Tag Archives: seeking-alpha

FXZ And RTM: Material Evidence

Summary An opportunity for long term investors to be pre-positioned in the materials sector. One fund is equally weighted, conservatively invested; the other more diversified and alpha weighted. Either fund challenges the investor to take advantage of the business cycle. There’s an old Wall Street adage to ‘buy low, sell high’ and based on the basic principles of investment, this statement is axiomatic. However, it does beg the questions, ‘how low is low?’ and ‘how high is high?’ So to apply this axiom, the idea would be to find an investment that is low. Anyone who has paid attention to global financial news over the past few months is well aware that the supply of strategic materials, as well as production, has run far, far ahead of demand. But just what is the ‘materials sector’? According to Investopedia : … A category of stocks that accounts for companies involved with the discovery, development and processing of raw materials. The basic materials sector includes the mining and refining of metals, chemical producers and forestry products. .. So apparently, this is a starting point: supply is high, demand is low therefore prices decline, thus profits, thus stock prices of ‘basic materials’ producers. (click to enlarge) Unless one has the time, effort, patience and knowledge to analyze and filter through the hundreds, if not thousands of global basic materials manufactures, it best to select a basic materials ETF and then a ‘plain vanilla’ one at that. Lastly, the individual would be wise to select the best fund in the class. By filter U.S.Equities => Basic Materials=> All, then excluding ‘Leveraged’, ‘Inverse’ and ‘ETN’, the very handy Seeking Alpha’s ETF Hub tool identifies nine suitable results. There are two candidates with a “least bad” one year performance and the best three year performance. First is the Guggenheim’s S&P Equal Weight Materials ETF (NYSEARCA: RTM ) and second is the First Trust Materials AlphaDEX ETF (NYSEARCA: FXZ ) . According to Guggenheim , the investment’s objective is to: … replicate as closely as possible, before fees and expenses, the performance of the S&P 500 Equal Weight Index Materials[S15] … Clearly, the 28 component holdings of the Guggenheim Materials fund are then equally weighted and readjusted quarterly according to the index it tracks. The underlying S&P tracking index: …imposes equal weights on the index constituents included in the S&P 500 that are classified in the GICS® materials sector… (Note that ” GICS ® ” is an abbreviation for G lobal I ndustry C lassification S tandard , developed by S&P and M organ S tanley C apital I nternational ). (click to enlarge) The First Trust fund’s investment objective: … is to seek investment results that correspond generally to the price and yield, before fees and expenses, of an equity index called the StrataQuant® Materials Index [STRQMT]. .. This is an: … enhanced index developed, maintained and sponsored by the NYSE Euronext or its affiliates which employs the AlphaDEX stock selection methodology to select materials stocks from the Russell 1000 Index .. The AlphaDEX methodology , as the name suggests will identify index components with the greatest potential for capital appreciation. In plain speak, the fund will weight companies in the sector which are performing better than the average company in the sector. So instead of just trying to just replicate the index, it weights its holdings more towards the best performing stocks. (click to enlarge) Observe though that both funds have performed similarly in both good and bad market cycles, but interestingly, the Guggenheim fund conservatively equally weights its holding whereas the First Trust Funds weights slightly more towards risk. The Guggenheim Fund has a far more simple subsector allocation construction, five in all and then most heavily weighted in Chemicals at 57% of the fund’s total holdings. The First Trust fund allocates among ten subsectors, also most heavily weighted in Chemicals, 34%, but also includes an allocation for Aerospace and Defense, 5%, normally part of the Industrial Sector. (click to enlarge) (data from First Trust and Guggenheim) Both companies, as might be expected, have holdings in common; 21 in all. These are listed by First Trust’s weightings; (since Guggenheim equally weights): Holdings in Common Name and Symbol FXZ Weighting SEALED AIR (NYSE: SEE ) 3.47% MARTIN MARIETTA (NYSE: MLM ) 3.12% VULCAN MATERIALS (NYSE: VMC ) 3.03% NEWMONT MINING (NYSE: NEM ) 2.70% The MOSAIC (NYSE: MOS ) 2.61% NUCOR (NYSE: NUE ) 2.42% LYONDELLBASELL (NYSE: LYB ) 2.26% ALOCA (NYSE: AA ) 2.25% DOW CHEMICAL (NYSE: DOW ) 1.89% SHERWIN-WILLIAMS (NYSE: SHW ) 1.89% EASTMAN CHEMICAL (NYSE: EMN ) 1.86% CF INDUSTRIES (NYSE: CF ) 1.65% BALL CORP (NYSE: BLL ) 1.24% AIRGAS (NYSE: ARG ) 1.18% E.I. du PONT de NEMOURS (NYSE: DD ) 1.11% WESTROCK (NYSE: WRK ) 0.76% ECOLAB (NYSE: ECL ) 0.68% AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICAL (NYSE: APD ) 0.65% PRAXAIR (NYSE: PX ) 0.58% INTL PAPER (NYSE: IP ) 0.56% PPG INDUSTRIES (NYSE: PPG ) 0.53% Data From First Trust and Guggenheim As a general rule, the investor should take the time and trouble to compare the holdings of any ETFs in the same asset class for a reason exemplified here. Of the 28 holdings of the Guggenheim Fund, only 7 are not in common with the First Trust fund. Of those 7, four are in the Chemical subsector, 2 in Containers & Packaging and one in Metals and Mining. Further, as mentioned above, the Guggenheim fund seems rather heavily weighted in Chemicals compared to the First Trust fund; 57.06% vs. 34.09%. In Containers & Packaging the Guggenheim fund is slightly more weighted than Firsts Trust; 18.17% vs. 13.25%. First Trust is a little more weighted in Metals and Mining; 14.23% vs. 20.10%. Lastly, by applying some simple arithmetic, the average weighting of the First Trust’s holding which are not in the Guggenheim fund is just over 2%. The equally weighted unadjusted Guggenheim holding averages 3.57%. The point being that Guggenheim fund is mostly contained in the First Trust fund in terms of holdings, similar in allocation and reasonably close in average weighting. Also as noted above, the First Trust fund has two Aerospace & Defense holdings, 4.69%; a subsector more properly defined as an Industrial subsector. One is Hexcel Corporation (NYSE: HXL ) and the other is Precision Cast Parts (NYSE: PCP ) . In the case of these two companies, the sector to which it belongs just might be a matter of perspective since both companies manufacture specialized materials . Hexcel manufactures: … everything from carbon fiber and reinforcement fabrics to pre-impregnated materials… …and honeycomb core, tooling materials and finished aircraft structures … Precision Cast Parts, as the name implies, manufactures precision and complex casting using high performance nickel and titanium alloys. Hence, although classified as Aerospace and Defense companies, they do produce materials used in industry so are appropriate holdings for a materials fund. Fund and Inception Expense Ratio 1 Year Return 3 Year Return 5 Year Return TTM Yield P/E 3 Month Average Volume Beta Guggenheim [RTM] 11/1/2006 0.40% -7.48% 11.67% 10.78% 1.54% 17 12020 1.09 First Trust [FXZ] 5/8/2007 0.70% -11.43% 9.36% 10.65% 1.57% 17 85131 1.08 (Data from YaHoo!, Guggenheim and First Trust) So what it boils down to is this. RTM is investing conservatively in this volatile sector. FXZ may be viewed as an extension of RTM, with the opportunity for capital appreciation. However, in doing so its accepting a little more risk in this volatile sector. Both are good choices, but the decision of which to choose depends on the risk tolerance of the investor. Having described both funds, the original point must be reiterated: Is this the time to buy into the Material Sector? By referring to the included price divided charts, it is evident that both funds are well off their lows, both lows having occurred in the recession year of 2008. Hence both funds appreciated during the recovery years, in particular those years for which emerging market nations created a seemingly insatiable demand for materials. If those emerging market nations are correcting towards a more sustainable growth rate, then the Materials sector correction may not yet be over. However, this is precisely what is meant by the ‘business cycle’. Eventually, excess supply will be worked down and production capacity will adjust accordingly so that supply and demand will again come into balance. Hence, for a risk tolerant individual investor, a gradual accumulation in the materials sectors, in particular, by patiently dollar cost average in over a long period of time will put the investor in an advantageous position to be able to take advantage of the next, inevitable, up cycle and put to the test the old adage, buy low, sell high.

Hedging For Disaster – Now, Are You Ready To Listen?

A follow-up to our September 4th post with new, actionable trade ideas. Our Options Opportunity Portfolio in now up 8.1% in week 7 – here’s how we did it. For those who can’t, or won’t, go to cash – we have some great hedging ideas. 3 weeks ago, we told you how to protect yourself from a market downturn . 21 days is not a lot of time to test an investing premise, but it’s good to take a look at our progress on this relatively small market dip (that we accurately predicted), so perhaps you’ll take the necessary precautions to avoid taking losses in the next leg of downturn. My biggest regret in 2008 was ” trying not to be so gloomy “, so now I’m going to keep reminding you to hedge (or better yet, get to cash!!!) – all the way down to the bottom. As you can see from Dave Fry’s S&P 500 chart, we’re barely down on the S&P from where we were on September 4th, so you’d think our bearish hedges wouldn’t pay off – but you’d be wrong! Why? Because, like our long market conditions, our bearish hedges follow our Be the House – Not the Gambler™ strategy, which allows you to make money in relatively flat markets too. Let’s take a look at the hedges we showed you that day (September 4th) from our Short-Term Portfolio: (click to enlarge) These are simple option trades called ” bull call spreads ” – something our PSW Members learn in their first week of trading stock options. This isn’t an educational post, so we’ll go right on to the results portion of the discussion: The ultra-short S&P (NYSEARCA: SDS ) September $21/24 bull call spread expired on 9/18 at $2.48 – up 50% from the $1.23 net we showed you on 9/4 (5th column from the right was that day’s prices). With 50 contracts, the position we showed you made $6,150 in 3 weeks. The ultra-short Nasdaq (NASDAQ: SQQQ ) September $21/24 bull call spread expired on 9/18 at $1.48 – up 169% from the 0.65 net we showed you on 9/4. With 50 contracts, the position we showed you made $4,150 in 3 weeks. The ultra-short Nasdaq January $18/30 bull call spread closed Friday at $4.50 – up 45% from the $3.10 net we showed you on 9/4. With 50 contracts, the position we showed you made $7,000 in 3 weeks. The ultra-short Russell (NYSEARCA: TZA ) October $11/14 bull call spread closed Friday at $1.28 – up 70% from the 0.75 net we showed you on 9/4. With 50 contracts, the position we showed you made $2,650 in 3 weeks. So that’s $50 less than $20,000 in gains from positions we showed you from our Short-Term Portfolio just 3 weeks ago (you’re welcome). At the time, our $100,000 portfolio was up 214.5% and $20%, added another 20% to bring us up to 234.5% all by itself; but we also wisely cashed in our longs right at the September highs, locking in gains on those positions as well (as noted in that post) – so our net is a bit better than that. I would tell you that you can learn all about hedging and options strategies at Philstockworld.com but wait, there’s more! That’s right, we also showed you our long trade ideas for our Option Opportunities Portfolio – a portfolio we have partnered with over at Seeking Alpha to help teach people basic option trading strategies following our virtual portfolio. At the time (same 9/4 post), the positions looked like this: With the full image, it’s easy to see what I meant by the current price. As with our Short-Term Portfolio at PSW, the Option Opportunities Portfolio practices a strategy of cashing in the winners and adjusting the losers (assuming we still like them) until they are also winners and we can profitably take them off the table. The performance of the above positions (and we detailed our logic for each one in the ” Hedging ” post) over the last 3 weeks has been: BID January $34 calls are now $1.95, down 28% for a loss of $1,500 in 3 weeks. We have rolled the position to the April $32 calls, now $3.80. DIA September $155/159 bull call spread expired at $4, up 207% for a gain of $5,400 in 3 weeks. RJET February $2.50/4 bull call spread is now net 0.45, up 350% for a gain of $350 in 3 weeks. IRBT January $25/Dec $32 bull call spread is now net $4.24, up 19% for a gain of $690 in 3 weeks. CCJ September $13 calls expired at 0.32, down 60% for a loss of $480 in 3 weeks. CCJ short December $14 calls are now 0.36, down 69% for a gain of $790 in 3 weeks (because we were short, not long). CCJ March $11/Jan $12 bull call spread is now net $1.05, down 58% for a loss of $1,450 in 3 weeks. TASR 2017 3-legged spread is now net $1, up 222% for a gain of $1,800 in 3 weeks. USO April/January 3-legged spread is now net $1.73, up 5,766% for a gain of $3,400 in 3 weeks. They weren’t all winners (can’t be, as we bet against ourselves to hedge our positions) but, as a group, the trades we showed you as a free sample just 23 days ago are now up $9,000, which is 9% of our $100,000 Portfolio. Of course it’s a live portfolio and we’ve added and subtracted positions since then, but our net return of 8.1% roughly reflects the gains we’ve managed to take off the table and now, hopefully, our new round of trades can do just as well in the next 3 weeks (sorry, no more freebies!). Would now be a good time to sell you on looking into our service? But wait – there’s more! In that same free post, I also laid our 3 brand-new trade ideas to prevent your portfolio from losing money in the rough markets we forecast ahead. As I noted above, we haven’t had much of a correction (yet) but, since we used our patented ” Be the House “™ strategy to lay out our trades – we still did pretty good. Buying 10 SQQQ October $22 calls for $4.20 ($4,200) Selling 10 SQQQ October $28 calls for $1.90 ($1,900) As you can see, ProShares UltraPro Short QQQ ETF ( SQQQ) can be extremely volatile and that’s why we were comfortable with such a wide spread (all the logic is laid out in the original post, which was more instructional). Now those October $22/28 bull call spreads are net $2.60 – up just 13% ($130) and still very playable as a hedge. We also suggested paying for the spread by selling the TASR 2017 $20 puts, which are now $3.60 (up $200) and we still like that combination but remember – you are obligating yourself to own 1,000 shares of TASR at $20 (now $23.58) – keep that in mind. Our second big hedge of that day was far more aggressive: Buying 20 TZA Oct $10 calls at $2.20 ($4,400) Selling 20 TZA Oct $13 calls at $1.00 ($2,000) Selling 10 TZA Jan $10 puts for $1.00 ($1,000) (click to enlarge) Another really volatile one but, as you can see, it’s well on track to our $13 goal and already the net on this 3-legged spread is $1.24, up 77% from the net 0.70 start and good for a $1,080 gain. It’s well on the way to a full $4,600 gain, so it’s still good as a new trade – just not as good as it was when we told you about it 3 weeks ago! Our final hedge from that day was our most aggressive as far as commitment. We felt very strongly the S&P would not hold 1,950 and we wanted some nice portfolio protection but, since that’s expensive, we offset the cost by promising to buy more of our Stock of the Year, Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ): Buying 30 SDS March $23 calls at $3 ($9,000) Selling 30 SDS March $28 calls at $2 ($6,000) Selling 5 AAPL 2017 $70 puts for $4.35 ($2,175) (click to enlarge) (click to enlarge) As you can see from the chart, SDS is well short of our goal, but does show the tendency to show dramatic gains on a sell-off. At the moment, the March $23/28 bull call spread is up slightly (+33%) at net $1.33 (+$990) but the short 2017 Apple calls have already dropped to $2.73 for a very nice $810 gain on 5 contracts. That means our net $825 spread is already $1,800 and up 121% ($975) in just 3 weeks. The maximum return on that spread is $15,000, so another $13,200 to go means you didn’t miss much if you are coming in late to the party – it just seems that way, if you didn’t catch the entries we published for our members (and for you) back on September 4th: “As I mentioned, we’ve gotten mainly to cash, but that doesn’t mean we don’t find new opportunities for trades almost every day and that’s all the commercial you’re going to get in this post because I’m sure the performance of the picks we publish speaks for itself and we assume you’re an intelligent man (or woman) and can make your own decision as to whether you want to invest in learning our investing techniques.” “Learning how to use options (and Futures – but that’s another article) to hedge your portfolio gives you BALANCE that can steer you through the roughest market waters – keep that in mind next time your portfolio is heading for the rocks!” Enjoy your weekend, – Phil

Public Utility Commission Decisions Will Determine The Future Of Investor Owned Utilities

Investors in utilities should be considering the impact of alternate energy sources on utilities. One of the best way to measure the impact is by looking at the decisions of the Public Utility Commissions and how they respond to alternate energy sources. We look at California market as one example where the Public Utility Commission decisions should discourage utility investments. When electricity rates go up in a region, consumers in that region are quick to blame the local utilities and cast them as villains. This phenomenon is particularly acute when it comes to Investor Owned Utilities. While the IOUs profit motive gets most of the blame, in many regions of the US, utilities operate under some very specific mandates from local Public Utility Commissions. This dynamic did not matter much to utility investors in the past since utilities were in a monopolistic situation and customers did not have much of a choice when it comes to energy sources. However, times are changing and in this era of distributed energy, utility investors should factor in the mindset of the relevant PUCs in determining which utility investments are vulnerable. The concern about utility future is especially acute in states where solar penetration is increasing rapidly. In these states, a local PUC’s response to solar and wind technologies is one very good way to assess whether a utility can do well in its regulatory landscape. In this context, we look at the regulatory landscape in California – a state with the highest solar penetration in the US outside of Hawaii. California Public Utilities Commission, or CPUC, after much contentious dialogue, announced a much awaited new rate design a few weeks back. While not completely unexpected, the rate decision is reflective of ongoing poor rate setting history in California and has severe long term implications for California’s three major Investor Owned Utilities Pacific Gas & Electric (NYSE: PCG ), Southern California Edison [owned by Edison International] (NYSE: EIX ) , San Diego Gas & Electric [owned by Sempra Energy] (NYSE: SRE ) While the decision itself is a long complex document with many nuances, the highlights of the ruling are as follows: – A minimum bill of $10 as opposed to a fixed bill requested by the utilities – Two tiered rate structure with a 25% cost difference between the tiers – A new super user rate for heavy electric users – A relatively accelerated path to TOU rate structures – 4 year glide path to new tiered rate structures Almost all of these decisions, except for the TOU rate structures, while directionally positive compared to the prior rate structures, fall woefully short of what is required to align California electric rates with the market forces. In evaluating the decision, it is instructive to understand the parameters that the PUC set for itself for this rate design. The so-called rate design principles, RDP, adopted by the Commission are as follows: 1. Low-income and medical baseline customers should have access to enough electricity to ensure basic needs (such as health and comfort) are met at an affordable cost; 2. Rates should be based on marginal cost; 3. Rates should be based on cost-causation principles; 4. Rates should encourage conservation and energy efficiency; 5. Rates should encourage reduction of both coincident and non-coincident peak demand; 6. Rates should be stable and understandable and provide customer choice; 7. Rates should generally avoid cross-subsidies, unless the cross-subsidies appropriately support explicit state policy goals; 8. Incentives should be explicit and transparent; 9. Rates should encourage economically efficient decision-making; 10. Transitions to new rate structures should emphasize customer education and outreach that enhances customer understanding and acceptance of new rates, and minimizes and appropriately considers the bill impacts associated with such transitions. What is most ironic about these rate design principles is that many of these goals are in conflict with each other and there is not a single criteria that mentions the goal as delivering low cost long term electricity to consumers. Understandably, a look at the pricing difference between California IOUs and municipal utilities (image below from energy.ca.gov) indicates that CPUC has largely been a failure in delivering low prices to California consumers. (click to enlarge) The root of the problem related to CPUC’s incoherent principles and an over reliance on cost based metrics, instead of market based metrics, in setting utility directives. This poor process has led to historical over investment in assets to justify a higher return to the IOU shareholders. This worked reasonably well for all involved (except customers) as long as there was no competition to the utilities. However, solar energy, and to a lesser degree, wind energy, are dramatically changing the market place dynamics. With many alternate sources of distributed generation accessible to customers, utilities are no longer the energy generating monopolies they used to be. The CPUC, unfortunately, continues to see consumers as subjects that pay the rates they set without considering that the electric generation landscape has changed and the consumer today has choices. CPUC rate structures hide many different subsidies in the form of volumetric rate structures. These subsidies will be problematic to utilities because they are not applied evenly across all the energy sources and will be increasingly coming at the expense of utilities. By being oblivious or nearly completely ignoring market forces, the CPUC is on the course to making utilities a lot less relevant for a big part of its customer base. Given the exponential growth in solar, this subsidy structure will start exacting an increasingly heavier toll on these utilities. The problem, especially in California, is likely to get worse if the PUC continues with its net metering policies and layers in subsidies for battery technologies on top of the already expensive other subsidies. Unless Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas & Electric can meaningfully alter this regulatory landscape, their future in California will be threatened. Investors will do well to stay away from these and other utilities that operate in an archaic framework that does not properly recognize the threat of solar to the utility business models. We see Pacific Gas & Electric as one of the highest risk utilities. Our view on PCG: Avoid