Author Archives: Scalper1

AQR Style Premia Alternative I, AQR Style Premia Alternative LV I, September 2015

By Samuel Lee Objective and strategy AQR’s Style Premia Alternative, or SPA, strategy offers leveraged, market-neutral exposure to the four major investing “styles” AQR has identified: Value , the tendency for fundamentally cheap assets to beat expensive assets. Momentum , the tendency for relative performance in assets to persist over the short run (about one to twelve months). Carry , the tendency for high-yield assets to beat low-yield assets. Defensive , the tendency for low-volatility assets to offer higher volatility-adjusted returns than high-volatility assets. To make the cut as a bona fide style, a strategy has to be persistent, pervasive, dynamic, liquid, transparent and systematic. SPA offers pure exposure to these styles across virtually all major markets, including stocks, bonds, currencies, and commodities. It removes big, intentional directional bets by going long and short and hedging residual market exposure. As with all alternative investments, the goal is to create returns uncorrelated with conventional portfolio returns. SPA sizes its positions by volatility, not nominal dollars. In quant-speak, risk is often used as shorthand for volatility, a convention I will adopt. Of course, volatility is not risk (though they are awfully correlated in many situations). SPA’s strategic risk allocations to each style are as follows: 34% each to value and momentum, 18% to defensive, and 14% to carry. Its strategic risk allocations to each asset class are as follows: 30% to global stock selection, 20% each to equity markets and fixed income, and 15% each to currencies and commodities. There is a bias to the value and momentum styles, perhaps reflecting AQR’s greater confidence in and longer history with them. Risk allocations drift based on momentum and “style agreement,” where high-conviction positions are leveraged up relative to low-conviction positions. The strategy’s overall risk target falls in steps in the event of a drawdown and rises as losses are recouped. These overlays embody some of the hard-knock knowledge speculators have acquired over the decades: bet on your best ideas, cut losers and ride winners, and cut capital at risk when one is trading poorly. SPA targets a Sharpe ratio of 0.7 over a market cycle. AQR offers two flavors to the public: the 10% volatility-targeted AQR Style Premia Alternative Fund Inst (MUTF: QSPIX ) and the 5%-vol AQR Style Premia Alternative LV Fund Inst (MUTF: QSLIX ). Adviser AQR Capital Management, LLC, was founded in 1998 by a team of ex-Goldman Sachs quant investors led by Clifford S. Asness, David G. Kabiller, Robert J. Krail, and John M. Liew. AQR stands for Applied Quantitative Research. The firm’s bread and butter has long been trading value and momentum together, an idea Asness studied in his PhD dissertation at the University of Chicago. (Asness’s PhD advisor was none other than Eugene Fama, father of modern finance and one of the co-formulators of the efficient market hypothesis.) When the firm started up, it was hot. It had one of the biggest launches of any hedge fund up to that point. Then the dot-com bubble inflated. The widening gap in valuations between value and growth stocks almost sunk AQR. According to Asness , the firm was six months away from going out of business. When the bubble burst, the firm’s returns soared and so did its assets. The good times rolled until the financial crisis shredded its returns . Firm-wide assets from peak-to-trough went from $39.1 billion to $17.2 billion. The good times are back: As of June-end, AQR has $136.2 billion under management. The two near-death experiences have instilled in AQR a fear of concentrated business risks. In 2009, AQR began to diversify away from its flighty institutional clientele by launching mutual funds to entice stickier retail investors. The firm has also launched new strategies at a steady clip, including managed futures, risk parity, and global macro. AQR has a strong academic bent. Its leadership is sprinkled with economics and finance PhDs from top universities, particularly the University of Chicago. The firm has poached academics with strong publishing records, including Andrea Frazzini, Lasse Pedersen, and Tobias Moskowitz. Its researchers and leaders are still active in publishing papers. The firm’s principals are critical of hedge funds that charge high fees on strategies that are largely replicable. AQR’s business model is to offer up simplified quant versions of these strategies and charge relatively low fees. Managers Andrea Frazzini, Jacques A. Friedman, Ronen Israel, and Michael Katz. Frazzini was a finance professor at University of Chicago and a rising star before he joined AQR. He is now a principal on AQR’s Global Stock Selection team. Friedman is head of the Global Stock Selection team and worked at Goldman Sachs with the original founders prior to joining AQR. Israel is head of Global Alternative Premia and prior to AQR was a senior analyst at Quantitative Financial Strategies Inc. Katz leads AQR’s macro and fixed-income team. Frazzini is the most recognizable, as he has the fortune of having a last name that’s first in alphabetical order and publishing several influential studies in top finance journals, including ” Betting Against Beta ” with his colleague Lasse Pedersen. Unlisted is the intellectual godfather of SPA, Antti Ilmanen, a University of Chicago finance PhD who authored Expected Returns , an imposing but plainly-written tome that synthesizes the academic literature as it relates to money management. Though written years before SPA was conceived, Expected Returns can be read as an extended argument for an SPA-like strategy. Strategy capacity and closure AQR has a history of closing funds and ensuring its assets don’t overwhelm the capacity of its strategies. When the firm launched in 1998, it could have started with $2 billion but chose to manage only half of that, according to founding partner David Kabiller . Of its mutual funds, AQR has already closed its Multi-Strategy Alternative, Diversified Arbitrage and Risk Parity mutual funds. However, AQR will meet additional demand by launching additional funds that are tweaked to have more capacity. As of the end of 2014, AQR reported a little over $3 billion in its SPA composite return record. Given the strategy’s strong recent returns, assets have almost certainly grown through capital appreciation and inflows. Because AQR uses many of the same models or signals in different formats and even in different strategies, the effective amount of capital dedicated to at least some components of SPA’s strategy is higher than the amount reported by AQR. Management’s stake in the fund As of Dec. 31, 2014, the strategy’s managers had no assets in the low-volatility SPA fund and little in the standard-volatility SPA fund. One trustee had less than $50,000 in QSPIX. Collectively, the managers had $170,004 to $700,000 in the SPA mutual funds. Although these are piddling amounts compared to the millions the managers make every year, the SPA strategy is tax inefficient. If the managers wanted significant exposure to the strategies, they would probably do so through the partnerships AQR offers to high-net-worth investors. But would they do that? AQR, like most quant shops, attempts to scarf down as much as possible the “free lunch” of diversification. The managers are well aware that their human capital is tied to AQR’s success and so they would probably not want to concentrate too heavily in its potent leveraged strategies. Opening date QSPIX opened on October 30, 2013. QSLIX opened on September 17, 2014. The live performance composite began on September 1, 2012. Minimum investment The minimum investment varies depending on share class, broker-dealer and channel. For individual investors, a Fidelity IRA offers the lowest hurdle: a mere $2,500 for the I share class of the normal and low-volatility flavors of SPA. Or you can get access through an advisor. Otherwise, the hurdles are steep: $5 million for the I class, $1 million for the N class, and $50 million for the R6 class. Expense ratio The I class for the normal and low-volatility versions cost 1.50% and 0.85%, respectively. The N classes costs 0.25% more and the R6 classes costs 0.10% less. The per-unit price of exposure to SPA is lower the higher the volatility of the strategy. QSPIX targets 10% vol and costs 1.5%. QSLIX targets 5% vol and costs 0.85%. Anyone can replicate a position in QSLIX by simply halving the amount invested in QSPIX and putting the rest in cash. The effective expense ratio of a half QSPIX, half cash clone strategy is 0.75%. Comments Among right-thinking passive investors who count fees by the basis point, AQR’s SPA strategy elicits revulsion. It’s expensive, leveraged, complicated, hard to understand, and did I mention expensive? To make the strategy easier to swallow, some passive-investing advocates argue SPA is “passive” because it’s transparent, systematic, and involves no discretionary stock selection or market forecasting. This definition is not universally accepted by academics, or even by AQR. The purer, technical definition of passive investing is a strategy that replicates market weightings, and indeed this definition is used by the venerable William Sharpe in his famous essay, ” The Arithmetic of Active Management .” I do not think SPA is passive in any widely understood sense of the word. In fact, I think it’s about as active as you can get within a mutual fund. And I also happen to think SPA is a great fund. Regardless of my warm feelings for the strategy, I consider SPA suitable only for a rare kind of nerd, not the investing public. Though SPA is aggressively active, its intellectual roots dig deep into the foundations of financial theory that underpin what are commonly thought to be “passive” strategies, particularly value- and size-tilted stock portfolios (DFA has made a big business selling them). The nerds among you will have quickly caught on that what AQR calls a style is nothing more than a factor, a decades-old idea that sprung from academic finance. For the non-nerds: A factor, loosely speaking, is a fundamental building block that explains asset returns. Most stocks move together, as if their crescendos and diminuendos were orchestrated by the hand of some invisible conductor. This co-movement is attributed to the equity market factor. According to factor theory, a factor generates a positive excess return called a premium as reward for the distinct risk it represents. It is now widely agreed that two factors pervade virtually all markets: value and momentum (size has long been criticized as weak). AQR’s researchers – including some of the leading lights in finance – argue there are two more: carry and defensive. They’ve marshalled data and theoretical arguments that share an uncanny family resemblance with the data and arguments marshalled to justify the size and value factors. The SPA strategy is a potent distillation of the factor-theoretical approach to investing. If you believe the methods that produced the research demonstrating the value and size effects are sound, then you have to admit that those same tools applied to different data sets may yield more factors that can be harvested. OK, I’ve blasted you with theory. On to more practical matters. Who should invest in this fund? Investors who believe active management can produce market-beating results and are willing to run some unusual but controllable risks. How much capital should one dedicate to it? Depends on how much you trust the strategy, the managers, and so on. I personally would invest up to 30% of my personal money in the fund (and may do so soon!), but that’s only because I have a high taste for unconventionality, decades of earnings ahead of me, high conviction in the strategy and people, and a pessimistic view of competing options (other alternatives as well as conventional stocks and bonds). Swedroe, on the other hand, says he has 3% of his portfolio in it. How should it be assessed? At a minimum, an alternative has to produce positive excess returns that are uncorrelated to the returns of conventional portfolios to be worthwhile. However, AQR is making a rather bold claim: It has identified four distinct strategies that produce decent returns on a standalone basis and are both largely uncorrelated with each other and conventional portfolios. When combined and leveraged, the resulting portfolio is expected to produce a much steadier stream of positive returns, also uncorrelated with conventional portfolios. So far, the strategy is working as advertised. Returns have been good and uncorrelated. In back-tests, the strategy only really suffered during the dot-com bubble and the financial crisis. Even then, returns weren’t horrendous. Is AQR’s 0.7 Sharpe ratio target reasonable? I think so, but I would be ecstatic with 0.5. What are its major risks? Aside from leverage, counterparty, operational, credit, etc., I worry about a repeat of the quant meltdown of August 2007. It’s thought that a long-short hedge fund suddenly liquidated its positions then. Because many hedge funds dynamically adjust their positions based on recent volatility and returns, the sudden price movements induced by the liquidation set off a self-reinforcing cycle where more and more hedge funds cut the same positions. The stampede to the exits resulted in huge and sudden losses. However, the terror was short-lived. The funds that sold out lost a lot of money; the funds that held onto their positions looked fine by month-end. AQR is cognizant of this risk and so keeps its holdings liquid and doesn’t go overboard with the leverage. However, it is hard for outsiders to assess whether AQR is doing enough to mitigate this risk. I think they are, because I trust AQR’s people, but I’m well aware that I could be wrong. Bottom line One of the best alternative funds available to mutual-fund investors.

Should We Care Why The Stocks We Buy Are Cheap?

One of my favorite blogs, Value and Opportunity , recently did a post about how the best value stocks are often those that are not cheap by the most obvious numbers (P/E, P/B, etc.). The post is entitled ” Value Investing Strategy: Cheap for a Reason “. The basic argument of the post is that: “… Especially in a market environment like now, cheap stocks are cheap for a reason . It is very unlikely that ‘you’ are the first and only one who knows how to run a screener and by chance you are the only one who can buy this great company at 3 times earnings which will quadruple within 6 months…The most important thing is to be really aware what the real problem is . If you don’t find the problem, then the chance is very high that you are missing something .” This is not at all how I look at stocks. I usually don’t know why a stock I’m buying is cheap. And I’m not sure I spend much time trying to figure out why someone else would or would not like the stock. I tend to just focus on whether I like the business and how much I’d “appraise” that business for. I can sometimes come up with possible reasons for why a stock I like is cheap. But I’m never sure those are the real reasons other people aren’t willing to buy the stock. I don’t think Quan sees himself – and I know I don’t see myself – as a contrarian investor. So, I assumed looking to see if a stock was “cheap for a reason” is something I simply don’t do. At least that’s what I thought before looking through the textual record of what I actually said about each stock I picked. In my last post, I mentioned 6 stocks that Quan and I picked for Singular Diligence which are now trading at a discount of 34% or greater to our original appraisal value. So, these are the 6 cheapest stocks we know of in intrinsic value – rather than traditional value metric – terms. I decided to go through the record and check for two things. One, how cheap these stocks are on the traditional value metrics. I will use Morningstar’s measures of P/E, P/B, and Dividend Yield for this. Two, what reason did I give (in the issue where I picked the stock) for why that stock might be cheap. Here are the 6 stocks. Discount to Appraisal Value: 58% Forward P/E: 9.6x P/B: 1.4x Dividend Yield: 3.6% Why I Said it Might Be Cheap: ” Hunter Douglas is an obscure stock. The Hunter Douglas brand is American. So, the company’s name is American. However, the stock trades in Europe. The company reports its results in U.S. dollars. But, the stock trades in Euros. The stock is 81% owned by the Sonnenberg family .” ( Note: Quan and I appraised this company – which sells shades and blinds mostly into the U.S. and European housing markets – based on its normal cyclical earnings, which we believe to be much higher than the very depressed earnings Hunter Douglas reported from 2009 to 2014. That could be given as a reason for why the stock is cheap. However, U.S.-traded stocks tied to housing are generally priced much more in line with the idea we are at a cyclically depressed point for their earnings. Hunter Douglas isn’t.) Frost (NYSE: CFR ) Discount to Appraisal Value: 55% Forward P/E: 12.0x P/B: 1.4x Dividend Yield: 3.4% Why I Said it Might Be Cheap: ” Frost has created a lot of intrinsic value since the 2008 financial panic. The stock market has not realized this because Frost has made very little on its loans and securities due to the Fed Funds Rate being near zero. In 2008, Frost had $10.5 billion in deposits. Today, Frost has $24 billion in deposits. Frost’s value comes entirely from its non-interest and very low interest bearing deposits. So, the intrinsic value of Frost as a buy and hold forever stock more than doubled from 2008 to today. The stock did not double, because reported EPS barely budged due to the yield on loans and securities being the lowest in history. When the Fed Funds Rate eventually increases from about 0% to 3% or higher – as all members of the Fed expect it will by about 2018 – Frost’s reported earnings will double. When Frost’s reported EPS doubles, its stock price will double. At that time – when the Fed Funds Rate has been 3% or higher for a year or more – investors will think Frost has become twice as valuable. That is false. Frost more than doubled its intrinsic value from 2008 to 2015, when it more than doubled its free and almost free deposits. A Fed Funds Rate near zero disguised this fact for about 7 years. Frost’s value was hidden for the last 7 years. But, Frost’s value will be obvious over the next 7 years. Frost is the clearest and best investment idea we have had since starting Singular Diligence in 2013. That fact is not obvious as I write this in 2015 with a Fed Funds rate near zero. It will be obvious in hindsight (in say 2019) with a Fed Funds rate near 3% .” Car-Mart (NASDAQ: CRMT ) Discount to Appraisal Value: 47% Forward P/E: 9.4x P/B: 1.3x Dividend Yield: 0% Why I Said it Might Be Cheap: ” Over the last 15 years, Car-Mart’s stock has returned 16% a year versus the S&P 500’s 4% a year return. It sounds strange to propose a stock is cheap when it is at ‘normal’ levels for a typical stock and within the range of multiples it has traded for in the past. However, Car-Mart’s past returns are very high compared to most stocks. In other words, the ‘normal’ historical range of multiples that Car-Mart traded at was simply too low… In the past, the company’s enterprise value has ranged from 0.8 times retail sales to 1.5 times retail sales. This constant undervaluation is what has caused the stock to outperform the S&P 500 by more than 10 percentage points per year since it went public .” Tandy Leather (NASDAQ: TLF ) Discount to Appraisal Value: 47% Forward P/E: 8.9x P/B: 1.5x Dividend Yield: 0% Why I Said it Might Be Cheap: I couldn’t find any quote from our issue on Tandy explaining what might cause the stock to be undervalued. I can come up with an argument now – but I don’t find it very convincing. Here’s the argument. Tandy is an illiquid stock. It trades less than $100,000 worth of shares on a normal trading day. As the only publicly traded leathercrafting retailer, it has literally zero peers. Only one analyst covers the stock. Most investors simply haven’t heard of Tandy Leather. I find that argument unconvincing because this is a U.S. stock. Tandy trades on the Nasdaq. It shows up on all screens that you’d run in the U.S. institutional ownership accounts for about two-thirds of the shareholder base. That means institutions hold over $50 million of Tandy stock. It’s a visible stock. People aren’t oblivious to its existence. Swatch ( OTCPK:SWGAY ) (*Valuation metrics are from Stockopedia for this one) Discount to Appraisal Value: 39% P/E: 14.8 x P/B: 1.9x Dividend Yield: 2.1% Why I Said it Might Be Cheap: ” The greatest risk of misjudging Swatch is not seeing a prolonged recession or depression coming in China. China is still much, much poorer than many of the markets it trades with. There is a lot of room for GDP per capita to grow over time. That means there is a lot of room for real wages to grow over time. However, China has several features that could be warning signs for a Japan like ‘lost decade’. It is not the point of this issue to speculate on that possibility. But it is rarely talked about by investors. And it is a potential problem. At no point in the last 35 years has Chinese economic growth been poor enough to qualify as anything like a recession. So, the biggest risk of misjudgment is assuming that the trend of the last few decades will always be normal. Chinese GDP growth has been in the range of 7% to 8% lately. Chinese population growth is only 0.5%. This means that GDP per capita is growing – even now – at 6.5% a year or faster. About 45% of Chinese GDP is investment in fixed capital. Meanwhile, about 15% of U.S. GDP is investment in fixed capital. This makes the risk of an overhang of long-lived assets much higher in China. There is a very high rate of growth in fixed capital per person. This is because Chinese GDP is very fast growing, almost half of Chinese GDP is investment spending, and Chinese population growth is low. As a result, China would be much less able to absorb a glut of long-lived assets. If the country builds too many apartment complexes, factories, airports, power plants, etc. they run the risk of having them be vacant or idle. Industries like construction are important in China. These are long cycle industries. They are susceptible to periods of overbuilding and then periods where they must be idle to absorb the overexpansion of previous years. China has been rapidly expanding since the late 1970s. So, there is always a risk of the sorts of problems Japan had…Quan and I have no predictions about the future growth of China. But it’s important to point out the impact a stagnant Chinese economy would have on Swatch. In the future – Swatch will likely get both the majority of its profits and the majority of its growth from Chinese consumers. If China’s economy has the kind of experience Japan’s did over the last 25 years – Chinese consumers will not increase their watch buying. Swatch’s growth will decline by at least half. If China is stagnant – Swatch may be stagnant.” Ekornes ( OTC:EKRNF ) (*Valuation metrics are from Stockopedia for this one) Discount to Appraisal Value: 38% P/E: 12.0x P/B: 2.6x Dividend Yield: 6.1% Why I Said it Might Be Cheap: ” Ekornes is clearly cheap. There are two possible reasons for this. One, the Ekornes name is unknown worldwide because the company’s main brand – Stressless – is different from the name under which the company is listed. Two, Ekornes trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Norway is a tiny country of just 6 million people. Very few investors outside Norway buy shares of Norwegian companies in Oslo. For example, half of Ekornes’s shares are held by Norwegians. Only 50% of Ekornes’s shares are in foreign hands. If Ekornes listed in Frankfurt, London, or New York – it would probably get more attention from investors outside Norway. The share price might be higher… The biggest reason why a foreign investor might avoid Ekornes is concern that the stock – which is bought and sold in Krone – will fluctuate in the investor’s home currency along with the exchange rate between that home currency and the Krone. So, for example, an American investor might feel certain that Ekornes’s share price of 100 Norwegian Krone will one day expand beyond 125 Norwegian Krone, but that investor fears a 25% drop in the Krone versus the Dollar – like the drop from 17 cents to 13 cents in the past year – would more than wipe out his gain. This is a valid short‐term concern. Ekornes’s share price in dollars will fluctuate even when the price in Oslo stays the same in Krone. However, this is not a valid long‐term concern. In the long‐run, a stock’s intrinsic value will follow its earning power. Ekornes’s earning power comes from the gap between its sales – made in Euros, Dollars, Pounds, Yen, etc. – and its costs. Ekornes gets 94% of its sales in currencies other than the Krone. Only the company’s labor cost is tied to the Krone. So, it is misleading to think of Ekornes’s intrinsic value as being a primarily Krone based figure. ” We can make a few statements from the above list. One, I usually do give some reason for why a stock might be cheap. I’ve never thought of this as being an important part of my own process when it comes to picking stocks. But apparently, giving a reason “why a stock might be cheap” was important enough for me to include when writing to subscribers in 5 out of 6 cases. Two, the stocks that look cheapest to us also look cheap based on traditional value metrics. Stockopedia tells me that the median forward P/E of all stocks in the U.S. and Europe is 15.2x. The forward P/Es of the 6 stocks Quan and I think are the cheapest ranged from 8.9x to 14.8x. There is one other test we can run on the 6 stocks Quan and I think are the cheapest. Here is a paragraph from near the end of the Value and Opportunity post: ” Actually, I strongly prefer “forgotten” sectors compared to those which just have recently started to decline. Yes, everyone is looking at oil companies these days as they have declined a lot in the last months and look cheap. But I actually find better value in banks or financial companies .” Look at the 6 stocks that are the cheapest based on today’s price as a percentage of our original appraisal value for them. Two of the stocks – Frost and Car-Mart – are U.S. financial companies. And two of the stocks – Ekornes and Hunter Douglas – are furnishings stocks. Finally, we can take a “top-down” look, as Value and Opportunity suggests. European stocks are cheaper than U.S. stocks. Most of the stocks we pick for Singular Diligence are U.S. stocks. But 3 out of 6 of the stocks we think are the cheapest trade in Europe. Ekornes is listed in Norway. Hunter Douglas (although more an American company than anything else) is listed in the Netherlands. And Swatch is listed in Switzerland. In the case of Hunter Douglas, I have to admit I do think the stock would trade at a higher P/E ratio if it were listed in New York instead of Amsterdam. So, although we consider ourselves bottom-up stock pickers, there is a top-down pattern at work here. European stocks are cheaper than U.S. stocks. Stocks tied to U.S. housing activity are cheap. And stocks tied to U.S. interest rates – that is, stocks that do better when rates are higher and credit tighter – are cheaper. If you just take the stocks that trade at a 34% or greater discount to our appraisal value, they’re not very diversified at all. Half of that group is European. One third is furnishings. And one third is U.S. financials. This means that one continent (Europe) and two industries (furniture and finance) explain most of the cheapness in the group. The one exception is Tandy. There is no top-down explanation for Tandy’s cheapness that I can see. And I don’t really have any explanation for why the market values the business so much lower than I do. There is something else to consider. A top-down explanation for why these 6 stocks are cheap may not be the only explanation. True, Hunter Douglas and Swatch are both European. But they’re also both family-controlled. Neither family has any interest in hyping their stock. And neither family is likely to sell at any price. Which explanation is the right explanation? Why is Hunter Douglas cheap? Is it because the Sonnenberg family controls so much of the stock and doesn’t care about getting Wall Street’s attention? Is it because it’s a European stock instead of a U.S. stock? Or, is it because Hunter Douglas’s earnings are tied to U.S. housing, and investors are pricing the stock off cyclically low earnings as if they were cyclically normal earnings? I don’t know. There are patterns in the “cheap” stocks we find. They do seem to come from cheap parts of the world and to be in cheap sectors. Now, I want to balance the numerical evidence with some purely anecdotal evidence. I’ve never tallied up the emails, but I get a pretty good number of them from people telling me they liked a stock I wrote about quite a bit, but they never actually bought it. When subscribers tell me why they liked a stock a lot but never bought it, they often give one of 5 reasons: It’s illiquid. The broker they currently use won’t buy it for them. It trades in a currency different from their own. It’s boring. There’s no catalyst – they plan to wait and maybe buy it later. I have no data supporting these 5 possible explanations for “why a stock is cheap”. I think top-down explanations for cheapness are often right. There are simply countries and sectors that are out of favor. But I think these 5 explanations may be right too. Stocks that are illiquid, boring, and lack a catalyst may always be cheaper than they deserve to be. If that’s true – simply learning to love illiquidity, boredom, and a lack of headlines in your portfolio might be enough to improve your returns. My own opinion is that if we are told a stock is “cheap” to start with, we’ll always find a reason why it should be cheap. We don’t value stocks blind. As value investors, we often know the P/E, P/B, the dividend yield – and maybe even the EV/EBITDA – of a stock before we’ve even read the company’s Annual Report. We come in expecting to find warts, and so we find warts. We then tell ourselves that the cheapness of the stock must be due to these warts. Once you’ve seen a cheap stock price, you can’t undo that kind of bias. Your mind has been tainted with the market’s view of the stock before you even read the business description. It’s strange, but true: In investing, you know other people’s views before you know your own. The best situation would be to have no knowledge of a stock’s price when you estimate its value. The next best situation would be to do our best to forget whatever prices we’ve seen and focus instead on calculating a truly independent appraisal of the stock’s value. Disclosure: Long HDUGF, CFR, CRMT, TLF, SWGAY, EKRNF.

Misconceptions About Banks (And A Glance At Wells Fargo)

Summary The banking industry is very durable and predictable. Deposit growth tends to follow GDP growth. Over the last 20 years, total deposits of all FDIC-insured institutions compounded 6.2% annually. There aren’t many businesses that have high-single digit growth forever. But that’s very possible for good banks. The key for investors is to avoid banks that rely on borrowings other than deposits. Overall, banks that have stable funding sources and that make inherently lower risk loans can be very safe. By Quan Hoang I came to the U.S. in the fall of 2008. It was a turbulent time when I read about bankruptcies or about “too big to fail” banks almost every morning. As a new student of economics and value investing, I developed an ingrained prejudice against banks in this abnormal period. Like most casual observers, I thought that banking is a risky business because of high leverage. Business cycle is inevitable and a small mistake can be magnified into big losses. So, I’d better stay away from banks. Geoff asked me to look at several banks over the years. No bank was good enough to change my preconception. But some did recently. I spent the last 3 months researching banks. I realized that there are good banks and bad banks. Some have more stable funding sources than others. Some banks focus on inherently safe loans more than others. It’s not impossible to understand some banks. In this post, I will discuss why some banks can be a great long-term investment. I will also discuss what I like and don’t like about Wells Fargo. Good Banks Can Grow Profitably for Many Years The banking industry is very durable and predictable. Deposit growth tends to follow GDP growth. Over the last 20 years, total deposits of all FDIC-insured institutions compounded 6.2% annually. Good banks can do better than that. The long-term trend is that there are fewer and fewer banks. The total number of FDIC-insured institutions declined from 11,970 in 1995 to 6,509 in 2014. That means deposits per bank can grow faster than GDP growth. The group of banks with more than $10 billion in assets grew much faster than groups with fewer assets. That can be explained by acquisitions. But the fact is that in most local markets, the top 5, 10, or 15 banks as a group tend to increase total market share over time. So, a durable bank can have a high chance of growing more than 5-6% organically. There aren’t many businesses that have high-single digit growth forever. But that’s very possible for good banks. The banking industry has lower costs than other types of lenders. Banks get funding from noninterest-bearing deposits, interest-bearing deposits, and other interest-bearing liabilities. The rates banks pay for interest-bearing deposits and other liabilities is very stable as a fraction of the Federal Fund Rates (FFR). For example, the cost of interest-bearing deposits for most banks is between 60% and 90% of FFR. Some deposits are more expensive than others. For example, the cost of money market account can be 70% of FFR, and the cost of time deposits can be 90% of FFR. The total cost of funding for banks is usually lower than FFR. The estimated cost of funding as % of FFR for some banks I looked at is: Frost (NYSE: CFR ): 42% Commerce Bancshares (NASDAQ: CBSH ): 48% First Financial: 49% Prosperity Bancshares (NYSE: PB ): 53% BOK Financial (NASDAQ: BOKF ): 59% Wells Fargo (NYSE: WFC ): 64% U.S. Bancorp (NYSE: USB ): 67% The industry data isn’t available but these are banks with lower-than-average funding. We can assume that cost of funding for the industry isn’t far from 80% of FFR. So, if FFR is 3%, the cost of funding is 2.4%. The average net operating cost of banks with $1 billion to $10 billion in assets is 1.8%, and of banks with more than $10 billion in assets is 1.1%. These two groups are representative of the industry because banks with $1 billion to $10 billion of assets hold 10% of total industry deposit, and banks with more than $10 billion in assets hold 80% of total industry deposit. So, the industry’s average net operating cost is less than 1.5%. That means the industry’s total cost of money is less than 4% if FFR is 3%. That’s lower than risk-free rates and is surely lower than the required rate of return for most money market funds or bond funds. So, the banking industry has lower cost than other lenders. But strong rivalry among banks forces yields to go up and down along with the cost of funding. Therefore, the industry’s net interest spread, defined as yield minus cost of funding, was very stable at about 3.5%, as shown in the following graph: (click to enlarge) The U.S. banking industry’s net interest margin had a fairly stable tendency to be about 3.5% from 1999-2014. Good banks can make 15-20% after-tax ROE. For example, Wells Fargo’s total cost is about 2.5% of total asset assuming 3% FFR. That means a very modest yield of 4% can result in 1.5% pre-tax return on earning assets. With 10x leverage, ROE will be 15% pre-tax and 10% after-tax. A normal yield of 6% results in 3.5% pre-tax return on earning assets or 23% after-tax ROE. FFR can go up and down, but Wells Fargo tends to maintain at least 1% cost advantage over the industry. That means Wells Fargo’s ROA is always at least 1% more than the industry’s average ROA. That guarantees an above-average ROE. Some Banks Have Low Risk The main argument against banks is leverage. But not all liabilities are equal. Deposits are not debt. Deposits are more like insurance float. Even better, deposits tend to increase a lot in financial crises because people want to conserve cash. Some good banks are considered “safe havens” and thus gain deposit market share in bad times. Short-term liabilities are what cause liquidity problems. Many banks rely on commercial paper or repo. According to a McKinsey report, deposits were just 49% of liabilities of U.S. banks in 2012. Commercial paper, repo, senior debt, and other liabilities made up 39% of liabilities. So, these banks can have big trouble in renewing short-term borrowings in a crisis. That’s very different from a bank like Frost whose deposits represent 96% of total liabilities. So, the inherent risk in banking is liquidity. The key for investors is to avoid banks that rely on borrowings other than deposits. Regulators watch some capital ratios but banks with a lot of short-term borrowing could still face liquidity problems in a crisis even if they have a lot of tangible equity to assets. Quality of funding sources is more important than capital ratios. Banks that rely on deposits for most of their funding are very safe. They won’t have a liquidity problem even if they incur some loan losses. However, banks have to maintain regulatory capital ratios. So, it’s important to avoid loan losses. I found that loans have different risk profiles. For example, consumer loans tend to have more losses – offset by higher yield – than business loans. That’s perhaps because of government programs that encourage lending to home buyers or students. Among business loans, commercial real estate (CRE) loans tend to have more losses than commercial & industrial (C&I) loans. That’s because there is more speculation in real estate development than in other industry. So, the types of loans a bank makes are as important as a conservative culture in minimizing losses. For example, it’s widely accepted that Wells Fargo has conservative lending. Yet, its average net charge-offs over the last 20 years was 1.09%. That’s way higher than Frost’s 0.48% or BOK Financial’s 0.27%. Frost and BOK make much fewer consumer loans than Wells Fargo. Overall, banks that have stable funding sources and that make inherently lower risk loans can be very safe. I propose a checklist for good banks: 1. High deposits/liabilities ( 80% or more) 2. High noninterest-bearing deposits/total deposits ( 30% or more) 3. Low operating cost ( 1% or less) 4. High C&I loans/Total loans ( 60% or more) My View on Wells Fargo When I first looked at Wells Fargo, I thought that it can make $60 billion pre-tax earnings. The idea was simple. The median net interest income/earning asset from 1991 to 2014 was 4.45%. Net operating cost was 0.57% in 2014. Net operating cost has been declining over time, so it makes sense to use the latest number instead of the past median number. So, Wells Fargo can make 4.45% – 0.57% = 3.88% pre-tax return on earning assets (ROEA). As of the last quarter, Wells Fargo had $1.55 trillion in earning assets. $1.55 trillion times 3.88% equals to $60 billion. Another approach gives a similar result. Wells Fargo’s cost of interest-bearing liabilities as a % of FFR was stable at about 88% with a variation of 0.20. Wells Fargo’s net interest spread, defined as yield minus cost of interest-bearing liabilities, was very stable at about 4.52% with a variation of 0.13. So, at a normal 3% FFR, cost of interest-bearing liabilities would be 3% * 88% = 2.64% , and yield would be 2.64% + 4.52% = 7.16% . Free funding sources are 27% of total earning assets, so weighted average net interest spread is 5.23% (= 27% * 7.16% + 73% * 4.52%). Subtracting net interest spread by 0.84% average net charge-offs/earning assets and 0.57% net operating cost results in 3.82% pre-tax ROEA. That implies $59 billion pre-tax income. Wells Fargo’s current market cap is $275 billion. So, Wells Fargo is trading at only 4.6 times normal pre-tax earnings. That makes Wells Fargo the cheapest bank I’ve ever seen. Even if it takes 10 years for Wells Fargo to make a normal 3.82% ROEA, investors can still make 13% annual return based on today’s price. Assuming 5% growth, Wells Fargo would have $2,520 billion earning assets in 2025. Applying 3.82% ROEA results in $96 billion pre-tax earnings. That’s 10.6% annual growth from last year’s $35 billion pre-tax earnings. Adding 2.8% dividend yields results in 13.4% annual return. There can be also some multiple expansion and share buyback. Wells Fargo has characteristics that I like. It has a low cost of funding. Noninterest-bearing deposits are 32% of total deposits. Noninterest-bearing deposits are only 20-25% of total deposits at most banks. It has an extremely low net operating cost of 0.57%. That’s the lowest I’ve ever seen. I looked at about 50 publicly traded regional banks and most have between 1.6% and 3.3% net operating cost. Wells Fargo has low net operating costs, thanks to cross-selling. For example, its retail bank cross sells on average 6.17 products per household. That generates a lot of fee income. Wells Fargo has strong consumer brand awareness. All national banks have this advantage but Wells Fargo is better at cross-selling than any other bank. It’s likely that Wells Fargo can gain market share over time. In other words, it can grow deposits by more than 5% annually. Wells Fargo is conservative. For example, it exited subprime lending in 2004. Most of its problems during the Great Recession were related to the loans acquired from Wachovia. Its lowest pre-provision earnings before tax (2.43% in 2014) covers 1.4 times the highest net charge-offs (1.76% in 2010.) But there are things I don’t like about Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo is very big in mortgages. The mortgage origination business is okay. This business requires scale and Wells Fargo funds one out of every three home loans in the U.S. The problem is that it retains about 10% of the loans it makes. Mortgage loans are 21% of earning assets. I’m not comfortable with these loans. There are some adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM). Can customers afford interest expenses of these loans if interest rates increase? It’s likely that loans made after 2008 are very safe. Mortgage loans have been so restricted after The Great Recession. For example, total mortgage credit availability index was just 125.5 in July 2015 compared to almost 900 in July 2006. Regardless, a higher interest rate is still a concern for ARM. Fixed mortgage loan can limit upside. Consumers took advantage of the low interest rates to refinance mortgage loans. So, Wells Fargo may have to carry a low yield portfolio for a while. For example, the yield on 1-4 family first mortgages was 4.19% in 2014, which is way lower than 7.27% in 2006. The securities portfolio is another concern. Securities totaled $322 billion or about 21% of total earning assets. Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) totaled $124 billion. Wells Fargo expects the value of MBS to decline by $8.2 billion if interest rates increase by 2%. It doesn’t give the same expectation for the whole securities portfolio. But it can possibly lose over $35 billion if interest rates increase by 3%. This is just a paper loss. The weighted-average expected maturity of securities available for sale was just 6.6 years. So, Wells Fargo can hold these securities until maturity and incur no actual loss. This potential loss is only relevant because of regulatory capital ratios. Basel III requires banks with more than $250 billion assets to include marked-to-market gains or losses in the calculation of capital ratio. Assuming a $40 billion loss, tier I ratio would be 7.6%, which is well above the requirement of 6%. Supplementary leverage ratio, which takes into account off-balance sheet exposures, would be 5.9%, which is higher than the required 5%. So, Wells Fargo passed my stress test. My last concern is that Wells Fargo is a “too big to fail” bank. Even if it will never have a liquidity issue, it can be forced by regulators to get a cash injection, resulting in share dilution. The book “Too Big to Fail” by Andrew Ross Sorkin tells the story about the protest of Wells Fargo’s CEO Kovacevich against the TARP: Dick Kovacevich, for one, was obviously not pleased to have been given this ultimatum. He had had to get on a flight-a commercial flight, no less-to Washington, a place he had always found contemptible, only to be told he would have to take money he thought he didn’t need from the government, in some godforsaken effort to save all these other cowboys? “I’m not one of you New York guys with your fancy products. Why am I in this room, talking about bailing you out?” he asked derisively.” And Henry Paulson responded with a threat of a regulatory crackdown: You’re going to get a call tomorrow telling you you’re undercapitalized and that you won’t be able to raise money in the private markets.” Well Fargo is a good bank. It’s very cheap. But it’s too big. Its loan portfolio is too complicated. And it gets too much attention from regulators. Many people follow the stock. They may know things that I don’t know about Wells Fargo. So, I prefer smaller banks that have a simpler balance sheet.