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Just Energy Is In Hot Water

Summary Just Energy is an energy reseller. The business model has many questionable elements. Several factors could cause the earnings to decline in FY2016. Just Energy (NYSE: JE ) is a Canadian retailer of energy across select regions in North America and the UK. The company has a long rap sheet of customer complaints, fraud charges, and consumer watchdog warnings. Investors have bid the stock up in recent weeks on a swing to profitability in the first quarter. That profit is based on a one-time item. Beneath the surface, Just Energy is a company with lengthy legal concerns, a declining customer base, and an inherently flawed business model. Flawed Business Model One of my favorite financial quotes is from famed investor Jim Chanos. “A business model that relies on deceiving customers is an inherently flawed model.” No sentence more accurately describes Just Energy. The services offer no value to consumers. In fact, one study found that the average JE customer pays more for their utility service than those who pay for their utilities through a traditional utility provider. If your business model is built on saving customers money by switching them to your service, shouldn’t your service actually be less expensive? It appears that in 98% of cases , it is not. According to a lawsuit in Illinois, “there is no reasonable person who could market this product by suggesting that a customer would ‘save’ money.” The lawsuit also noted that “almost all of [Just Energy’s] plans have cost customers far in excess of what [utilities charge].” This could partially explain the aggressive sales practices. If your services cannot deliver as promised, why not just bend the truth? The company’s profits rely on selling long-term contracts to customers at rates higher than can be achieved in the marketplace. Essentially, the company locks customers into 5-year contracts and hopes that energy rates decline. The only way it makes a profit is by overcharging customers. Again, a business model marketed as a less expensive alternative to utilities that can only make a profit when it is, in fact, more expensive, is deceptive and fundamentally flawed. Legal Concerns There is a litany of formal complaints filed against the company, so many in fact that it has had to change its name and buy new brands in an apparent attempt to hide the past misdeeds. Among the most notable concerns are lawsuits brought by the Attorneys General of Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio and New York. Complaints filed by the Canadian Energy Board and consumer watchdog groups have also caused reason for concern given the repeated allegations of misconduct. The company has an almost unheard of F rating by the Better Business Bureau . The BBB cited “a large volume and pattern of complaints concerning misleading sales practices.” (click to enlarge) Source: Internet review websites Just Energy could arguably have received more complaints per customer than any other publicly listed company in North America. The Illinois Attorneys General lawsuit found that the company received about 30,000 complaints annually in the state of Illinois alone. So what caused so many formal complaints against the firm? As most lawsuits describe, the company’s sales team goes door-to-door soliciting homeowners to purchase energy contracts. It also utilizes telemarketers in its sales process. The fraud complaints stem from thousands of sales reps purposely lying about rates, and in some cases, signing up customers without their permission. Source: News articles The unbelievably poor compliance at JE is a cause for future concern, as the practices are systemic of the organization and do not seem to have been curtailed. In fact, they are getting worse. In July 2015, Just Energy partnered with an alleged pyramid scheme to distribute its products. Lyoness is a MLM firm with a long history of pyramid scheme accusations. Think Herbalife (NYSE: HLF ), but worse. If the company’s former sales team was so inadequately trained that hundreds had to be laid off after defrauding clients, why would the distributors for a company under numerous fraud investigations be any better? According to an Australian regulator, Lyoness’ distributors “lie about every aspect of the business they are promoting.” These people will now be the face of Just Energy. Cue the forthcoming onslaught of Attorneys General investigations that are likely to emerge. Declining Customer Base While the company has largely weathered the past concerns, that luck seems to be eroding. As customers are coming out of their five-year contracts, they do not seem to be re-enrolling. Additionally, the company is failing to find new customers. Perhaps the years of negative reviews, multiple fraud investigations, and bad press coverage have dissuaded customers from trying out the company’s service. Or perhaps they can just do math and do not want to pay more for a service they already receive. For the first time in years, the company had a net loss of customers in the most recent quarter. Additionally, the number of new customers was the lowest since 2012. In red below, we can see that new customers are down 31% from Q1 2015 and down 15% from Q1 2014. The company is not growing the customer base enough to offset those leaving the business. (click to enlarge) Source: Investor presentation (with Q1 info added by author) How This Will Impact Earnings With a clear downward trend developing, investors should prepare for a future decline in sales. The average Just Energy contract is 3.5 years. The decline in new customers is not directly felt on the income statement just yet. As customers leave (about 1.15 million per year), the inability to replace those customers will cause revenues to decline. For the first time in years, JE is losing more customers than it is gaining. Customers leaving today locked into a temporarily low point in natural gas prices, thus new customers that replace the customers being lost are “higher margin.” While management has spun this as a positive, in reality it is a massive headwind. As noted, the average customer contract is 3.5 years. In early 2012 (exactly 3 ½ years ago), natural gas prices bottomed at nearly $2. So yes, the customers leaving are being replaced by new customers with higher margins, but it is short lived. In the coming quarters, as more customers leave, the new customers will be lower margin than those customers lost. Source: NASDAQ The next two years are going to be a massive headwind as the company loses customers that signed up under much higher natural gas prices than today’s prices. Recognizing this impact, the company began diversifying the portfolio over the past several years. In 2009, debts were zero. Today, debts are in excess of C$677 million. The decision to buy electricity suppliers has cost the company in a time when profits and margins are going to begin eroding. Impact On The Stock Predicting JE’s EPS is a challenge. The company often swings between massive losses and equally massive profits. Over the past three years, the company has posted net profits from C$602 to losses of C$579. With customer attrition likely to increase over the next year, it will be virtually impossible to produce a net income. While Q1 saw an EPS of C$0.67, that figure was due to asset sales. That is not a long-term means of growth. Had the company not sold off a unit for C$505 million, it would have posted a loss for the quarter. For FY2016, expect a significant loss (unless JE continues selling off assets). While management is correct that margins are improving, that effect will fade in Q2 and reverse in Q3. New customers will begin to constrain margins beginning in November. That is because 42 months ago (3.5 years) natural gas prices fell to levels below current levels. That lasted from December 2011 to June 2012. Every customer who signed up after June 2012 is a higher-margin customer than the ones the company is acquiring today. JE requires volatile gas prices for profits. In 2015, natural gas has been flat. In order to turn a profit, gas prices would need to drop. At $2.7 today, that seems unlikely. With all of this in mind, the company could post continuing revenue growth, but will still report losses. Management does not provide earnings or revenue outlook, instead it only focuses on EBITDA outlook. For FY2016, the company expects C$193-C$203 million in EBITDA. The excessive focus on EBITDA is alarming from an investor’s standpoint. Multiple forensic accounting firms have highlighted red flags in relation to how JE calculates its EBITDA. Additionally, it is always alarming when a company with no tangible cost structure (JE does not own any hard assets) only points to EBITDA. In 2015, the company generated sales of C$831 per RCE (residential customer equivalents). This is the non-GAAP figure used to calculate the number of customers. The actual number of customers is around two million. The C$831 per RCE is higher in 2015 because margins are increasing. As margins decline (as I have suggested will be the case in the second half of FY2016), the revenue per RCE should normalize to figures from previous years. About ⅓ of Just Energy’s customers leave each year. In past years that decline was offset by adding more customers, creating a net gain. That trend reversed in Q1. If the rate of decline experienced in Q1 continues throughout FY2016, total RCE will decline to 4,390,000. Using the C$831 figure (which I feel is very generous), total revenue for the year will come to C$3.6b, a 7.7% decline from 2015.   RCE Sales per RCE Sales (in millions)   Q1 4,609,000 C$202.4 C$933   Q2 4,535,000 C$202.4 C$918   Q3 4,462,000 C$202.4 C$903   Q4 4,390,000 C$202.4 C$889   Total – – C$3,643   Source: 10-Q The exact nature of any declines are subject to a number of factors including the timing of margin contraction, the severity of the contraction and the ability of the company to aggressively increase marketing to obtain new customers. All of these factors could impact the above calculation. At the end of the day, things do not look good for Just Energy. It is hard to imagine how the company will grow EBITDA by 5.5% (as it predicts) when the business is facing declining customer growth, increasing attrition and declining margins for 2016. Long term, there are too many headwinds to keep this electricity and natural gas reseller from being an attractive investment. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

The One Factor To Explain Them All

Yesterday’s post on hedge funds got me thinking again about how vague “risk factors” are. CAPM uses a one factor model showing that risk explained why certain assets performed better than others.¹ Basically, take more risk and you’ll generate a better return. That didn’t exactly explain things fully though. In fact, higher risk often correlates with worse returns.² Over the course of the last 25 years the idea of “factor investing” has really boomed. And investment companies loved this because they could market specific stylized facts that explained why the markets do certain things and why you should pay them high fees so they can take advantage of those things for you. Heck, even hardcore passive investors, who are notorious fee avoiders, will trip over themselves buying higher fee funds trying to guess the best factors to own at certain times. As a result, we got the small cap factor and the value factor and the momentum factor and all sorts of other factors. I think we’re up to 1,000+ factors now. There are so many I could just start making them up. And I will. Right now. For instance, companies whose founders are dog owners might outperform companies whose founders are cat owners. This is a perfectly logical assumption because dogs are better than cats so company founders who own dogs must be smarter than company founders who own cats. So, we now have the dog vs cat factor. If I tweak some data and find it’s statistically meaningful over long periods of time then I might even start a high fee fund to sell you. No cat owners allowed, obviously. Okay, okay. I am being stupid. I know. But you see my point, right? A lot of these “factors” could be nothing more than slick data mining by someone who found a pattern that doesn’t really exist. We want to understand and be able to predict things so badly that we often find stylized facts where they don’t even exist. But maybe we just can’t know. That doesn’t mean it’s not worth trying to find out or to try guessing about future outcomes. But we should start from one general factor: The We-Know-A-Lot-Less-Than-We-Think-We-Know Factor This doesn’t require some law of the financial markets that says anything has to outperform anything else over the long-term. Yes, we know that stocks will generally beat bonds because they’re a contract that gives the equity owner greater claim to profits than the bonds, but that doesn’t mean stocks have to outperform bonds or even that they’re more risky (whatever “risk” means in the context of this discussion to begin with, but that’s a whole other matter). The point is, you don’t necessarily earn a “risk premia” in stocks. You earn a contractual premia assuming the firm earns enough profit to pay it out (good luck predicting which firms will generate the highest profits in the future) and a bunch of apes with keyboards try to guess what the future value of those profits will be. Importantly, no one needs the efficient market hypothesis to understand why markets are really hard to beat. You just need the basic arithmetic of global asset allocation to understand that . This whole monetary system is something humans created from thin air. And we have, at best, an imprecise understanding of what financial assets are really worth at certain times and so the best we can do is try to understand the world for what it is, slap together some sound assumptions about the future, reduce our frictions, manage the known risks as best as possible and hope it doesn’t all fall apart at some point. Is it really much more complex than that? ¹ – Here’s the Three Factor Model. Here’s the Five Factor Model. Here’s a 100+ Factor model paper. Here’s a real model. 2 – See this paper titled ” High idiosyncratic volatility and low returns: International and further U.S. evidence “.

Response To: Structured Note Read The Fine Print

Response to a biased article by AllianceBernstein on Structured Notes. Structured Notes may be helpful in introducing, reducing or modifying risk. The referenced Structured Note is not given credit in the referenced article for the downside protection it provides. Furthermore, to compare to a balanced portfolio which wins in all markets is unrealistic. I recently came upon a Seeking Alpha article by Alliance Bernstein titled Structured Notes: Read the Fine Print . The article expressed a fairly negative and, in my opinion, inaccurate view of structured investing based on an analysis of one structured note in particular. As an experienced structurer and trader prior to founding Exceed Investments, I’d like to help set the record straight. The article analyzes a 5-year 28% buffered note on the S&P 500 as an example. While they do not share a link to the terms, the note is similar to, if not exactly the same, as this note . First, let’s briefly consider what a structured note is and discuss its purpose. Structured notes are an example of what I call “defined outcome” investments, which are options-based strategies that allow investors to shape a risk/ reward exposure to fit their personal objectives. In these strategies, market participation levels are preset. Therefore, the targeted downside participation is known in advance, as is the upside potential. A defined outcome investment can be built to introduce risk, reduce risk, or modify it – in this case, the 28% buffered note offers S&P exposure with a material level of downside protection, which I will refer to as downside “insurance” in this article. Performance at maturity, assuming no default of the issuer, looks like this (X axis is Adjusted S&P 500 return; Y axis is the Note return): An investor may be interested in this product if they are risk-averse but still want to participate in equity markets (e.g., an executive who is retiring in 5 years from now and can’t take a big hit over the next 5 years). The “insurance policy” of this note will cover up to 28% of downside “damage” 5 years from now – e.g., market down 28%, investor loses 0, market down 40%, investor loses 12%. As in all insurance policies, a premium needs to be paid – in this case, the investor loses all dividends of the S&P 500. Over 5 years, those lost dividends amount to about 12% in a reasonable model scenario (2% annual dividend rate, assumed reinvestment at a compounded 8%). Is 28% of potential downside insurance worth giving up 12% of dividend upside, while still participating in the price appreciation of the S&P 500? There’s no right answer to that question as it depends on an individual’s needs and perspectives. As mentioned, I found a number of inaccuracies and misrepresentations (e.g., expense levels, liquidity) in the article but will focus on the main items which I found to be flawed. To summarize: The article directly compares the expected performance of the S&P 500 with the Note, without fairly pointing out the insurance benefit provided by the Note The article then compares the performance of a balanced portfolio with the Note, which I find two issues with – Why compare a product vs. a balanced portfolio? It’s an unfair comparison – no sane investor would invest all their funds in a single note The balanced portfolio described is somehow expected to gain during equity declines as well as fairly closely match bull returns, which is just impossible Greater detail follows: “Our analysis suggests that this structured note has an 80% chance of underperforming the S&P 500 over the next five years…” On one hand, while I can’t attest to the accuracy of their model, it seems reasonable. The note will underperform the S&P if the S&P finishes > -12% after 5 years. That’s because the cost of the insurance purchased, (i.e., 12% of lost dividends), will be greater than the insurance “payout” if the market isn’t down by more than 12%. Given historical performance, odds are the S&P does better than a cumulative -12% over the next 5 years. On the other hand, this isn’t a fair statement. If an investor buys any type of insurance, (e.g., earthquake insurance, fire insurance, theft insurance) and there is no major catastrophe in the next 5 years, which is usually the case, the investor will lag the performance of people who didn’t buy insurance. The same is true of buying 28% worth of portfolio insurance – if the market isn’t down by at least your premium spent, you will lag. That obviously doesn’t mean ipso facto that no one should buy insurance. “Projecting thousands of plausible outcomes across all types of market environments, we found that the median outcome for the structured note is more than 6% below what we’d expect from a fully diversified balanced portfolio, as the next Display ” For starters, no reasonable investor would take all their assets and purchase this single structured note vs. choosing a balanced portfolio. A more reasonable approach to this comparison may be to replace a relevant component of the balanced portfolio, for instance large cap value, with the structured note and then stress test outcomes between the two varying portfolios. Now let’s talk about the finding that a balanced portfolio over 5 years results in a median 4.5% return when the stock market finishes down, and a median 38% return when the market finishes up (which is apparently just about equal to the S&P price return). While I am sure their model is well designed, this simply doesn’t pass the smell test. How did individuals with balanced portfolios do in 2008? Hint: not very well. I am not aware of any product or portfolio design that had positive returns in 2008 and then proceeded to equal the price return of the S&P 500 over the following five years. If someone else is, please share it with me so I can invest. In conclusion, while I acknowledge that Structured Notes have issues (I cover them in detail at the end of this white paper ), which is what drove me to found Exceed Investments in the first place, this article does not treat them fairly. Ultimately, the referenced note provides a very defined risk / reward exposure to the S&P 500, providing a level of downside protection that may be deemed appropriate and/or may resonate for a subset of investors. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.