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Asset Class Weekly: Preferred Stock Collateral Damage

Summary The preferred stock market has come to be seen by many investors as a refuge in post financial crisis markets. But for those allocated to the preferred stock space, now is not the time for complacency. Preferred stocks have not been without their own past periods of extreme downside volatility. And the asset class resides worryingly close to the current wildfires now blazing in the high-yield bond market. The preferred stock market has come to be seen by many investors as a refuge in post financial crisis markets. Price performance has been notably consistent and income has been relatively generous at a time when those living on fixed incomes are starving for yield. And unlike other high-yielding markets such as high-yield bonds (NYSEARCA: HYG ) and master limited partnerships (NYSEARCA: MLPI ), it has not fallen victim in recent years to sudden bouts of unsettling downside volatility. But, for those allocated to the preferred stock space, now is not the time for complacency. Preferred stocks have not been without their own past periods of extreme downside volatility. And the asset class resides worryingly close to the current wildfires now blazing in the high-yield bond market. Preferred Stocks: A Lot To Like Up until recently, I had been meaningfully allocated to preferred stocks for some time. The reasoning for this maximum strategy allocation to the asset class was driven by the fact that there is a lot to like about the preferred stock space. First, preferred stocks were a more fairly valued option in an otherwise richly-valued high-income universe. Preferred stock yield spreads relative to U.S. Treasuries have been fairly consistent throughout the post-crisis period. According to the iShares S&P Preferred Stock Index (NYSEARCA: PFF ) relative to a benchmark 10-year Treasury yield, the current spread is at 3.7%, which is in the middle of the post-crisis range and well above the levels seen prior to the financial crisis in 2007 when this spread had dipped below 2%. (click to enlarge) And on an absolute basis, yields have remained relatively attractive at above 6% after cresting as high as 7% in late 2014. And this absolute yield is consistent with what we have seen from the category over the past decade. (click to enlarge) Adding further to the appeal of the preferred stock asset class has been the relative quality advantage enjoyed by preferred stocks relative to other higher-yielding alternatives. For although owning preferred stocks in their various structures rank lower on the capital structure than the offerings in the high-yield bond space, investors are standing on the rungs of higher-quality companies that boast credit ratings that are “A” or better in many cases. Moreover, a vast majority of the preferred stock universe at more than 80% is made up of companies in the financial sector. While this dedicated sector exposure proved highly problematic during the financial crisis (more on this point later), in the current environment, it actually represents an advantage. For example, more than half of the preferred stock universe is made up of issuance from the systemically important financial institutions such as Bank of America (NYSE: BAC ), Wells Fargo (NYSE: WFC ), U.S. Bancorp (NYSE: USB ), JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM ) and Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS ) among others. And the one thing that has been relentlessly demonstrated by monetary policymakers during the post-crisis period is that the health of these institutions will be guarded and protected by policymakers at all costs no matter what new operational missteps are made in the future. So, for all of these reasons, the preferred stock space has been an ideal destination for capital during the post crisis period. And the consistently strong price performance from the asset class has been rewarding in recent years. (click to enlarge) But market conditions have been changing in 2015. And the risks are now rising for what has been a placid destination in recent years. A History Not Without Trauma While the last few years have been a blissful period for preferred stock investors, this has not always been the case. The asset class has endured its own periods of extreme trauma throughout history. (click to enlarge) For example, during the financial crisis, while the stock market as measured by the S&P 500 Index (NYSEARCA: SPY ) fell by more than -50% from peak to trough, the preferred stock universe performed measurably worse in falling by nearly -65% over the duration of the crisis. Of course, much of this downside was driven by the heavy weighting to financials in the asset class. And while this characteristic may imply a degree of downside protection today, if we do find ourselves in the midst of another global financial accident, the category would likely suffer disproportionately once again under such a scenario. The Threat Of Collateral Damage Today The larger risk facing the preferred stock universe today is the threat of collateral damage spilling over from the high-yield bond space. Why exactly would challenges in the lower credit quality segment of the high-yield bond space impact investment-grade-rated preferred stocks largely concentrated in financials? Because many of the money managers that operate in the high-yield bond space are also the same investors actively involved in owning other high-yielding investments such as senior bank loans (NYSEARCA: BKLN ), convertible bonds (NYSEARCA: CWB ) and preferred stocks. Why would this matter? Because, if you are a money manager that is in a cash crunch and the high-yield bonds that you own have turned illiquid, you will likely turn to sell the other higher-quality assets that are still liquid in order to raise cash. This is where the contagion effects of illiquidity in a certain segment of financial markets starts to spread. For just like the high-yield bond space, the preferred stock universe is not the most liquid category in financial markets despite the fact that these securities trade on an exchange. While some of the larger preferred stocks trade with reasonable volume under normal market conditions, it is nothing like what is seen in the common stock market, as bid-ask spreads are often wide on any given trading day. And a fair number of preferred stocks trade with volumes in the thousands to hundreds on any given day with some periodically going untraded on any given day. As a result, if liquidation pressures were to spill over into the preferred stock market in earnest, we could quickly see staggeringly dramatic intraday price movements that can extend for days, weeks or even months depending on the degree of market stress. For the nimble investor, such dramatic dislocations can present incredibly good buying opportunities to snatch up high-quality preferred securities at dramatic discounts that eventually provide robust capital gains with attractive yields paid along the way. But, for many retirees that are not interested in trading the wild swings of the preferred stock market but instead simply want to clip their coupons and sleep well at night, such wild price deviations can prove devastatingly traumatic, particularly if they are unaware that they may occur at any given point in time and be accompanied by the periodic dividend suspension and/or bankruptcy like those experienced by Lehman Brothers’ preferred stock investors back in 2008. Where Do We Stand Today? To date, the preferred stock universe as a whole continues to hold up fairly well. The asset class as measured by the iShares S&P Preferred Stock Index reached a dividend adjusted all-time high as recently as the end of November. And while the high-0yield bond market has fallen precipitously since the start of December with a more than -6% decline, the preferred stock market is lower by only a fraction at just over -2%. In short, all remains reasonably well. But not entirely so, as several cracks warrant attention. First, preferred stocks started the week on a troubling note. Preferred stocks opened lower and faded throughout the trading day, effectively ending on their lows. This stood in sharp contrast to high-yield bonds that found their footing around 11:30AM today and traded sideways for the remainder of the day. Monday was only one trading day, but investors are well served to monitor this recent development for any continuation to the downside, as this would suggest that the problem in high yield is starting to spread. (click to enlarge) Second, standing back and taking a broader view on preferred stocks, not only is the category now precariously perched on its ultra long-term 400-day moving average, but also as evidenced by its price chart dating back to the summer, it is prone to flash crash pressures like experienced on the wild trading day of August 24. (click to enlarge) Lastly, while the preferred stock universe in general continues to hold up, specific segments of the space are breaking down. During the financial crisis, it was financial preferreds that were obliterated while non-financial preferreds (NYSEARCA: PFXF ) largely held their own. This time around, non-financial preferred stocks from industries such as telecommunications, agriculture, healthcare services, oil & gas, mining and pipelines have deviated from the path of the broader preferred stock universe and have instead latched on to the high-yield bond path lower. (click to enlarge) Thus, while the preferred stock market continues to hold up, it is warranting increasingly close attention going forward, as risk levels are rising both around and within the asset class. Recommendations Much like the high-yield bond and master limited partnership investors that have now gone before, preferred stock investors would be well served to have a heightened level of risk awareness going forward. It may very well be that preferred stocks emerge unscathed from this latest episode of capital market stress. Then again, they may eventually fall victim to the spillover effects that are now dogging related asset classes. Does any of this suggest that the asset class will suddenly head straight to the downside tomorrow? Not at all, for it may take a fair amount of time before the preferred stocks succumb to any downside pressure if at all. And even if the category begins to buckle, it is likely to do so with fits and starts over a more extended period of time. But the fact remains that risk environment surrounding preferred stocks has been elevated from where it has been over the last several years. If nothing else, a heightened degree of price volatility should be expected going forward. Disclosure : This article is for information purposes only. There are risks involved with investing including loss of principal. Gerring Capital Partners makes no explicit or implicit guarantee with respect to performance or the outcome of any investment or projections made. There is no guarantee that the goals of the strategies discussed by Gerring Capital Partners will be met.

Long/Short Equity Funds: The Best And Worst Of November

After posting losses in September and gains in October, Morningstar’s long/short equity mutual fund category was flat for the month of November – but this doesn’t mean there weren’t standout funds. Indeed, one of the worst performers from October was able to bounce back into the top three for November. In this review of the category, we look not only at the one-month returns of the month’s best and worst funds, but also the composition of their three-year returns in terms of alpha and beta, as well as their three-year Sharpe ratios and standard deviations. A quick refresher: Beta refers to the risk level of a security relative to the market. A beta of 1.0 implies the same risk level as the market, while a beta of more than 1.0 means the security (or fund in this case) is riskier than the market. A beta of less than 1.0 implies a risk less than the market. Alpha is the amount of performance in excess of a security’s beta adjusted benchmark. Sharpe ratio is a measure of return (above the risk free rate) per unit of risk – the higher, the better. (click to enlarge) Top Performers in November The three best-performing long/short equity mutual funds in November were: For the second straight month, a Catalyst fund topped the list. But while October saw the Catalyst Hedged Insider Buying Fund (MUTF: STVIX ) lead all long/short equity mutual funds, in November it was the Catalyst Insider Long/Short Fund that led the pack at +7.21%. For the first eleven months of the year, CIAAX returned an even 2%, and its three-year return through November 30 stood at an annualized 4.42%. The fund had a negative alpha (-0.60) for the three-year period, with a three-year beta of 0.39, and a Sharpe ratio of 0.35. The Burnham Financial Long/Short Fund was November’s second-best-performing long/short equity mutual fund, with returns of +5.53%. While its gains lagged those of the Catalyst Insider fund, BURFX’s longer-term numbers are much more appealing: Its three-year return of 20.31%, and alpha of 11.98%, was accomplished with a relatively low level of volatility (9.17% standard deviation) and a beta of just less than half the market (0.45). The fund’s three-year Sharpe ratio of 2.07 is outstanding. Finally, the Turner Medical Sciences Long/Short Fund was the third-best long/short equity mutual fund to own in November, boasting returns of +5.36%. This was a turnaround for the Turner fund, which was the third-worst performer in October, with losses of 4.99%. Over the past three years, TMSCX has returned an annualized 14.61% with a beta of just 0.19. This has resulted in the fund’s alpha of 11.94% ranking just 4 basis points less than the Burnham fund above, despite a much lower 3-year annualized return. However, with it’s higher standard deviation over the period, the fund’s Sharpe ratio stood came it 0.93 for the three-year period, a bit less than half the Burnham fund’s Sharpe ratio. (click to enlarge) Worst Performers in November The three worst-performing long/short equity mutual funds in November were: The Philadelphia Investment Partners New Generation Fund, the month’s worst performer, lost more than the month’s top-performer gained, with a one-month return of -7.55%. Its dismal three-year returns of -5.45% can be broken down into a 0.80 beta and -17.54 alpha, resulting in a Sharpe ratio of -0.49 for the three years ending November 30. The Clinton Long Short Equity Fund hasn’t been around long enough to have three-year return data, but its one-month losses of 4.84% in November made it the second-worst long/short equity mutual fund to own that month. For the first eleven months of 2015, WKCIX lost 13.49% of its value. The Whitebox Tactical Opportunities Fund ( WBMIX ) was November’s third-worst long/short equity fund, with returns of -3.58%. For the first eleven months of 2015, WBMIX generated losses of 19.50%, and its three-year returns of -3.17% through November 30. The fund has a low 3-year beta of 0.13 and a -4.90 alpha. The fund’s three-year Sharpe ratio stood at -0.33 as of November 30. (click to enlarge) October’s Best and Worst: Follow-Up The Catalyst Hedged Insider Buying ( STVIX ), Tealeaf Long/Short Deep Value (MUTF: LEFIX ), and Giralda Manager (MUTF: GDAMX ) funds were October’s top three long/short equity mutual funds, with respective one-month returns of 10.71%, 9.05%, and 8.73%. In November, STVIX returned a category-matching 0.00%, while LEFIX and GDAMX posted respective one-month returns of 3.02% and 0.15%. October’s worst performers were the CMG Tactical Futures Strategy Fund (MUTF: SCOIX ) and the Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund (MUTF: HHCAX ), which lost 6.74% and 5.54%. In November, those funds continued their losing ways with returns of -2.02% and -1.55%, respectively. Past Performance does not necessarily predict future results.

The Dynamics Of Liquidity And Investing

I’ve been getting questions recently about liquidity , specifically in the context of exchange traded funds ( ETFs ). Liquidity is a hot topic in financial markets these days, so let’s spend a little time going over it. First, we’ll explore what we mean by “liquidity” and then we’ll explain what it means when it comes to ETFs. Defining liquidity When I think about liquidity, I think about a transaction: I am able to buy or sell something at a known price. The more liquid an investment, the easier it is to buy and sell without affecting the asset’s price. More fully, liquidity has three main components: price, time and size. If an asset is liquid, I can trade it quickly, and I can trade a large amount of it, without moving its price. In reality, most investments involve trade-offs between these three components. Want to trade quickly? You may not be able to trade a large amount, or you may impact the price you are going to receive. Want to trade a large amount? Do it slowly, or be prepared to impact prices. A general rule of thumb for liquidity for most investments is that you can get two of the three attributes, but not all three at once. If we consider liquid assets, a large cap stock is a good example. Unless you are trading a significant number of shares, you can generally trade fairly quickly at a price that is close to what you see on the exchange. A home, on the other hand, is relatively illiquid; you can get an estimate on its price, but until a buyer signs on the dotted line and you have a check in hand, it’s unclear what you’ll actually get when selling your home. And it will generally take you a while to sell your home, no matter what its size. Liquidity and ETFs When it comes to a security like an ETF, I can see that it’s trading at a certain price, and I can generally buy or sell that ETF at a price that’s pretty close to the quoted price. I can generally trade fairly quickly, as long as my trade is not large compared to the security’s volume. A large ETF trade is in some ways similar to a large equity trade; I need to trade over time or risk impacting the price. Let’s take it a step further and look at bond ETFs. If you want to go out and buy a bond, you can’t just buy it on the open market via an exchange. Instead you would buy it over the counter, in a negotiated transaction with a broker. The price you would trade at is often unclear, and it can be difficult to trade a large amount, or trade quickly. In fact, some investors may find that individual bonds don’t have any of the three aforementioned features of liquidity. With a bond ETF, which is a basket of bonds traded on an exchange, you have much more price transparency. You can actually see the price at which a bond ETF is trading and have a sense of the price of a trade and how many shares might be available to trade at that price. As the bond ETF trades on an exchange, you can generally trade it with the same speed as an individual stock. The liquidity rule of thumb still applies to bond ETFs; it can be difficult to trade in large size, quickly and without impacting price, but overall, exchange trading liquidity can be greater than liquidity in underlying markets . And that is an improvement that all investors can benefit from. This post originally appeared on the BlackRock Blog.