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What Drives The Financial Sector?

Summary The financial sector is the second largest component of S&P 500. Its performance to a large extent is a combination of long equities and short bonds. XLF’s performance clearly illustrates the diversification benefit an investor achieves as opposed to individual stock investment. With a 16.5% share, financial sector stocks currently account for the second largest part of S&P 500, trailing only behind the information technology sector. According to ETFdb , there are 41 ETFs tracking U.S. financial stocks. By far the largest of them is the Financial Select Sector SPDR ETF (NYSEARCA: XLF ), which has $18.5 billion of assets under management (AUM), exceeding the total number for the remaining 40 funds combined. In this article I would like to probe the main contributors to XLF returns, splitting them into two categories. The first one contains broad market forces, or so called factors, driving the ETF’s performance. The second category includes the largest individual holdings, which set the tone for overall funds performance. Factor analysis Analyzing daily price changes from the last 12 months, the simple factor analysis on risk analysis tool InvestSpy gives the first insight into the driving forces behind XLF returns. Using asset classes as explanatory variables, the results table looks as follows: The practical interpretation of this output is that to replicate performance of $1,000 invested in XLF as closely as possible, an investor would need to buy $1,000 of the Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF (NYSEARCA: VTI ), whilst shorting $580 of the Vanguard Total Bond Market ETF (NYSEARCA: BND ), $80 of the SPDR Gold Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: GLD ) and $10 of the United States Oil Fund (NYSEARCA: USO ). The important takeaway is that essentially XLF acts as a combination of long equities and short fixed income. The coefficients estimated by this basic factor analysis enable one to project potential performance of XLF in various market scenarios, incorporating views about stock and bond markets. Largest holdings XLF has 87 holdings, which range from banks to insurance companies to real estate investment trusts. Whilst 82 of these positions have a weight below 3%, each of the largest 5 holdings accounts for more than 5%. This means that 37% of the AUM is invested in only 5 stocks, naturally making them the primary drivers of the fund’s returns. Wells Fargo & Company (NYSE: WFC ) – 8.7% weight Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B (NYSE: BRK.B ) – 8.4% JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM ) – 8.2% Bank of America Corporation (NYSE: BAC ) – 6.1% Citigroup Inc. (NYSE: C ) – 5.4% Over the last 12 months, these five stocks contributed 0.70% to XLF total return of 1.2%. Four out of five largest holdings are banking stocks, which, upon further inspection, demonstrate fairly similar risk characteristics: Source: InvestSpy All four banking stocks have a beta coefficient above 1, showing higher than average sensitivity to the broad market movements. Their annualized volatility ranging from 19.2% to 24.8% substantially exceeds that of the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ), which stood at 15.0% over the same period. BRK.B is a bit of an outlier here and exhibits more contained risk parameters, largely due to the fact that it is to a certain extent a funds in its own right, heavily tilted towards value stocks. Further analysis of the correlation matrix reveals that the same BRK.B is the position that is most correlated to the S&P 500 index with a coefficient of 0.87. Comparing with other top holdings, BAC appears to be the position that is most independent. Source: InvestSpy One observation from both tables in this section is that XLF demonstrates two main features of a pool of individual stocks. First, it has lower annualized volatility and maximum drawdown than its individual holdings, which is a great illustration of the diversification effect. Second, it is significantly more correlated to the broader stock market than its individual holdings as the idiosyncratic risk becomes reduced in a portfolio. Conclusion Putting all pieces together, XLF tends to behave as a combination of long stocks and short bonds. The performance of the financial sector can be projected incorporating investor’s outlook for both of these markets. Furthermore, 37% of the fund is concentrated in 5 mega cap stocks, four of which are banks. Whilst these stocks individually are more volatile than the broad market, putting them together in one basket reduces volatility, beta and drawdown metrics. Unless an investor has a strong preference for a specific financial stock, XLF performance brings all the benefits that one may expect from a sector ETF.

A Really Long-Term Test Of Currency Carry Strategy

Academic research using a long time horizon (more than 100 years of data) confirmed the existence of the currency carry trade effect but found significantly lower risk-adjusted profitability than comparable empirical studies. The analysis also reveals rare occurrences of significant losses which can be worse than those in year 2008. A carry trade strategy can still provide diversification benefits to long-only equity investors as equities and currency carry trades sometimes appear to be exposed to different sources of risk. We wrote a short introduction to currency strategies in our previous article where we examined whether we can view currencies as a distinct asset class . In this article, we will continue in our investigation and elaborate more about the most popular systematic currency trading strategy – Currency Carry Trade (you can see the detailed description of this strategy and a list of related academic research papers on Quantpedia – The Encyclopedia of Quantitative Trading Strategies ). There are already several academic research papers that have examined the return-generating ability of the carry trade strategy and have found that it has significant positive excess returns or Sharpe ratio that can be twice as high as that of the equity markets. However, most of these studies cover only the period after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in 1973. Luckily, one important research paper by Doskow and Swinkels (2014) 1 is different from the others. Their main contribution to previous literature lies in broadening the sample period so that it covers multiple currency regimes. This also enables us to look at the risks of carry trading in the pre-Bretton-Woods period. We will attempt to interpret the findings on the risk and return characteristics of both nominal and real carry trade over a period of more than a hundred years and eventually compare these strategies to the behavior of the equity market. As a basis for their empirical work, the authors used the database from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2013). It offers exchange rates and treasury bill returns of 20 countries for most of the 1900-2012 period. Even though the analysis had to rely on returns on treasury bills instead of short-term deposit rates, it did not have a significant impact on the obtained results. Also, the fact that the analysis could not be made using data with higher than annual frequency was proved to be of very little importance by the authors. The methodology Doskow and Swinkels used to examine the carry trade returns was as follows: they ranked currencies based on their treasury bill returns (which serve as a proxy for ex-ante yields) every year and then invested in four currencies with the highest interest rates while shorting four with the lowest interest rates. This way they obtained the annual carry trade returns for the period of 1901-2012. In order to obtain the results for real carry trades, it was necessary to adjust the nominal returns on treasury bills by deducting the country-specific inflation and ranking the countries based on these inflation-adjusted (real) returns. What are the main findings of Doskow and Swinkels? And has there been a worse year in history for the currency carry strategy than year 2008? The historical data on the returns from nominal carry trade s revealed several interesting things: Two decades from the sample period were quite exceptional (1901-1909 and the 1950s). The Sharpe ratio in the first decade reached an outstanding value of 3.45 compared to the second best of 1.02 from the 1950s. This result was mainly attributed to the stability of returns over the decade. The steady performance lasted until the beginning of World War I. The loss of 20.2 percent from 1918 is comparable to that of the recent global financial crisis (-21.3 percent in 2008). A similar result of -21.2 percent in 1931 was achieved during the Great Recession, associated with the collapse of gold exchange standard. The most harsh period was the 1940s decade, the period of WWII. It is the only decade from the sample period that recorded a negative average return (-5.3 percent, compared to the second lowest of 1.7 percent in the previous 1930s decade) and, therefore, also a negative Sharpe ratio. The only double-digit negative returns in the post-Bretton-Woods era (besides 2008) were recorded in the middle of the 1980s (1985 and 1986), both indicating losses close to 15 percent. The cumulative performance of world equities against the carry trade strategies over the 1901-2012 (excluding 1940s) is shown in Figure 1. We can see the equity markets struggled in the pre-WWII period as opposed to carry trade strategies; after the WWII, both currency carry trade and equities showed an upward trend. (click to enlarge) The authors underline several implications: Firstly , empirical evidence suggests that the currency carry trade existed in the past even before the year 1973. But the average profitability relative to the risk is markedly lower than is usually presented in studies that use more recent data – Sharpe ratio of 0.26 over the entire period (or 0.38, excluding the 1940s) compared to the usual results often exceeding 0.6. Secondly, the large losses in the first half of the sample period could be attributed to materialized crash risk, a rare event risk, or the so-called “peso problem”, as supported by the recent literature. Analysis shows that hidden risk in currency carry trades is greater than most investors think and losses greater than the loss in the year 2008 were recorded in the past. Finally, the average Sharpe ratio of equities was close to those of carry strategies (0.31 vs. 0.38 and 0.24). However, the important result is surprisingly low correlation between nominal carry trades and equities of only 0.2, which suggests possible diversification benefits for long-only equity investors. The results obtained for the real carry trade are considerably more volatile compared to the nominal. It is again mainly due to the extreme values measured in 1940s; e.g. a positive return of 282.4(!) percent in 1948 (appreciation of long German mark) and an immediate loss of 71.7 percent in the next year. Not accounting for the 1940s provides much more similar results to those for the nominal carry trade, even though the risk-adjusted performance is still noticeably lower (average Sharpe of 0.24 compared to 0.38). Also, the real and nominal carry trade returns were weakly correlated over the entire period (0.39) due to high inflation experienced by a number of countries. However, in the period of generally low and stable inflation (after 1985), the correlation increased to 0.64. What are the conclusions for ordinary investors: Is the currency carry effect real? Apparently, yes. The really long test performed by Doskow and Swinkels (using data which hadn’t been used before) showed that currency carry is a real effect. We can reasonably expect it will probably exist also in the future. Is it a free lunch? Not at all. Analysis shows that currency carry trades had some really bad periods in the past (worse than 2008). It will have bad periods in the future too. Should we add it into a portfolio? It may be a good idea. Currency carry has a comparable long-term Sharpe ratio to equities and very low correlation. It is an alternative asset class and, therefore, not a lot of people are comfortable with a high allocation to it. But it definitely has a place in a modern diversified investment portfolio. How to invest in currency carry trade strategies? Our previous article shows that it is not a wise idea to use an active currency fund. ETFs like the PowerShares DB G10 Currency Harvest ETF (NYSEARCA: DBV ) or the iPath Optimized Currency Carry ETN (NYSEARCA: ICI ). REFERENCES 1. DOSKOW, N. – SWINKELS, L. 2014. Empirical evidence on the currency carry trade, 1900-2012 . Journal of International Money and Finance

Project $1M: Achieving $1M With Growth Stocks, Part 2

I’ve created Project $1M to try and attain a $1M capital base from growth stocks in 11 years. I’m focused on including stocks that have a moat and some strong growth drivers. I will introduce the next 6 stocks in the list in this update. I introduced the concept of my growth oriented model portfolio in a previous article. The focus of that portfolio was directed toward achieving a $1M capital base in approximately 11 years, starting from a base of $217,500. I introduced the first 6 stocks in the portfolio last week. I’d like to introduce the next 6 stocks in the portfolio in this update and show how the portfolio currently stands. LinkedIn (NYSE: LNKD ) – The reason that I’ve included LinkedIn in my portfolio is because I view LinkedIn as the flip side to Facebook (NASDAQ: FB ). LinkedIn is an indispensable tool for professional networking that enterprises and recruiters are increasingly eager to tap into. Similar to the case with social networks, the platform with the largest set of professional contacts is the one that more users will ultimately wish to join. Similarly, the platform with the greatest user base is the one that advertisers and marketers will gravitate toward. LinkedIn’s rise has been pretty stratospheric, and the company now has close to 350M users in less than a decade. LinkedIn has a variety of revenue generating opportunities open to it, including enterprise talent acquisition as well as advertising, which it has just started to play a role in. Business to business advertising is a $30B annual market. The market for recruiting tools is also estimated at over $35B. I believe LinkedIn has at least a decade of double digit revenue growth. NovoNordisk (NYSE: NVO ) has a lock on the insulin supplied diabetes market, with the firm estimated to control roughly 30% of the overall market. Novo has returns on capital in excess of 60% over the last few years and has increased revenues more than 3x over the last decade. The market for insulin dependent diabetes is close to $30B currently. This is only expected to increase as an increasing number of obesity cases triggers a greater percentage of insulin dependent diabetes. Market growth estimates for the next 5 years are for approximately 6% volume growth in insulin supplies, and as the market leader, NovoNordisk will likely see volume growth slightly higher than this. Novo should also be able to implement pricing increases to take annual revenue growth of close to 10% over the next 5 years, if not beyond. Core Labs (NYSE: CLB ) provides yield enhancement services to the oil and gas industry. Essentially, the company works with oil and gas companies to help them best optimize their oil fields to extract the maximum level of output. With oil and gas producers recently reducing capex levels and investment on fields offering marginal profitability, Core Labs has experienced some revenue pressure. However historical returns on capital have been quite exceptional and even now remain close to 40%. Core Labs helps its clients identify the best sites for new production, as well as maximize returns on existing assets. As such, it is fairly well positioned across all aspects of the production life cycle. Once the oil price recovers over the next few years, I expect Core Labs will once again resume its uptrend in revenue growth. Moody’s (NYSE: MCO ) is a strong part of the debt rating oligopoly along with S&P and Fitch, and has managed consistent, double digit EPS growth for the last 5 years. The debt ratings business has particularly strong barriers to entry, and natural incentives on the part of those in the ecosystem to keep the number of ratings players low. Too many different ratings providers allows companies to “ratings shop” in a bid to get the best rating from an issuer. This relative industry strength and the lack of any real price competition is reflected in Moody’s return on invested capital, which is in excess of 30%. While the last few years have been a bonanza for Moody’s as companies have issued significant debt to take advantage of low interest rates, I expect Moody’s will still see strong revenue growth over the medium term as low interest rates continue to persist, and industry structure remains favorable. Starbucks (NASDAQ: SBUX ) is synonymous with coffee, and increasingly teas and pastries. The stock has a long-term track record of delivering excellent returns for its investors. In fact, a $10,000 investment in SBUX made in 1992 would be worth $1.93M today. This reflects a return over time of just under 25.5% annually. One of the things that distinguish Starbucks compared to other retailers is the company’s willingness to experiment with new concepts. Starbucks recently announced a partnership with Dannon to provide a range of yoghurt based products into the store. The US market for yogurt is worth approximately $7B and has grown at an average rate of 8.5% annually, according to EuroMonitor, so Starbucks presence in the space stands to be a nice contributor to the company’s bottom line. Starbucks’ extensive store footprint and brand perception gives the company license to extend its in-store offering to other product categories, such as smoothies and teas, which the company is beginning to offer. Starbucks still manages double digit revenue growth, with an impressive return on equity that is over 30%. Resmed (NYSE: RMD ) is one of the key solution providers for the sleep apnea market. The company controls almost 40% of CPAP instruments. A large portion of the population with sleep apnea is still undiagnosed, so Resmed likely has years of growth ahead of it. The company has managed mid teens EPS growth for most of the last decade, with a return on invested capital in the high teens. A launch of in home solutions will likely further open up the market for apnea sufferers who have severe sleeping problems, but who haven’t been inclined to go to sleep labs to get the appropriate testing for diagnosis. The 12 names that existing in the Project $1M portfolio, and their respective weightings are shown below. Name Shares Held $ Market Value % Weight Baidu Inc ADR (NASDAQ: BIDU ) 54 10,123.38 6.4% Core Laboratories NV 64 7,445.12 4.7% Facebook Inc Class A 99 10,095.03 6.4% LinkedIn Corp Class A 42 10,116.54 6.4% MasterCard Inc Class A 305 30,191.95 19.1% Mercadolibre Inc 102 10,033.74 6.3% Moody’s Corporation 156 15,000.96 9.5% Novo Nordisk A/S ADR 235 12,497.30 7.9% Priceline Group Inc 7 10,179.68 6.4% ResMed Inc 174 10,024.14 6.3% Starbucks Corp 201 12,576.57 8.0% Visa Inc Class A 256 19,860.48 12.6% Project $1M 158,144.89 100