Tag Archives: investing ideas

Active Power: At An Inflection Point?

ACPW is a name that has long been a disappointment. But it appears that new management is showing to have an effect on shaping operations at the company – ACPW just reported its sixth quarter of greater than 1:1 book/bill. ACPW is also growing sales while managing higher gross margins – this had the effect of reducing overall cash burn, always a concern for microcaps. If ACPW can sustain its operating momentum it should scale up market cap with each quarter reported as the niche has a well-established EV/revenue multiple. Active Power (NASDAQ: ACPW ) is an interesting name that I came across recently. The company’s headquarters is coincidentally located just a few blocks away from my home. After passing by its offices time and time again, and this is a name that I’ve seen trend in the social arenas a few times over the last year, I decided to take a look into the filings. What I found looks like a company that might be at an inflection point that has long been in the making. First, ACPW is “engaged in designing, manufacturing and selling of flywheel-based uninterruptible power supply (“UPS”) products and modular infrastructure solutions (SOURCE: ACPW 10-K)”. Put simply, the company helps regulate power to facilities and entities that can ill afford to not have a steady power flow; and provides essential infrastructure to facilities and entities that want greater control over microgrids. The latter functionality taps into the burgeoning market for off-grid power production from a single or multiple sources of alternative energy production (e.g. solar power installations, wind power farms, etc.). Both UPS power regulation and microgrid applications are growing more evident value-props in 1) an increasingly stressed electrical infrastructure (international electrical infrastructures are already stressed) and 2) an infrastructure in which microgrids (read: hospitals, university campuses, massive server host facilities, etc.) are becoming more valuable. While these are long term, secular trends to be sure – there is no denying that the visibility of the necessity for equipment and services provided by ACPW is increasing. In that the value prop and visibility of value prop are set up in this instance to be longer term, I’m viewing ACPW as strictly a long-term buy and hold opportunity. Shares of ACPW likely will not trade sharply higher overnight, but I believe they will trade higher steadily over extended durations. (click to enlarge) In saying that, through 1H/15 reporting ACPW is showing to have steadily improving operations and a more consistently stable overall model. Trading at less than one times EV/revenue (TTM) and trading 30 bps below a peer group EV/revenue multiple average of 1X (consisting of Capstone Turbine (NASDAQ: CPST ), FuelCell Energy (NASDAQ: FCEL ), Maxwell Technologies (NASDAQ: MXWL ) and PowerSecure International (NYSE: POWR )), now might be a good time to consider initiating a position in ACPW. ACPW has generated ~$58 million in TTM revenues, showing a healthy revenue base for a microcap – certainly having such revenues allows the company certain flexibilities not inherent in pre/low revenue microcap models, and is on pace to achieve approximately the same figure in full year 2015 (annualizing 1H/15 performance – it should be noted that ACPW does report lumpy revenues from time to time). The company also recently posted its first quarter of positive Adjusted EBITDA in quite some time and greatly closed its long-standing net loss and negative EPS: (click to enlarge) When coupling this income statement performance with the fact that the company has ~$10.6 million in C&CE on its balance sheet, $37.4 million in assets, $19.8 million in liabilities, and $5.5 million in debt, I consider the company to not be at any near-term structural risk. ACPW’s cash, which is always important to monitor in this market cap space, should last at least the next 12 months. I anticipate the cash balance will likely last much longer, basing this assumption on ACPW’s 10-K filing and cash burn generally associated with total net loss. I could realistically see full year 2015, which through 1H/15 ACPW has shown roughly half the total cash burn as 1H/14, being the lowest cash burn print in 4 years . If ACPW can prove out 2015 to be at or near cash flow breakeven, management has not given guidance to this, this would materially move forward the bull case. Typically with microcaps, dilution and/or a reliance on debt as a result of high rates of cash burn is at or near the top of the risk list. ACPW, depending on sales ramp, might be close to negating this risk. In regards to sales at ACPW, upon reviewing the company’s 10-K filing for the year ended 12/31/14 this was a red flag to me in considering ACPW for a bullish recommendation. I noticed that the company had, as of its now 6-month-old 10-K filing, a history of falling sales on flat operating expenses – which was particularly concerning. I also knew that ACPW had changed management teams less than two years ago and the lack of progress visible on the topline was adding to my initial concerns. However, when viewing the current year’s Q1 and Q2 10-Q filings, of course, I saw the data illustrated in the image above which speaks quite to the contrary of the performance in the 10-K. ACPW appears to have turned a corner in selling as of the first two quarters of 2015. Still, even knowing this, it was encouraging to see that ACPW broke out its sales in its August Investor Deck into book to bill ratios. ACPW, as of Q2/15, reported its sixth consecutive quarter of a greater than 1.0 book to bill ratio – this has led to a much healthier trend line: (click to enlarge) Again, this increased consistency and overall scale has led to a return to positive Adjusted EBITDA for ACPW as well as increasing gross margins – another sign of increasing operating health: (click to enlarge) Finally, it should be noted that ACPW has fragmented and diversified both its geographical revenue dependence as well as its dependence on any singular revenue channel – yet more reasons to believe that the increased book to bill ratio is sustainable under the new regime: (click to enlarge) All told I believe ACPW is deserving of a hard look at this point in its development by those interested in securing an ownership in electrical grid and microgrid management. I don’t believe there is any denying that there are secular growth trends supporting both a need and desire for these types of services. ACPW, while being largely a disappointment since its IPO many years ago, appears to be changing course under new management. The story at ACPW has been slowly progressing – to management’s credit this does have quite a bit to do with the fact that ACPW is a capital equipment company – but it is now having a positive effect on the company’s health. If ACPW is at an inflection point, which I’m leaning heavily into the fact that it is, it should be able to grow its market cap. Despite improved financial performance in the first half of the year, the stock has not moved. The realization of a continuation of greater than 1:1 book to bill ratios bodes well for the company and its shares. Good luck everybody. Editor’s Note: This article covers one or more stocks trading at less than $1 per share and/or with less than a $100 million market cap. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

It’s Better With Beta

The title of Larry Swedroe’s latest book, The Incredible Shrinking Alpha, raises a question: what happened to the idea that skilled managers can consistently beat the market? In a recent interview with Swedroe, we discussed the idea that this ability hasn’t really disappeared: it’s just that “alpha has become beta.” What exactly does that mean? In investing jargon, alpha is the name given to the excess return a fund manager achieves through skill. Beta , on the other hand, refers to the returns available to anyone who is willing to accept a known risk. When Swedroe says “alpha has become beta,” he simply means that anyone who understands how to structure a portfolio can increase their expected returns by simply changing their exposure to specific types of risk, known as “factors.” A factor is a characteristic of a stock that affects its expected return and risk. Factor investing (sometimes marketed as “smart beta”) means identifying which of these characteristics might predict higher returns in the future-even if it also brings more risk-and then building a diversified portfolio that captures those returns in a systematic way, without resorting to picking individual stocks. And then there were three As I’ve written about before , the so-called Fama-French Three Factor Model was a revolution in investing. In a landmark 1993 paper , Eugene Fama and Kenneth French argued that the vast majority of a stock portfolio’s returns could be explained not by the manager’s genius, but by its exposure to beta (market risk), small-cap stocks (which are expected to outperform large caps over time) and value stocks (companies with low prices relative to fundamentals such as book value, dividends and earnings, which tend to outperform growth stocks). But it didn’t end there. Later in the 1990s, a fourth factor was identified: momentum , or the tendency for stocks that have recently performed well (or poorly) to continue in the same direction. In the last few years, researchers have identified several more. First was the profitability factor : companies with a high ratio of gross profits to assets tend to outperform, even though these are generally growth stocks, not value stocks. That was followed by the investment factor , which is based on the counterintuitive idea that capital expenditures on new acquisitions and ventures usually fail, and therefore lead to lower stock returns in the future. The factor zoo If you this all sounds overly complicated, you’re not alone in that opinion. One finance professor famously described the “zoo of new factors” now in the academic literature. “Something like 300 factors have been identified,” Swedroe says. “Because there is a big premium on being published, you want to be the professor who finds a factor: then you can go and get a job on Wall Street.” One commentator reported that “some quant shops now use an 81-factor model to build equity portfolios.” The good news, says Swedroe, is that no one needs anything close to an 81-factor portfolio. “The thing to understand is that some of these factors are really just manifestations of some other factor,” Swedroe says. In a new paper , Fama and French acknowledge that once you consider beta, size, value, profitability and investment, none of the other factors have any meaningful explanatory power. (This idea is discussed in the final appendix to The Incredible Shrinking Alpha .) Five is enough In our interview, Swedroe used an analogy to explain why simple portfolios get you most of the way there. “Say you’re taking a drive across Canada, and it’s 3,000 miles. And let’s say that during each leg of your journey you drive halfway. So the first leg you drive 1,500 miles, and the next leg you drive 750 miles, and so on.” You make progress every day, but each successive leg of the journey has less of an impact. “It’s the same thing with a portfolio: if you add bonds to a stock portfolio, that’s a big move. Then you add international stocks, and that’s a pretty big move too, though not as big as adding bonds. Then you start adding small-cap and value. Once you’re at that eighth or ninth asset class, yes, you will pick up something, but you’re already most of the way there. So we want to focus on the factors that really matter the most: the ones with the big premiums, as well as the ones that help diversify. And I think the literature is pretty clear now that we’ve got these five.” Swedroe also points out that more factors may mean fewer stocks. “If you keep adding screens, what happens is you get a less and less diversified portfolio. You could start out with a small-cap portfolio that is 2,500 stocks, and then you make it small-value and you’re down to 1,500. Add another screen and you’re down to 700. At some point you don’t have enough of a diversified portfolio. So you have to make decisions about how to do this.” One decision might just be to stick to a plain-vanilla Couch Potato strategy. In fact, if you’re a DIY investor you probably should . Factor investing may be able to increase your returns slightly over the long term, but only if you have the expertise to manage a more complicated portfolio. Consider it the icing, not the cake itself .

Investing With The Slowskys: Appreciating The Value Of Expertise, Analysis And Judgment

Ideas and news items with obvious implications get quickly discounted by the market. Diversity breakdown is one of the greatest threats to market efficiency and therefore reasonably accurate price discovery. A good deal of evidence suggests that just such a diversity breakdown has been occurring. Sources of “slow traveling ideas” that can maintain a truly independent perspective will likely prove investors’ best antidote to institutional biases and short-termism. For do-it-yourselfers, frugal consumers, and efficiency seekers, the proliferation of the internet, smart mobile devices, and high speed connectivity has been a remarkable boon that has more than offset many economic headwinds. We can pull up a how-to video in YouTube in seconds (and for free) rather than calling a contractor for a minor repair, we can buy ebooks at a fraction of the price of hard copies, and we save all kinds of physical trips with online applications, emails, video calls, etc. Investors have realized their own bonanza with free online news, price data, and research that used to cost investment firms tens of thousands of dollars. As the cost of information has declined, its consumption has exploded to create an ever-more frenetic, information intensive society. We see evidence of this everywhere including in communications advice to limit messages to “a few bullet points” and to use “punchy, catchy language.” While information resources have done a great deal to improve convenience and to keep investors better informed, there is one big thing they haven’t done and cannot do: improve long-term investment performance. That free information cannot improve investment performance may seem counterintuitive, but it actually reveals a key characteristic of reasonably efficient markets: When information is free and easy to acquire, you only have what everyone else has — and it gets discounted into stock prices almost instantaneously. This challenge begs the larger question of how to outperform markets that are mostly efficient and was addressed beautifully in well-worn, but still relevant, research by Jack Treynor and Michael Mauboussin. Treynor laid solid intellectual foundations for the challenge in his 1975 piece, “Long term investing” [ here ]. He tells us: When one talks about market efficiency, it is important to distinguish between ideas whose implications are obvious and consequently travel quickly and ideas that require reflection, judgment, and special expertise for their evaluation and consequently travel slowly. The second kind of idea … is the only meaningful basis for ‘long-term investing’. So a direct answer to the challenge of how to outperform is to acknowledge that data points, news bits, and other items “whose implications are obvious” do not provide a meaningful basis for long-term investing. Deeper analysis is required. But there is also a more subtle implication from Treynor’s insights: opportunities for outperformance arise when significant portions of market participants make the same error or act in the same way. In particular, Treynor articulates the importance of the assumption of independence in regards to market efficiency: As the key to the averaging process underlying an accurate consensus is the assumption of independence, if all — or even a substantial fraction — of these investors make the same error, the independence assumption is violated and the consensus can diverge significantly from true value. The market then ceases to be efficient in the sense of pricing available information correctly. Mauboussin also picks up on this thought [ here ]. According to Mauboussin, markets fail because, “Most simply, investor heterogeneity breaks down and everyone acts in unison, leading to excessive optimism (greed) or pessimism (fear).” So what really matters for markets functioning well is for a diverse group of investors to each make decisions independently. Although diversity breakdowns don’t occur frequently, when they do, Mauboussin notes that they “provide investors with significant opportunities to earn excess rates of return.” Interestingly, a fair bit of evidence suggests that we may be in the midst of just such a diversity breakdown. For one, it is no secret that many institutional incentives exist that work in opposition to investors’ best interests. Mauboussin highlights some of these: Current incentives encourage agent behavior that is not always consistent with maximizing long-term shareholder returns (Bradford Cornell and Roll, 2005). In recent decades many large investment firms have emphasized marketing (often at the expense of the investment process), increased the number of funds they offer (selling what’s hot), and boosted the number of stocks they hold in order to minimize tracking error versus the benchmark. He notes further, But perhaps the most significant incentive-caused behavior, and most relevant for a discussion of how to beat the market, is the reduction in investment time horizons. According to Bogle (2005), average equity portfolio turnover rose from 20% in the mid-1960s to 112% in 2004. And fund managers aren’t the only ones with shorter time horizons; Bogle documents that mutual fund owners redeem shares at a rate four times higher than a few decades ago. While this data is not completely fresh, the trends have not changed and in the case of exchange trade funds (ETFs), are far worse. If these conditions weren’t already enough to warrant concern, recent industry trends suggest the risk of diversity breakdown has been increasing. The 2104 Investment Company Factbook describes, for example, that: The growth of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and defined contribution (DC) plans, particularly 401(k) plans, explains some of households’ increased reliance on investment companies during the past two decades. In other words, progressively greater chunks of money have been flowing to institutions that have the same set of biases. Unfortunately, there’s more. The Fed’s policies since the financial crisis have likely made these challenges to market diversity even worse. With investment firms already fairly uniformly predisposed towards remaining fully invested in order to preserve near term revenues, the Fed’s policies of keeping interest rates near zero and explicitly targeting higher asset prices has made it even harder for investment firms to buck the trend. Further, any efforts on the part of money managers to independently manage risk over the last several years have been severely punished by the effects of new iterations of quantitative easing and other extraordinary monetary policy tools. In summary, the last several years of market activity have created a nearly perfect storm of short-termism. While the magnitude of diversity break down can be fairly debated, it is difficult to refute that investor heterogeneity has diminished. After all, there is no doubt that institutional investors have like incentives that cause similar behaviors and that those same institutional investors comprise a “substantial fraction” of the investor base from which it is sufficient to undermine an “accurate consensus”. Jeremy Grantham recently made a less than thinly veiled reference to these directional forces in a Financial Times article when he noted that “If you’re a naturally conservative investor and still alive, you’re doing pretty well.” What should investors take away from all of this? The most immediate implication is that there is substantial evidence that U.S. stock markets are experiencing the kind of diversity breakdown by which “consensus can diverge significantly from true value.” Industry structure, trends, and monetary policy have all combined to erode market diversity in a way that can cause significant losses — and significant gains. It could well be that having a truly independent view is one of the greatest strengths an investor can have right now. Second, and in a more general sense, investors should be extremely skeptical as to the investment value of news bits and data items. In an important sense, these results should not be surprising. As Mauboussin notes, Time horizon is a crucial consideration in any probabilistic field. In these systems, short-term results show mostly noise — the noise-to-signal ratio is very high. But over time, the signal reveals itself, and the noise-to-signal ratio drops. Short-term investors dwell mostly in the world of noise. Such tidbits may certainly be helpful in other ways, but investors should not be fooled into believing they are useful for long-term investing. Only deep research and analysis can help out on that front. Given this important and time-honored insight, it is interesting and ironic that the breakdown in investor diversity is moving in the direction of more noise and less signal. Sources of “slow traveling ideas” that can maintain a truly independent perspective will prove investors’ best antidote to institutional biases and short-termism. In conclusion, for many years, Comcast aired a commercial for its internet service that featured a couple of turtles named the Slowskys who were averse to anything that was fast. Although this portrayal was obviously a parody, it illustrates a perfectly appropriate maxim for investing: Slow traveling ideas are a long-term investor’s best bet for delivering superior results. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.