB+ portfolio has the highest yield here, and that’s with a 12% premium which means the managers are generating 7.4% yield from California muni bonds. It does, however, also somewhat typical for high-premium, high-yield PIMCO funds, post negative undistributed net investment income. PCK’s UNII runs about -7.2% of its annual distribution (at market) or somewhat less than a single month’s premium. While not at a level that puts up worrisome red flags, it is the highest in the category. The fund last cut its distribution in April 2014 (-14%). Two Blackrock funds, MCA and MYC, have the strongest credit quality with average ratings of AA-. They fall mid-pack for distribution, near the top for leverage, and about the middle for adjusted duration. For anyone concerned about credit risk, they may represent the best choice. A step down the credit quality scale is NBW which shares a BB+ rating with PCK. It has a moderate discount of -3%, a mid level yield of 5.47%, and the second highest leverage (41.02% to PCK’s high value of 41.12%) in the category. It pays more than a point less than PCK, slightly less then the better-rated portfolios from MCA and MYC, so I see no reason one would purchase it at this time. Dropping down to BBB+ takes us to another Blackrock fund, BFZ. It offers a solid distribution yields of 5.62%, medium low adjusted duration and a discount of -2.34%. Eaton Vance’s EIA holds one of several BBB rated portfolios and generates the highest yield of the set. It does so with an impressively short leverage-adjusted duration (3.7) second only to the unleveraged BIZ. For all but the most yield-hungry or credit-wary, it should be the choice of group. I’ve tried to summarize portfolio compositions in this chart. Funds are grouped by weighted average credit rating and scored on the basis of distribution yield. The dot size represents the level of leverage. (click to enlarge) From this view, MCA, MYC, PCK look like the top choices. But this view does not factor in PCK’s premium. Nor does it include our knowledge of that negative UNII. So I’d go with Blackrock’s offerings with the race going to MCA on the basis of those few basis points of higher yield generated by its deeper discount. Both of those factors could change in a day, so let’s call them a wash. BFZ could be considered next along with EIA and EVM. BFZ offers a better credit quality (BBB+ to BBB) but trails a bit in yield. EIA wins handily on effective duration with BFZ near and EVM trailing slightly. Beyond these fund, one is looking primarily for high yield, so there’s PCZ with its 12% premium, or Invesco’s VCV with a -6.1% discount. One would have to be satisfied that PZC’s quarter point of yield justified the premium purchase to chose it over VCV. Finally, for an investor who puts yield second to leverage (or lack of leverage), the two choices would seem to be Nuveen’s NCA or NCB. I did not try to find AMT liability for all of the funds but the few I’ve singled out range from AMT free to having moderate levels of their income subject to AMT. The Eaton Vance funds (EIA and EVM) are AMT free as are the PIMCO funds (PCK, PCQ and PZC). Blackrock’s funds do have AMT liability: BFZ (1.43%), MYC (3.53%), MCA (4.70%). Invesco’s VCV has 4.56% subject to AMT and for Neuberger Berman’s NBW it’s 5.27%. The low leverage funds top the list with NCA at 11.58% and NCB at 6.27%. Summing Up California Muni Bond CEFs are likely overbought and investors who are inclined to trade funds as discounts and premiums rise and fall should likely be looking to sell rather than make purchases at this time. Investors interested in opening or expanding long term positions in California tax-free income have some solid choice depending on one’s priorities. EIA with is high quality portfolio and short durations is a strong contender as is its stable mate EVM. MCA and MYC offer the lowest credit risk and give up only trivial amounts on yield. Other funds with solid reasons to own and hold include VCV for high yield, NBW for its portfolio quality, and NCA and NCB for low leverage. PCK is a solid choice for someone willing to overlook the premium and the negative UNII. It’s not for me but PIMCO’s premium funds have their staunch advocates.