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Atmos Energy’s (ATO) CEO Kim Cocklin on Q1 2016 Results – Earnings Call Transcript

Operator Greetings, and welcome to the Atmos Energy First Quarter 2016 Earnings Conference Call. At this time all participants are in a listen-only mode. A question-and-answer session will follow the formal presentation. [Operator Instructions] As a reminder, this conference is being recorded. I would now turn the conference over to Ms. Susan Giles, Vice President, Investor Relations. Thank you Ms. Giles, you may now begin. Susan Giles Thank you, Manny, and good morning, everyone. Thank you all for joining us. This call is being webcast live on the Internet. Our earnings release and conference call slide presentation and Form 10-Q are all available on our website at AtmosEnergy.com. As we review these financial results and discuss future expectations, please keep in mind that some of our discussion might contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. Our forward-looking statements and projections could differ materially from actual results. The factors that could cause such material differences are outlined on Slide 17, and more fully described in our SEC filings. Our first speaker this morning is Mr. Bret Eckert, Senior Vice President and CFO of Atmos Energy. Bret Eckert Thank you, Susan, and good morning, everyone. We appreciate you joining us and your interest in Atmos Energy. Reported net income for the quarter was $103 million, or $1.00 per diluted share, compared with $98 million or $0.96 one year ago. Excluding unrealized margins in both periods net income was $96 million or $0.93 per diluted share compared to $93 million or $0.91 last year. Slides 3 and 4 provide financial highlights for our regulated operations for the three month period. The continued pursuit of our infrastructure investment strategy drove our quarter-over-quarter growth. Rate released through our regulated distribution and pipeline operations combined generated about $24 million of incremental margin in the first quarter of fiscal 2016. About $14 million of this amount came from our regulated distribution segment with about $7 million in our Mid-Tex division and the remainder from our Mississippi and West Texas divisions. The remaining $10 million came from the regulated pipeline segment primarily as the result of new rates from the approved 2015 GRIP filing. Additionally our weather normalization mechanisms, which over about 97% of utility margins, [worked its design] insulating both the company and our customers during atypical weather. We experienced a 21% quarter-over-quarter decrease in regulated distribution sales volumes due to the weather that was 29% warmer than last year’s quarter. However, gross profit decreased just $1.1 million. Focusing now on our spending as expected consolidated O&M increased by about $6 million quarter-over-quarter mainly due to incremental pipeline maintenance spending, as well as increased administrative expense in our regulated operations. Capital expenditures increased by $30 million in the first quarter compared to one year ago, despite the particularly challenging weather conditions in Texas during the quarter, which slowed several regulated distribution projects during the period. However, spending in our regulated pipeline segment increased as we continued to enhance and fortify our Bethel and Tri-City storage fields. These efforts will improve our ability to reliably deliver gas to our North Texas customers and serve the peak day requirement of the Mid-Tex division and ATT’s other LDC customers. We remain on track to achieve our capital budget target of $1 billion to $1.1 billion for fiscal 2016 as detailed on Slide 15. Moving now to our earnings guidance for fiscal 2016, we still expect fiscal 2016 earnings per share to be in the previously announced range of $3.20 to $3.40 per diluted share, excluding unrealized margins at September 30, 2016 and that is shown on Slide 12. The expected contribution from our regulated and non-regulated operation as well as estimates for selected expenses for the year remain unchanged since we announced fiscal 2016 projections last November, and we expect the continued execution of our infrastructure investment strategy coupled with constructive regulation to be the primary driver for this year’s results. Looking at slide 13, we anticipate annual operating income increases of between $100 million to $125 million from implemented rate outcomes this year. Thank you for your time and now I will hand the call to our CEO, Kim Cocklin, for closing remarks. Kim? Kim Cocklin Thank you, Bret. Excellent report. We have reported a very solid start to this fiscal 2016 and are very encouraged with the expectations for the full year. Without question the weather event this past quarter presented a number of challenges. Our West Texas division endured a record blizzard, while our Mid-Tex division encountered a series of deadly tornadoes and record rainfall in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex. The devastating weather in Texas tested the reliability of our system and the good news is that the capital improvements we have made to our distribution system and the extensive training of our field employees proved to be both valuable and effective while operating safely and reliably during these challenging conditions. We also achieved very solid progress in the [rates] this first quarter. In Kansas, a settlement was reached and supported by all parties that will benefit our customers over the long term and there is now pending action before the Kansas Corporation Commission. In Colorado, we received approval for a Systems Safety and Integrity Rider, which is a forward-looking infrastructure investment mechanism effective January 1 of this year for a three year term. And in Mississippi we have a system integrity rider, which is also a forward-looking infrastructure mechanism. These important changes continued to demonstrate that fair and balanced regulation will continue to support our journey to becoming the nation’s safest utility with an annual capital investment of over $1 billion. Rate outcomes have provided annual operating increases of about $12 million and we have filed cases now pending which seek about $33 million of annual operating income increases. We expect to make between 12 to 15 more filings this fiscal year, which will request between $90 million to $100 million of additional operating income increases. Slide 14 provides a summary of our expected fiscal ’16 rate filings. We are off to a solid start and our performance continues the track record of meeting our commitments to invest in our regulated assets, growing our rate base and earnings and maintaining an unwavering attitude to strive to become the nation’s safest utility. Year-over-year our weighted average cost of gas has decreased, which will continue to help and alleviate any upward rate pressure associated with our increased capital spending. Our balance sheet remains very healthy and our credit ratings are strong. Our debt capital ratio at December 31 was essentially flat year-over-year at 49.6%. We remain focused on spending between $1 billion to $1.4 billion of capital annually through fiscal 2020. We believe our internal capital investment opportunities will enable rate based growth, which would generate earnings per share growth of 6% to 8% through fiscal 2020. Yesterday our board declared our 129th consecutive quarterly cash dividend of $0.42. The indicated annual dividend rate for fiscal ’16 is $1.68, which is a 7.7% increase over last year. With projected earnings per share growth of 6% to 8% coupled with our dividend yield we are committing to delivering total shareholder return in the 9% to 11% range through fiscal ’20. Thank you for your time and now we will open the call up for questions. Manny? Question-and-Answer Session Operator [Operator Instructions] Our first question is from Brian Russo of Ladenburg Thalmann. Please go ahead. Brian Russo Hi, good morning. Bret Eckert Good morning Brian. Kim Cocklin Good morning. Brian Russo I noticed that the rate base slide and the financing need slide is, as you mentioned, consistent with the assumptions laid out at your analyst conference in November, and I am just curious was there any impact to bonus depreciation since the assumptions in November or did November capture your outlook for bonus depreciation? Bret Eckert Brian, this is Bret Eckert. The impact of the extension of bonus at the 50% level really doesn’t have any significant impact on us in ’16 or really over the five-year plan. Brian Russo And why is that exactly? Bret Eckert It has a small impact from a cash basis percentage. But outside of that the impact on rate base is very small. Brian Russo Okay, and then also just on the rate base slide, if you just take your rate base plus CapEx minus depreciation it seems like that calculation is higher than the illustrated assumptions in your annual rate base growth through 2020 and I was just wondering what other adjustments are included in that adjusted for taxes? Bret Eckert Yes, I think that it is mainly just timing Brian, you take it at a period end or you are taking on cases that are in progress or approved rate base that is already approved. I think you’re just seeing the timing of annual rate making when you have got fiscal year-end at September 30, and you have rate filings throughout the year. Brian Russo Got it, understood. And the debt-to-cap ratio at 49.6% that seems lower than maybe what the assumption is for the full year or the trend in the debt-to-cap ratio and I’m just curious is it just the seasonality of the retained earnings? Bret Eckert Yes, it is really just the seasonality as your short-term debt balances are higher at the end of December than they are at the end of September. That really is just the timing and then as collections come in as you go through the winter heating season that balance comes back down. So really it is driven by timing. Everything that we discussed with regard to our financing plan is consistent with what we have laid out in November. Brian Russo Okay, great. And then lastly I noticed in the non-reg segment unit margins increased to $0.12 per Mcf versus $0.10, is that sustainable? Bret Eckert I think when you look at the guidance of the $14 million to $19 million we reaffirmed, the same guidance that we provided in November and so, I would still expect the earnings to come in at that range. Some of it is timing as you go throughout the year, but nothing has changed from our previous income projections for them. Brian Russo Okay, great. Thank you very much. Operator Thank you. The next question is from Spencer Joyce of Hilliard Lyons. Please go ahead. Spencer Joyce Hi, good morning guys and Susan as well. Congrats on a nice quarter. Bret Eckert Good morning Spencer. Kim Cocklin It is good to hear your voice. Thank you. Spencer Joyce Yes. Merry Christmas. Happy New Year. It has been a while. Just a couple of quick ones here from me, first I know Kim you mentioned a couple of special or not special weather items from the first quarter here. Would it be safe to assume there was a bit of additional O&M expense housed in the first quarter and maybe for projecting kind of 2Q ’17 maybe we will see a little bit of a give back or perhaps a pullback in the growth rate there? Bret Eckert I think, Spencer it is Bret, a little of that is just timing. We did have an increase as expected in O&M in the quarter. The O&M projected range that we provided back in November still holds today. So a lot of that is just going to be timing of spend. We did have some wet weather in some of our jurisdictions that impacted capital and O&M a little bit but on a full year basis we expect it to come in at the levels that we previously provided. Spencer Joyce Okay, perfect. And then more broadly, I know you all had been fairly steadfast in relaying that you are fairly insulated from a lot of the malaise that we have seen in the oil and gas markets and even in Texas I know the direct exposure of the economy to energy is fairly small, but can you just hold our hand a little bit more there and let us know kind of how you are doing in the context of what it feels like it could be a tougher economic environment there in Texas? Kim Cocklin Hi Spencer this is Kim. No, we really don’t expect – we haven’t noticed any changes particularly in Texas and the other major metropolitan areas that we are servicing and Louisiana and Mississippi, let us say Kentucky, Tennessee, Colorado, Kansas, even around the Blacksburg area, I mean everything continues to be better than what is being reported. I think there is a whole lot of information coming out of the financial channels right now that everybody expecting kind of a rocky ’16 for the stock market, and that a lot of that is driven by what is happening according to them in China and then some of the energy prices bouncing around, but we continue to be a significant beneficiary of lower energy prices and a strong dollar. We are controlling everything that we can control and so I think the other thing is the Fed probably is going to push back any kind of increase on the rate as well. So, I think that is going to bode well for utilities. So I think you are certainly in the right space and you are certainly right on target having Atmos as your top pick in 2016. Spencer Joyce So far, so good. Kim Cocklin Damn right. I mean, yes, you are all about it. You have been right for a good while now for the last three years. Spencer Joyce It is a good thing I’m on a call now. I’m blushing a bit. But all right, again nice quarter and we will talk soon. Kim Cocklin Thank you. Bret Eckert Thank you, Spencer. Operator Thank you. The next question is from Charles Fishman of Morningstar. Please go ahead. Charles Fishman Thank you. Just as a follow-up to that last question, I realized the insulation you have from commodity prices, but does the volatility help your non-regulated segment at all? Bret Eckert Go ahead Mike. Mike Haefner This is Mike Charles. Our non-reg segment really – primarily is focused on our delivered gas business, where they are really managing the aggregation of supply in the pipeline and storage contracts to get gas to municipalities, other LDCs and small industrial. So it is really not – we are really not affected by that and we run a flat book. We don’t take any risk. In the market we get a little bit of lift out of our facility, but it is just – it is miniscule. Charles Fishman Okay. So maybe the lower earnings from non-regulated quarter-to-quarter which I realize is just one quarter is really more volume driven than anything else, correct? Mike Haefner It is just timing. Bret Eckert Yes, it is just timing. Charles Fishman Okay. Kim Cocklin Charles, that business is all about managing risk and we are not about to try to take advantage of any volatility, we are going to run a flat book and as Bret said, and we continue to emphasize at every meeting we have with analysts, they are plugged in at about $14 million to $19 million of net income this year and every year till 2020. We are not encouraging them to grow, but we are encouraging them to be a value added service provider to the smaller municipalities, commercial industrial customers that need energy management expertise, which is what they bring to the table and have done so each and every year, demonstrated by their performance in the Masteo customer survey where they have came in at number one or number two the last five years. So we are very proud of that fact. But they do provide an extremely valuable service to the smaller customers that are situated behind our, the distribution utilities that we serve in eight states. And again it is energy management expertise for those people that don’t have it on staff. Charles Fishman And then Kim, just as a macro view of the industry, we saw a similar company in Salt Lake did acquire an announced acquisition earlier this week, at a price that was somewhat lower than some of the other premiums we have seen. Do you have any thoughts as far as the industry that we have reached the peak of maybe some of the multiples already? Kim Cocklin No, I don’t think so. I think you guys are better versed at looking at some of the parts than some of us, but if you – you got to factor in the business model that is being pursued in some of the parts of any that resides in the portfolio. So there is a difference I think between a peer regulated natural gas utility where 95% of the earnings are coming from distribution and intrastate pipeline in Texas versus other folks that may have a little bit more spread out with the non-regulated or they may have some MLP eligible assets in the form of an interstate pipeline or some midstream operations or even regulated production. Charles Fishman Okay. That is all I have. Thank you. That was quite helpful. Bret Eckert Great. Thank you. Operator Thank you. The next question is from Stephen Byrd of Morgan Stanley. Please go ahead. Stephen Byrd Hi, good morning. Susan Giles Good morning. Kim Cocklin Good morning Stephen. Stephen Byrd Most of my questions have been addressed. I just have one or two I wanted to follow-up on , over time you all have done a great job of reducing the regulatory lag quite a bit and just looking at your regulatory calendar coming up, how should we think about your further efforts to limit that lag, I know I guess it is less than 5% of your CapEx at this point and it has more than a 12 month lag, which is phenomenal, but just curious where should we be thinking about in terms of if things go well in terms of your upcoming filings, how should we think about further reducing that regulatory lag? Bret Eckert Hi Stephen, it is Bret Eckert, as we reaffirm, we still expect that regulatory outcomes on an annualized basis will be $100 million to $125 million in fiscal ’16, we continue to really focus on the execution of our capital spend and continuing to partner with our regulators in our annual filing. A lot of what we have got now is just continued execution. Kim highlighted the new mechanisms last year that we got in Tennessee, in Mississippi. We had a new mechanism in Colorado for infrastructure that went into effect on 1st January and then he commented on what we are doing in Kansas. And so, it is just the continued effort of what you have seen in previous years to be able to always focus on finding ways to continue to reduce regulatory lag, but things are continuing to progress as we expected. Kim Cocklin I mean, we are measuring this in baby steps and very incremental byte-sized pieces Stephen and I think, the resolution that we achieved with our customers and the staff and now that is being reviewed before the KCC in Kansas is something that we think is a very positive step in the right direction and then as Bret said, we pointed out the forward-looking infrastructure mechanism in Colorado and Mississippi both identified for capital. So I mean we feel very good and I mean every filing that we make we are trying to educate the staff and the regulators that we are talking to about the continued need to reduce lag in order to facilitate the investment in this journey to safety that we are on right now. I think we are spending about three times – the depreciation rate is only – can only be done as long as you have a manageable lag process that we are continuing to focus on. So we feel good and we are going to continue to try to do better. Stephen Byrd That makes perfect sense. My last question, I think I have got a good sense for the answer, but I feel compelled to ask it anyway just following up on the M&A environment that we are seeing, it is clear that there is still a lot of capital available, there is still likely to be strong valuations for really high quality, high growth companies, I am just curious in terms of your reaction to the continued pace of M&A activity, how do you think about that in the context of your own company versus your own standalone growth plans? Bret Eckert Well, I mean, we have been in the camp that we thought the M&A activity would not slow down and it started to heat up at the end of ’15 and it has just continued through ’16 and I think you are going to see a continuation of that activity in this pace. I mean I think that the companies that remain on the board have to be extremely attractive and have some very good business models and bring to the table some platforms that don’t exist for some of these – for some of the folks that are going up and down the shopping isles at the present time. So, we have got a great plan. We have got a great strategy. I mean I think there is a lot of good companies out there like us as well. You have got to have a better handle on it than we do, I mean, you’ve got to think please don’t grow to the sky and the multiples that where the companies are trading seem to be extremely rich, but we continue to represent that we are an attractive opportunity for prudent investors with just the metrics that we are throwing out and that we are committed to deliver and that the results that we are putting forth justify putting this in your portfolio. Stephen Byrd Well said, very much understood. Thank you. Bret Eckert Thank you, Stephen. Operator Thank you. Our next question is from Mark Levin of BB&T. Please go ahead. Mark Levin Hi guys. Very solid quarter and a very difficult market environment. Just a quick question and it maybe just entirely too early to answer it, but I will throw it out there anyway. The $3.20 to $3.40 guidance that you reaffirmed, maybe you can, having gone through at least one quarter give us some idea of how you feel about that range, it is reasonably wide, maybe there are two or three factors that you think are critical towards getting to the upper end and the two or three factors that could lead you to the lower end of the range? Bret Eckert Hi Mark it is Bret. I mean, you heard earlier yes, we did reaffirm that guidance of $3.20 to $3.40, we would look potentially to look totighten that guidance later in the year, butwe absolutely remain on track. As you said, the first quarter was a solid first quarter. It came in right in line with our expectation and we still remain very well positioned to achieve that $3.20 to $3.40 guidance range. Kim Cocklin This is a difficult market environment and we are up a bit above 10% year-to-date, we will take it. Mark Levin I know you guys are doing everything you can. Great… Kim Cocklin We are [battling] fast and furious, [Indiscernible]. Mark Levin Absolutely. All right, well thank you guys and congratulations on a good quarter. Bret Eckert Thank you Mark. Operator Thank you. We have no further questions at this time. I would like to turn the conference back over to management for any closing comments. Susan Giles I just want to say that a recording of the call is available for replay on our website through May 4. And again we appreciate your interest and thank you for joining us. Bye-bye. Copyright policy: All transcripts on this site are the copyright of Seeking Alpha. 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Choosing Between ETFs And Mutual Funds: Strategy, Then Structure

By Joel M. Dickson, Ph.D.; David T. Kwon, CFA; James J. Rowley Jr., CFA An investor’s decision to use an exchange-traded fund (ETF) versus a conventional mutual fund is a portfolio-implementation decision, rather than a choice of investment strategy. In terms of product structure, ETFs are more similar to mutual funds than they are different. Both vehicles offer the benefits of pooled investing, primary regulation under the same laws, and an ability to issue new shares and redeem existing shares that allows investors to transact at a fair price. Four key factors should be considered when deciding between using ETFs and mutual funds: investment strategy, trading flexibility, accessibility, and costs. For investors who prefer a greater variety of index-based strategies, the ability to trade intraday with various order types, and more open fund access, ETFs may be the better choice. However, for investors who want a greater variety of traditional actively managed strategies, the trading convenience of mutual funds, and the breadth of mutual funds available on their trading platform, mutual funds may be preferable. Costs are a function of both ongoing costs and transaction costs, and may depend largely on the time horizon of the investment. Mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) have become popular options for investors around the world. As of June 30, 2015, total ETF assets stood at $2.9 trillion globally, representing 11% of overall fund assets. In the United States, ETFs have recently grown at a more rapid pace than mutual funds. For the ten years ended June 30, U.S.-listed ETF assets expanded at an annual rate of 24%, to $2.1 trillion-increasing from just 4% to 14% of overall fund assets. Today, investors can select from more than 1,500 ETFs and close to 8,000 mutual funds in the United States alone.[1] This paper focuses on helping investors make an informed decision between mutual funds and ETFs as product vehicles. We reiterate that although the product-vehicle decision is clearly important, research has shown that the asset allocation decision is the crucial determinant of portfolio performance, since it explains the vast majority of the variability of investors’ returns [2] and is the starting point for the portfolio-construction process.[3] Similarities between mutual funds and ETFs Mutual funds and ETFs share many key characteristics. Both are pooled vehicles that provide exposure to various markets, diversification, and generally reasonable investment costs; they are primarily regulated by the same laws; and they issue new shares and redeem existing shares to meet investor demand. Both structures have conveniently enabled investors to implement asset allocation decisions when building diversified investment portfolios. Figure 1 shows how similarly mutual fund and ETF investors have allocated assets across broad categories. As of June 30, 2015, 96% of ETF assets were invested in ETFs organized and regulated as registered investment companies under the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), the same regulatory regime that governs U.S. mutual funds. The 1940 Act provides for a host of investor protections, including requiring a fund to hold at least 85% of its net assets in liquid assets, constraining a fund’s use of leverage, and mandating that a fund’s assets be held by a custodian (typically a U.S. bank), but segregated from the asset manager and the bank’s assets. To the extent the management firm or bank were to go bankrupt, ETF and mutual fund investors have a legal right to the fund’s assets. In addition, all mutual funds and ETFs must comply with the disclosure- based provisions of the 1940 Act, the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, and associated Securities Exchange Commission Rules.[4] These provisions require ETFs and mutual funds to disclose material information via fund prospectuses and annual reports to help investors make informed investment decisions. Perceived differences: Mutual funds and ETFs Differences between mutual funds and ETFs are often exaggerated by the investment community. For example, ETFs are often promoted as costing significantly less than mutual funds. On its face, such a claim appears to be true, since ETFs have an expense-ratio advantage relative to mutual funds both in terms of a simple cost average (0.57% versus 1.24%, respectively) and an asset-weighted cost average (0.29% versus 0.69%). However, this advantage is due largely to the investment strategy of most ETFs, rather than to their product structure. Ninety-nine percent of ETF assets as of June 30, 2015, were index-based, while 84% of mutual fund assets were actively managed. Given that expense ratios of index vehicles tend to be lower than those of actively managed strategies, Figure 2 confirms that ETFs’ cost advantage has more to do with whether or not the underlying strategy is indexed rather than whether the structure is an ETF or mutual fund. Actual differences: Mutual funds and ETFs Most of the differences between mutual funds and ETFs relate to the way investors transact in fund shares. Investors buy and sell mutual fund shares directly from the fund (sometimes through a financial advisor or other intermediary) at a net asset value (NAV) that is calculated by the fund once a day. In contrast, ETF investors typically buy and sell ETF shares from each other throughout the day on an exchange at a traded market price. Figure 3 illustrates these transaction methods. Only certain large institutional investors called “authorized participants” (APs) transact with the ETF directly at NAV in a process known as creation/redemption (see the box, “Creation and redemption of ETF shares”). This mechanism enables ETFs to issue new shares and redeem existing shares. During the course of the trading day, investor orders to buy and sell ETF shares are matched on an exchange with the help of market makers. At the end of the trading day, if market makers have a net short position in shares of an ETF (i.e., they sold more than they bought) or a net long position (i.e., they bought more than they sold), they might decide to offset those positions by seeking to create new shares or redeem the existing shares. ETF creations and redemptions are usually executed once per day at their net asset value, at 4 p.m., Eastern time. The process by which ETFs issue and redeem new shares is actually quite similar to that of mutual funds. Mutual funds accept buy and sell orders throughout the day. At the end of the day, only the difference between the buy orders and sell orders results in net share issuance or redemption. Shares are issued or redeemed once per day at their net asset value, at 4 p.m., Eastern time. Investors’ choice criteria: Mutual funds versus ETFs When choosing to implement one’s investment allocation with mutual funds or ETFs, or a mix of both, investors should consider the following four key factors: investment strategy, trading flexibility, accessibility, and costs. Investment strategy As part of the portfolio-construction process, investors decide whether to allocate their investments using index-based or actively managed strategies. Figure 4 demonstrates that, as mentioned earlier, mutual funds are largely actively managed, whereas ETFs are mostly index-based, so investors seeking to use active strategies for specific markets may prefer mutual funds, while investors seeking to use index-based strategies may prefer ETFs. Figure 4 also suggests that there is a wider array of index providers and index-construction methodologies used by ETFs as opposed to mutual funds. ETFs offer exposure to a greater number of unique benchmarks, many of which are lesser-known or more specialized than traditional benchmarks.[5] In this connection, investors should note that the indexing concept has expanded greatly to include a large number of nontraditional, non-market-cap-weighted indexes. Such indexes represent rules-based active strategies that attempt to outperform traditional market-cap-weighted benchmarks in some way, including by higher returns or lower volatility.[6] ETFs that track these indexes are classified as index products because they seek to track an index, even though the index itself may reflect an underlying active strategy.[7] This has effectively blurred the lines between traditional index strategies and active management. Another element of investment choice is that of exposure to alternative investments like physical commodities and currencies. Both mutual funds and non-1940 Act ETFs offer these types of alternative exposures but may do so in different ways. In some cases, non-1940 Act ETFs provide investors with more direct and efficient exposure to alternative investments than do mutual funds. This is particularly true for funds seeking commodity market exposure. For instance, a number of non-1940 Act ETFs provide exposure to commodity markets by investing substantially all of their assets in physical commodities (e.g., gold) or commodity futures. In contrast, mutual funds generally cannot invest directly in physical commodities or commodity futures, and instead must obtain this exposure through a combination of investments (e.g., commodity-related notes, stocks of commodity- related operating companies, and foreign subsidiaries investing in commodity-related derivatives or physical commodities). Investors may appreciate the ability to gain exposure to these alternative asset classes in different ways through a mutual fund or non-1940 Act ETF (see Figure 5) as part of either a strategic or tactical asset allocation. The non-1940 Act ETFs, however, are subject to different regulations than mutual funds and can give rise to special tax considerations for investors. Trading flexibility The ability to transact at the daily NAV of a mutual fund may offer sufficient flexibility for most investors; however, some may prefer the additional flexibility offered by ETFs. The exchange-traded nature of ETFs affords investors not only flexibility in the form of intraday trading but variation in the trade type, and the option to frequently trade fund shares. Mutual funds, however, also offer certain trading conveniences. More specifically, U.S.-listed ETF shares trade and price continually throughout the trading day on an exchange, enabling investors to execute ETF trades on an intraday basis. Investors can submit an order to buy or sell a mutual fund (i.e., conduct a transaction) at any point in time, but the transaction is executed at the next available NAV, typically 4 p.m., Eastern time. Therefore, if desired, investors can use ETFs to express an investment view with more precise timing than they are able to with mutual funds. ETFs, by virtue of trading on an exchange, offer investors the same trading flexibility offered by stocks, including limit orders, market orders, stop-loss orders, and the abilities to purchase on margin and to sell short.[8] Investors can use a limit or market order to emphasize either price or execution certainty, respectively. By buying ETFs on margin, investors can leverage returns or obtain capital for liquidity needs. The ability to sell ETFs short enables investors to hedge their portfolio, or express a negative view on a sector or an entire market, albeit at a cost. (See accompanying box, “The language of trading: Some key terms.”) Mutual funds offer limited trade-order types, namely buy or sell. As such, ETFs offer a greater variation regarding the type of trade order. Mutual funds often implement restrictions on frequent trading of fund shares in an effort to limit excessive portfolio turnover. This is because cash flows into or out of a mutual fund trigger transactions costs as a result of portfolio managers buying and selling securities. These transactions costs are often shared by all shareholders of the fund. ETFs cannot restrict frequent trading, because ETF investors trade with each other and not with the ETF itself. (However, ETF investors also typically pay the full amount of transactions costs resulting from their trades, and any cash flows into or out of an ETF are usually conducted via in-kind transactions-at least in the United States-so existing shareholders in an ETF do not incur costs related to in-kind transactions.) As a result, investors may find that they have greater freedom to implement short-term trades using ETFs than using mutual funds. The direct trading nature of mutual funds affords investors certain trading conveniences that ETFs typically do not offer. To trade mutual fund shares, investors generally submit a dollar amount to purchase or sell, while ETFs typically require investors to determine a specific number of shares they would like to purchase or sell. Further, mutual funds typically provide automatic investment and withdrawal services that link directly to investors’ bank accounts. ETFs are usually unable to provide such individualized services. Accessibility When deciding between using mutual funds or ETFs for a specific portfolio allocation, investors need to determine whether they have access to a specific mutual fund or ETF. On a given broker-dealer platform, investors and advisors may not have access to all existing mutual funds in the industry; that is because a mutual fund must enter into a selling agreement with the broker-dealer so that it will distribute the mutual fund via the broker-dealer’s platform. Some fund companies may not wish to enter into such agreements. In contrast, because ETFs trade on an exchange, an ETF investor can access virtually any ETF that exists, so long as the investor owns a brokerage account. It’s possible that a mutual fund or ETF might not be accessible to an investor because it fails to be included on an “approved list.” Generally, such funds or ETFs have not yet undergone a due-diligence review of their investment objectives and costs by the broker-dealer platform. Costs Investors should consider two types of costs when evaluating use of mutual funds versus ETFs: ongoing costs and transaction costs. Ongoing costs include expense ratios and taxes and are incurred gradually over time, becoming a larger component of total costs the longer the investment is held. Transaction costs include bid-ask spreads, upfront fees, and premiums and discounts, and are incurred each time an investor makes a trade-thus, increased numbers of transactions lead to increased costs. More specifics on ongoing costs. The expense ratio, which detracts from investors’ returns because it is gradually deducted from the NAV of a mutual fund or ETF, captures the ongoing expenses incurred by the vehicle. The expense ratio includes: management fees (typically the most significant cost overall), registration fees, legal and auditing fees, custodian and transfer-agent fees, interest fees, shareholder service fees, and other costs such as rent, salaries, and equipment.[9] Taxes, another ongoing cost, can be a substantial drag on investors’ returns for investments in a taxable account.[10] All 1940 Act funds are furthermore subject to regulation under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. From a shareholder’s perspective, taxation of 1940 Act ETFs and mutual funds is the same. For example, capital gains or losses on the sale of ETF and mutual fund shares by investors are subject to the same capital gains taxation rules. Equivalent taxation also applies with respect to buying and selling of securities by the portfolio manager of an ETF or mutual fund: When an ETF or mutual fund distributes any gains generated on the sale of portfolio securities to its shareholders, short-term capital gains are taxed to shareholders at ordinary income tax rates, and long-term capital gains are taxed to shareholders at the lower long-term capital gains rates. In addition, any net investment income (for example, interest or dividends received by a fund on its portfolio securities) paid out by both are treated as current income and generally taxed to shareholders at ordinary income-tax rates, although for ETFs or mutual funds that invest in dividend-paying stocks, some or all of these distributions may be taxable to shareholders at the currently lower qualified dividend rates. Much has been made of ETFs’ in-kind creation and redemption mechanism and how it contributes to ETF tax efficiency. ETFs can satisfy redemptions by selecting those securities with the highest embedded unrealized capital gains (lowest cost-basis shares), thereby leaving those securities with the lowest unrealized capital gains and reducing potential taxes in the future. However, mutual funds may be more likely to realize losses through traditional cash redemptions by liquidating positions with the lowest unrealized gains and/or greatest unrealized loss (highest cost-basis shares). In addition, mutual funds are also able to use in-kind redemptions, though this is less common than ETFs’ use of in-kind redemptions. Ultimately, many factors contribute to tax efficiency. The underlying investment strategy (whether index or active) tends to be the main driver, while Bryan and Rawson (2014) noted that the “tax efficiency of index mutual funds and ETFs may have more to do with diligent portfolio management and investor behavior than simply a choice of vehicle.” More specifics on transaction costs. When transacting products that trade on an exchange, investors incur bid- ask spreads-that is, the difference between the highest price a buyer is willing to pay (bid) for a security and the lowest price a seller is willing to accept (ask or “offer”) for that security. If an ETF had an offer price of $100.02 and a bid price of $99.98, the bid-ask spread would be $0.04. ETFs are subject to bid-ask spreads-mutual funds are not. The bid-ask spread is charged by market makers as compensation for the risks and costs they incur in providing a liquid market for an ETF. As Figure 6 shows, bid-ask spreads are generally lower for ETFs that trade in large volumes (since market-makers incur lower risk to offer the ETF on the market) and for ETFs whose underlying securities are more liquid (since market- makers incur lower cost to create ETF shares). Up-front fees may or may not apply in various situations, but they have the same effect. They remove a portion of the invested amount at the outset of the transaction. Mutual funds can be subject to loads and ticket charges. Loads are a percentage of the amount invested that is charged by the mutual fund. Ticket charges are fixed dollar costs that are sometimes charged by investment account providers to process buys or sells of mutual funds. Even “no load” funds can carry ticket charges when bought or sold on platforms not associated with the fund sponsor. ETFs can be subject to brokerage commissions. They are fees charged by a broker-dealer or brokerage account to make a trade in an ETF. Whether or not an ETF is subject to a brokerage commission depends on the ETF itself and the brokerage account where it is traded. A premium or discount is the difference between an ETF’s market price and the value of the underlying securities in its portfolio. Because an ETF is traded throughout the day on an exchange, its market price can deviate from the value of its underlying securities, although the creation and redemption of ETFs generally keeps the market price close to the currently observed or implied value of its underlying securities. Any small differences between the two- known as “premiums” (when the market price is greater than the value of the underlying securities) and “discounts” (market price is lower than the value of the underlying securities)-are largely influenced by transaction costs in the underlying securities’ markets, time-zone differences across global markets, and intraday investor supply and demand for the ETF shares. During times of equilibrium, markets essentially have balanced supply and demand. In such an environment, an ETF’s market price would likely be at a small premium. The premium would reflect various costs faced by the market maker, including those to transact in the underlying market as well as fees related to the creation or redemption of ETF shares. Figure 7 provides insight into how the average premiums/discounts in ETFs tend to be a function of underlying market transaction costs. In the five categories shown, the median premium/ discount, indicated by the red box, rises in accordance with the general level of transaction costs in the respective underlying markets. U.S. equities are extremely liquid and have minimal transaction costs, as do U.S. government bonds. International equities have slightly higher transaction costs than either of the former. Figure 7 also illustrates how the variability of the premium/ discount is largely a reflection of time-zone differences between an ETF’s trading hours and the trading hours of the underlying securities, as well as the propensity of the underlying market’s transaction costs to fluctuate. In the case of time-zone differences, the effects can be seen notably with international stock ETFs; with fluctuating levels of transaction costs, the effects can be seen notably with U.S. corporate-bond ETFs and U.S. high-yield bond ETFs. Unlike the bid-ask spread, however, the impact of premiums and discounts is uncertain. Premiums and discounts can either boost investor returns (e.g., if buying at a discount and selling at a premium), hurt the returns (e.g., if buying at a premium and selling at a discount), or have no effect on returns (e.g., if premium or discount remains unchanged). Given the uncertain nature and relatively minimal impact of premiums and discounts, investors may find it more practical to focus their cost analysis on the bid-ask spread. Comparing costs: Holding period matters Given that, as just discussed, the ongoing costs accrue gradually over time, while transaction costs occur entirely at the time of transaction, there is a time element to the analysis. Determining which of the two competing vehicles incurs lower costs may depend largely on the expected holding period of the investment. Figure 8 summarizes a hypothetical transaction cost/ ongoing cost analysis for a mutual fund versus an ETF.[11] The analysis assumes that both the mutual fund and ETF under consideration track the same market, that the transaction is a one-time purchase in which neither premiums/discounts nor differences in return lost to taxes are incurred (meaning expense ratio is the only ongoing cost), and that gross return expectations are similar for both products. Given these assumptions, investors would face four potential scenarios depending on each product’s expense ratio and transaction costs. In scenarios 1 and 3, the product with the lower expense ratio and the lower transaction costs (the ETF, in scenario 1 and the mutual fund, in scenario 3) has a clear advantage over the other. In scenarios 2 and 4, the advantage is unclear, meaning a time-horizon-based breakeven analysis is required, as described next. The breakeven holding period equals the difference between transaction costs divided by the difference in expense ratio (appendix Figure A-1 explains the formula in greater detail): Figure 9 provides a sensitivity analysis of how breakeven holding periods change as the transaction cost differential and the ongoing cost differential change. For example, if the transaction cost for an ETF is 20 basis points (bps) and 10 bps for a mutual fund, the mutual fund would have a transaction cost advantage of 10 bps. If the expense ratio of an ETF is 10 bps and 110 bps for the mutual fund, the ETF would have an expense ratio advantage of 100 bps. In this case, the breakeven holding period is 0.10 year, or roughly five weeks. An investor whose expected holding period is greater than five weeks should choose the ETF, because it will be more cost-effective after that period of time. Figure 9 shows that the breakeven holding period lengthens as the transaction cost differential increases, because it takes the product with higher transaction costs longer to recoup these costs. Conversely, the breakeven period shortens as the expense ratio differential grows, since the product with the expense ratio advantage needs less time to catch up. The breakeven analysis suggests that the vehicle with higher transaction costs may be unfavorable for short- term trading strategies. This includes not just frequent trading of the same initial “lump sum” investment but also frequent trading in the form of multiple, subsequent new cash-flow investments such as dollar-cost averaging. For example, consider a situation in which an investor is deciding between an ETF with a bid-ask spread as its transaction cost, and a mutual fund with no transaction costs. Even though in this situation the ETF has an expense ratio advantage, the accumulation of transaction costs with every ETF trade may make the mutual fund the more cost-effective option. The same considerations should apply for investors deciding between two ETFs. Conclusion Deciding to use ETFs or mutual funds (or both) in a portfolio is part of the implementation step of the portfolio construction process. Mutual funds have traditionally been the choice of many investors, but exchange-traded funds have recently emerged as yet another way to obtain diversified exposure to various asset classes. Although ETFs are often promoted as a significantly better vehicle than mutual funds, the two products possess many similarities, including the benefits of pooled investing, primary regulation under the same laws, and the ability to issue new shares and redeem existing shares, allowing investors to transact at a price that closely reflects the underlying value of their securities. Ultimately, four key factors should be considered when deciding between mutual funds and ETFs: investment strategy, trading flexibility, accessibility, and costs. Mutual funds may be preferred by investors who want to use active strategies in their portfolio, who prefer the trading convenience of mutual fund investing, and who are satisfied with the availability of mutual funds on their investment platform. On the other hand, ETFs may be preferred by investors who want a greater variety of index-based options, who value the trading flexibility associated with trading on an exchange, and who desire the more open access provided by brokerage-based distribution. Costs must be weighed dynamically, owing to the trade-off between ongoing costs and transaction costs. This trade-off generally results in a selection that is based on the investment’s time horizon. References Arnott, Robert D., Jason Hsu, and Philip Moore, 2005. Fundamental Indexation. Financial Analysts Journal 61(2): 83-99. Brinson, Gary P., L. Randolph Hood, and Gilbert L. Beebower, 1986. Determinants of Portfolio Performance. Financial Analysts Journal 42(4): 39-44. Bryan, Alex, and Michael Rawson, 2014. The Cost of Owning ETFs and Index Mutual Funds. Morningstar Manager Research, December 1; available at http://global.morningstar.com/us/ documents/pr/Cost-Of-Owning-Index-ETF-MFS.pdf. Dickson, Joel M., and James J. Rowley Jr., 2014. ‘Best Practices’ for ETF Trading: Seven Rules of the Road. Valley Forge, Pa.: The Vanguard Group. Donaldson, Scott J., Maria Bruno, David J. Walker, Todd Schlanger, and Francis M. Kinniry Jr., 2013. Vanguard’s Framework for Constructing Diversified Portfolios. Valley Forge, Pa.: The Vanguard Group. Philips, Christopher B., and Francis M. Kinniry Jr., 2012. Determining the Appropriate Benchmark: A Review of Major Market Indexes. Valley Forge, Pa.: The Vanguard Group. Philips, Christopher B., Francis M. Kinniry Jr., David J. Walker, and Charles J. Thomas, 2011. A Review of Alternative Approaches to Equity Indexing. Valley Forge, Pa.: The Vanguard Group. Appendix. Breakeven-period analysis Footnotes Unless otherwise stated, all data points in this paper are derived from Vanguard calculations using Morningstar, Inc., as of June 30, 2015. The data include mutual funds (open-end funds) and what are sometimes referred to as exchange-traded products such as open-end ETFs, unit investment trust ETFs, grantor-trust ETFs, and partnership ETFs. We have excluded exchange- traded notes (ETNs) from this universe of exchange-traded products, as well as from the text discussion here, because ETNs actually are debt instruments and not true investment funds. See Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986), for further discussion of asset allocation. See Donaldson et al. (2013), for further discussion of top-down portfolio construction. The SEC is the primary regulator of U.S. mutual funds and ETFs subject to the 1940 Act. Among other oversight functions, the SEC conducts both periodic and special examinations of funds’ compliance controls, operations, and compliance with regulatory requirements. See Philips and Kinniry (2012), for a discussion of more well-known index-provider construction methodologies. See Arnott, Hsu, and Moore (2005), for a discussion of fundamental indexes. See Philips et al. (2011), for a discussion of market-cap-weighted versus non-market-cap-weighted indexes. See Dickson and Rowley (2014), for a further discussion of ETF trading best practices. The expense ratio calculation does not include transaction costs that occur inside the portfolio as a result of portfolio transactions. These costs include brokerage commissions and bid-ask spreads paid when buying and selling securities in the portfolio. However, these costs are reflected in the fund’s NAV. The analysis reflects the impact on taxable investors. The impact of taxes is mitigated for tax-exempt institutions or taxable investors who hold funds in tax-advantaged accounts. This analysis may also apply when comparing one ETF to another ETF, or one mutual fund to another. To analyze costs between specific ETFs and mutual funds, see Vanguard’s cost simulation tool here . Notes about risk and performance data: Investments are subject to market risk, including the possible loss of the money you invest. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns. Be aware that fluctuations in the financial markets and other factors may cause declines in the value of your account. There is no guarantee that any particular asset allocation or mix of funds will meet your investment objectives or provide you with a given level of income. We recommend that you consult a tax or financial advisor about your individual situation. Funds that concentrate on a relatively narrow market sector face the risk of higher share-price volatility. Prices of mid- and small-cap stocks often fluctuate more than those of large-company stocks. U.S. government backing of Treasury or agency securities applies only to the underlying securities and does not prevent share-price fluctuations. Because high-yield bonds are considered speculative, investors should be prepared to assume a substantially greater level of credit risk than with other types of bonds. Diversification does not ensure a profit or protect against a loss in a declining market.

Active Vs. Passive Investing And The ‘Suckers At The Poker Table’ Fallacy

By Druce Vertes, CFA Image credit: ©iStockphoto.com/animatedfunk Warren Buffett sometimes says things that seem… contradictory. For example, in the “You don’t have to be a genius to be a great investor” category: ” Success in investing doesn’t correlate with IQ once you’re above the level of 25.” “If you are in the investment business and have an IQ of 150, sell 30 points to someone else.” He loves tweaking academic proponents of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH): “I’d be a bum on the street with a tin cup if the markets were always efficient.” ” Naturally the disservice done students and gullible investment professionals who have swallowed EMH has been an extraordinary service to us . . . In any sort of a contest – financial, mental, or physical – it’s an enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it’s useless to even try.” And yet Buffett also says most people should steer clear of active investing: Like those same gullible investment professionals and misguided EMH proponents, he recommends low-cost index funds. “A low-cost index fund is the most sensible equity investment for the great majority of investors.” “My advice to [his own self-selected!] trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors – whether pension funds, institutions or individuals – who employ high-fee managers.” How can Buffett say passive investing is best for most people and also an “enormous advantage” for active investors like him? If it helps everyone else, how can it also help him? The opposite view is sometimes described as the ” suckers at the poker table ” hypothesis – the theory that an increase in passive investing is bad for active investors like Buffett because the fewer suckers there are to fleece, the less profit there is for smart active investors. So which view is right? The “suckers at the poker table” theory, or Warren Buffett, who says passive investors make his job easier? And how can Buffett be right while at the same time saying most people should invest passively? Let’s do a simple thought experiment: What would happen if everyone was a passive investor except Warren Buffett? As is often the case, we find that Buffett is way ahead of everyone else. He is both correct and self-serving. Anyone can use an index to match the market on a holding period-return basis, and yet Buffett can still crush everyone else on a money-weighted basis. A brief theoretical digression: The Grossman-Stiglitz paradox holds that you can’t have a perfectly efficient market because that requires someone to be willing to arbitrage away any inefficient price. But arbitrageurs have to get paid. So they will only step in if they’re compensated for their time, data services, research, compliance, office rent, overhead, and an adequate after-tax, risk-adjusted return. So markets tend towards an equilibrium where prices are boundedly efficient, where there is no more mispricing than at the level that would make arbitrage profitable. The set of all investors is the market itself and, in the aggregate in any given period, earns the market return. The subset of index investors, by virtue of owning the market portfolio, also earns the market return. To make the indexers and non-indexers add up to the market, the non-index investors in the aggregate must also earn the market return. 1 In the aggregate, those “arbitrageur” active investors aren’t making any excess profits! Before expenses, they are matching the market, and after expenses they are underperforming. In order to have any profitable active investors, it seems you have to posit overconfident, “dumb” active money that loses money trading against the “smart” arbitrageurs. And that doesn’t make much sense. It implies the persistence of a class of irrational investors. If there’s a tug of war between smart money and dumb money, and a priori the dumb money is as strong as the smart money, and it’s to the smart money’s advantage to trick the dumb money whenever possible, why should that make prices efficient? It sounds like a theory of irrational traders and not very efficient markets. Let’s see if another thought experiment can shed some light: What happens if passive investors take over the market so there is only one active investor left: our hypothetical Warren Buffett? Let’s disregard for the moment changes in the composition of the index. We only have Buffett trading with passive investors. The passive investors just want to enter and exit the whole market. They don’t want to trade individual stocks or a non-market-weighted portfolio. And there are no other active investors to trade with other than Buffett, who makes a bid-ask market for the index, selling when it’s above his estimate of fair value and buying when it’s below fair value. A somewhat trivial example, which should be familiar to those who have done the CFA curriculum on holding period vs. money-weighted returns: Cash Flows Index Fair Value Index Price Premium/ Discount Holding Period Return Cost Averaging Investor 1 Dumb Investor 2 Dumb Investor 3 Warren Buffett Corporate Issuance Year 0 $ 100.00 100.00 0% (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) – 3,000 Year 1 $ 105.00 94.50 -10% -5.5% (1,000) – 945 (1,000) 1,055 Year 2 $ 110.25 121.28 10% 28.3% (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) 1,283 1,717 Final value $ 115.76 115.76 0% -4.5% 3,337 2,112 955 – Holding period return 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% Money weighted return (IRR) 5.4% 2.7% -5.0% 28.3% The index fair value grows at 5% per year. It starts priced at fair value in Year 0, in Year 1, it trades at a 10% discount, in Year 2, at a 10% premium, and then finally returns to fair value in Year 3. The holding period return, which ignores flows, is 5%, matching the index. Dollar cost averaging Investor 1 buys $1,000 worth of stock each year and has a money-weighted return of 5.4% as a result of automatically buying more shares when they are cheap and fewer when they are expensive. Dumb Investor 2 panics when the market goes to a 10% discount and doesn’t buy that year and ends up with a 2.7% money-weighted return. Dumb Investor 3 panics even worse, sells when the market goes to a 10% discount, and ends up with a -5.0% money-weighted return. Warren Buffett stays out of the market until it trades at a 10% discount, sells at a 10% premium, and ends up with a 28.3% money-weighted return. Everyone gets the same 5% holding period return, which ignores flows. But on a money-weighted, risk-adjusted basis, of course, the returns are very different, and our Warren Buffett crushes the market. One way of looking at it is Buffett increases the size of the overall pie when the odds are in his favor, shrinks it when they aren’t, and outperforms without necessarily taking anything from the other investors, who earn the market return in each holding period. Another way of looking at it is to consider the whole scenario as one holding period during which Buffett took advantage of people who were selling low and buying high. Effectively, our Warren Buffett sets a floor under the market when events or cash flows make the passive investor inclined to sell excessively cheap and sets a ceiling when the market gets expensive. If you examine any individual year, everyone here is a passive investor in the sense of always holding the index. But if you think of the entire scenario as one holding period, only someone who owns the index and never trades is really a passive investor. Everyone else is buying high or selling low within the period. If you’re planning to invest for an objective other than buying and holding forever, you have to make decisions about when and how much to invest and when and how much to withdraw. On a sufficiently long timeline, the probability of being a completely passive investor goes to zero. Eventually, you have to make an active investment decision, and at that point, the shrewd investors are lying in wait. Everyone eventually has to pay Charon to cross the river Styx. It gets even better for Buffett when you incorporate index changes. An IPO comes out. The IPO is initially not in the index. Our hypothetical Warren Buffett sets the IPO price. He doesn’t have anyone to bid against or anyone to trade with besides the issuers since the stock is not yet in the index. Being an accommodating fellow, he sets the price at fair value minus his margin of safety, illiquidity discount, etc. The IPO eventually gets added to the index. Indexers have to buy the stock. Buffett solely determines the price at which it gets added to the index. In his obliging manner, he sets it at fair value for a liquid index stock plus a reasonable convenience premium. What a sweet deal! Pay a steep discount for any security not in the index and demand a big premium when they go into the index. Similar profits are available when securities exit the index. Going back to the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox, the arbitrageur active traders can do pretty well, even without the existence of a large pool of permanently underperforming “dumb money,” which is unnecessary and illogical. They pull a bit of Star Trek’s Kobayashi Maru scenario by going outside the bounds of picking stocks from within the index. The “suckers at the poker table” paradigm goes astray because there isn’t some exogenous fixed size of the investment pie investors are fighting over. The returns are endogenous: They are in part determined by how smart the investors are, how well the capital in the economy is allocated, and by everything else that impacts economic and market outcomes. The size of the profits pie is not fixed. When investors take a risk funding an early Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ) or Wynn (NASDAQ: WYNN ), they increase the size of the overall pie, getting a bigger slice without taking a commensurate amount from everyone else. Smart money going into appropriately priced investment opportunities grows the whole pie. Dumb money going to bad businesses shrinks the pie. Once it’s not a strictly zero-sum game, you don’t need “suckers at the poker table” to outperform. Sufficiently smart money creates its own suckers. Bill Ackman, in his most recent Pershing Square letter, asked “Is There an Index Fund Bubble?” He pointed out that if index funds generally side with management, they make the activist’s job harder. But increased herding can be a self-fulfilling prophecy with bubble dynamics, and it increases opportunities outside liquid indexes. There are useful parallels between investing and poker , but investing is not a zero-sum game, dumb money is not the primary driver of returns for most strategies, and the “suckers at the poker table” is not a useful analogy for most long-term investors. 1 This accounting excludes issuers of stock, who are kind of important. Companies are net distributors of cash to their stockholders. They pay dividends and they on net buy back stock , these days. So everyone cannot be a passive investor in the S&P and reinvest dividends. If they tried, something would have to give. Investors would bid up stocks until someone capitulated and started selling, or companies started issuing stock, or something. When it’s not a zero-sum game, reasoning from accounting identities tends to be misleading. Disclaimer: Please note that the content of this site should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute.