Author Archives: Scalper1

With Further Market Declines Likely, Keep The Long Run In Mind

This article originally appeared on the Independent Observer Blog . August was the worst month for U.S. markets in more than three years, so say the headlines. I suspect it was also the worst month in at least that long for many international markets as well. And, as today’s numbers show us, we aren’t done yet. As I write this, U.S. markets are down about 2.5 percent, and European markets closed down around 3 percent. There is actually not much more I can add to what I’ve already written. Current valuations remain relatively high , and there is certainly the potential for further declines if the market adjusts to more typical valuation levels. From a correction standpoint, the S&P 500 is still down less than 10 percent from the peak. In other words, for all the hype and worry, we are in a market decline that, by historical standards, is both small and normal. This is not to minimize the current situation, however. Substantial technical damage has been done to U.S. markets, which remain below both the 200-day and 400-day moving averages. This suggests to me that more weakness is very likely. Indeed, the odds of a more substantial decline are, in my opinion, rising as confidence continues to erode. Many decision rules that have tested well in the past are now pointing to more declines as well. With further market declines likely, what should you do? If you have longer-term money invested (i.e., you don’t need it for 10 years or more), try to stay put. And if you’re still contributing to your portfolio, remember that the decline actually represents an opportunity, since you can invest at lower prices and benefit from potential future growth. If you have shorter-term money invested (i.e., you need it in the next couple of years), or if you’re already drawing down your portfolio in retirement, work with your financial advisor to determine what effect a large decline would have on your financial well-being. Hopefully, your portfolio is structured in a way that any decline will have minimal impact over time. If not, you might want to consider making changes to ensure that is the case. Once your portfolio design meets your needs, though, unfortunately, there is little left to do but buckle up and endure the ride. Why this decline looks different I won’t say enjoy the ride, of course, but to make it less painful, consider that this decline is different: First, many previous and major, long-lasting declines – 2000 and 2008 being the most recent – came at the end of multiyear debt-fueled booms. We might get to that point eventually, but we’re not there now. Households have actually continued to pay off debt during the past few years, not add to it. Second, sustained declines typically took hold during periods of recession while, today, the U.S. economy continues to grow in a sustainable way. Third, the lack of corrections like this over the past few years has, arguably, been unhealthy. The current decline is actually a painful but necessary step to clear out market excesses and lay the groundwork for further advances. This prescription – prepare and keep the long run in mind – is neither easy nor satisfying. The only real thing it has going for it is that, over time, it generally works. That is what I try to focus on, and I suggest you do the same.

TCW/Gargoyle Hedged Value, September 2015

By David Objective and strategy TCW/Gargoyle Hedged Value seeks long-term capital appreciation while exposing investors to less risk than broad stock market indices. The strategy is to hold a diversified portfolio mid- to large-cap value stocks, mostly domestic, and to hedge part of the stock market risk by selling a blend of index call options. In theory, the mix will allow investors to enjoy most of the market’s upside while being buffered for a fair chunk of its downside. Adviser TCW. TCW, based in Los Angeles, was founded in 1971 as Trust Company of the West. About $140 billion of that are in fixed income assets. The Carlyle Group owns about 60% of the adviser while TCW’s employees own the remainder. They advise 22 TCW funds, as well as nine Metropolitan West funds with a new series of TCW Alternative funds in registration. As of June 30, 2015, the firm had about $180 billion in AUM; of that, $18 billion resides in TCW funds and $76 billion in the mostly fixed-income MetWest funds. Manager Joshua B. Parker and Alan Salzbank. Messrs. Parker and Salzbank are the Managing Partners of Gargoyle Investment Advisor, LLC. They were the architects of the combined strategy and managed the hedge fund which became RiverPark/Gargoyle, and now TCW/Gargoyle, and also oversee about a half billion in separate accounts. Mr. Parker, a securities lawyer by training is also an internationally competitive bridge player (Gates, Buffett, Parker…) and there’s some reason to believe that the habits of mind that make for successful bridge play also makes for successful options trading. They both have over three decades of experience and all of the investment folks who support them at Gargoyle have at least 20 years of experience in the industry. Strategy capacity and closure The managers estimate that they could manage about $2 billion in the stock portion of the portfolio and a vastly greater sum in the large, liquid options market. TCW appears not to have any clear standards controlling fund closures. Active share “Active share” measures the degree to which a fund’s portfolio differs from the holdings of its benchmark portfolio. High active share indicates management which is providing a portfolio that is substantially different from, and independent of, the index. An active share of zero indicates perfect overlap with the index, 100 indicates perfect independence. Gargoyle has calculated the active share of the equity portion of the portfolio but is legally constrained from making that information public. Given the portfolio’s distinctive construction, it’s apt to be reasonably high. Management’s stake in the fund As of January 2014, the managers had $5 million invested in the strategy (including $500,000 in this fund). Gargoyle Partners and employees have over $10 million invested in the strategy. Opening date The strategy was originally embodied in a hedge fund which launched December 31, 1999. The hedge fund converted to a mutual fund on April 30, 2012. TCW adopted the RiverPark fund on June 26, 2015. Minimum investment $5000, reduced to $1000 for retirement accounts. There’s also an institutional share class (MUTF: TFHIX ) with a $1 million minimum and 1.25% expense ratio. Expense ratio 1.50%, after waivers, on assets of $74.5 million, as of July 2015. Comments Shakespeare was right. Juliet, the world’s most famously confused 13-year-old, decries the harm that a name can do: ‘Tis but thy name that is my enemy; Thou art thyself, though not a Montague. What’s Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot, Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part Belonging to a man. O, be some other name! What’s in a name? that which we call a rose By any other name would smell as sweet; So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d, Retain that dear perfection which he owes Without that title. Her point is clear: people react to the name, no matter how little sense that makes. In many ways, they make the same mistake with this fund. The word “hedged” as the first significant term of the name leads many people to think “low volatility,” “mild-mannered,” “market neutral” or something comparable. Those who understand the fund’s strategy recognize that it isn’t any of those things. The Gargoyle fund has two components. The fund combines an unleveraged long portfolio and a 50% short portfolio, for a steady market exposure of 50%. The portfolio rebalances between those strategies monthly, but monitors and trades its options portfolio “in real time” throughout the month. The long portfolio is 80-120 stocks, and stock selection is algorithmic. They screen the 1000 largest US stocks on four valuation criteria (price to book, earnings, cash flow and sales) and then assign a “J score” to each stock based on how its current valuation compares with (1) its historic valuation and (2) its industry peers’ valuation. They then buy the hundred most undervalued stocks, but maintain sector weightings that are close to the S&P 500’s. The options portfolio is index call options. At base, they’re selling insurance policies to nervous investors. Those policies pay an average premium of 2% per month and rise in value as the market falls. That 2% is a long-term average, during the market panic in the fall of 2008, their options were generating 8% per month in premiums. Why index calls? Two reasons: (1) they are systematically mispriced, and so they generate more profit (or suffer less of a loss) than they theoretically should. Apparently, anxious investors are not as price sensitive as they should be. In particular, these options are overpriced by about 35 basis points per month 88% of the time. For sellers such as Gargoyle, that means something like a 35 bps free lunch. Moreover, (2) selling calls on their individual stocks – that is, betting that the stocks in their long portfolio will fall – would reduce returns. They believe that their long portfolio is a collection of stocks superior to any index and so they don’t want to hedge away any of their stock-specific upside. By managing their options overlay, the team can react to changes in the extent to which their investors are exposed to the stock markets movements. At base, as they sell more index options, they reduce the degree to which the fund is exposed to the market. Their plan is to keep net market exposure somewhere in the range of 35-65%, with a 50% average and a healthy amount of income. On whole, the strategy works. The entire strategy has outperformed the S&P. Since inception, its returns have roughly doubled those of the S&P 500. It’s done so with modestly less volatility. Throughout, it has sort of clubbed its actively-managed long-short peers. More significantly, it has substantially outperformed the gargantuan Gateway Fund (MUTF: GATEX ). At $7.8 billion, Gateway is – for many institutions and advisors – the automatic go-to fund for an options-hedged portfolio. It’s not clear to me that it should be. Here’s the long-term performance of Gateway (green) versus Gargoyle (blue): Two things stand out: an initial investment in Gargoyle fifteen years ago would have returned more than twice as much as the same investment at the same time in Gateway (or the S&P 500). That outperformance is neither a fluke nor a one-time occurrence: Gargoyle leads Gateway over the past one, three, five, seven and ten-year periods as well. The second thing that stands out is Gargoyle’s weak performance in the 2008 crash. The fund’s maximum drawdown was 48%, between 10/07 and 03/09. The managers attribute that loss to the nature of the fund’s long portfolio: it buys stocks in badly dented companies when the price of the stock is even lower than the company’s dents would warrant. Unfortunately in the meltdown, those were the stocks people least wanted to own so they got killed. The fund’s discipline kept them from wavering: they stayed 100% invested and rebalanced monthly to buy more of the stocks that were cratering. The payback came in 2009 when they posted a 42% return against the S&P’s 26% and again in 2010 when they made 18% to the index’s 15%. The managers believe that ’08 was exceptional, and note that the strategy actually made money from 2000-02 when the market suffered from the bursting of the dot-com bubble. Morty Schaja, president of River Park Funds, notes that “We are going to have meltdowns in the future, but it is unlikely that they will play out the same way as it did 2008 . . . a market decline that is substantial but lasts a long time, would play better for Gargoyle that sells 1-2% option premium and therefore has that as a cushion every month as compared to a sudden drop in one quarter where they are more exposed. Similarly, a market decline that experiences movement from growth stocks to value stocks would benefit a Gargoyle, as compared to a 2008.” I concur. Just as the French obsession with avoiding a repeat of WW1 led to the disastrous decision to build the Maginot Line in the 1930s, so an investor’s obsession with avoiding “another ’08” will lead him badly astray. What about the ETF option? Josh and Alan anticipate clubbing the emerging bevy of buy-write ETFs. The guys identify two structural advantages they have over an ETF: (1) they buy stocks superior to those in broad indexes and (2) they manage their options portfolio moment by moment, while the ETF just sits and takes hits for 29 out of 30 days each month. There’s evidence that they’re right. The ETFs are largely based on the CBOE S&P Buy-Write Index (BXM). Between 2000 and 2012, the S&P 500 returned 24% and the BXM returned 52%; the options portion of the Gargoyle portfolio returned 110% while the long portfolio crushed the S&P. Nonetheless, investors need to know that returns are lumpy; it’s quite capable of beating the S&P 500 for three or four years in a row, and then trailing it for the next three or four. The fund’s returns are not highly correlated with the returns of the S&P 500; the fund may lose money when the index makes money, and vice versa. That’s true in the short term – it beat the S&P 500 during August’s turbulence but substantially trailed during the quieter July – as well as the long-term. All of that is driven by the fact that this is a fairly aggressive value portfolio. In years when value investing is out of favor and momentum rules the day, the fund will lag. Bottom line On average and over time, a value-oriented portfolio works. It outperforms growth-oriented portfolios and generally does so with lower volatility. On average and over time, an options overlay works and an actively-managed one works better. It generates substantial income and effectively buffers market volatility with modest loss of upside potential. There will always be periods, such as the rapidly rising market of the past several years, where their performance is merely solid rather than spectacular. That said, Messrs. Parker and Salzbank have been doing this and doing this well for decades. What’s the role of the fund in a portfolio? For the guys, it’s virtually 100% of their US equity exposure. In talking with investors, they discuss it as a substitute for a large-cap value investment; so if your asset allocation plan is 20% LCV, then you could profitably invest up to 20% of your portfolio in Gargoyle. Indeed, the record suggests “very profitably.”

Is A Recession Necessary For The S&P 500 To Fall 20% From All-Time Highs?

Is it possible for a bear market to occur when the U.S. economy is expanding? Certainly. In spite of the obvious evidence that U.S. stock assets tend to fall long before the most prominent minds affirm contraction in the U.S. economy, an overwhelming number of analysts keep exclaiming that there is no recession in sight. Right now, U.S. stocks require clarity on rate policy more than they require anything else. Is it possible for a bear market to occur when the U.S. economy is expanding? Certainly. In fact, most bear markets are already well on their way to becoming 20% price declines long before a recession is formerly identified. Consider the most recent bearish retreat (10/07-3/09). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) officially declared on 12/1/08 that the U.S. recession had started in December of 2007 – a declaration that came nearly one year after the economic downturn’s inception. Nine months before the NBER expressed its “recession” call, the S&P 500 had already plummeted close to the 20% level (March 2008.) At that moment, the Federal Reserve saved financial markets by joining JPMorgan Chase in bailing out Bear Stearns. Then, in the first week of July, five months before the NBER proclamation, the S&P 500 had descended more than the requisite 20%. And by the time anyone could count on an authenticated recession, the S&P 500 had already plummeted roughly 47.8% – close to half of its entire value. Well, okay. I suppose that the world’s best economists should err on the side of caution before making hasty decisions. Perhaps NBER, composed of academic economists from Harvard, Stanford and other top-notch universities, were quicker in warning investors prior to the 3/2000-10/2002 tech wreck? Unfortunately, nine months before the NBER expressed a March 2001 recession start in November of 2001, the S&P 500 had already made its bearish descent. (Nine months again?) It gets worse. The S&P 500 had already dropped 29% by November of 2001 and the “New Economy” NASDAQ had already plummeted 65%! In spite of the obvious evidence that U.S. stock assets tend to fall long before the most prominent minds affirm contraction in the U.S. economy, an overwhelming number of analysts keep exclaiming that there is no recession in sight. And without a recession, they say, there’s not going to be a bear. I am not sure this is an accurate statement. Since 1950, we have seen non-recession 20%-plus drops in 1962, 1966, 1978 and 1987. We have also seen non-recession drops that do not get the full benefit of the bear title (e.g., 1998’s Asian currency crisis/Long-Term Capital Management, 2011’s eurozone, etc.), yet reached the 20% threshold via “intra-day” price movement and/or “rounding.” What’s more, why do people automatically assign the recession tag to bear markets like the 3/2000-10/2002 tech wreck when the recession first began one year later in March of 2001? Perhaps because NBER later revised the recession date as having started in Q4 2000? I have no idea if we will see a bear on this correction go-around or the next 10%-19% pullback or the one after that. What I do know is that the commodity slump has resulted in ConocoPhillips (NYSE: COP ) slashing 10% of its global workforce; high paying oil jobs continue to disappear in a world of $45 oil. I also know that the Federal Reserve wants to hike overnight rates, likely raising the borrowing costs for consumers and businesses just as the Atlanta Fed expects Q3 GDP at an anemic 1.2%. Perhaps most importantly, I recognize that the U.S. economy is part of a global economy that has been decelerating. JPMorgan’s Global Manufacturing PMI is now at 50.7 where a reading below 50 would be indicative of a global manufacturing recession. In mid-August’s ” 15 Warning Signs ,” I discussed the reasons why a pullback from the market top was exceptionally likely. One week later, in ” Don’t Blame China, ” I talked about the reasons why investors should expect a relief rally. And in my Thursday (8/27) commentary, ” Are You Selling The Drama Or Buying The Rally ,” I wrote: If history teaches us that benchmarks tend to retrace half of their losses before retesting their lows – if you feel like you’ve been here before and you don’t choose to be scarred like that again – perhaps you might anticipate better buying opportunities in the weeks ahead. You should not be surprised by today’s (Tuesday, September 1) extremely volatile move lower. The S&P 500 has moved back below the correction point of 1917 because the global economy is decelerating and investors are fearful that a rate hiking campaign by the Federal Reserve might be the straw that breaks the U.S. camel’s spine. And manufacturer-dependent sector funds like Materials Select Sector SPDR (NYSEARCA: XLB ) are taking the heaviest hits. Do I think that a Fed tightening cycle might cause an imminent U.S. recession? Not if chairwoman Yellen and other committee members decide upon a sloth-like pace of one-eighth of a point every third meeting or a “one-n-done” quarter point that would not be revisited for six months. Then again, I am not sure that the recession/non-recession matters as much as others do. Right now, U.S. stocks require clarity on rate policy more than they require anything else. The longer it takes for the Fed to provide clarity, the more U.S. stocks are likely to struggle. Disclosure: Gary Gordon, MS, CFP is the president of Pacific Park Financial, Inc., a Registered Investment Adviser with the SEC. Gary Gordon, Pacific Park Financial, Inc, and/or its clients may hold positions in the ETFs, mutual funds, and/or any investment asset mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell or hold securities. At times, issuers of exchange-traded products compensate Pacific Park Financial, Inc. or its subsidiaries for advertising at the ETF Expert web site. ETF Expert content is created independently of any advertising relationships.