Tag Archives: etfs

The Sources Of Volatility And The Challenge For Active Management

By Craig Lazzara, Global Head of Index Investment Strategy If we needed a reminder of the continuing volatility of the world’s financial markets, the first weeks of 2016 obliged us by providing one. What’s often overlooked, especially when volatility spikes, is that there are two distinct sources of volatility . Understanding them can not only enhance our appreciation of market dynamics, but also provides some important insights for portfolio managers. The two components are correlation and dispersion . Correlation, the more familiar of the two, is a measure of timing . Correlations within an equity market are, in our experience, invariably positive , indicating that stocks tend to move up and down together. As correlations rise and diversification effects diminish, the co-movement of index components is heightened, and market volatility increases. Dispersion, on the other hand, is a measure of magnitude : it tells us by how much the return of the average stock differs from the market average. In a high dispersion environment, the gap between the market’s winners and losers is relatively large. Given positive correlations, as dispersion rises, the market’s gyrations will take place within wider bands – and volatility will increase. The chart below illustrates the cross-sectional interaction of dispersion, correlation, and volatility using the sectors of the S&P 400 . The numbers in parentheses show the last 12 months’ volatility for each sector. Energy, unsurprisingly, was the most volatile sector, driven largely by its very wide dispersion. The Financials sector was the index’s least volatile. Notice that the volatility of Utilities (17.4%) and Health Care (17.0%) were more or less the same. Yet their volatility came from different sources . Utility volatility is correlation-driven; the gap between the sector’s winners and losers is low, producing low dispersion, but the winners and losers are highly likely to move together, producing high correlation. Health Care’s volatility comes from the opposite direction – from low correlation, meaning that the sector’s components tend to move more independently, but with higher dispersion, indicating a bigger gap between winners and losers. The sources of sector volatility have important implications for active managers: For a sector like Utilities, stock selection should be a relatively low priority. Low dispersion means that the gap between winners and losers is relatively low; this reduces the value of an analyst’s skill . For Health Care (and other high-dispersion sectors), the situation is different – the opportunity to add (or to lose) value by stock selection is relatively large. If research resources are constrained, this is where they should be concentrated. The nature of the research question is fundamentally different for these two sector types. For Utilities, the sector call is important, the stock selection decision much less so. For Health Care, the stock selection decision is more critical. An investor who understands the sources of volatility is more likely to be successful at managing and exploiting it. Disclosure: © S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC 2015. Indexology® is a trademark of S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC (SPDJI). S&P® is a trademark of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC and Dow Jones® is a trademark of Dow Jones Trademark Holdings LLC, and those marks have been licensed to S&P DJI. This material is reproduced with the prior written consent of S&P DJI. For more information on S&P DJI and to see our full disclaimer, visit www.spdji.com/terms-of-use .

Evaluating Sustainable Competitive Advantages: Entry And Exit Barriers

Originally published October 9, 2015 By Baijnath Ramraika, CFA and Prashant Trivedi, CFA Click to enlarge “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulder of Giants.” – Isaac Newton “In business, I look for economic castles protected by unbreachable moats.” – Warren Buffett In our earlier research papers on the topic of high quality, Investment Returns to Quality in Developed Markets and High Quality Stocks in Emerging Markets , we showed that high-quality stocks generate superior investment returns with lower risk compared to their benchmark indexes. While both papers laid out a quantitative framework for identifying high-quality businesses, the optimal investment selection process includes a significant non-quantitative component: the existence of sustainable competitive advantages. A strong competitive advantage and its sustainability are the most important attributes of a high-quality business. Much of the investment returns that accrue to investors from the quality factor depends on the ability of the business to persist with its supernormal returns on capital. However, the excess returns can persist only if the business is able to keep competition at bay, which is a factor of the sustainability of the competitive advantage of the business. While it is possible to develop quantitative models that can differentiate businesses that possess sustainable competitive advantages from those that don’t, this is best done within a well-structured human-decision-making process while recognizing its cognitive limitations. Our research paper on the limited rationality of the human mind further investigates the design of such a process such that errors of cognition are minimized. This article is the first in a series discussing an assessment process for existence or absence of sustainable competitive advantages. In this article, we discuss the basic building blocks of an investment process designed to identify high-quality businesses: the entry and exit barriers. There is nothing new about much of what is discussed here. The concept of sustainable competitive advantages and the building blocks to the assessment of sustainable competitive advantages have been discussed and elaborated by several market luminaries including Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. Through this series of articles, we will present a structured investment process that lends itself to modification and adoption by the reader. Barriers to entry Buffett says that he looks for businesses with “unbreachable” moats. What does he mean by moats? Moats are deep, broad ditches that were filled with water and surrounded a castle. Historically, moat[1] served as the preliminary line of defense by restricting access to enemy forces and serving as entry barriers. If the playground of a business wherein it operates can be referred to as a castle, the entry barriers that protect that playground can be referred to as moats. So why are moats important? Let’s say that an industry or business is enjoying supernormal returns on capital. Those returns mean that every dollar of capital invested in the business will be valued at more than a dollar. The possibility of creating a superior asset by replicating such a business will attract other entrepreneurs to commit capital and resources. This is where entry barriers come into play. If entry barriers are low or non-existent, other entrepreneurs will successfully enter the business, driving supply upwards and returns downwards. This process will continue until all the excess returns are competed away. However, if entry barriers are insurmountable, efforts of competitors will fail and they will be unable to make inroads into the business, allowing the supernormal returns of the business to persist. Barriers to exit: The overpowering component Much of the discussion on moats focuses on entry barriers. However, exit barriers are extremely relevant when analyzing the ability of a business to persist with supernormal returns. While entry barriers determine the ability of competition to make inroads in the business, exit barriers determine the competitive structure that persists among the incumbents within the industry. Essentially, exit barriers dictate what happens once you are inside the castle. If you find that life gets miserable, exit barriers determine your ability to leave in search of greener pastures. Industries with exit barriers are hard to leave; even businesses with poor economics are forced to stay. In such businesses, the profitability of everyone is dictated by the dumbest competitor. Car markers: A case of exit barriers nullifying entry barriers Consider the case of automakers, an industry characterized by substantial entry barriers. One of the sources of entry barriers protecting auto makers is the cost of development of new models. The development cost of a new model varies significantly. Depending on the scope and complexity of the project, the costs of developing a new model can range from US$1 billion to US$6 billion[2] [3]. To be a viable competitor and occupy enough mind-space of consumers, an automaker requires about five to six models. Assuming the development cost per model of US$2 to 3 billion and useful life of a new model of five years, an automaker will need to sell 2.4 to 3.6 million vehicles per year in order to keep the development cost per vehicle down to US$1,000. With the U.S. market currently estimated at about 18 million passenger vehicles per year[4] [5], the market can accommodate five to six competitors. The problem with this industry structure is twofold. First, there are enough competitors vying for the consumer’s dollars that price competition is likely to be high. Second and importantly, there are substantial exit barriers. Development costs that served as entry barriers also serve as exit barriers. Once spent, development costs are essentially sunk costs and can be recovered only by sales of an ever-increasing number of vehicles. This results in substantial price competition such that excess returns, if any, are hard to maintain. Iron ore: Yet another case of exit barriers cancelling out entry barriers A similar dynamic is at work among commodity producers. Consider the case of iron ore miners. There are substantial entry barriers in the form of large initial capital investments, a large scale of operations and the time it takes to develop a new mine, which ranges from five to seven years. As per our calculations, the total capital cost for iron ore mining range from US$240-450 per tonne for the largest miners. Compared to these capital costs, the cash cost of production per tonne currently is at US$15 per tonne[6]. These large capital costs that serve as entry barriers also serve the role of exit barriers as an iron ore mine doesn’t have much of an alternative use. Again, the result of the exit barrier is sub-par profitability for the industry over the full business cycle. Mousetraps: Fixed costs and exit barriers Let’s say that we have an industry with strong but not insurmountable entry barriers. Let’s assume that the primary entry barrier in case of this industry is the production capacity and the only economically viable production size is at 30% of the industry size. Let’s further assume that there are three incumbent firms in the business with each one them operating at about 30% of the industry demand. The demand-supply imbalance that exists in this case will typically result in the existing firms earning supernormal returns on their capital. Attracted by excess returns earned by the industry, a new entrant commits enough resources to prevail over the entry barriers and enters the business. As the new competitor enters the business, the industry ends up with an oversupplied situation[7]. If exit barriers are high, either of the four firms will find it hard to exit the business with the result being a price war. The intensity of the price war in an industry with high exit barriers will depend on the underlying cost structures. The higher the proportion of fixed costs in the industry’s cost structure, the more intense the competition will be. For example, if any or all of the four competitors start to lose money if market share of a firm were to drop below say 26%, the price war will be extremely intense. The likely result of such an industry dynamic will be under-par returns on capital for all businesses in this industry, at least as long as the oversupply situation persists. This is the primary reason for poor profitability of the airline industry. The airline industry is characterized by high exit barriers. When faced with industry overcapacity, it becomes very hard for existing players to exit as it is hard to put the airplane to an alternative use[8]. Further, the industry has high fixed costs and so airlines engage in price wars to fill their seats. The result is extremely poor returns on capital. Extreme caution is appropriate when investing in an industry that is characterized by high exit barriers and high fixed costs, even if the industry has strong entry barriers. In such industries, there is always a competitor, typically the most inefficient one, who is willing to cut prices to grow market share. Typically, in such businesses, even the most efficient producer suffers as the cash cost of production of the marginal unit will be less than the total cost of production of the cost leader. Interaction of entry and exit barriers Figure 1 shows the interaction of entry and exit barriers. Within this framework, there are four market structures: Free flowers – Low entry barriers with low exit barriers: Existence of low entry barriers along with low exit barriers give rise to perfectly competitive markets. This is because any demand-supply imbalance is quickly resolved by entry or exit of market supply. Junkyards – Low entry barriers with high exit barriers: Such market structures give rise to nightmarish experiences to entrepreneurs. Demand-supply mismatch conditions where demand exceeds supply are promptly resolved by increased supply as new supply enters attracted by excess returns. However, once supply exceeds demand – which is how most demand excesses are resolved – industry’s returns on capital drops below cost of capital. This happens due to the existence of high exit barriers as existing players drop prices to acquire higher market share. Mirage – High entry barriers with high exit barriers: Such market structures give rise to cyclical markets. Depending on the number of competitors that the industry can support, returns on capital over time can range from miserable to reasonably good. Cyclicality of profitability for businesses in such industries is mostly driven by the existence of exit barriers. Any demand-supply mismatch where supply exceeds demand is resolved by price cuts as existing competitors compete to acquire market share[9]. Natural moats – High entry barriers with low exit barriers: Such markets give rise to natural moats. High entry barriers help keep competition away, allowing existing competitors to earn superiors returns. Further, low exit barriers allow excess supply to be weaned out such that any supply excesses are quickly resolved in favor of lower supply, reinstating industry’s profitability. Figure 1 : Interaction of Entry and Exit Barriers Just as Buffett talks of multiple components when discussing the desirable attributes of a good business[10], there are multiple components that determine the strength and sustainability of the competitive advantage of a business. However, barriers to entry and barriers to exit serve as the basic building blocks of that process. An investor who is able to appropriately judge the existence and strength of these two barriers is on his way to investment genius. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moat [2] http://www.autoblog.com/2010/07/27/why-does-it-cost-so-much-for-automakers-to-develop-new-models/ [3] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/10/us-generalmotors-autos-volt-idUSBRE88904J20120910 [4] http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-autosales.html#autosalesD [5] http://www.motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html [6] http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining/bhp-inches-ahead-of-rio-in-game-of-cents-20150906-gjg4yl.html [7] 30% times 4 means supply now exceeds demand by 20%. [8] It is important to note that exit barriers do not refer to the ability of an incumbent to exit the business by selling out to another incumbent or a new entrant. The important consideration is whether or not the assets of the industry can be employed for an alternative use. If not, entry barriers will assert themselves whenever the industry suffers from overcapacity. [9] Such industries run into significant problems if a determined new entrant is willing to throw in enough capital and resources to overcome the entry barriers. If such a competitor is able to overcome the entry barriers and enter the business, the existence of exit barriers result in sub-par profitability for all players until such time that demand grows to match supply. [10] “…. it’s a simple business. It’s not an easy business. I don’t want a business that’s easy for competitors. I want a business with a moat around it. I want a very valuable castle in the middle. And then I want…the Duke who’s in charge of that castle to be honest and hardworking and able. And then I want a big moat around the castle, and that moat can be various things.” – Warren Buffett This article first appeared on Advisor Perspectives .

What Powerball, Stocks, And Contrarianism Have In Common

“You’ve got to kick fear to the side, because the payoff is huge.” – Mariska Hargitay We all know that the lottery is random, and that the odds are one in 292 million. Maybe you’ll get lucky and win it all, or maybe you’ll split the payout because multiple people luckily choose the same winning numbers. But keep in mind that the higher the lottery jackpot goes, the more likely you are to split the pot with others. Lottery participation is not linear. Every new dollar increase in the jackpot game after game does not bring with it a set new number of people who play. Rather, the larger the jackpot, the more exponential the number of people who play becomes. That means the more attention the lottery gets, the odds of splitting the payout with others actually increases. Meaning if you really want to play the lottery, the best way to do so given the same odds of choosing the right numbers is actually to bet on a jackpot that is high, but not high enough to attract a large number of new players. And this relates to the stock market how? The more an investment is talked up (largely because that investment has already moved and made a boat load of money), the more likely you are to split the payout among others listening to the same reasons to buy that particular investment. The more people know about a big payout, the more likely you are to split the pot and not make as much as you hoped. There is a high correlation to the amount of attention the Powerball and stock market gains receive from the media and the jump in the number of new entrants who come in afterwards This is where contrarianism comes into play. Few people pay attention to losing investments. Those who do will often be too scared to buy in after a large drawdown, even though the very definition of “buy low, sell high” is based on those depressed prices that happen peak to trough. Some will argue that if a stock, asset class, or strategy is down, it must be down for a good reason. As we know from several quantitative studies of markets, however, that “good reason” may be either 1) legitimate, 2) random, or 3) based on a cycle that simply doesn’t favor that investment. We show the latter point as being a major one in our award winning papers related to predicting stock market volatility. Being a contrarian isn’t about going against the crowd. It’s about betting on a jackpot which few other players are betting on, so the odds of you splitting the payout are much lower. Let’s apply this to today’s market. Ask yourself very simply – where have most people overweighted their portfolios? What is the overarching narrative? Where are most people betting? Likely on the “cleanest dirty shirt” on the global landscape, which is the US stock market. Why? Because Fed policy and the Age of QE, combined with ever faster information flow from the internet has resulted in a similar Powerball mentality among a large portion of the investor landscape. Make no mistake about it – though we may hear stories about investors “selling” US stocks (NYSEARCA: SPY ) in this volatility, you can’t unwind 5+ years of divergence from the rest of the world in 5+ trading days. Where does the contrarian look to now? Reflation through a bounce in commodities (NYSEARCA: DBC ) and emerging markets (NYSEARCA: EEM ), both of which no one seems to want to buy a ticket on. Of course that doesn’t mean you buy that ticket right here, right now. But that also doesn’t mean you should ignore what on the surface looks like a low payout right now. 6 11 19 48 54 06 QP