Tag Archives: health

The Hidden Danger Of Index Funds

Summary Index funds have grown fantastically in popularity, and in 2014 received over half of inflows to equity funds. Data suggests that index funds outperform during bull markets, but not during bear markets. Index funds have become extremely popular, perhaps a bit too popular for both the health of your portfolio during current market conditions and the long-term implications to the stock market. The recent return of volatility to the market – multiple days where the major averages gained or lost several percent – has revealed a lot about the stock market that years of slow, grinding gains managed to camouflage. Index funds have become the “new religion” of the stock market, but they may not be the panacea that many think. In particular, they may pose a danger to the value of your investments under current market conditions. The Growth of Index Funds Index funds have been around for decades. Vanguard introduced its Vanguard Five Hundred Index Fund (MUTF: VFINX ) in 1976. Enthusiasm for indexing remained muted for years, but in 1992 the Amex went a step further and created the S&P Depository Receipts Trust Series 1, or “SPDRs.” These proved extremely popular, and many other Exchange Traded Funds (“ETFs”) soon followed. The allure of ETFs that mirror an index is obvious. They remove human error and, more importantly, the expense of active management. The real benefit, though, is the fact that securities linked to an index provide an “average” performance that beats that of the majority of active managers. The media loves to tout that passive investing beats active investing up to 85% of the time. Warren Buffett famously advises non-professionals to dump their money into index funds. Even those arguing in favor of active management, such as Wealthfront Knowledge Center, must admit that during bull markets, index returns beat those of most active managers. So, this is not an attack on index funds. They have their place. However, there is more to the story than simply assuming that index funds will remove all investing concerns. Burton Malkiel, whose “A Random Walk Down Wall Street” is one of the classics of investing, studied why index funds are better investments. He concluded that the primary reason is simply the extra costs associated with active management. Otherwise, they offer similar performance. There are good reasons for passive investment. Many, if not most, investors, don’t have the time or inclination to ascend the steep learning curve required to become a successful investor. They have their own careers, own lives, and not everyone is entranced by the wonders of the stock market. While one might think that the growth of the Internet and extremely low commissions relative to the past would lead to individual investors becoming more active investors who take matters into their own hands, it seems that the opposite is taking place. Why this is happening is a complex problem. Perhaps the inundation of random facts and opinions about stocks now available on the Internet has the perverse (or perhaps salutary) effect of making amateur investors realize how little they (or their advisers) really know about how stocks will do. From its humble origins in the 1970s, index investing recently has mushroomed. As of year-end 2013, it accounted for 35% of equity funds and 17% of fixed income funds. In 2014, 55% of money invested in equity mutual funds went to index funds. Obviously, if the asset base of equity funds was 35% in index funds, but the marginal contributions constituted 55%, the popularity of index funds is growing quickly. One could almost call it a “bandwagon effect.” There is very good reason to be leery about something that provides such an attractive lure that seems to cure all investing problems. Why This Trend is Dangerous It is easy for investors to look at the research showing the out-performance of index funds, throw up their hands, and bypass active management. I myself like index-based funds. They make sense for good returns without too much effort, and the data supports that. The problem is that they make too much good sense. This was masked for several years due to the gradual rise of the U.S. markets since the 2008-2009 recession. Basically, the stock market during these past few years was a “one decision” project. If you bought during periods of market weakness, the market quickly sent the averages to new highs. We can argue about the reasons, but the slow, steady, unflinching march higher of the S&P 500 and other major indexes in recent years made active management basically superfluous. Why pay the additional costs of active management if everything is going up? While making perfect sense for the individual investor, for the investing class this seemingly ironclad line of reasoning could lead to poor results in the future for a couple of reasons. First, index funds do not perform well during bear markets. In fact, a study found that during bear markets, an S&P 500 index fund beat only 34% and 38% of its active management competitors. That means that the “cruise control” of index funds will send you into the ditch just at the wrong time. Second, index funds rely on the pricing of their components for their own pricing, but that pricing can be questionable at times. This may seem trivial, but it can hurt you in unexpected ways during illiquid markets. On Monday 24 August 2015, when the Dow Jones Industrials opened down over 1100 points, many stocks didn’t open until well after the open. Market makers basically had to “guess” at the prices of their stocks. Old-time market participants will recall the same thing happening during the 1987 market break, and during others. This type of volatility leads to “pricing havoc” of index ETFs, as happened on Monday. That may sound terrific if you wanted to buy an ETF at a weirdly low price, but not if you were selling. Third, the growth of index funds appears to be turning the market into a binary casino. Now, it is hardly new to disparage the market as a random casino, that has been going on for as long as stock markets have been around. However, decreasing the role of active managers means the market increasingly leans toward becoming an “all or nothing” bet. If people are selling, then everything sells off at once, and vice versa. Bob Pisani at CNBC noted that there were wild swings of “panic selling” and “panic buying” during the big Monday morning rout, something he had never seen before. He mentioned that there were “strange numbers” in the market, such as only two new highs and 1200 new lows, and 120 stocks advancing while 3100 were declining. Was this due to the influence of all-or-nothing indexing decisions? That could have been a contributing factor. If you were holding an index fund, that would have directly affected pricing of your holdings, quite possibly to your detriment if you had chosen that time to sell. A glance at the chart shows how bizarre some prices were that morning. Fourth, if you don’t have active managers and sufficient numbers of investors in individual stocks, on what exactly are the indexes going to be based in the future? This is more of a longer-term problem, but if you don’t have millions of individual decisions being made about individual securities every day, the market is only going to become more binary and treacherous. The only thing left to determine its course, really, will be economic government data at a macro level, with individual stock prices set basically by the index funds. The individuality of the market will lessen, and as things become more “standardized,” you can count on returns decreasing. Conclusion Index funds make good sense for the individual investor – too much good sense at times. I use them myself, as do many professional investors. However, hidden dangers lurk both in the short term – if the market suddenly stops rising year after year – and long term. They can be dangerous to your financial health during times of market volatility. There are many ways for the individual investor to shield themselves from these sorts of dangers, but ignoring them is not one of them. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

ALLETE: Not A Compelling Buy For Dividend Investors

Summary Reliance on aging coal-fired power generation is a risk. Capital expenditures and dividend payments exceed operational cash flow. Dividend yield is solid but has not grown and is unlikely to grow meaningfully in the future. ALLETE, Inc. (NYSE: ALE ) primarily operates as a regulated utility, providing services for customers in Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, and Illinois. By comparison to some utilities, ALLETE’s largest customers are primarily industrial in nature, with these large customers (mining and paper industries primarily) drawing 54% of KWH generated. Because of this, ALLETE profit is tied directly to the health of these industries. Luckily, Minnesota mining production has continued at full-speed even in the face of a global rout in commodities that have deeply impacted the iron and steel industries. Investors who own ALLETE should focus more of their attention on the health of ALLETE industrial customers rather than traditional utility research, such as demographic trends and unemployment growth in the service areas that primarily affect residential consumers. Aging Infrastructure And Management’s Plan The vast majority of energy production for ALLETE comes from coal-fired power generation. At the end of 2014, 64% (1,277 MW) of energy production was coal-fired. The majority of these coal-fired plants are getting quite old — while units 3 and 4 at the Cohasset, MN facility are the newest (producing 75% of generation at this massive facility), these were still originally constructed in 1973 and 1980. Like a large swath of US coal-fired plants, obsolesce may soon be around the corner. The average lifespan of a coal-fired plant is forty years, according the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners . While the Cohasset facility has seen many updates over the years, facts remain that the bones of the facility have aged. Those that follow my work on utilities know that I’m a big fan of natural gas and other renewable power regeneration. This isn’t driven by my own personal feelings on the environmental impact. Regardless of your thoughts on environmental regulation, investors should nonetheless be aware of the fact that the Environmental Protection Agency has begun taking a harder stance on coal and that course is unlikely to change. Regulations on pollutant emission will likely only continue to strengthen and so will the cost burden on utilities to maintain necessary updates on these aging coal-fired plants. As a recent example of the cost impact, ALLETE is nearing completion of an environmental upgrade at one of its plants; total cost will run $260M to bring the plant into compliance with the Mercury Emissions Reduction Act. While this is cost recovery eligible through rate increases on the retail customer and if approved these customers will have no alternative but to bear the cost, industrial customers (which if we remember constitute the majority of revenue) do have the option to pursue other providers with approval from the state or can generate their own electricity on-site. This is why it is imperative that investors who remain long on ALLETE as a company pay close attention to the strides the company is making in renewables and natural gas. The company is targeting a production goal of thirds — one-third of energy production with coal, one-third with renewables, and one-third with natural gas. This was most likely driven in part by the Minnesota Next Generation Energy Act of 2007, which requires 25% of retail energy sales to be from renewables by 2025, with hurdles of 17% in 2016 and 20% in 2020. These hurdles are around the corner, but luckily ALLETE does have a foundation to work off of. There is some minimal existing hydroelectric production (105 MW) spread throughout Minnesota, but the likely new crown jewel for ALLETE is its Bison Wind Energy Center in North Dakota, which produced 497 MW of energy at the end of 2014. Further bolstering renewables production is the agreement reached to purchase hundreds of megawatts of production from AES Corporation (NYSE: AES ) early on in 2015. I’m long AES Corporation, and I see this as a win/win for both companies. AES has spread itself way too thin around the globe and these asset sales make sense to let the company gain focus on more core facilities. ALLETE in return gains solid wind production facilities that will likely be immediately accretive to earnings per share. As another related victory for ALLETE in the renewables space, the deal for ALLETE to construct a wind farm for Montana-Dakota Utilities, a division of MDU Resources Group (NYSE: MDU ) shows that the company has an industry reputation for knowing what it is doing when it comes to wind construction. Operating Results (click to enlarge) Total revenue has grown at a 5.81% over the past five-year period and this trend is set to continue with revenue projected at 1.2B for 2015. Fuel expenses have fallen as coal prices have taken a nosedive, a benefit that many utilities have enjoyed in recent years. This input cost windfall has resulted in expanding operating margins. Net income growth would have been stronger if not for a burgeoning debt load; total debt now stands at nearly $1.4B, almost double the $773M the company held in 2014. This is due to the fact that capital expenditures have massively outstripped operational cash flow over the past five years. Operational cash flow totaled $1.2B in the 2010-2014 period; capital expenditures totaled $1.8B. This out-of-balance is before factoring in dividends, which totaled another $350M. This is not what you want to see from a utility. By comparison, Calpine Corporation (NYSE: CPN ), which I own, has seen nearly $3.8B in operational cash flow versus $2.8B in capital expenditures over the same timeframe. This falls back to the cost of running and maintaining coal-fired plants. Calpine primarily operates extremely new, high-technology natural gas plants, the direct opposite of ALLETE’s current portfolio. Management is guiding these costs to fall over the next five years, capital expenditures are guided to average $250M/year versus the prior five-year average of $360M. Even with those decreases, ALLETE may continue to run into a situation where they must raise more debt to fund all their obligations. Conclusion While investors might be tempted by the 4% dividend yield, investors should keep in mind the five-year average dividend growth rate has only been 2.2% and this is unlikely to change. No large catalysts exist for substantial earnings per share and dividend expansion in my opinion. Total shareholder returns are likely to lag a broader utility index and investors would likely be better off in other names with more opportunity. Larger peers like American Electric Power (NYSE: AEP ) or prior-mentioned name AES Corporation present more compelling stories for stable dividend growth. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Arbitrage Alert! Closed-End Funds At Divergent Valuations

Summary BME and THQ are closed-end funds with similar investment objectives and portfolios which have been well correlated historically. The funds are currently trading at wildly divergent premium/discount valuations. Long/short traders should consider a pair trade of long THQ, short BME. BME has filed for a secondary offering of shares that represents more than 20 days’ volume, adding further downward pressure to that fund. As any investor even moderately familiar with the world of closed-end fund (CEF) investing knows, funds rarely trade at net asset value. Funds’ market-determined prices can be at a premium to – or more frequently, a discount to – net asset value (NAV). Theories abound about why the market tends to “love” or “hate” funds at a given time. However, to state the obvious, the market tends to feel similarly about similar funds. For instance, currently, the market hates funds that focus on high yield bonds, while favoring funds that focus on lower yielding, higher quality bonds. As a result, premium/discount arbitrage can be tricky since it creates risk that the market proves correct in its love and hatred of different categories of funds (hint: the market is often quite wrong). Currently, however, there exists an interesting arbitrage pair trade between two similar biotech funds, BME and THQ, which exist on opposite ends of the market’s love/hate continuum. Similar Funds BlackRock Health Sciences Trust (NYSE: BME ) is a well established, non-diversified fund which focuses on healthcare equity investments, with an option writing overlay for added income. From the sponsor website: BlackRock Health Sciences Trust’s (the ‘Trust’) investment objective is to provide total return through a combination of current income, current gains and long-term capital appreciation. The Trust seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing, under normal market conditions, at least 80% of its assets in equity securities of companies engaged in the health sciences and related industries and equity derivatives with exposure to the health sciences industry. The Trust utilizes an option writing (selling) strategy to enhance dividend yield. Tekla Healthcare Opportunities Fund (NYSE: THQ ) is a younger fund that was launched by Tekla just over a year ago to focus on a similar segment of healthcare-related equity investments. From Tekla’s website: Tekla Healthcare Opportunities Fund (“THQ”) is a non-diversified closed-end fund traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker THQ. THQ employs a versatile investment strategy with broad access to opportunities within 11 sub-sectors of healthcare and has the ability to invest across a company’s full capital structure. While there are some differences in scope, (BME uses option writing while THQ has been active in convertible debt), the two funds are remarkably similar in their asset allocations, in some cases making major investments in identical equities [Biogen Inc. (NASDAQ: BIIB ), Celgene Corporation (NASDAQ: CELG ), Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (NYSE: BMY )] and in others choosing close competitors. Source: cefconnect.com, Fund SEC filings Unsurprisingly, given the similarity in holdings, the funds’ net asset values have generally moved in lock-step, with a correlation of daily NAV changes of 0.94 ( source: Convergence Investments analysis) during the past 12 months. (click to enlarge) Source: Yahoo! finance Divergent Valuations Despite the funds’ quite similar portfolios and NAV performance, the market is (currently) valuing the funds quite differently. As of closing on 8/18, THQ traded at -10.5% discount to NAV while BME traded at a 8.1% premium , implying that BME investors are willing to spend 21% more for a similar basket of investments. BME Premium/Discount YTD (click to enlarge) THQ Premium/Discount YTD (click to enlarge) Source: cefconnect.com The Trade While 10% discounts or 8% premiums are both within the range of normal for closed-end funds, the simultaneous existence of both in similar funds is quite rare. The trade implied by this temporary market mispricing is fairly straightforward. Long/short investors should consider long THQ, short BME. Given the funds’ high cross correlation and relatively similar beta risk (BME: 0.63, THQ: 0.69, source: Convergence Investments analysis ), it would not be unreasonable to use 1:1 ratio for a market neutral position. Long-only investors considering investment in BME should strongly consider the alternative of THQ and those with current positions in BME may consider rotating into THQ. I should note, however, that my firm takes no view for or against the healthcare sector so long-only investors should consider their attraction to sector exposure in addition to the many other factors to consider regarding suitability for any investor’s unique circumstances. A Potential Catalyst Finally, Blackrock’s BME fund recently filed definitive materials with the SEC on 8/12/15 for a 453,000 share secondary offering. While the share distributors will undoubtedly seek to sell into the market gradually, this share count is more than 20x average daily volumes so is likely to introduce some downward pressure, especially if share distributors see narrowing premiums. Disclosure: I am/we are long THQ. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: Also, currently short BME. Convergence Investment Management may recommend various securities included within this article for inclusion for individual client portfolios. These recommendations may change at any time and are specific to the individual client’s objectives and risk tolerance.