Author Archives: Scalper1

A Volatile, Illiquid Paradise

Summary Two characteristics of today’s market – volatility and illiquidity – are in focus for many investors. What many small investors fail to realize is that straightforward Graham-style investing isn’t the only way to profit from volatility. This market is paradise for the small, self-directed value investor with a willingness to take on insurance liabilities. There is a lot of confusion about volatility . Some people think that volatility is the square root of the variance in a price series. They would be correct, except when they’re not. Others think that volatility is whatever the CBOE’s VIX metric says. This is also true, but limiting. Similarly, still others would argue that volatility is whatever the derivatives market implies that volatility is. Most will agree, however, that volatility is bad . We say “most,” but Seeking Alpha really isn’t “most” people. Any investor with even a cursory understanding of Graham-style investing knows the metaphor of Mr. Market, the moody, irrational purveyor of market prices. If we are patient with him, we can take advantage of his irrationality, which is what we ought to do as investors. In this understanding, volatility is simply noise , and it certainly isn’t a bad thing. As value-driven investors, we encourage this latter mentality, but we wonder if “volatility-as-noise” cuts the conversation too short. We see more opportunity here than the traditional Graham paradigm suggests. Taking advantage of more When we take advantage of what we estimate to be mispriced securities, we are directly using the volatility of the market to our advantage. The idea is that our counterparties (sellers or buyers) are simply lacking in time, cash, or information (or perhaps they are limited by fiduciary obligations), and when we trade shares, their loss is our gain. What if we take this one step further? If we are comfortable taking advantage of others’ value miscalculations by buying or selling a stock at a certain price, why would we not also be comfortable taking advantage of our counterparties’ miscalculations (or irrational obsession) with volatility itself? Return to the popular impressions of volatility. Each has profound limitations. When we take the square root of a variance , we are more often than not simply using a security’s end-of-day closing prices. This ignores daily ranges, which can be quite significant. When we refer only to the VIX , we correlate volatility almost exclusively with indices’ downside and thereby mistake “volatility” for “fear” (thank the financial media for this). When we rely on the implied volatility of derivatives, we assume a standard deviation of returns in a stock, largely ignoring the possibility of gapping and skewed returns. Assessing risk with any one of these volatility measures is a fool’s errand — and there are plenty of fools in the market. The illiquidity trap When we view volatility as baseless noise rather than risk , a whole world of opportunity presents itself. I.e., if we think that Mr. Market’s irrationality presents us with opportunity, then others’ “risk” can be our reward. If you were afraid of volatility (here meaning simply variation in a price series), as many portfolio managers are (think pensions), you would be eager to hedge against it. This has always been the case, though as we gaze into the maw of a potential bear market, survival instinct makes portfolio insurance more appealing than ever. As a corollary, selling insurance (puts) in periods of (VIX-style) volatility can be quite profitable. August 24th demonstrated, however, that this is not “normal” volatility. In the last few years, the Wild West of HFT penny-spread market-making turned the average transaction size into a tiny fraction of what it used to be, and largely pushed other market-makers out of the game. When the exchanges then gradually disincentivized even HFT market-making (thank you Michael Lewis ), no one was left to provide liquidity — especially in times of uncertainty (see 2010 Flash Crash ). What this means for the aforementioned portfolio managers is that the exchanges are not friendly places to do business in volume. For large orders, crossing networks and dark pools are preferred. The problem with these venues is that your counterparty is typically as well-informed as you are (i.e., they won’t be buyers when things are hairy). With nobody to sell to, paying a premium for a put option (and guaranteeing yourself a customer at a pre-determined price) becomes even more appealing. Selling insurance Value investors have beliefs about the intrinsic value of companies . Whether by virtue of cash-flow growth, “real options,” management savvy, or relative undervaluation, we can determine a range of prices at which we would be happy to own any publicly traded stock. Sometimes those ranges are small and confident; sometimes they are wide and uncertain; sometimes they converge at $0.00. Regardless, we have a basis for investment and a preferred entry point. The upshot to this assumption is that by selling insurance to portfolio managers in the form of put options, we can have our cake and eat it too. By selling a put at a strike price within our target range, we can not only provide ourselves the opportunity to buy into a stock at a favorable price, but also collect premium for our trouble (regardless). Furthermore, since brokers tend to be generous in their risk calculations for put-sellers (thank the Black-Scholes-Merton equation for conventional risk-assessment), we can get our fingers into all sorts of opportunities at relatively low cost, spread risk across multiple sectors, and collect premium while we wait. To most speculators, “risk of assignment” in the case of a decline in price would be detrimental. To a value investor, “risk of assignment” at a favorable price doesn’t sound much like risk at all. This is the strength of being a value-oriented investor. Ignoring a high-volatility, high-premium market environment is a missed opportunity. To some readers, this will already seem mind-numbingly obvious. Indeed, some contributors on Seeking Alpha are already practitioners of this philosophy (though they are not usually the most visible). Others, however, may not have seen an opportunity for this approach in the frothier, low-implied-volatility markets of the past few years, and may have discarded the idea out of hand. Now – in a high-volatility, high-uncertainty, and low-liquidity market – is the time to reconsider.

The New Silk Road Is A Great Opportunity For The BRIC And Asia Ex-Japan Shares

Summary BRIC and Asia countries want to develop the New Silk Road. The New Silk Road will boost international trade. BRIC and Asia companies will benefit from the existence of the New Silk Road. Every BRIC and Asia shares price reduction should be treated as an opportunity for accumulation. When 500 years ago the economy of many countries began to integrate, Eurasia became the world trade center. But in the following centuries the USA became a hegemon. Now Eurasia has a chance to change the situation significantly. The construction of the New Silk Road can help. There is a powerful force in Eurasia . This region has 75% of the global population. On its territory there are more than 70% of all energy resources and about 65% of global wealth. An alternative for controlling an entire continent is to dominate the world’s oceans. Controlling the sea trade routes allows control of international trade and movement of strategic raw materials, so Eurasia can be indirectly controlled. This was a British Empire strategy in the 19th century – whoever control the sea routes, controlled Eurasia also. In the 20th century, control of the oceans has passed into the hands of the United States. Just as the British, the Americans control Eurasia with the help of numerous military bases . Americans have more military bases than all other countries put together. Where in the world is the U.S. Military? (August 2015) (click to enlarge) Lily pads – small security locations Source: Politico China and Russia show the largest disapproval against the US hegemony. Unable to resist the sea power of the United States, these countries are trying to neutralize it. Russia and China are trying to transform Eurasia in such way, which allows them to control trade routes but also allows to diminish the importance of the sea trade routes. (click to enlarge) Source: World Shipping Council Reducing the role of the sea trade is of great importance in terms of geopolitics. The transformation with which we now have to deal with on the Eurasia continent is one of the major changes on the international scene since the end of World War II. Reintegration of Asia and Europe – known most recently as the “New Silk Road” – is what the United States fear most. Silk Road existed in the past. It was a trade route which connected China with Europe . It was more than 6,500 km length. The Old Silk Road Source: Perceptions The New Silk Road is supposed to be a network of high-speed railways, modern highways, airports, seaports, energy networks and infrastructure. If everything will go according to the plan, the train from London will reach Beijing in just two days in 2025 ! The New Silk Road (click to enlarge) Source: Xinhua New Silk Road is the largest infrastructure investment in history. The combination of Europe and Asia overland trade routes will give Eurasia the independence from the United States. Reactivation of the Silk Road was announced in 2013 by the Chinese president Xi Jinping. Officially, the project was not, of course, a counterweight to the US sea hegemony. The project was presented as the axis of cooperation between the countries of Europe and Asia. The Chinese are incredibly effective and consistent, they have access to appropriate technology and they have huge financial resources and political will to implement such an ambitious project. The New Silk Road project is officially in the initial stage. Implementation of the first stage has already begun. The train run from Yiwu (China) to Madrid (Spain) took four months at the turn of 2014 and 2015. An ambitious project of the New Silk Road is just one of the elements that integrate the economy of Eurasia. In the past three years we saw the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). There are also ongoing works at SWIFT-alternative payment system . Summary China, Russia and other BRIC and Asia countries know that they must act together in order to counter the military and economic power of the United States. The development of the New Silk Road will create new conditions for trade. The projects are incredibly ambitious, but the Chinese are very effective in the implementation of the economic assumptions. In just three years, their local currency was made the fifth most commonly used trading currency in the world. The Chinese established juan-denominated crude derivatives contract just few weeks ago. However, it is not certain that the New Silk Road will emerge. Chinese projects will encounter the powerful resistance from the US administration and its allies. The United States – as a real hegemon – will do everything it can to maintain a dominant position. In addition, the creation of a New Silk Road may be hampered by the imperial Russian impulse under the leadership of W. Putin. For example, the extension of the conflict in the east of Ukraine on the whole CEE region will certainly hamper the implementation of the New Silk Road project. How to invest in the development of a New Silk Road Assuming, however, that all will go well, and the new Silk Road will be built in 10-20 years, you can ask the question: how should I invest to achieve gains from the emergence of this incredible infrastructure project? Of course, the creation of the New Silk Road will benefit – first and foremost – Russia, China and all countries which find themselves on the trail. The companies from countries which are now in 3rd league of world economy can grow significantly. So it seems that every panic sale of Asian, Russian and BRIC’ shares should be used by investors to accumulate. Of course, the easiest and cheapest way to do it is investing through appropriate ETFs. Below there are lists of the cheapest and the best performing ETF funds. 5 Best Broad Asia ETFs – 3 Years Return Source: ETFdb 5 Cheapest Broad Asia ETFs Source: ETFdb BRIC ETFs 5 Year Returns Source: ETFdb BRIC ETFs Expense Ratio Source: ETFdb

Buy The Fourth Quarter Of The Third Year Of The Presidential Cycle

The best time to buy the Presidential Election Cycle is from September of the second year to April of the third year. Nevertheless, the fourth quarter of the third year is strong, particularly after a weak third quarter. In the past, it was better to buy near the end of October than at the end of September. How does the fourth quarter do in the third year of the Presidential election cycle? ‘Everyone knows’ that the third year of the Presidential cycle is incredibly reliable, and has returns that far exceed the other three years. Even Grantham has touted it, which I thought must be tongue-in-cheek, because he is a macro-guy. So I decided to go back and check, and found his letter written at the end of the third quarter in 2014 for GMO. It turns out he was quite serious. Regular readers know the score: +2.5% a month for the seven months from October 1 to April 30, in year three on average since 1932 (a total of +17%). This is now the 21st cycle. The odds of drawing 20 random 7-month returns this strong are just over 1 in 200 according to our 10 million trials. But 17 of the actual 20 historical experiences were up, and the worst of the 3 downs was only -6.4%, so the odds of this consistency plus the high return would be much smaller. The remaining 5 months of the Presidential year have a good but not remarkable record, over .75% per month, but the killer here is that the remaining 36 months since 1932 averaged a measly +0.2% a month!” Reference to the remaining 5 months means that Grantham views the third year of the Presidential cycle as running from September to September. More importantly, we have missed the key months from September 30 to April 30. From 2014 to 2015, that time span had the S&P 500 rising by 11.39%, which is not too shabby given what the market has done since. Yahoo Finance only had S&P 500 data as far back as 1950. So my analysis is for the 16 third years since then (see the table below). We have completed 17 years from his September to April time frame, however, and I calculated an average 19.72% return for those time periods, with a median return of 19.49%. There was only one decline of -.76% in 1978-79. But dividends have not been included. So every period actually had a positive total return. For the full calendar third year, the average return was 17.12%, with a median return of 18.08%. That’s very good also, but not as good, and that is a 12-month return versus Grantham’s 7-month return. For all years since 1950, the average calendar year gain was 9.18%. Therefore, the average gain in the other 3 years of the Presidential cycle works out to 5.69%. Out of the 16 third years, 15 were up, and one was unchanged (2011). With stocks down YTD, the odds would appear to be good that we will get a nice rally over the last three months. I say ‘appear to be good’, because statistically we can’t calculate the odds. This is a small sample. It is not a random sample. And there is no solid theory to support why the pattern of the recent past should hold in the future. Let’s see how the last three months of the third year have done since 1950. From 9/30 to the end of the year, the average gain in the S&P has been 3.04%, with a median return of 4.39%. The mean is lower because of the skew created by 1987. Third Year Pres. Cycle %ch. Oct. 31 to end of yr % ch. Sept. prev. yr to April 3rd yr % ch. Full 3rd year % ch. April to Sept. 3rd yr % ch. 9/30 to end of 3rd yr % ch. Sept. low to end 3rd yr % ch. Oct. low to end 3rd yr % ch. Sept. 30 to Oct. low % ch. Sept. low to Oct. low 1951 3.62 15.32 16.35 3.7 2.19 2.19 4.9 -2.58 -2.58 1955 7.42 17.49 26.40 15.04 4.14 6.74 11.47 -6.57 -4.25 1959 4.12 15.04 8.48 -1.23 5.29 8.61 6.95 -1.55 1.56 1963 1.36 24.04 18.89 2.72 4.63 4.63 4.38 .24 .24 1967 3.40 22.79 20.09 2.87 -.25 2.98 3.4 -3.53 -.41 1971 8.34 23.31 10.79 -5.4 3.81 4.58 8.85 -4.63 -3.92 1975 1.29 37.39 31.55 -3.93 7.54 9.86 8.75 -1.12 1.02 1979 5.91 -.76 12.2 7.43 -1.35 1.35 7.84 -8.53 -6.02 1983 .84 36.55 17.27 1.00 -.69 .43 .95 -1.63 -.52 1987 -1.87 24.66 2.03 11.61 -23.2 -20.4 9.89 -30.1 -27.6 1991 6.28 22.64 26.31 3.31 7.56 8.73 10.69 -2.83 -1.77 1995 5.92 11.24 34.11 13.54 5.39 8.28 6.65 -1.18 1.53 1999 7.8 31.28 19.53 -3.93 14.54 15.84 17.78 -2.75 -1.65 2003 5.83 12.47 26.38 8.62 11.64 11.64 9.20 2.23 2.23 2007 -5.23 10.97 3.53 2.99 -3.82 1.15 -2.15 -1.71 3.37 2011 0.34 19.49 -.003 -17.0 11.15 11.34 14.41 -2.5 -2.69 2015 11.39 -7.93 Mean 3.46 19.72 17.12 1.96 3.04 4.87 7.75 -4.32 -2.59 Med. 3.87 19.49 18.08 2.87 4.39 5.68 8.30 -2.67 -1.09 (The median date of the September low is the 21st. The median date for the October low is the 17th.) The average fourth quarter gain for all years since 1950 is 4.06% with a median of 4.92%. So the third year of the Presidential cycle has a lower average using both measures. The much lower mean is probably because of 1987, but clearly the fourth quarter of the third year is actually not as good as other years. There were 5 down quarters out of 16. They were 1967, 1979, 1983, 1987 and 2007. But all 5 years that declined from April to September 30 (1959, 1971, 1975, 1999, and 2011) had good gains in the fourth quarter . This augurs well for 2015, but 5 out of 5 does not mean we have to get 6 out of 6. The average gain for the two months following October 31 was 3.46% with a median of 3.87%. I don’t know what the comparable percentages are for all years. Two years had declines – 1987 and 2007. So the return is better for the last two months than the last three months. This should not be a surprise. I compared the October lows with the September lows, and found that on average (in the third year), the October low was 2.59% lower than the September low (see the table). October had a lower low in 10 out of 16 years. If you can identify the October low, then the average gain from there to the end of the year was 7.75% with a median of 8.30%. 2007 was the only down year with a loss of -2.15%. Locating the vicinity of the October low is not as stupid as it sounds. The median low date was October 17th. Unfortunately, the 1987 crash was on the 17th, 18th and 19th with the huge losses on the 19th (I remember it well. I was 100% invested and canoeing a river in Missouri.). Eight of the 16 lows were on the 19th or later. Three of the lows were on the second to last or last day. So if you buy at the close on the third to last day, you should be able to beat that average return dated from the end of October. The last two days in October are pretty good on average. I will buy stocks when Financial Select Sector SPDR ETF (NYSEARCA: XLF ) hits a twenty-day high (adjusted for dividend payments). The levels are posted in my Instablog. I actually buy small caps when XLF hits a twenty-day high. I compared the Russell 2000’s performance in the fourth quarter of the third year with the S&P 500 since 1987, and found that on average the S&P did slightly better. The R2000 is more volatile. In strong fourth quarters, it beat the S&P. In weak fourth quarters, it underperformed badly; e.g. 1987. I’m pretty optimistic about the last two months of the year. There is a strong possibility that October will be bad, because of all the negative macro- indicators. Risky high-yield investments like MLPs, mREITs, and junk bonds have been hammered. Sentiment is very negative as indicated by Investors Intelligence, Hulbert’s sentiment measures, Rydex, and Citigroup’s Euphoria/Panic model. I think sentiment follows the market. If October brings further drops in stock prices, then these measures will become even more negative, but that will set us up for a bigger bounce into the end of the year.