Tag Archives: ideas

Illiquid Securities Could Bite Mutual Fund Shareholders In The Rear

Increasingly mutual funds are buying into startups before they are public. That sounds great as you read about the valuations afforded non-traded startups. But look at the 2000 tech stock bubble, startups don’t always work out as planned. There has been a series of articles lately spattered across The Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and Forbes discussing the issue of mutual funds and illiquid securities. It isn’t that this is a huge problem, but it’s one that’s worth understanding because it could have a notable impact on you if you happen to own a fund like , say, the Fidelity Contrafund Fund (MUTF: FCNTX ). How much is Airbnb worth? Around the middle of 2015 , Airbnb raised $1.5 billion worth of money by selling non-public shares. That gave the company a valuation of roughly $25.5 billion. Just for reference, Marriott International’s market cap is around $20 billion. Airbnb is a hot tech startup that helps people rent out their guest rooms over the internet. (Marriott is just a lowly public company that’s been doing the whole hotel thing for decades.) Airbnb is such a hot investment because it’s part of the “sharing economy” theme that’s big right now, including names like Uber. Uber is pretty much an online taxi service that allows every day folks to hire themselves out for rides. These are exciting ideas, to be sure, though I’m not a big fan myself. The idea of having strangers stay in my home or of staying in a stranger’s home doesn’t appeal to me. I’ll just pay for a room at a hotel, thanks. But the sharing society theme is really changing the world as we know it. Uber, for example, has prompted taxi drivers around the world to revolt . (And why not, taxi drivers generally have to go through hoops to get their hack licenses, anyone with a car and an Internet connection could potentially become an Uber driver.) But here’s the thing, Uber and Airbnb are private companies. Mom and pop investors can’t buy into them. But as the Airbnb example above shows, sophisticated and wealthy investors can and do. The list of well-heeled investors looking to get in on the next big thing before it goes public, however, is increasingly including mutual funds. The kind of funds that mom and pop investors actually own. That’s some list Take, for example, the Fidelity Contrafund. A quick look at the fund’s June 2015 semi-annual report shows that it’s invested in Airbnb and Uber. But that’s not the end of the list, it’s also invested in 23andme, Blue Apron, Dropbox, and Pinterest, among others. If you’ve never heard of some of these companies don’t feel bad, they are private placement darlings. But if you own Contrafund, you own a tiny slice of these startups. To be fair, they are just a small portion of Contrafund’s portfolio, but I’m not sure that these are the types of companies investors were thinking about when they gave Fidelity Contrafund their hard-earned money to invest. Contrafund, by the way, is hardly alone. For example, the T. Rowe Price Media & Telecommunications Fund (MUTF: PRMTX ) also owned Uber, Dropbox, and Airbnb, among many other private placements at the mid-point of the year . (Just to be clear, I’m not sure Uber or Airbnb count as media or telecom, and I’ll give a leery pass on Dropbox.) Forbes , meanwhile, recently highlighted the Hartford Growth Opportunities Fund (MUTF: HGOIX ) as having as much as 6% of assets in such investments with the Davis Global Fund (MUTF: DGFYX ) at 4%, those are getting to notable numbers percentage wise. And, obviously, This isn’t unique to one fund sponsor or one fund. So my first big concern is really about fund companies living up to their fiduciary duty. Are these the types of investments that should be in a portfolio meant for small investors? You could argue that the funds are providing access to an area from which investors would be otherwise excluded. Moreover, compared to the total portfolio, these investments are relatively small and could have a big payoff. These are true statements and I can see the validity of the arguments. But I remember how shocking it was to watch the tech bubble implode. It was exactly these types of companies that did the imploding once they came public. Is that risk reward tradeoff a good one for a retiree? I’m not sure it is. And if the excitement fades before these private placements list on a public exchange, these investments could turn sour and leave the funds that own them with no way out. Is that a real number? So the appropriateness of private placements in mutual funds is my first concern. But that leads to other issues. For example, it can be hard, if not contractually impossible, to sell private placements since there’s no public market. That means these are illiquid securities that could weigh down the fund in a bear market. The manager will have no choice but to sell more liquid, and potentially better, companies to meet redemptions if investors start pulling money out of the fund. That’s true even if the private companies are still doing OK operationally. And valuations are tricky, too. To give you an example, in PRMTX’s June semi-annual report it’s investment in Airbnb is listed as worth twice what it was purchased for in April of 2014. But there’s no public market so it basically had to make that number up. That’s why there’s a little number 3 footnote next to the position. That footnote tells you that its a level 3 security for valuation purposes. Note 2 to the semi-annual report explains that level 3 prices are based on “unobservable inputs.” (If that wording isn’t ominous, I don’t know what is.) In other words, T. Rowe Price didn’t have a whole lot to go on when assigning Airbnb and its other private placements a valuation. I’m going to believe that they did the best they could to come up with a reasonable valuation, but there’s a problem here. A recent Wall Street Journal article listed the per share price that was used for Uber at four different mutual funds. The difference between the highest and lowest valuations varied by nearly $7 a share. The low end was Contrafund at $33.32 a share. The high end was the BlackRock Global Allocation Fund (MUTF: MDLOX ) at $40.02 a share. On an absolute dollar basis that doesn’t seem so bad, but it’s a strikingly large 20% difference. Interestingly, the Vanguard U.S. Growth Fund (MUTF: VWUSX ) was toward the high-end at $39.64. (Yes, even Vanguard is doing it!) Now here’s an awkward questions that you can’t help but ask: Are some fund families inflating the valuation of private placement investments to boost performance? I don’t want to believe that’s true, but a 20% difference is pretty large. How could these supposedly smart people be so far apart? You have to admit that there’s a lot of temptation there, even if it turns out that everything is on the up and up. Knowing is half the battle This isn’t a reason to sell all your mutual funds. But it is a warning that you should take a moment to review the list of securities that your mutual funds own. You might be surprised at what you find. And while the exposure to these securities might seem small today, don’t underestimate the risk this could pose to the fund and your wealth. That’s particularly true if the impressive valuations that private placements are being afforded today turn out to be nothing more than wishful thinking-just like the Internet darlings that fell of a cliff in the tech crash.

Reeling In Small-Cap Alpha

Summary Stocks of small companies have higher incidences of price volatility and mispricing, increasing opportunities for investors to earn excess returns. Implementing outperforming strategies, such as value or momentum, in the small-cap universe amplifies their alpha-generating potential. High trading costs of small-cap stocks disadvantages passive implementation when compared to skilled active management. Although we live at the edge of the Pacific Ocean, our weekend adventures often take us inland to enjoy the lakes and streams of California and her neighboring states. A favorite pastime is fresh-water fishing. For most, the lure of fishing is a combination of serene beauty, contemplative quiet, and the satisfaction of reeling in as many big fish as possible. We admit that the first two attractions are very appealing in their restorative powers, particularly to office-weary asset managers, but we can’t help being most inspired by the basic challenge of catching a lot of big fish. The folklore claims 10% of fishermen catch 90% of the fish. What do the top 10% know that the others don’t? Investors’ search for alpha is not dissimilar to the strategies of skilled and experienced fishermen. First, the skilled know the right location. They use multiple lines and hooks or lures to increase their opportunities. And they attract greater numbers of fish by chumming – adding scent or bait to the water. In the world of asset management, we can think of risk and mispricing as the chum that attracts alpha. Just as all fishing locations are not equal – contrast the teeming Lake Tahoe with the perishing Salton Sea – not all segments of the equity market are equal in the opportunities they present for finding alpha. Small-Cap Alpha: Abundant, but Unreliable Lake Tahoe is well known for both its abundance and diversity of fish. The academic literature has made a similar case for small stocks, often believed to be a deep pool into which an investor can cast her net and pull out a weighty haul of alpha. Stocks of small companies vary significantly in price volatility, are more prone to defaults, and have high trading costs. In combination, these characteristics create an unpredictable risk distribution for small-cap stocks, and the same traits contribute to their frequently being mispriced. In addition, many known anomalies, or risk factors, have significantly higher return dispersion among small companies, creating numerous opportunities for alpha production. Our research shows, however, that small stocks are not a dependable source of standalone premium. Granted, the small-cap universe is plentiful – there are thousands more small companies than large companies – and diverse – the U.S. economy encourages virtually any type of business or strategy an entrepreneur can envision – but these traits alone are insufficient to ensure small caps will unfailingly produce an excess return. Many market participants believe that, just like value stocks outperform growth stocks, and positive momentum stocks outperform negative momentum stocks, small-cap stocks outperform large-cap stocks. In a recent article (Kalesnik and Beck, 2014), we discuss the evidence that supports the size premium. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the main arguments in favor and against small size as a standalone source of premium. In our view, the arguments against are much stronger than the arguments in favor: we judge the evidence that small-cap companies, in general, outperform large-cap companies to be unreliable. Our advice to the equity investor is to examine that small cap you are considering to be sure it has the alpha-producing qualities you seek – if absent, toss that small fish back, and cast your line again. Small caps are not the fish, they are the fishing spot – not the source of alpha, but rather a place where alpha can be found. A Fertile Fishing Spot Even if small companies are not as a group reliably outperforming large companies, small-cap stocks still hold significant promise for investors – they are a fertile fishing spot for alpha. Small caps, like other investment strategies, benefit from two potential sources of outperformance: 1) exposure to sources of risk that are compensated with higher returns, and 2) systematic sources of mispricing that can be exploited. Small stocks come with higher risk than large stocks as measured by credit rating, delisting probability, and volatility. Table 1 reports the distress and volatility characteristics of U.S. stocks by size quintile. The S&P credit rating difference between small-cap stocks (B rated) and large-cap stocks (A+ rated) indicates the higher likelihood (over 200 times) of smaller stocks being delisted, often because of default. Small caps have a delisting rate of 2.38% versus 0.01% for large caps. The higher price volatility of small caps is evident at both portfolio and stock-specific levels. The portfolio composed of the smallest 20% of stocks is about 44% more volatile than the portfolio of the largest 20% of stocks – 20.6% versus 14.3%, respectively. A portfolio, however, masks a lot of stock-specific volatility. A comparison of the median stock volatility of the highest and lowest quintiles is significantly more striking: the median volatility of the smallest stocks (50.5%) is almost 100% more volatile than the median volatility of the largest stocks (25.5%). Also, the dispersion in stock volatility is much greater for small stocks than for large stocks, with a 25th-75th percentile range of 32.1%-76.0% compared to 19.8%-33.2%, respectively. With a much wider dispersion in stock-level risk, investors looking to capitalize on known risk premia should consider doing their fishing in the small-cap side of the pond. Smaller companies, by virtue of their vast numbers, limited market liquidity, and resultant lower investor demand, tend as a category to have very light analyst coverage. Therefore, much less is known by, or available to, the average investor about the fundamental strength of most small companies. Investors struggle to digest this complexity and to translate the information they are able to discern into efficient prices. Greater instances of mispricing are the practical outcome. Such mispricing creates an opportunity for investors to capture excess returns, much as the fisherman’s baited hook entices the next bream that skims by. If mispricing in the small-cap segment of the market is well known, why does the mispricing persist? Why is it not arbitraged away? One likely reason is high trading costs. Table 2 lists the average bid-ask spreads for each of the size quintiles over the period 1988-2014. The bid-ask spread serves as a proxy for trading costs. Clearly, the average spread is much higher for the smallest-cap quintile compared to the largest over both the entire 27-year period and the last 10 years. Large trading costs make potential trades of small-cap stocks less profitable, allowing the mispricing to persist. Just as a lake with heavier vegetation provides a more fertile environment for fish to thrive, we believe the small-cap universe provides fertile ground for finding highly mispriced stocks. In the never-ending debate over whether certain sources of outperformance – such as value and momentum – arise from risk or mispricing, for our purposes, it actually doesn’t matter! Based on the evidence we have just presented, small caps offer a bountiful location to find alpha. Reeling In Alpha As we stated in the previous section, outperformance requires that risk be adequately compensated by return. In seeking excess returns, we can attempt to exploit the higher riskiness and greater probability of mispricing in small-cap stocks by implementing outperforming strategies – such as those that capture the value, momentum, and quality premiums – within the small-cap universe. Value in small caps. In the simplest interpretation, value strategies favor the stocks of companies with high accounting fundamentals-to-price ratios (value stocks) relative to those with low fundamentals-to-price ratios (growth stocks). The high ratio of fundamentals relative to price can signal that the stock is justifiably risky so that the market is willing to purchase the stock only at a reduced price. Alternatively, the high ratio may signal that the stock is actually underpriced for its fundamentals. In either case, historical experience has shown that buying value companies has been a profitable strategy. For value stocks deemed to be cheap because of higher risk, this characteristic should be magnified in the more opaque small-cap universe, and hence, offer investors a higher premium for assuming that risk. For value stocks attributed to mispricing (i.e., fundamentally strong stocks being temporarily priced too low, and vice versa), returns should be higher when the value strategy is executed in small caps because of the greater potential for the mispricing of small companies. In Table 3 , we show the performance of different definitions of value strategies implemented in both large-cap and small-cap stocks from 1967 to 2014. Value stocks, regardless of the definition of value, 1 outperform growth stocks in both large-cap and small-cap market segments. More importantly, the outperformance of value stocks relative to growth stocks is significantly larger for the strategies executed in small-cap stocks. The t-stats of two of the long-short value strategies implemented in small caps are significant at the 1% level, and one is significant at the 5% level. This compares to two of the same strategies implemented in the large-cap universe being significant at the 5% level, and one at the 10% level. Momentum in small caps. The momentum strategy favors stocks that over a recent period have risen steadily in price. Once identified, these stocks typically continue their upward, outperforming trajectory for an additional period of time; momentum can also assume a downward trajectory. Like the value strategy, the momentum strategy’s ability to deliver excess returns has both risk and mispricing explanations. In our view, the most convincing argument is related to risk, that is, market participants initially underreact to earnings surprises (up or down), only to follow up with a buy or sell action when the earnings information is later confirmed. Similar to the argument we made for implementing a value strategy with small-cap stocks, the risk associated with a momentum strategy would also be amplified when implemented with small caps and would generate a higher return premium. If momentum derives its value-add from mispricing, the fact that small caps are potentially more prone to mispricing should make a momentum strategy implemented in small caps even more profitable. In Table 4 , we compare the performance of the recent winners versus losers in the universes of large-cap and small-cap stocks. The gains from momentum are much higher among the small caps. The t-stats of all five momentum strategies implemented in small caps are significant at the 1% level compared to only two of the five strategies being significant at the 10% level when implemented in large caps. Quality in small caps. Quality investing as a standalone strategy has been gaining a lot of attention. Investing in quality companies is intuitively appealing, but what drivers underlie the strategy? Again, the possible explanations are mispricing and risk. Mispricing theory would argue that investors are unable to correctly translate information beyond simple financial metrics into efficient prices, and risk theory would argue that several metrics related to quality are associated with a distinct undiversifiable correlation pattern, which in a multifactor setting may signal that quality stocks are compensated by a risk premium. If either or both of these explanations are true, we would expect a stronger relationship in the universe of small-cap stocks. A quality strategy encompasses a very broad category of possible signals, creating the danger of focusing on a nonrepresentative outlier. To avoid this potential problem, we identify nine broad groups of quality definitions, and within these groups, 35 narrower definitions. Table A2 in the Appendix provides the definitions. We simulate the performance of the 35 quality definitions in both large-cap and small-cap universes. Table 5 provides these results. 2 We find that for large-cap stocks in the aggregate, quality stocks do not have a performance advantage over junk stocks. 3 By contrast, in the small-cap universe, quality stocks outperform junk stocks. The performance advantage as indicated by the t-stat of the long-short quality portfolio is statistically significant at the 1% level for small caps. In the recent article, “Size Matters If You Control Your Junk,” Asness et al. (2015) document that small-cap companies outperform the market if low-quality companies are avoided. We have a minor quibble with the interpretation of trying to rescue the size premium by controlling for junk. Why not “Size Matters If You Control Your Growth” or “Size Matters If You Avoid Losers”? Arguing that size matters if you control for junk, rather than arguing that most anomalies generate better performance – or any performance at all – when implemented in small-cap stocks, is not much different from arguing, for example, that rebalancing is a repackaged value strategy. At the end of the day, however, our empirical findings and those of Asness et al. are similar: quality small-cap stocks can be a good source of excess return. Both Location and Skill Matter The key to a successful day of fishing is location. The same is true of outperforming in the equity market. The investor must find where alpha is located. Small size – along with value and momentum – is generally considered to be a singularly promising location. Our empirical research, however, calls this general wisdom into question. We find that small size alone does not guarantee outperformance. But small size does offer fertile waters in which to find alpha and reel it in. Both sources of outperformance in investment strategies – compensated risk and mispricing – are amplified when implemented in the small-cap universe because small-cap stocks take both characteristics to the extreme; well-known anomalies show much stronger outcomes when implemented among smaller companies. We conclude that exploiting outperforming strategies within the small-cap universe can deliver excess returns. Because small-cap stocks have high trading costs, implementation skill matters – a lot. Passive implementation of investment strategies in the small-cap segment of the market is definitely disadvantaged versus their skilled active implementation. Active managers can hide their trades, position themselves to narrow the bid-ask spread, and minimize turnover. Ultimately, the equity investor will haul in a larger alpha catch by emulating the skilled fisherman: first, identifying a promising location (i.e., small cap stocks), then using multiple lines and hooks (i.e., implementing value, momentum, and quality strategies to exploit the chum of risk and mispricing in each), and lastly, dangling the lure of skilled active management to tease out the smallest trading costs possible. Endnotes The only value strategy that lacks statistical significance in Table 3 is the strategy defined by dividend yield. It comes with significant volatility reduction, a feature, however, that can make the strategy attractive to some investors. The lower volatility of the high dividend yield portfolio increases the volatility of the long-short portfolio used in the statistical test and renders the difference statistically insignificant. Hsu et al. (forthcoming) document that in terms of Sharpe ratios, the value strategy defined as dividend yields provides an economically and statistically significant advantage. We show only the aggregate results in the interest of space We interpret these findings as a lack of robustness for quality as a broad investment category. It does not mean that individual definitions of quality may not have investment merits; further characteristics may be of interest and deserve more detailed study. References Asness, Cliff, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel, Tobias Moskowitz, and Lasse Heje Pederson. 2015. “Size Matters If You Control Your Junk.” Fama-Miller working paper (January). Available at SSRN. Banz, Rolf. 1981. “The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common Stocks.” Journal of Financial Economics , vol. 9, no. 1 (March): 3-18. Hsu, Jason, Vitali Kalesnik, Helge Kostka, and Noah Beck. Forthcoming. “Factor Zoology.” Research Affiliates working paper. Kalesnik, Vitali, and Noah Beck. 2014. ” Busting the Myth About Size .” Research Affiliates Simply Stated, December. Sloan, Richard. 1996. “Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About Future Earnings?” The Accounting Review , vol. 71, no. 3 (July): 289-315. The authors wish to thank Chris Brightman, CFA, and Kay Jaitly, CFA, for their substantial contributions to this article. Appendix This article was originally published on researchaffiliates.com by Vitali Kalesnik and Noah Beck . Disclaimer: The statements, views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of Research Affiliates, LLC. Any such statements, views or opinions are subject to change without notice. Nothing contained herein is an offer or sale of securities or derivatives and is not investment advice. Any specific reference or link to securities or derivatives on this website are not those of the author.

Utility ETFs Slide On Weaker-Than-Expected Q3 Earnings

The utility sector disappointed in its third-quarter results over the last two weeks with earnings and revenue miss from some of the major players in the space, including Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE: DUK ), NextEra Energy (NYSE: NEE ) and Dominion Resources Inc. (NYSE: D ). However, a recovering U.S. economy, warmer-than-normal weather and ultra-low interest rates helped boost the top and bottom lines of most of these companies. The latest concern threatening the utility sector is the possibility of an interest rate hike in December by the Fed following stellar jobs report for October and the Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s affirmative stance on it. This high-yielding, capital intensive sector mostly resorts to external sources of financing to carry out its generation, distribution and transmission projects. Therefore, a rising interest rate environment certainly does not bode well for them. Below we have highlighted the third-quarter results of the aforementioned utility companies in detail. Duke Energy Duke Energy reported adjusted earnings of $1.47 per share for the quarter that fell short of the Zacks Consensus Estimate of $1.52 by 3.3%. However, quarterly earnings rose 5% year over year on the back of warmer weather compared to the previous year. Further, robust growth in its regulated utilities business as well as the North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency acquisition led to the upside. Total revenue was $6,483 million, lagging the Zacks Consensus Estimate of $6,595 million by 1.7%. Nevertheless, revenues increased 1.4% on a year-over-year basis, driven mainly by rise in the company’s regulated electric unit’s revenues. The company tapered its high end of the earlier 2015 earnings guidance range to $4.55-$4.65 per share from $4.55-$4.75 per share. Shares of the company declined 5.5% (as of November 9, 2015) since its earnings release on November 5. NextEra Energy NextEra Energy’s quarterly adjusted earnings of $1.60 per share missed the Zacks Consensus Estimate of $1.64 by 2.4%. Despite this, earnings climbed 3.2% year over year on the back of higher revenues from Florida Power & Light Company. However, operating revenues of $4,954 million surpassed the Zacks Consensus Estimate by 2.7% and increased 6.5% from the year-ago level. NextEra reaffirmed its 2015 earnings guidance of $5.40-$5.70 per share and expects the figure to come in on the upper end of the range. Meanwhile, earnings per share are expected in a range of 5.85-$6.35 for 2016 and $6.60-$7.10 for 2018. Shares of the company went down nearly 5% since its earnings release on October 28. Dominion Resources Dominion Resources’ quarterly operating earnings of $1.03 per share lagged the Zacks Consensus Estimate of $1.06 by 2.8%. However, earnings increased 10.8% from 93 cents per share in the prior-year quarter due to normal weather and earnings from farmout transactions. The company’s operating revenues of $2,976 million also missed the Zacks Consensus Estimate of $3,181 million by 6.4% and declined about 2.4% year over year. Dominion expects to earn 85 cents to 95 cents per share for the fourth-quarter 2015 compared with 84 cents per share in the year-ago period. The company reaffirmed its 2015 earnings guidance of $3.50 to $3.85 per share. Shares of the company fell 5.2% since its earnings release on November 2. ETFs in Focus The sliding stock prices of these utility companies following the dull third-quarter results have adversely impacted the performance of ETFs with significant exposure to them. Below we have highlighted three of these ETFs, which have lost around 5% in the past two weeks. Investors are advised to exercise caution before investing in these ETFs as the looming rate hike is expected to worsen their performance in the coming days ahead. Utilities Select Sector SPDR (NYSEARCA: XLU ) XLU is one of the most popular in the space with nearly $6.3 billion in AUM and average daily volume of roughly 12.5 million shares. The main purpose of this fund is to provide investment results that correspond to the performance of the Utilities Select Sector Index. This fund holds 29 stocks with NextEra Energy, Duke Energy and Dominion Resources holding the top three spots with a combined exposure of nearly 25% in its assets. The fund charges only 15 bps in investor fees per year and currently carries a Zacks ETF Rank #3 (Hold) with a Medium risk outlook. Vanguard Utilities ETF (NYSEARCA: VPU ) This ETF tracks the MSCI US Investable Market Utilities 25/50 Index, measuring the performance of 81 U.S. utilities stocks as classified under the Global Industry Classification Standard. Duke Energy, NextEra Energy and Dominion Resources occupy the top three positions in the fund with a combined exposure of a little more than 20% in the fund’s assets. The fund has amassed $1.6 billion in its asset base and trades in a moderate volume of 144,000 shares per day. It is even cheaper than XLU with 12 bps in annual fees and carries a Zacks ETF Rank #3 with a Medium risk outlook. iShares Dow Jones US Utilities (NYSEARCA: IDU ) The fund follows the Dow Jones U.S. Utilities Sector Index, measuring the performance of 60 utility stocks in the U.S. equity market. Duke Energy, NextEra Energy and Dominion Resources are placed in the top three positions in the fund, together accounting for a share of nearly 21% of the total assets. The fund manages an asset base of around $560 million and exchanges about 182,000 shares per day. It is a bit expensive with 43 bps in annual fees and has a Zacks ETF Rank #3 with a Medium risk outlook. Original Post