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Q4 2015 Investment Style Ratings For ETFs And Mutual Funds

Summary Our style ratings are based on the aggregation of our fund ratings for every ETF and mutual fund in each style. The primary driver behind an Attractive fund rating is good portfolio management (stock picking) combined with low total annual costs. Cheap funds can dupe investors and investors should invest only in funds with good stocks and low fees. At the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2015, only the Large Cap Value and Large Cap Blend styles earn an Attractive-or-better rating. Our style ratings are based on the aggregation of our fund ratings for every ETF and mutual fund in each style. See last quarter’s Style Ratings here. Investors looking for style funds that hold quality stocks should look no further than the Large Cap Blend and Large Cap Value styles. Not only do these styles receive our Attractive rating, they also house the most Attractive-or-better rated funds. Figures 4 through 7 provide more details. The primary driver behind an Attractive fund rating is good portfolio management , or good stock picking, with low total annual costs . Attractive-or-better ratings do not always correlate with Attractive-or-better total annual costs. This fact underscores that (1) cheap funds can dupe investors and (2) investors should invest only in funds with good stocks and low fees. See Figures 4 through 13 for a detailed breakdown of ratings distributions by investment style. All of our reports on the best & worst ETFs and mutual funds in every investment style are available here . Figure 1: Ratings For All Investment Styles (click to enlarge) To earn an Attractive-or-better Predictive Rating, an ETF or mutual fund must have high-quality holdings and low costs. Only the top 30% of all ETFs and mutual funds earn our Attractive or better rating. The State Street SPDR Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF (NYSEARCA: DIA ) is the top rated Large Cap Value fund. It gets our Very Attractive rating by allocating over 51% of its value to Attractive-or-better-rated stocks. International Business Machines (NYSE: IBM ) is one of our favorite stocks held by DIA and receives our Attractive rating. Over the last decade, IBM has grown after-tax profit (NOPAT) by 8% compounded annually while doubling NOPAT margins. In addition to strong NOPAT growth, IBM has improved its return on invested capital ( ROIC ) to 12%, from 9% in 2005. Despite the strength in its business, IBM shares remain undervalued. At its current price of $140/share, IBM has a price to economic book value ratio ( PEBV ) of 0.8. This ratio implies that the market expects IBM’s NOPAT to permanently decline by 20%. Even if IBM can only grow NOPAT by 2% compounded annually for the next five years , the stock is worth $211/share today – a 51% upside. The ProFunds Small Cap Fund (MUTF: SLPSX ) is the worst rated Small Cap Blend fund and overall worst-rated style mutual fund. It gets our Very Dangerous rating by allocating 20% of its value to Dangerous-or-worse-rated stocks and 60% held in cash. Making matters worse, it charges investors total annual costs of 5.50%. Why should investors pay such high fees when over half their assets are held in cash? Denny’s Corporation (NASDAQ: DENN ) is one of our least favorite stocks held by Small Cap ETFs and mutual funds and earns our Dangerous rating. Over the last five years, the company’s NOPAT has declined by 7% compounded annually. The company currently earns a 6% ROIC. Despite declining profits, DENN has soared over the past five years and shares are up nearly 250%. This price appreciation has left DENN significantly overvalued. To justify its current price of $11/share, Denny’s must grow NOPAT by 10% compounded annually for the next 15 years . This expectation seems rather optimistic given Denny’s failure to grow profits over the past five years. Figure 2 shows the distribution of our Predictive Ratings for all investment style ETFs and mutual funds. Figure 2: Distribution of ETFs & Mutual Funds (Assets and Count) by Predictive Rating (click to enlarge) Figure 3 offers additional details on the quality of the investment style funds. Note that the average total annual cost of Very Dangerous funds is almost four times that of Very Attractive funds. Figure 3: Predictive Rating Distribution Stats (click to enlarge) * Avg TAC = Weighted Average Total Annual Costs This table shows that only the best of the best funds get our Very Attractive Rating: they must hold good stocks AND have low costs. Investors deserve to have the best of both and we are here to give it to them. Ratings by Investment Style Figure 4 presents a mapping of Very Attractive funds by investment style. The chart shows the number of Very Attractive funds in each investment style and the percentage of assets in each style allocated to funds that are rated Very Attractive. Figure 4: Very Attractive ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Figure 5 presents the data charted in Figure 4 Figure 5: Very Attractive ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Figure 6 presents a mapping of Attractive funds by investment style. The chart shows the number of Attractive funds in each style and the percentage of assets allocated to Attractive-rated funds in each style. Figure 6: Attractive ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Figure 7 presents the data charted in Figure 6. Figure 7: Attractive ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Figure 8 presents a mapping of Neutral funds by investment style. The chart shows the number of Neutral funds in each investment style and the percentage of assets allocated to Neutral-rated funds in each style. Figure 8: Neutral ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Figure 9 presents the data charted in Figure 8. Figure 9: Neutral ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Figure 10 presents a mapping of Dangerous funds by fund style. The chart shows the number of Dangerous funds in each investment style and the percentage of assets allocated to Dangerous-rated funds in each style. The landscape of style ETFs and mutual funds is littered with Dangerous funds. Investors in Small Cap Blend funds have put over 57% of their assets in Dangerous-rated funds. Figure 10: Dangerous ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Figure 11 presents the data charted in Figure 10. Figure 11: Dangerous ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Figure 12 presents a mapping of Very Dangerous funds by fund style. The chart shows the number of Very Dangerous funds in each investment style and the percentage of assets in each style allocated to funds that are rated Very Dangerous. Figure 12: Very Dangerous ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Figure 13 presents the data charted in Figure 12. Figure 13: Very Dangerous ETFs & Mutual Funds by Investment Style (click to enlarge) Source Figures 1-13: New Constructs, LLC and company filings D isclosure: David Trainer and Thaxston McKee receive no compensation to write about any specific stock, sector or theme.

Should Apple Investors Time The Market?

Summary You’re not always dumber, or unluckier, than every other investor. Neither am I nor any other group, manager, or fund. The irregularity of market prices makes it a near certainty that we all get fooled from time to time. Remember, someone else is on the opposite side of each trade. Odds of making profitable investments, along with their rate of gains, net of losses, is what counts. One target is above market averages. Another is above your goals; that’s success. Look at Apple as an example, over the past 5 years. Can it be timed? Does it need to be? Only your goals may answer that question. Let’s be real careful about measuring results. That means preventing the cherry-picking of favorable time periods to start and end with. If we look at every day as a start, and every day as an end, that problem is largely resolved. Largely, but not entirely. The holding-period that may be involved needs to be considered, as well. And the measurement units and manner of calculation matter. When it comes to combining gains and losses in one or more holding periods, you probably are aware (hopefully not from direct experience) that a 50% gain after a 50% loss does not return an investment to its starting point. That is why geometric mean averaging must be used to resolve the computational problem properly, rather than simple arithmetic summation and averaging. The holding period problem is resolved by calculating Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGR). What the CAGR does is to find the average growth in each unit of the holding period, and then restate those holding period “grains” into a standard 1-year whole “loaf” of performance. Because each unit grain is represented by 1+the unit’s change, those pieces can be properly reassembled into a geometric mean. The CAGR of a 3-year, 4-month, and 5-day holding period (for example) measured by its beginning and ending points, will produce the same result as a series of those 3 years, 4 months, and 5 days of single day changes geometrically compounded day by day. Then when each are annualized by taking the 1/(number of days) root of that compounding, and raising it to its 365th power, minus 1, they will show the same CAGR. So if we took the CAGRs of 13-week periods (just for example) starting daily for 9 months, we should have a near-perfect measure of the annual rate of change for the data being examined during that year. Our Example of Apple We have a computer program tool that does exactly that kind of measuring. It was written originally over 40 years ago, back when the same kinds of measurements of stock performance were also needed. Figure 1 shows the result of it being applied to the last 5 years of stock price data for Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ). Figure 1 (click to enlarge) It uses the daily closing prices of AAPL from 11/3/10 to 11/4/15, all 1261 of them to perform CAGR price-change measurements in progressively longer holding periods of from one week (5 market days) to 16 weeks of 80 market days, indicated by the yellow column footers. The average CAGRs during the whole 5 years are shown in the blue row marked at left by the RWD:RSK cryptic ratio title of 1 : 1. It contains all 1256 starting days possible to compute the 5-day holding periods averaged in the first data column, of 22 (%). Each column in that row contains 5 fewer days of CAGRs of 5-day longer holding periods than the column to its left, out to 1176 (count not shown) examples of 80-day long periods. It is a fair conclusion to reach that AAPL stock’s average annual rate of growth during the past 5 years has been 21% ~ 22%. Our last bullet-point question in the introduction to this article above may have its answer in this blue row of Figure 1 data. If the investor’s personal objective of investing in AAPL is to outperform the market, timing the purchase and sale of AAPL stock seems not to be necessary. On the other hand, if the investor’s goal is to compete successfully with the most productive equity investment managers, a 22% rate of gain might be inadequate. If so, the other question of “Can AAPL be timed?” may be worth exploring. What evidence exists of successful AAPL timing? That evidence exists in the upper rows of Figure 1. They contain the CAGRs of those days following forecasts that are implied by the hedging actions of the market-making (“MM”) community. Actions as they sought to protect their own firm capital that was necessary to be put at risk temporarily while helping big-dollar fund-clients adjust their portfolio holdings of AAPL. Those implied forecasts contained price ranges believed possible to be encountered during the time following the volume (block) trade that necessitated each capital risk exposure and its protection. A time necessary (up to a few months) to unwind the derivatives contracts involved in providing the hedge protections. The MM beliefs producing the price ranges of the forecasts are the products of well-informed depth research of publicly-known fundamental economic, competitive, and political surroundings, plus possible advantages of personal and professional contacts among industry and corporate sources. Plus appraisals of current market influences from other interested investors seen by “order flow” among the community of market-making professionals. The price range forecasts, split by the market quote at the time of the trade, provide an upside-to-downside price change potential balance of reward-to-risk proportions. That changes from day to day. The extent of its imbalance is indicated in the upper row RWD:RSK captions and the frequency of its presence, (or more extreme) is shown in the column headed #BUYS. Pure logic suggests that there should be no days where buyers might be found during periods where knowledgeable appraisals indicated larger downsides than upsides. But it does exist, perhaps due to less well-reasoned appraisals among the public than among the market pros. But during this 5-year period that has not happened. Instead, there have been 47 days that prompted professional analysis suggesting practically no downside price change prospect for a buyer of AAPL. Those 47 days were followed by periods of up to 80 days in which the subsequent price of AAPL stock rose at rates of as much as CAGRs of 70%. Another 18 days joined that 47 where AAPL price drawdowns from the forecast-day quotes were seen to be a trivial 1/50th as large as the upside prospect. Combined, those 65 days averaged CAGRs of as much as 60% or more. Should timing be tried? Now, is this enough of an incentive to attempt the timing of AAPL purchases? The excess returns above the blue-row average are +40% to +50% rates above the usual AAPL gains. And they have occurred in about 5% of the days – one out of every 20. With 21 market days a month, that’s almost one a month. But these are overall averages among the 65 days. How good are the odds of hitting a winner? Are there just a few big payoffs involved here? Figure 2 shows what percentage of the 65 produced gains. Figure 2 (click to enlarge) Say, not bad! With 7 out of every 8 instances a winner, that looks a lot better than the blue-row average of 2 out of 3. But how bad might that 8th experience be. Could it kill four of the others? Figure 3 addresses that question. Figure 3 (click to enlarge) Whoa! Lose nearly a quarter of my money? No way, Way. Easy does it. This table show the single worst case price drawdown – at any point in the holding period. Figure 2 tells what proportion of all the exposures have recovered from the drawdowns during their periods after the forecast, and those that have not may have recovered some, so their positions at this time of measurement may be a lot better than the worst possible. But you would have to struggle past that -24% worst case, if it recurred during your adventure, and simply being aware that it could happen, even once, no matter when, if that is scare enough, then the answer is no, you shouldn’t try to time AAPL buys. Still, be aware that drawdown (or worse, -30%) could have happened any time an AAPL buy might have been held as long as 65 market days (13 weeks, or 3 months). And you would have had to live through that. Maybe you did, like a lot of folks. At least 2/3rds of them, maybe 7 out of 10, are back in the win column. There’s a reason that AAPL is the biggest market cap in the game. Conclusion With good guidance many stocks can be effectively timed, in comparison with simply buying and holding them. Even good growers like AAPL. In fact few stocks have 5-year records of over +20% CAGRs. Those with slow growth, high dividend yields (4-6%) often have price ranges each year that are in the 50% to 100% low to high experience. One adequately-timed purchase and subsequent sale often can result in a year’s payoff that is double or even triple what the buy & hold year would produce. But it requires a mind-set that can accommodate the awareness and presence of temporary price risks. That is more than many investors can stand, and they are limited to single-to-low-double-digit returns from their investments. With adequate capital resources, that may be all they need, and so they are fortunate. The failure of market averages to show much of any growth over the past 15 years suggests that there are many passive market index investors not so fortunate, losing all that time, with little to show for it.

Market Lab Report – Premarket Pulse 11/6/15

Major averages fell yesterday on lower volume ahead of today’s jobs data. Unemployment came in at 5%, below the 5.1% estimate, the lowest level since April 2008. 271,000 jobs were created in October, well ahead of the 180,000 estimate. Hourly wages rose at the fastest pace since the US recession ended in mid-2009. With the blowout jobs data in place, CME FedWatch now shows the probability of a rate hike in December at 74%. This, however, could create issues as we discussed in our Thursday Oct 29 MLR. The European Central Bank remains firmly pledged to keeping their easy money policies in place, thus no rate hikes are expected from the ECB anytime soon. Further, the Bank of England yesterday said that due to the lack of sufficient global growth as well as anemic growth in the UK, it has no intention to raise interest rates. This flies in the face of analysts and economists who were expecting the BOE to be more hawkish in terms of future rate hikes. U.S. futures fell on the news and are currently down around -0.4% at the time of this writing. Concerns remain that a rate hike may be too soon, and may well stir issues. Social networking site Facebook (FB) had a buyable gap up after a strong earnings report. Pretax margin 57.1%, earnings and sales are re-accelerating, group rank 2. FB is a supercap which attract institutional money in this environment as witnessed by the NASDAQ-100 being the first major index to hit new highs. Website hosting leader GoDaddy (GDDY) had a buyable gap up after a strong earnings report.