Tag Archives: etfs

Damage Control: Is It Too Late Too Become More Defensive?

A manufacturing recession doesn’t matter… until it does. Consider industrial production. For the third straight month, industrial production, which includes mining, utilities, as well as manufacturing, contracted. How anemic is American industry right now? The year-over-year percentage change provides a helpful snapshot of the weakness. Not surprisingly, media mega-stars routinely dismiss manufacturers, miners and utility providers as relics of yesterday’s economy. They maintain that consumers are the only ones who count in a consumption-based society. The erosion of the high-paying careers in those segments notwithstanding, might the rosy projections for household consumption be misleading? After all, retail sales (ex auto) pulled back 0.1% in December, even as economists anticipated 0.2% growth. We can look at consumer trends in a variety of ways. As I pointed out in my most recent commentary (1/12/16), year-over-year percent growth in personal consumption expenditures (PCE) has been declining steadily for roughly 18 months. Meanwhile, year-over-year percentage changes in retail sales (ex auto) emulate what is taking place in American industry. So what happened to the “clear-cut” benefit of lower oil prices? Weren’t they supposed to be a giant tax cut for the American consumer, prompting them to spend? Not when wage growth is tepid. And not when many households have chosen to increase their savings. It should not go unnoticed that the S&P SPDR Retail Index has quickly descended into bear territory. The SPDR S&P Retail ETF (NYSEARCA: XRT ) is currently down about 22.3%. Even more disheartening for those who had not become more defensive in their asset allocation over the past year? The price of XRT is lower than it was two years ago. Ironically enough, the question is no longer whether U.S. stocks have entered a bear market in the same way that the retail segment has. Indeed, Bespoke Research already demonstrated that the average large-company stock, the average mid-sized company stock and the average small-company stock have all surpassed the 20% bear market threshold. In the same vein, the median stock in the Russell 3000 and the Value Line Index show the same. The only question now is whether or not there will be enough buying interest in market-cap weighted indices like the S&P 500 and the Dow Jones Industrials to avoid a similar fate. The SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) does have impressive support at the 185 level. In my estimation, the best shot that the major benchmarks have in avoiding a “bear market headline” is the same injection that occurred during the euro-zone crisis in 2011. Specifically, nearly all of the U.S. indexes and overseas benchmarks fell 20%-40% during that summer. The Dow and the S&P 500 escaped a similar fate with depreciation of “just” 19%-19.9%, due to “well-timed” stimulus promises by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the U.S. Federal Reserve. Already, Fed fund futures have pushed out their anticipation of a second rate hike out to Q3 (July-September) from March. The market does not believe the Fed party line of 4 rate hikes in 2015. In fact, if the Dow and the S&P 500 do fall to significantly lower levels, one might anticipate the central bank of the United States reversing course; perhaps the notion of negative interest rates and/or QE4 might be introduced to the investing public. Historically speaking, however, the wildcard of a Fed reversal may not be enough to calm the nerves of panicky market-based participants. Take a look at this table for the S&P 500’s first five trading days in January. (Note: I won’t even incorporate the horrific second week that investors are dealing with right now.) The worst first five days for the S&P 500 occurred right here in 2016. But that’s not all. In the table, seven of the nine worst starts ultimately offered poor risk-reward results, either with additional losses or sub-par total gains through year-end. “Wait a second, Gary. Those other two years in 1991 and in 1982 show extraordinary price appreciation. Isn’t that reason enough to be optimistic?” Not if you recognize that the price gains that occurred in 1991 came at the conclusion of the 20% losses for the 1990-1991 stock market bear. And not if you realize that the price appreciation that followed in 1982 came at the end of the 27% losses for the 1981-1982 stock market bear. Right now, we’re not coming off of a 20% price collapse of the S&P 500. It follows that to the extent one wants to take the history of market direction into account, one would have to look at 2016’s prospects in an unfavorable light. I spent the better part of 2014 explaining the benefits of a barbell approach for a late-stage bull . We matched large-cap U.S. stock assets like the iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA: IVV ), the Health Care Select Sect SPDR ETF (NYSEARCA: XLV ) and the iShares S&P 100 ETF (NYSEARCA: OEF ) with longer-term investment grade bonds like the Vanguard Extended Duration Treasury ETF (NYSEARCA: EDV ), the iShares 7-10 Year Treasury Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: IEF ) and the SPDR Nuveen Barclays Municipal Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: TFI ). By May of 2015, I expressed the tactical asset allocation changes that I believed were necessary in an unfavorable risk-reward environment, encouraging investors to lower their overall exposure to risk assets . Trying to exit markets during panicky sell-offs rarely proves beneficial. That said, if you believe that you may have been too assertive with your exposure to riskier holdings, you might wait for an inevitable bounce higher. One can work his/her way to a more defensive stance until the fundamental, technical and economic backdrop improves. Disclosure: Gary Gordon, MS, CFP is the president of Pacific Park Financial, Inc., a Registered Investment Adviser with the SEC. Gary Gordon, Pacific Park Financial, Inc, and/or its clients may hold positions in the ETFs, mutual funds, and/or any investment asset mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell or hold securities. At times, issuers of exchange-traded products compensate Pacific Park Financial, Inc. or its subsidiaries for advertising at the ETF Expert web site. ETF Expert content is created independently of any advertising relationships.

More Pain Ahead For Basic Materials ETFs In 2016?

It’s been years since basic materials ETFs last saw their days of glory. As for the last few years, the space has been an area of concern, thanks to a surging greenback, massive crash in oil prices and hard landing fears in China. Moreover, supply glut has been a long-lasting issue for this space. Things were fragile for long in China given the protracted slowdown in the domestic manufacturing sector, credit crunch concerns and a property market slowdown. As a result, the Chinese economy has been undergoing a tumultuous phase for the last few months. To shore up the ailing economy and the turbulent market, the Chinese government took several measures; but nothing could really heal the pain. Since the Chinese economy accounts for about half of the global consumption of industrial commodities and is the second biggest purchaser of oil, a further slowdown in the Chinese economy would mean weaker demand for commodities. In any case, most developed economies are presently in a state of slowdown and thus require lesser commodities for weak demand. Also, the strength in the greenback owing to Fed policy tightening marred the broader commodity prices as most of these materials are priced in the U.S. dollar. Also, a hike in interest rates tends to boost investors’ interest in income-generating assets and thus hurts the investment demand for non-yielding commodities. So, all in all, fears of softening demand amid abundant supplies have led to a broad-based meltdown in commodities prices. Commodities at Multi-Year Lows Copper prices have already plunged to a new six-year low on Chinese economic issues. Events in China are major contributors as the country is the world’s biggest consumer of this industrial metal, making up roughly 40% of global copper demand. Thus, a prolonged manufacturing slowdown in the world’s second largest economy cast a dark cloud over the red metal. Iron ore fell to a five-and-a-half year low in December 2015 and analysts predict that the rout can deepen further as ” Chinese steel mills rebuild the inventory.” Nickel prices plummeted to a 12-year low on low demand from “the stainless steel sector , the dominant source of demand for nickel.” Most agricultural commodities are also in the red. The oil price rout is getting more and more acute lately with Brent crude having slipped to a 12-year low and WTI crude falling to a seven-year low. Analysts expect the pressure to remain in place. ETFs to Lose More in 2016 iShares U.S. Basic Materials ETF (NYSEARCA: IYM ) – Down 20% in the last one year (as of January 12, 2016) and about 9.6% year to date. The fund is the most exposed to chemicals though steel, gold and aluminum take about 10% of the fund. SPDR Materials Select Sector Fund (NYSEARCA: XLB ) – Down 16.4% in the last one year (as of January 12, 2016) and about 9.2% year to date. The fund puts 73.8% off its assets in the chemical sector followed by 9.5% of assets in the metals & mining sector, and 8.7% in containers and packaging sector. The fund is heavy on Du Pont (NYSE: DD ) (11.4%) and Dow Chemical (NYSE: DOW ) (11.2%). SPDR S&P Metals & Mining ETF (NYSEARCA: XME ) – Down 53.9% in the last one year (as of January 12, 2016) and about 15% year to date. Steel occupies almost half of the portfolio followed by 10% in aluminum, diversified metals and gold each. iShares MSCI Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (NYSEARCA: PICK ) – Down 50.4% in the last one year (as of January 12, 2016) and about 15.8% year to date. Materials hold about the entire fund though consumer services and consumer durables take a slight portion of the ETF. The fund’s main focus is on companies like BHP Billiton (NYSE: BHP ), Rio Tinto (NYSE: RIO ) and Glencore ( OTCPK:GLNCY ). Bottom Line With the operating backdrop in 2016 expected to be no different than 2015, the basic materials sector will replay the same pattern that we saw in the recent past. At Zacks, we have most of the materials ETFs as Sell-rated at the time of writing. Original Post

What Do Rising Rates Mean For Closed-End Funds?

It’s a misconception that rising rates make it difficult for closed-end funds to deliver competitive results By Christopher Dahlin, UIT Product Strategy and Development Specialist It’s not a stretch to characterize closed-end funds as an often misunderstood investment vehicle. Perhaps that’s because the closed-end fund universe is smaller than those of open-end mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), or because their market price and net asset value (NAV) frequently fluctuate. Whatever the reason, closed-end funds occasionally get lumped together as one asset class, even though they invest in a wide array of securities across styles and strategies, just as open-end mutual funds and ETFs do. But the prevalent misconception that closed-end funds generally have difficulty delivering competitive returns in a rising rate environment is of particular importance in light of the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) recent rate hike and the likelihood of more to come. Rising rate fears widen discounts Some investors believe that because many closed-end funds employ financial leverage – which is typically tied to short-term interest rates – increased borrowing costs may inhibit total return-producing capabilities. The graph below illustrates this bias. Starting about the time of 2013’s “taper tantrum” – shorthand for the market’s reaction to then-Fed Chairman’s Ben Bernanke’s indication of possible tapering of its stimulus program – and leading up to the Fed’s recent decision to raise the federal funds rate, fears of the first rate increase since 2006 have led to a broad sell-off among closed-end funds, causing discounts to widen considerably. During this period, the average closed-end fund progressed from trading near NAV to approximately 10% discounts, valuations not seen since The Great Recession. Taper tantrum to rate rise: Valuations not seen since The Great Recession Source: Morningstar Traded Fund Center, Jan. 24, 2013, through Dec. 16, 2015. The CEF average discount is a daily unweighted average of the entire domestically-traded closed-end fund universe. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Historical perspective: Returns and rising rates What’s interesting is that, contrary to the recent investor exodus preceding the rate increase, history indicates closed-end funds are capable of producing competitive returns during periods of rising interest rates. Investors need look no further than the last Fed tightening cycle in 2004 for evidence of such closed-end fund outperformance, from both an NAV and market price perspective. As the graph below indicates, closed-end fund valuations widened considerably prior to the Fed’s first 2004 rate increase similar to today’s market. Déjà vu: Closed-end valuations widened prior to the 2004 tightening cycle Source: Morningstar Traded Fund Center, Jan. 1, 2004, through Sept. 29, 2006. The CEF average discount is a daily unweighted average of the entire domestically-traded closed-end fund universe. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. However, entering that tightening cycle with such large discounts actually allowed closed-end fund discounts to subsequently narrow throughout much of the period and produce outperformance across various asset classes on both NAV and market price, as show in the graph below. Narrowing discounts resulted in outperformance during the previous tightening cycle Source: Morningstar Traded Funds Centre. Index returns: S&P 500 Index, BofA Merrill Lynch Municipal Master Index and BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate Master Index. Closed-end fund returns: US general equity peers, national municipal bond peers and investment-grade corporate bond peers. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. An investment cannot be made directly in an index. Using leverage to enhance returns While borrowing costs did increase for most closed-end funds during the Fed’s last period of increasing interest rates, many managers were able to overcome that obstacle by delivering strong investment returns, as shown above. Although monitoring borrowing costs is an important consideration in closed-end fund investing, it’s not the only variable used to determine the effectiveness of leverage. It’s important to note that leverage is a tool that generally magnifies investment returns; as long as the cost of leverage is less than the total return generated by the investments within the fund, leverage may add positively to performance. When evaluating closed-end funds, it’s important to consider both the return potential of the underlying investments as well as the current premium/discount levels relative to historical levels to determine the current valuation of the closed-end fund itself. Although financial history never repeats itself exactly, it does often rhyme. Many closed-end funds today appear to be following a pattern similar to the last time the Fed initiated a cycle of increasing interest rates. Closed-end fund discounts within many sectors are trading in excess of their historical levels. Depending on an investor’s outlook for a particular asset class, this may be an opportune time to take a closer look at closed-end funds. Important information The S&P 500® Index is an unmanaged index considered representative of the US stock market. The BofA Merrill Lynch Municipals Master Index measures total return on tax-exempt investment grade debt publicly issued by states and US territories, including price and interest income, based on the mix of these bonds in the market. The BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate Master Index tracks the performance of US dollar-denominated, investment- grade-rated corporate debt publically issued in the US domestic market. A closed-end fund is a publicly traded investment company that raises a fixed amount of capital through an initial public offering (IPO) and is then structured, listed and traded like a stock on a stock exchange. An open-end fund is a type of mutual fund with no restriction on the amount of shares issued; it will continue to issue shares to meet investor demand and will buy back shares when investors wish to sell. Net asset value is the per-share value of open-end and closed-end funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Mutual funds’ NAV is computed once a day based on the closing market prices of the securities in the fund’s portfolio’ shares of ETFs and closed-end funds trade at market value, which can be a dollar value above (trading at a premium) or below (trading at a discount) NAV. Financial leverage refers to the use of debt to acquire additional assets. Shares of closed-end funds frequently trade at a discount to their net asset value in the secondary market and the net asset value of closed-end fund shares may decrease. In general, stock values fluctuate, sometimes widely, in response to activities specific to the company as well as general market, economic and political conditions. Fixed-income investments are subject to credit risk of the issuer and the effects of changing interest rates. Interest rate risk refers to the risk that bond prices generally fall as interest rates rise and vice versa. An issuer may be unable to meet interest and/or principal payments, thereby causing its instruments to decrease in value and lowering the issuer’s credit rating. Municipal securities are subject to the risk that legislative or economic conditions could affect an issuer’s ability to make payments of principal and/ or interest. Leverage created from borrowing or certain types of transactions or instruments may impair liquidity, cause positions to be liquidated at an unfavorable time, lose more than the amount invested, or increase volatility. There is no assurance a trust will achieve its investment objective. An investment in these unit investment trusts are subject to market risk, which is the possibility that the market values of securities owned by the trust will decline and that the value of trust units may therefore be less than what you paid for them. Accordingly, you can lose money investing in these trusts. The trust should be considered as part of a long-term investment strategy and you should consider your ability to pursue it by investing in successive trusts, if available. You will realize tax consequences associated with investing from one series to the next. Before investing, carefully read the prospectus and/or summary prospectus and carefully consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses. For this and more complete information about the products, visit invesco.com/fundprospectus for a prospectus/summary prospectus. The information provided is for educational purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation of the suitability of any investment strategy for a particular investor. Invesco does not provide tax advice. The tax information contained herein is general and is not exhaustive by nature. Federal and state tax laws are complex and constantly changing. Investors should always consult their own legal or tax professional for information concerning their individual situation. The opinions expressed are those of the authors, are based on current market conditions and are subject to change without notice. These opinions may differ from those of other Invesco investment professionals. NOT FDIC INSURED MAY LOSE VALUE NO BANK GUARANTEE All data provided by Invesco unless otherwise noted. Invesco Distributors, Inc. is the US distributor for Invesco Ltd.’s retail products and collective trust funds. Invesco Advisers, Inc. and other affiliated investment advisers mentioned provide investment advisory services and do not sell securities. Invesco Unit Investment Trusts are distributed by the sponsor, Invesco Capital Markets, Inc., and broker-dealers including Invesco Distributors, Inc. PowerShares® is a registered trademark of Invesco PowerShares Capital Management LLC (Invesco PowerShares). Each entity is an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Invesco Ltd. ©2016 Invesco Ltd. All rights reserved. What do rising rates mean for closed-end funds? by Invesco Blog