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SEC Proposals To Lower Liquidity Risk In Mutual Funds

Periods of large investor withdrawals may spell doom for both fund houses and investors. Many funds have piled up hard-to-sell assets, which are non effective during such periods of withdrawals. The five-member Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) unanimously voted last week to recommend new rules to help the multitrillion asset-management industry with effective liquidity risk management. These additional safety measures will require mutual funds and ETFs to implement new plans to manage liquidity risks. The proposal calls for funds to keep a minimum amount of cash or cash equivalents that can be easily sold within three days (down from seven days currently required for mutual funds). Moreover, fund families may charge investors who redeem their holdings on days of increased withdrawals. The move comes as part of five initiatives framed by the SEC to minimize risks imbedded in such funds and adequately shield them from any financial shock. Since the financial crisis, the asset management sector has been under increasing regulatory scrutiny. The proposals came after the Fed and IMF warned that certain funds may be incapable of keeping up with investor redemptions if there is a market rout. Addressing the Redemption Challenges The challenge is to meet shareholder redemptions during periods of stress and ensure smooth functioning of the funds amid large withdrawals. The SEC targets lower overall systematic risks in the $60 trillion asset-management industry and protection of investors’ interests. “Promoting stronger liquidity risk management is essential to protecting the interests of the millions of Americans who invest in mutual funds and exchange-traded funds,” said SEC Chair Mary Jo White. “These significant reforms would require funds to better manage their liquidity risks, give them new tools to meet that requirement, and enhance the Commission’s oversight.” The Reforms Under the proposal, mutual funds and ETFs must implement liquidity risk management programs and enhance disclosure regarding fund liquidity and redemption practices. These would lead to timely redemption of shares and collection of assets by investors without hampering day-to-day running of the funds. Further, the open-end funds will have to allow the use of “swing pricing” in certain cases. Swing pricing is a liquidity management tool designed to reduce the dilution impact of subscriptions and redemptions on non-trading fund investors. This step would enable mutual funds to reveal the fund’s net asset value (NAV) costs related to shareholders’ trading activity. In addition, the proposed reforms would put a 15% cap on investments that can be made in hard-to-trade assets. As reported by The Wall Street Journal , some of the largest U.S. bond mutual funds have 15% or more of their money invested in such illiquid securities. Need for Covering Liquidity Risks Assets are deemed liquid when an investor can buy or sell large quantities rapidly at an expected price. During market rout, investors may engage in intense panic selling, for which funds must have adequate the liquidity or return cash to investors. For instance, there are fears of bond liquidity once the Fed decides to hike rates. There is a growing concern that a massive exit from bonds may freeze the markets as the number of sellers may not match the number of buyers. An ideal market would have the right level of liquidity at the right price. Redemption of bonds will increase the sell-off and then fund managers will have to sell the less liquid assets to match investors’ cash demands. However, if a mutual fund or an ETF holds illiquid bonds, the price swings will be rapid and would create a vicious cycle as price drops will again end up in selling pressure. Funds with High Liquidity & Low Redemption Fees In such scenario, investors may buy funds that offer high liquidity and low redemption costs. As for liquidity, substantial stock holdings would provide the edge during a debt market sell-off. While withdrawing money from mutual funds, there are certain charges or penalties that investors may have to bear. The charges may include sales load and 12-b1 fees. While selling a fund, investors may have to incur Deferred Sales Charge (Load). There may be funds that carry no sales load, but have 12-b1 fees, which are operational expenses between 0.25% and 1% of the fund’s net asset. Funds may also charge redemption fees. It is different from sales load since it is not paid to a broker but directly to the fund. The SEC has set a 2% maximum ceiling on redemption fees. 3 Funds to Buy Hence, funds carrying no sales load and low expense ratio stuffed with substantial stock holdings in its portfolio should be safe picks. We have narrowed our search based on favorable Zacks Mutual Fund Ranks. The following funds carry either a Zacks Mutual Fund Rank #1 (Strong Buy) or Zacks Mutual Fund Rank #2 (Buy) as we expect the funds to outperform its peers in the future. Remember, the goal of the Zacks Mutual Fund Rank is to guide investors to identify potential winners and losers. Unlike most of the fund-rating systems, the Zacks Mutual Fund Rank is not just focused on past performance. The minimum initial investment is within $5000. The funds have encouraging returns for each of the 1, 3 and 5-year periods. The Fidelity Small Cap Growth Fund (MUTF: FCPGX ) seeks long-term capital appreciation. Under normal circumstances, FCPGX invests at least 65% of its total assets in the common and preferred stocks of companies located in at least three countries in Europe, Australia and the Pacific Rim. FCPGX offers dividends, if any, and capital gains, if any, at least annually. Fidelity Small Cap Growth carries a Zacks Mutual Fund Rank #1. While the year-to-date and 1-year returns are 9% and 18%, respectively, the respective 3- and 5-year annualized return is 16.6% and 16.7%. Looking at asset allocation, over 97% is invested in stocks, while it holds 2.8% as cash. Annual expense ratio of 0.90% is lower than the category average of 1.34%. The VALIC Company I Health Sciences Fund (MUTF: VCHSX ) invests the majority of its assets in common stocks of healthcare products, medicine or life sciences related companies. VCHSX focuses mainly on investing in large and mid-cap companies. A maximum of 35% of VCHSX’s assets is invested foreign companies. VALIC Company I Health Sciences carries a Zacks Mutual Fund Rank #2. While the year-to-date and 1-year returns are 13.5% and 26.4%, respectively, the 3- and 5-year annualized returns are 29.9% and 29.7% respectively. Looking at asset allocation, nearly 94% is invested in stocks, while it holds 5.1% as cash. Annual expense ratio of 1.09% is lower than the category average of 1.35%. The Bridgeway Small-Cap Growth Fund (MUTF: BRSGX ) aims to provide total return on capital over the long term. BRSGX invests in a broad range of small cap growth stocks that must be listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ. Bridgeway Small-Cap Growth carries a Zacks Mutual Fund Rank #1. While the year-to-date and 1-year returns are respectively 6.8% and 12.7%, the 3- and 5-year annualized returns are a respective 16.9% and 16.4%. Looking at asset allocation, 99.5% is invested in stocks. Annual expense ratio of 0.94% is lower than the category average of 1.34%. Link to the original article on Zacks.com

How Survivorship Bias Distorts Reality

Summary We tend to only consider information that’s presented to us and ignore absent information that may be extremely relevant. But focusing on one side of the equation while neglecting the other distorts your thinking and decision making process. This bias frequently arises in all kinds of contexts; once you’re familiar with it, you’ll be primed to notice it wherever it’s hiding. Back during World War II, statistician Abraham Wald was tasked with helping the Allies decide where to add armor to their bombers. The hope was that this extra protection would help minimize bomber losses to enemy anti-aircraft fire. The top brass of the Allied army thought the answer was obvious: just look at the bombers that returned from missions, and add armor to the areas that showed the most damage. But Wald disagreed. He explained that the damage actually revealed the locations that needed the least additional armor; in other words, it’s where a bomber could be hit and still survive the flight home. Wald’s solution was counterintuitive. He recommended adding more armor to places like the engine where there was no damage, because that’s where the bombers that didn’t make it back were hit. This simple advice would end up saving the lives of thousands of Allied air crews. Typical Damage Patterns on Returning Bombers Source: A North Investments The bomber problem is a classic case of “survivorship bias” – the tendency to only consider information that’s presented to us (e.g., bombers that survived), and ignore absent information that may be extremely relevant (e.g., bombers that got shot down). Focusing on the former and ignoring the latter distorts the way you think and make decisions. It’s a bias that frequently arises in all kinds of contexts. And once you’re familiar with it, you’ll be primed to notice it wherever it’s hiding. Like health and longevity advice. We look to old people on guidance for living a long life when we should really examine those who died early to learn what to avoid. I recall watching a documentary about centenarians (100+ year olds) who claimed that the key their longevity was smoking and drinking every day. The non-statistically minded (which includes most of us) will misinterpret this as proof that smoking and drinking isn’t that harmful, not realizing that centenarians represent the lucky few who won the genetic lottery. There’s a much larger pool of people who made the same poor health choices and didn’t live long enough to appear on television; so the unusually lucky few tend to stand out and, hence, receive the most attention. Survivorship bias also skews our understanding of the past. Take the widespread and highly romanticized belief that old things (pick one: cars, TVs, toasters, etc.) were made better than they are today. The much more likely truth is that 99% of old things were poorly made and are now rusting out of sight. The few things that did manage to survive intact were the ones that were well made. That doesn’t mean everything was. The same goes when it comes to music. Songs that leap from memory when someone mentions a decade like the 1980s tend to be songs that became hits. As a result, good songs begin to represent 1980s music because we still listen to them, even though the vast majority of music produced during that decade was less than memorable. Our childhood memories work much the same way. We tend to remember the good times and forget the bad, deceiving ourselves into thinking that the “good old days” were far better than they really were. No wonder the present never seems as good as the past. Even religious beliefs are affected by survivorship bias. Consider the story told by Marcus Tullius Cicero about the atheist Diagoras. He was shown the painted portraits of faithful worshipers who prayed and were later saved from a shipwreck. The implication was that praying protects you from drowning. Diagoras asked, “Where are the portraits of those who prayed, then drowned?” There were none. Dead worshipers, like the downed bombers, can’t advertise their experiences, so they get excluded from the sample. This is how people get fooled into believing in miracles (which are nothing more than positive low-probability events). Let’s say a disease is 99.99% fatal and 1,000 people get it. The single survivor will surely see his recovery as a miracle; of course, the reality is that the statistics of the situation simply dictated that “someone” would survive. The lucky survivor gets to stick around and tell his miraculous story; the 999 non-survivors, being dead, can’t tell their non-miraculous ones. Something similar occurs in the investment industry. It claims that some people are extremely skilled, since year after year they’ve outperformed the market. They’ll identify these “investment gurus” and convince you of their abilities. But a simple thought experiment can show that it would be impossible to not have these gurus produced just by luck. Imagine you had thousands of money-managing chimpanzees picking stocks at random. If every year you fired the losers, leaving only the winners, eventually you’d end up with long-term steady winners. Since all you see are the handful of survivors, you’ll be led to believe that random stock selection is a good investment strategy, and that some chimpanzees are considerably better investors than others. Plus, since chimpanzees charge lower fees than their human counterparts (bananas are inexpensive), you might even be tempted to let one of these hairy creatures manage your portfolio. I wouldn’t recommend it. Even though human money managers employ more sophisticated investment strategies, it’s still easy to get fooled by survivorship bias. Given the multitude of different strategies, some are bound by pure luck, even over long periods of time, to produce superior performance even if they don’t genuinely possess predictive power. And it’s this small subset of surviving strategies that attract the most attention and investment capital. Consider the famous Super Bowl Indicator, which says stocks go up in years when a team from the NFC wins and down when an AFC team wins. It was right 63% of the time between the first Super Bowl in 1967 and 2014. In years where an NFC team has won, however, the indicator’s accuracy improves to 88%. Sounds impressive. Unfortunately, as is the case with many popular investment strategies, the indicator has no predictive power – it’s simply a case of spurious correlation (just like ice cream sales and forest fires are correlated, but neither causes the other). Making investment decisions based on such random relationships is how you go broke. S&P 500 Returns as Predicted by the Super Bowl Indicator Note: The 2015 Super Bowl was won by the New England Patriots (an AFC team), which means that 2015 should be a down year for stocks . . . so far it appears to be the right call. Source: A North Investments Some of today’s most widely used investment strategies are nothing more than Super Bowl Indicators in disguise. Take Warren Buffett’s focused value investing, which involves betting heavily on a few high quality, undervalued companies. He’s made tens of billions of dollars following this approach, and it seems to work for others too. Forbes’ wealthiest people list is almost entirely made up of individuals who, like Buffett, were rewarded for putting all of their eggs in one basket. You simply don’t become as rich as Facebook’s (NASDAQ: FB ) Mark Zuckerberg or Microsoft’s (NASDAQ: MSFT ) Bill Gates by holding a well-diversified portfolio. But the reverse is also true – holding an under-diversified portfolio probably won’t make you that rich either (if anything, it’ll help you go bankrupt). Just look at the cemetery. The graveyard of failures is full of unlucky people who, just like the population of life’s lottery winners, put all of their eggs in one basket. Ignoring them is like ignoring the bombers that were shot down, it’s financial suicide. Which brings us to the whole notion of success itself. Numerous studies on the topic follow a similar methodology. They take a population of suit-and-tie-wearing hotshots and look at what they all have in common: courage, passion, risk taking, vision, and so on, and infer that these traits are the “secret to their success.” To recognize the flaw here, simply look at the cemetery of failed persons. What traits do they all share in common? Here’s a hint: courage, passion, risk taking, vision, etc., just like the population of hotshots. This is difficult to see because failures don’t appear on television and on the covers of magazines. They don’t write books and memoirs. They don’t travel the world giving seminars and lectures. In short, nobody’s interested in what they have to say (even though they can teach you some useful tricks like “what not to do” and “mistake to avoid”). There may be some differences in skills, but what truly separates life’s winners and losers is plain old luck. The moral here is to be careful from whom you seek advice, because advice-giving is a monopoly run by lucky survivors. To paraphrase the famous psychologist Daniel Kahneman, stupid decisions that work out well become brilliant decisions in hindsight. The things people like Steve Jobs or Mark Zuckerberg or Bill Gates did right are like the damaged bombers that managed to survive the flight home. The much larger pool of people, those who made equally risky bets and failed, exit the sample. This gives us a distorted view of the odds of success. So, before you emulate a famous entrepreneur by dropping out of college and starting a business in your parents’ garage, ask yourself this question: How many people have done this same exact thing and failed? Way too many to count. No one remembers or cares about these losers and their unsuccessful companies. For every wealthy startup founder, there are thousands of other entrepreneurs who end up with only a cluttered garage. Surviving those statistical odds is nearly impossible. In Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave,” he describes a cave where prisoners are chained, unable to see anything, except shadows on the wall before them. The prisoners believe the shadows to be reality. However, one prisoner is freed and brought outside for the first time. At first he’s blinded by the brightness of the sun, but after his eyes accustom he realizes that the shadows were only fragments of reality. The point here is that what we see isn’t always the whole truth. Spending your life only learning from survivors, reading books about successful people, and poring over the history of companies that changed the world is like being imprisoned in Plato’s Cave – all you get is a biased and incomplete view of the facts. However, leaving the cave and acknowledging the other side of the equation (i.e., the non-survivors, losers, failures, etc.) prevents you from getting fooled by survivorship bias.

Preferred Shares With International Exposure And 9% Yield

Summary Preferred shares as an investment category is dominated by US securities. Two funds offer opportunities to diversify the preferred shares allocation in an income portfolio. These funds are discussed here. With this article, I conclude my look at preferred-shares closed-end funds. In the first ( Where Are the Best Opportunities in Preferred Shares? ), I presented the data on 16 funds in the category. I followed up with a closer look at my choices among the purely domestic fund ( These Top Choices for Preferred Shares Will Bring Nearly 9% Yields to Your Income Portfolio ). Here, I conclude with the two international funds in the category. The Funds Flaherty & Crumrine Dynamic Preferred & Income Fund Inc (NYSE: DFP ) First Trust Intermediate Duration Preferred & Income Fund (NYSE: FPF ) Both funds score high enough on my initial screen to make it to the overall short list. DFP stood out on the basis of its recent returns (especially on NAV) and FPF scored high for its high distribution (top of the category for market distribution, and second on NAV) and its high level (third in category) of undistributed net investment income backing up the distribution yields. I put off examining them in detail because I wanted to focus on the domestic funds, all of which had an extended historical record. DFP and FPF are more recent funds; both, coincidentally, have the same inception date of May 24, 2013. Discount/Premium Discounts are identical (-7.95%) for each, which is about mid-range for the category. And for both, the discounts have been shrinking. DFP’s Z-scores are positive for 3 and 6 months. For 3 months it’s 1.03. For FPF, Z-scores are positive for 3, 6, and 12 months; for 3 months it’s 1.1. Both funds showed a similar pattern in the evolution of their discounts. Both held a premium valuation at inception and soon thereafter, then, as is typical of closed-end funds, the premiums fell to discounts as the fund began trading. This can be seen in these charts (from cefconnect ) of their full premium/discount histories. First DFP (click to enlarge) and FPF. (click to enlarge) FPF falls below the category trend line on the Discount vs. NAV Distribution chart (see previous articles for this chart). DFP is above it. As I’ve noted, this relationship favors funds that fall below the trend line. Distributions FPF’s yield on price is a category-leading 9.01%, from a 8.29% NAV distribution yield. DFP’s distributions are mid-category, both on price (8.59%) and NAV (7.91%). DFP has negative UNII (undistributed net investment income) at -2.5% of its distribution, which value places it ahead of only two other funds, neither of which made the cut for the short list. FPF is positive with excess UNII at 5.28% of its distribution, which is third for the metric in the category Two funds examined previously, JPC and HPI , lead. FPF has paid out special distributions in each of its two years of activity; it would appear shareholders can expect another for 2015. When the special distribution is included in yield calculations, FPF’s yield for the past twelve months is 9.8%. Preferred shares dividends may be qualified for the 15% tax rate for most investors. For the 2014 tax year, FPF reported 56.53% of its income from qualified dividends, and DFP reported 70.20%. This is similar to the pattern we saw previously in the domestic funds where the Flaherty & Crumrine funds had the highest levels of qualified dividends. Portfolios These two are the only funds in the category that have holdings extending beyond US borders. All of the others are 100% invested in US companies. For DFP, the non-US segment of the portfolio is 21.3%; for FPF it is more than twice that, 48.7%. FPF also has a more diverse group of countries represented as we see in the tables below: (click to enlarge) Both funds are leveraged, as are all the funds in this category. DFP has 33.6% leverage, which is the category median, and FPF has 30.99% ranking seventh or one off the median. DFP’s portfolio is 97.8% invested in preferred shares. FPF’s objective strategy statement ( here ) states that it “will invest at least 80% of its Managed Assets in a portfolio of preferred and other income-producing securities.” The fund is listed as having 29.8% of its portfolio in preferreds and 67.3% is in a category described as “investment funds.” From the most recent holdings statement, I take that larger category to be fixed-rate capital preferred securities, hybrid securities that combine the features of both corporate bonds and preferred stock. These are typically issued by utility companies and financial institutions and accrue certain tax benefits to the issuing institution. According to Fidelity, these typically provide higher yields and typically are senior to preferred or common stock. Morningstar lists a weighted average credit score of BBB- for DFP. No average is calculated for FPF, but the fund’s most recent report ( here ) shows a distribution centered on BBB-. FPF’s credit quality distribution is shown below: (click to enlarge) Both funds’ portfolios are heavily concentrated in the financial sector. This is how FPF reports the industry distribution for its holdings: (click to enlarge) And this is how DFP’s holdings break down on a sector level: Summary These funds offer international diversification to the preferred shares investor. FPF, with its greater exposure to non-US holdings and a wider range of countries in its portfolio, does this more effectively. The primary reason to venture into these funds, in my view, is for international exposure and FPF does that more effectively than DFP. So, the edge here goes to FPF. Both have a reasonable discount, but those discounts are well above (i.e., less negative, therefore less discounted) recent mean values. Neither has an edge on this metric. DPF offers a high yield, but it comes with the downside of negative UNII. FPF’s yield is higher and one might reasonably expect a year-end special distribution from the fund as well. FPF has a stronger recent total return record (11.5% for one year, second to the John Hancock funds ( HPF , HPI and HPS discussed earlier). A clear win for FPF here. I’m not sure that I’d consider either fund a timely buy right now, but between the two, the clear choice would have to be FPF for its stronger yield, favorable UNII, and its more diverse portfolio.