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VYM: A Quality Dividend Growing ETF

Summary Features great dividend growth and diversification across sectors. Traditional low Vanguard expense fees keep your costs down. Lags, though closely follows the S&P for total return. Fund 10% down for the year creates a buying opportunity. Solid ETF choice to balance with SCHD for long-term income generation. Introduction The Vanguard High Dividend Yield ETF (NYSEARCA: VYM ) is a quality ETF by Vanguard, the leader in low-cost ETFs. The fund tracks the FTSE High Dividend Yield Index which tracks stocks that are forecasted to have above-average dividend yields. The fund applies no type of quality metric or additional screening to the companies. It also excludes REITs. It currently has 434 holdings and carries an expense ratio of 0.10%. The Holdings VYM holds a wider variety of stocks than the Schwab U.S. Dividend Equity ETF ( SCHD), which I wrote about in another article . (click to enlarge) To compare, both funds are light on materials while SCHD is also very light on utilities, financials and telecommunications. A few basic stats, the top 10 holdings make up 30% of VYM, 42% of SCHD, and the top 25 makes up 58% of VYM vs. 74% for SCHD. Dividend Growth VYM has also featured great dividend growth the last several years. We need to see what the December dividend is, but using the trailing 12-month period (last raise announced 9/23/15), it grew 12.4% this past year, and has a 3-year average of 12.7%. Performance Inception to-date performance vs. the S&P has slightly lagged as mentioned in the summary. This return is assuming all dividends reinvested. Data courtesy of DividendChannel. (click to enlarge) I like to compare this with SCHD’s inception to-date results to get a closer apples-to-apples comparison of a dividend based ETF. (click to enlarge) SCHD has lagged VYM since its inception by a percentage point each year. One other comparison point between VYM and SCHD is looking at their top holdings. Since their top holdings make up the majority of the funds, it’s important to see how they are similar and where they differ. This information may help an investor decide which fund to buy into (if it’s an either/or scenario) based on the business prospects of a company(ies) that may be absent from a fund. The green colors mean the company is contained within both funds, red means that one is not contained within the other (for example Wells Fargo (NYSE: WFC ) and AT&T (NYSE: T ) are not in SCHD) and yellow denotes they are in the other fund, just not the top 30. Why Now? The market has been off its highs in 2015 as there are now several factors weighing on the market. Looking at the past 5 years, the yield has never been higher. It briefly touched over 3% during the corrections of 2011 and 2013, but has sustained 3%+ for the last few months of 2015. This offers a historically good entry point. The sharp rally of the past week has pushed the yield down however from approximately 3.42% to 3.25%. VYM data by YCharts Conclusion VYM is another great ETF product by Vanguard. The fund has had a solid track record of performance, delivering growing dividends while closely following the performance of the S&P 500. The yield is still over a percentage point higher than the S&P for investors focusing on generating more income while still delivering great total return. I like the prospects of both VYM and SCHD and think they can be compared to one another whether adding to an existing or opening a new position.

Notes On The SEC’s Proposal On Mutual Fund Liquidity

I’m still working through the SEC’s proposal on Mutual Fund Liquidity, which I mentioned at the end of this article : Q: Are you going to write anything regarding the SEC’s proposal on open end mutual funds and ETFs regarding liquidity ? A: …my main question to myself is whether I have enough time to do it justice. There’s their white paper on liquidity and mutual funds . The proposed rule is a monster at 415 pages , and I may have better things to do. If I do anything with it, you’ll see it here first. These are just notes on the proposal so far. Here goes: 1) It’s a solution in search of a problem. After the financial crisis, regulators got one message strongly – focus on liquidity. Good point with respect to banks and other depositary financials, useless with respect to everything else. Insurers and asset managers pose no systemic risk, unless like AIG they have a derivatives counterparty. Even money market funds weren’t that big of a problem – halt withdrawals for a short amount of time, and hand out losses to withdrawing unitholders. The problem the SEC is trying to deal with seems to be that in a crisis, mutual fund holders who do not sell lose value from those who are selling because the Net Asset Value at the end of the day does not go low enough. In the short run, mutual fund managers tend to sell liquid assets when redemptions are spiking; the prices of illiquid assets don’t move as much as they should, and so the NAV is artificially high post-redemptions, until the prices of illiquid assets adjust. The proposal allows for “swing pricing.” From the SEC release : The Commission will consider proposed amendments to Investment Company Act rule 22c-1 that would permit, but not require, open-end funds (except money market funds or ETFs) to use “swing pricing.” Swing pricing is the process of reflecting in a fund’s NAV the costs associated with shareholders’ trading activity in order to pass those costs on to the purchasing and redeeming shareholders. It is designed to protect existing shareholders from dilution associated with shareholder purchases and redemptions and would be another tool to help funds manage liquidity risks. Pooled investment vehicles in certain foreign jurisdictions currently use forms of swing pricing. A fund that chooses to use swing pricing would reflect in its NAV a specified amount, the swing factor, once the level of net purchases into or net redemptions from the fund exceeds a specified percentage of the fund’s NAV known as the swing threshold. The proposed amendments include factors that funds would be required to consider to determine the swing threshold and swing factor, and to annually review the swing threshold. The fund’s board, including the independent directors, would be required to approve the fund’s swing pricing policies and procedures. But there are simpler ways to do this. In the wake of the mutual fund timing scandal, mutual funds were allowed to estimate the NAV to reflect the underlying value of assets that don’t adjust rapidly. This just needs to be followed more aggressively in a crisis, and peg the NAV lower than they otherwise would, for the sake of those that hold on. Perhaps better still would be provisions where exit loads are paid back to the funds, not the fund companies. Those are frequently used for funds where the underlying assets are less liquid. Those would more than compensate for any losses. 2) This disproportionately affects fixed income funds. One size does not fit all here. Fixed income funds already use matrix pricing extensively – the NAV is always an estimate because not only do the grand majority of fixed income instruments not trade each day, most of them do not have anyone publicly posting a bid or ask. In order to get a decent yield, you have to accept some amount of lesser liquidity. Do you want to force bond managers to start buying instruments that are nominally more liquid, but carry more risk of loss? Dividend-paying common stocks are more liquid than bonds, but it is far easier to lose money in stocks than in bonds. Liquidity risk in bonds is important, but it is not the only risk that managers face. it should not be made a high priority relative to credit or interest rate risks. 3) One could argue that every order affects market pricing – nothing is truly liquid. The calculations behind the analyses will be fraught with unprovable assumptions, and merely replace a known risk with an unknown risk. 4) Liquidity is not as constant as you might imagine. Raising your bid to buy, or lowering your ask to sell are normal activities. Particularly with illiquid stocks and bonds, volume only picks up when someone arrives wanting to buy or sell, and then the rest of the holders and potential holders react to what he wants to do. It is very easy to underestimate the amount of potential liquidity in a given asset. As with any asset, it comes at a cost. I spent a lot of time trading illiquid bonds. If I liked the creditworthiness, during times of market stress, I would buy bonds that others wanted to get rid of. What surprised me was how easy it was to source the bonds and sell the bonds if you weren’t in a hurry. Just be diffident, say you want to pick up or pose one or two million of par value in the right context, say it to the right broker who knows the bond, and you can begin the negotiation. I actually found it to be a lot of fun, and it made good money for my insurance client. 5) It affects good things about mutual funds. Really, this regulation should have to go through a benefit-cost analysis to show that it does more good than harm. Illiquid assets, properly chosen, can add significant value. As Jason Zweig of the Wall Street Journal said : The bad news is that the new regulations might well make most fund managers even more chicken-hearted than they already are – and a rare few into bigger risk-takers than ever. You want to kill off active managers, or make them even more index-like? This proposal will help do that. 6) Do you want funds to limit their size to comply with the rules, while the fund firm rolls out “clone” fund 2, 3, 4, 5, etc? You will never fully get rid of pricing issues with mutual funds, but the problems are largely self-correcting, and they are not systemic. It would be better if the SEC just withdrew these proposed rules. My guess is that the costs outweigh the benefits, and by a wide margin. Disclosure: None

ETF Issues: What You Don’t Know Might Hurt You

ETFs can be great options for investors. But you have to know what you are buying. iShares, for example, isn’t making that easy, though it’s doing the best it can. Exchange traded funds, or ETFs, are an incredible work of human ingenuity. They are pooled investment vehicles that trade close to net asset value while being traded all day long. And while there are good reasons to like these hot products, there are also reasons to dislike them. And a single data point provided by iShares shows one of those reasons. I don’t hate ETFs To start, I don’t hate ETFs. I just don’t like them as much as most investors seem to. And certainly not as much as Wall Street does, based on how many ETFs have been brought to market in recent years. Yes, they are cheap to own and provide quick and easy diversification. But it’s so easy to buy an ETF that people aren’t looking closely enough at what they are buying. That may not matter much if you pick up the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ), a clone of the S&P 500 Index. But with more and more esoteric ETF product being created by rabid Wall Street salesmen, taking the time to get to know what you own is starting to matter more and more. For example, I recently wrote about the fine print in the prospectus of the Global X Yieldco Index ETF (NASDAQ: YLCO ). Essentially, this ETF is focused on buying 20 stocks in a new and niche sector that doesn’t really have 20 stocks to buy. YLCO is all about the story, not so much about the substance, in my eyes. Maybe YLCO will be a great ETF at some point, but right now it’s a risky proposition that all but the most aggressive investors should avoid. So, yes ETFs can be good. But Wall Street has been perverting this goodness in an attempt to make a buck. iShares isn’t evil But don’t think it’s only exotic fare about which you need to be concerned. Even more “normal” stuff can lead you astray. For example, the iShares NASDAQ Biotechnology ETF (NASDAQ: IBB ) has some problems of its own. Now iShares is the ETF arm of giant asset manager BlackRock (NYSE: BLK ). And, for the most part, BlackRock is a stand up company. But that doesn’t mean every product it sells is a good investment option. For example, a quick look at IBB’s overview page shows a P/E ratio of 25. That might not be too surprising given that biotech companies are high growth. You wouldn’t expect a P/E of 10 for this group. In fact, you might even say it’s on the low side for the sector, which is known for housing money losing companies looking for a big score via the creation of new drugs. Which is why you should click the little information icon next to that P/E stat. That’s where you’ll learn that the P/E ratio doesn’t include companies that don’t have earnings. So, essentially, the P/E really tells you less about the ETF’s portfolio than you might at first believe. Interestingly, the same issue pops up throughout iShare’s data on P/E. For example, the iShares U.S. Oil & Gas Exploration & Production ETF (NYSEARCA: IEO ) has a P/E that’s listed at a little over 8. With 70% of its assets in the oil and gas exploration sector, where companies are bleeding red ink, you have to step back and wonder what’s going on. A low P/E makes sense for an out of favor sector, but does that average really tell you the whole story? The thing is the warning about P/E is a standard disclosure on the iShares site and holds true for everything from a niche biotech fund to the company’s S&P 500 Index clone. And iShares really isn’t doing anything malicious. It’s a database issue. You can’t calculate a meaningful P/E if a company doesn’t have any E to work with. So in order to get the job done, in this case calculating an average P/E, you toss the garbage numbers. And, thus, you create a P/E by using only those companies with earnings. Which, unfortunately, biases the number you have just created so that it may offer a misleading picture of the portfolio. So I’m not hating on iShares, there’s not much else it could do to provide site-wide data. And at least it goes the extra step of disclosing this little problem. But it should make you step back and take pause. If you own that biotech fund or the oil and gas fund, the stats you are using to validate your purchase may, in fact, not be reliable. This issue can be found at open-end mutual funds, too, so don’t think ETFs are the only problem child. The best example comes from Morningstar. This research and data house is very open about the way it calculates most of its data, you just have to look. And when it comes to average P/E, they have a workbook available that explains, “If a stock has a negative value for the financial variable (EPS, CPS), the stock will be excluded from the calculation.” EPS is earnings per share and CPS is cash flow per share. So any site that uses Morningstar data will be impacted by this issue… like Fidelity (read the fine print at the bottom of the data page). The question is to what degree is there a problem. In some cases it’s a minor issue. In the case of IBB, roughly half of the ETF’s holding don’t make any money and are excluded from the P/E calculation, according to The Wall Street Journal . That makes the P/E figure provided by iShares pretty much useless in my eyes. And it points out yet another problem that ETF investors may not realize when they buy what is currently a hot Wall Street product. Know what you own For many investors ETFs are seen as a short cut. A punt option that doesn’t require much thinking. In many cases that’s true, but in many others it isn’t. Which is why knowing what you own is so important. Can you accept the average P/E for an S&P 500 Index fund at face value? Yeah, probably. But what about an ETF honed in on an industry that’s filled with money-losing companies, like biotech? I don’t think that passes the sniff test. You’d be better off doing a little more digging into the portfolio to get a good understanding of what’s in there. Again, I don’t hate ETFs. But they are so popular and have been pushed so hard by Wall Street that I fear investors don’t have any clue what they own. Too many people have been lulled into complacency by slick marketing and an avalanche of new products. I don’t think that’s a story that ends well. If you own an ETF, I recommend taking a deeper dive just to make sure you really own what you think you own.