Tag Archives: ideas

Buy The Fourth Quarter Of The Third Year Of The Presidential Cycle

The best time to buy the Presidential Election Cycle is from September of the second year to April of the third year. Nevertheless, the fourth quarter of the third year is strong, particularly after a weak third quarter. In the past, it was better to buy near the end of October than at the end of September. How does the fourth quarter do in the third year of the Presidential election cycle? ‘Everyone knows’ that the third year of the Presidential cycle is incredibly reliable, and has returns that far exceed the other three years. Even Grantham has touted it, which I thought must be tongue-in-cheek, because he is a macro-guy. So I decided to go back and check, and found his letter written at the end of the third quarter in 2014 for GMO. It turns out he was quite serious. Regular readers know the score: +2.5% a month for the seven months from October 1 to April 30, in year three on average since 1932 (a total of +17%). This is now the 21st cycle. The odds of drawing 20 random 7-month returns this strong are just over 1 in 200 according to our 10 million trials. But 17 of the actual 20 historical experiences were up, and the worst of the 3 downs was only -6.4%, so the odds of this consistency plus the high return would be much smaller. The remaining 5 months of the Presidential year have a good but not remarkable record, over .75% per month, but the killer here is that the remaining 36 months since 1932 averaged a measly +0.2% a month!” Reference to the remaining 5 months means that Grantham views the third year of the Presidential cycle as running from September to September. More importantly, we have missed the key months from September 30 to April 30. From 2014 to 2015, that time span had the S&P 500 rising by 11.39%, which is not too shabby given what the market has done since. Yahoo Finance only had S&P 500 data as far back as 1950. So my analysis is for the 16 third years since then (see the table below). We have completed 17 years from his September to April time frame, however, and I calculated an average 19.72% return for those time periods, with a median return of 19.49%. There was only one decline of -.76% in 1978-79. But dividends have not been included. So every period actually had a positive total return. For the full calendar third year, the average return was 17.12%, with a median return of 18.08%. That’s very good also, but not as good, and that is a 12-month return versus Grantham’s 7-month return. For all years since 1950, the average calendar year gain was 9.18%. Therefore, the average gain in the other 3 years of the Presidential cycle works out to 5.69%. Out of the 16 third years, 15 were up, and one was unchanged (2011). With stocks down YTD, the odds would appear to be good that we will get a nice rally over the last three months. I say ‘appear to be good’, because statistically we can’t calculate the odds. This is a small sample. It is not a random sample. And there is no solid theory to support why the pattern of the recent past should hold in the future. Let’s see how the last three months of the third year have done since 1950. From 9/30 to the end of the year, the average gain in the S&P has been 3.04%, with a median return of 4.39%. The mean is lower because of the skew created by 1987. Third Year Pres. Cycle %ch. Oct. 31 to end of yr % ch. Sept. prev. yr to April 3rd yr % ch. Full 3rd year % ch. April to Sept. 3rd yr % ch. 9/30 to end of 3rd yr % ch. Sept. low to end 3rd yr % ch. Oct. low to end 3rd yr % ch. Sept. 30 to Oct. low % ch. Sept. low to Oct. low 1951 3.62 15.32 16.35 3.7 2.19 2.19 4.9 -2.58 -2.58 1955 7.42 17.49 26.40 15.04 4.14 6.74 11.47 -6.57 -4.25 1959 4.12 15.04 8.48 -1.23 5.29 8.61 6.95 -1.55 1.56 1963 1.36 24.04 18.89 2.72 4.63 4.63 4.38 .24 .24 1967 3.40 22.79 20.09 2.87 -.25 2.98 3.4 -3.53 -.41 1971 8.34 23.31 10.79 -5.4 3.81 4.58 8.85 -4.63 -3.92 1975 1.29 37.39 31.55 -3.93 7.54 9.86 8.75 -1.12 1.02 1979 5.91 -.76 12.2 7.43 -1.35 1.35 7.84 -8.53 -6.02 1983 .84 36.55 17.27 1.00 -.69 .43 .95 -1.63 -.52 1987 -1.87 24.66 2.03 11.61 -23.2 -20.4 9.89 -30.1 -27.6 1991 6.28 22.64 26.31 3.31 7.56 8.73 10.69 -2.83 -1.77 1995 5.92 11.24 34.11 13.54 5.39 8.28 6.65 -1.18 1.53 1999 7.8 31.28 19.53 -3.93 14.54 15.84 17.78 -2.75 -1.65 2003 5.83 12.47 26.38 8.62 11.64 11.64 9.20 2.23 2.23 2007 -5.23 10.97 3.53 2.99 -3.82 1.15 -2.15 -1.71 3.37 2011 0.34 19.49 -.003 -17.0 11.15 11.34 14.41 -2.5 -2.69 2015 11.39 -7.93 Mean 3.46 19.72 17.12 1.96 3.04 4.87 7.75 -4.32 -2.59 Med. 3.87 19.49 18.08 2.87 4.39 5.68 8.30 -2.67 -1.09 (The median date of the September low is the 21st. The median date for the October low is the 17th.) The average fourth quarter gain for all years since 1950 is 4.06% with a median of 4.92%. So the third year of the Presidential cycle has a lower average using both measures. The much lower mean is probably because of 1987, but clearly the fourth quarter of the third year is actually not as good as other years. There were 5 down quarters out of 16. They were 1967, 1979, 1983, 1987 and 2007. But all 5 years that declined from April to September 30 (1959, 1971, 1975, 1999, and 2011) had good gains in the fourth quarter . This augurs well for 2015, but 5 out of 5 does not mean we have to get 6 out of 6. The average gain for the two months following October 31 was 3.46% with a median of 3.87%. I don’t know what the comparable percentages are for all years. Two years had declines – 1987 and 2007. So the return is better for the last two months than the last three months. This should not be a surprise. I compared the October lows with the September lows, and found that on average (in the third year), the October low was 2.59% lower than the September low (see the table). October had a lower low in 10 out of 16 years. If you can identify the October low, then the average gain from there to the end of the year was 7.75% with a median of 8.30%. 2007 was the only down year with a loss of -2.15%. Locating the vicinity of the October low is not as stupid as it sounds. The median low date was October 17th. Unfortunately, the 1987 crash was on the 17th, 18th and 19th with the huge losses on the 19th (I remember it well. I was 100% invested and canoeing a river in Missouri.). Eight of the 16 lows were on the 19th or later. Three of the lows were on the second to last or last day. So if you buy at the close on the third to last day, you should be able to beat that average return dated from the end of October. The last two days in October are pretty good on average. I will buy stocks when Financial Select Sector SPDR ETF (NYSEARCA: XLF ) hits a twenty-day high (adjusted for dividend payments). The levels are posted in my Instablog. I actually buy small caps when XLF hits a twenty-day high. I compared the Russell 2000’s performance in the fourth quarter of the third year with the S&P 500 since 1987, and found that on average the S&P did slightly better. The R2000 is more volatile. In strong fourth quarters, it beat the S&P. In weak fourth quarters, it underperformed badly; e.g. 1987. I’m pretty optimistic about the last two months of the year. There is a strong possibility that October will be bad, because of all the negative macro- indicators. Risky high-yield investments like MLPs, mREITs, and junk bonds have been hammered. Sentiment is very negative as indicated by Investors Intelligence, Hulbert’s sentiment measures, Rydex, and Citigroup’s Euphoria/Panic model. I think sentiment follows the market. If October brings further drops in stock prices, then these measures will become even more negative, but that will set us up for a bigger bounce into the end of the year.

Why Hasn’t Active Investing Outperformed Passive Investing In Recent Years?

By Jason Voss, CFA Over the last several months, I’ve explored why active investing has been unable to outperform passive investing in recent years. My series is called Alpha Wounds, and so far, the issues covered are the unintended consequences of benchmarks on active management, the poor measurement techniques of investment industry adjuncts, and the lack of diversity in the human resources portfolio . In this week’s CFA Institute Financial NewsBrief , we decided to ask our readers their explanation for the lack of active management outperformance. Rare for our polls, we included a large number of options to try and capture a wide swathe of opinions. The options provided appear to have successfully reflected the broad range of views, as 90% of the 743 respondents selected one of the specific choices rather than “other”. Because it is difficult to know the precise reason for choosing the “other” category, it makes sense to recalculate the percentages without including “other”. These modified results are the ones listed in parentheses below. Note: We did receive one e-mailed response from a reader who opted for “other”. The reader explained, “I marked ‘other’ [because] the market is illogical, so trying to apply logic is bound to fail.” Why has active investing been unable to outperform passive investing in recent years? (click to enlarge) Active Managers Can Do Nothing to Outperform About 24% (27%) of respondents believe that the reason for active management’s underperformance is the deleterious effects of high fees on net performance . This is not surprising, given the large number of studies highlighting this fact. Many asset management firms are, in fact, trying to reduce their expenses to mitigate this alpha drag. Another 15% (16.5%) believe that individual investment managers cannot compete with the wisdom of financial markets. Combined, this means that about 40% (43.5%) believe that no matter what active managers do, they cannot beat passive investment strategies. Active Managers Can Do Something to Outperform Of the remaining five options, 10% (10.8%) believe that the concentration of top stocks in indices detracts from the success of active managers. For those not familiar with the argument, it recognizes that indices have built in momentum effects because many of them are market capitalization-weighted. Indices are, effectively, “must buy” lists of securities that create demand, not because of fundamentals, but because passive strategists must buy the securities in order to closely track their index. Controlling for these momentum effects is outside the specific capabilities of active managers as security prices advance. When indices fall, however, active managers not invested intimately with the securities in the index should be able to avoid some of the downside. What hope do active managers have of beating passive strategies? Together, the four remaining options provide some insight. Most importantly, according to 18% (20.2%) of respondents, active managers should minimize their use of benchmarking, style boxes, and tracking error, which lead to a sameness of results. Next, 13% (14.7%) believe that active managers are guilty of short-termism and need to change their investment time horizon and lower turnover. Incidentally, lowering turnover reduces trading costs and will reduce the expense ratio of active funds. Increasing diversity of opinion in active management is believed by about one in 20 respondents (5.5%) to be critical for improving success. Lastly, approximately 5% (5.2%) of those polled think that active managers should improve their due diligence to better compete with passive strategies. Active vs. Passive Tug-of-War Taken together, the above four tactics, all well within the purview of active management, represent about 46% of total responses as compared with the roughly 44% of responses from those who believe active strategies can never beat passive ones. This result indicates a tug-of-war between camps and, to my mind, reflects the conversation occurring in the financial community in the long-running active vs. passive debate. Disclaimer: All posts are the opinion of the author. As such, they should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute or the author’s employer.