Tag Archives: management

BIV: Excellent Diversification In A Single Bond ETF

Summary BIV offers investors exposure to both corporate bonds ranging from triple A to Baa and U.S. government debt. The inclusion of lower credit rating debts is allowing the ETF to offer more respectable yields. If investors wanted to get a large portion of their domestic bond exposure through a single ETF, BIV would be an extremely strong contender. I still prefer BIV in the context of a diversified portfolio, but it can eliminate the need for some other bond holdings. The Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index ETF (NYSEARCA: BIV ) is a very interesting bond fund. As I’ve been searching for appealing bond funds, I’ve found some of my favorites are from Vanguard. Given my distaste for high expense ratios, it should be no surprise that the Vanguard products would be appealing. Quick Introduction The Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index ETF is showing a yield to maturity of 2.7% and an average duration of 6.5 years. The yields are not high, but the duration is also not very long. All around, so far this seems fairly reasonable. If an investor wanted to use a single ETF for a large portion of their bond portfolio, this would be an option that could get it done without generating excessive amounts of risk. Credit Quality The following chart breaks down the credit quality of the issues being held in the portfolio. The lowest ratings are Baa, which is high enough that I’m not very concerned about the credit risk. However, the use of the lower rated credit securities is critical to allowing the ETF to establish a yield that is not horrible. This is a case of a fairly diversified portfolio in terms of credit ratings and it provides investors with an option for grabbing most of their domestic bond exposure within a single holding. Maturities I grabbed another chart to show the effective maturity on the securities: The maturity profile for the Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index ETF shows that an investor looking for domestic bond exposure would be wise to focus on surrounding the ETF with very short durations or longer durations. The portfolio has great diversification across credit ratings but the maturities are heavily focused. A Hypothetical Portfolio I put together a very simple sample portfolio using Invest Spy. Due to some of the ETFs being newer the sample period is limited to a little over two years. (click to enlarge) This hypothetical portfolio is weighted to 60% equity and 40% bonds. To break that down the weights from the equity section are 30% total market index (NYSEARCA: VTI ), 10% equity REITs (NYSEARCA: VNQ ), 5% Utilities, 5% Consumer Staples (NYSEARCA: VDC ), 10% International Equity. The bond section is holding 10% in junk bonds (NYSEARCA: JNK ), 5% in extended duration treasuries (NYSEARCA: EDV ), 5% in emerging market government bonds (NASDAQ: VWOB ), 5% short term corporate debt (NASDAQ: VCSH ), 5% in short term government debt (NASDAQ: VGSH ), 5% in mortgage backed securities (NASDAQ: VMBS ), and 5% in intermediate-term corporate bonds . This portfolio won’t be perfect for hitting the efficient frontier, but it should beat the vast majority of real portfolios investors are using on a risk adjusted basis. If long term rates were higher I would have used a higher weighting for long duration bonds due to their exceptionally correlation to major equity classes. My disclosure already states it, but I’ll reiterate that I am long VTI and VNQ. Annualized Volatility When measuring risk adjusted returns for a portfolio the most efficient method is usually to use the Sharpe ratio. For that ratio we are taking the total return annualized return and subtracting the risk free rate. Then we divide the resulting number by the annualized volatility. The problem is that this metric is only really known after the fact. Predicting the level of returns in advance is problematic but correlations and relative volatility are more reliable over time than returns. Within the chart investors can see the annualized volatility of each holding as well as the resulting annualized volatility for the portfolio. While some holdings have higher annualized volatility scores, such as EDV, the ETF makes up for that by having negative correlation to a few of the equity holdings. As a result, the ETF only contributes .6% of the total risk in the portfolio. An Alternative Composition BIV is showing more annual volatility than VMBS, VGSH, and VCSH but it is also offering stronger yields. If an investor wanted to simplify the portfolio, they could raise the exposure to BIV and drop the exposures outside of EDV and VWOB. I prepared a second chart that demonstrates the same portfolio with BIV elevated to 20% of the portfolio and VMBS, VGSH, and VCSH eliminated. This portfolio would have significantly less short term exposure and no exposure to Mortgage-Backed Securities. (click to enlarge) This second portfolio is showing precisely what investors should expect. The annualized volatility increased slightly from 7.0% to 7.1%, but the total return over the period (about 26 months) increased from 19.8% to 20.1%. This bond allocation that relies more heavily on BIV is slightly more aggressive but it is also simpler to put in place. Correlation I want to dive a little deeper into the correlation statistics. The table below provides the correlation across each of those ETFs which should make it very quick to see which ones are work very well together. When a correlation is shown in the tan color it indicates a negative correlation which is very attractive for reaching the efficient frontier. You’ll notice that quite a few of the bond funds have negative correlations to VTI and the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ). Since VTI and SPY have a correlation ranging between 99% and 99.9% depending on the measurement period, it should not be surprising that those two funds have very similar correlations to other holdings. Here is the correlation table: (click to enlarge) BIV has a negative correlation to the market in general as demonstrated by the -.15 correlation to both VTI and SPY and virtually no correlation to foreign markets or consumer staples. On the other hand, it does show correlations to VNQ (which is REITs) and VPU (which is utilities) because those investments are both considered income investments. Conclusion BIV is one of the best options available for an investor that wants to reduce the number of tickers they need to follow. If an investor uses it to eliminate other short term bond funds they may see a slight increase in portfolio volatility as well as a slight increase in the expected returns on the portfolio. There are few bond funds that I think work well as such a large portion of the bond holdings within a portfolio, but BIV does it quite well. Since the holdings are limited to intermediate term domestic securities, it is still reasonable to maintain a small longer term allocation and an international allocation. Disclosure: I am/we are long VTI, VNQ. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: Information in this article represents the opinion of the analyst. All statements are represented as opinions, rather than facts, and should not be construed as advice to buy or sell a security. Ratings of “outperform” and “underperform” reflect the analyst’s estimation of a divergence between the market value for a security and the price that would be appropriate given the potential for risks and returns relative to other securities. The analyst does not know your particular objectives for returns or constraints upon investing. All investors are encouraged to do their own research before making any investment decision. Information is regularly obtained from Yahoo Finance, Google Finance, and SEC Database. If Yahoo, Google, or the SEC database contained faulty or old information it could be incorporated into my analysis.

Is The SKEW Index Predictive For The S&P 500?

Summary It is difficult to understand exactly what the CBOE Skew Index means, and even more difficult to find a use for it. This has not prevented some commentators from using it as an indicator for the S&P 500, usually in conjunction with the better-known VIX Index. I find no reason to believe that the SKEW Index serves as a useful indicator, and not much logic for thinking that it would. SKEW is useful only to a rather restricted group of professional hedge traders, such as swaps dealers, and can safely be ignored by the rest of us. Given its inexhaustible creativity, it was only a matter of time before the CBOE created an indicator that challenges investors to find a use for it. Meet the SKEW Index ($SKEW:IND). Yet as obscure and difficult to interpret as this index is, there are some who believe it is an indicator for the S&P 500. This article disputes that contention. What is it? The CBOE Skew Index, unveiled in 2011, provides an index of traders’ vertical skew expectations, based on analysis of the volatility smile of deeply-out-of-the-money S&P 500 index options. All of which is jargon, except to option aficionados. But SKEW is just another way of measuring the extent to which investors expect the distribution of security returns to be non-normal. That is, it indicates the degree to which the median return is expected to differ from the mean, and the extent to which the distribution will include more and/or more extreme outliers. On the downside, the latter are known as “black swans” ─ a term I dislike, since it confuses empirical uncertainty with probability (the probability that black swans existed when probability theory was being developed was 100%; uncertainty based on Eurocentric data is a completely separate matter). In option terms, the non-normality of returns means that the assumptions about future volatility embedded in option prices are not symmetrical with respect to strike prices, so that the put and the call at the same strike price do not have the same implied volatility. Thus ─ since most (but by no means all) equity returns are negatively skewed ─ buyers of puts generally assume (and pay for) higher volatility than call buyers. If puts and calls at a given out-of-the-money strike have the same implied volatility, their graphic representation forms a “smile” that indicates that traders assume a normal distribution of returns from the underlying. In most cases, there is a difference between the implied volatility of puts and calls, and the “smile” is more like a smirk: The smirk tells us that option traders do not expect the returns on the underlying to be normally distributed, and in the case shown above, that the outliers will tend to be on the downside. How Has it Behaved? Since the beginning of 2010, the index has developed like this: It requires some explanation. A reading of 100 indicates an expected normal distribution of S&P 500 returns. The higher the reading, the more skewed to the right of the mean traders expect returns to be ─ and the more likely and/or more severe the negative outliers will be. A reading of 100 indicates that the expected probability of a ≥3σ negative outlier is 0.15% (roughly the likelihood of being dealt a full house in five card straight poker with no wild cards), while a reading of 145 indicates a 2.81% expected probability (a bit better than the chance of rolling a double six on a single throw of dice). The trend is disturbing ─ it suggests that traders expect an increasing number of negative outliers, or more damaging ones. It may be that they do, but I suspect that a better explanation is that, since the crash, there has been increased investor interest in “tail insurance,” demand for which is likely to have pushed the index upward. Thus, I believe that the trend does not represent investors’ response to a specific forecast of disaster, but a more widespread realization of the availability and perhaps advisability of insurance. This does not just represent the hedging activity of hedge funds and sophisticated institutions: any product that offers a downside floor, such as the structured notes popular with private bank clients, is hedged in the options market by its issuer. Not surprisingly, such products have become increasingly popular since the crash. What Does It Mean? This is the $64,000 question, because it is not at all clear what the extent to which a tail event might mean, since a tail event, by definition, is something unexpected. ‘Implied volatility’ is a portmanteau term, carrying the freight not contained in the other variables of the Black-Scholes model, all of which are much more precisely defined. It is in effect the bucket into which everything that determines the price of an option ─ other than those narrowly defined variables ─ is placed, including the price markup that options writers demand. This markup varies with market conditions. Put writers may demand higher prices based solely on their perception that they can get them, without reference to volatility forecasts, and purchasers may accommodate them because they are forced by their circumstances (for instance, as issuers of structured products) to hedge, regardless of whether they think the insurance is well priced. To suggest that every change in the volatility smile implies a change in risk perceptions is nonsense. This raises relatively few issues for interpreting the meaning of the VIX Index, because supply and demand for options is significantly determined by perceptions of the identifiable, near-term and “ordinary” risks that the VIX Index measures. But skew is a different matter: there would be no tail events if they were widely anticipated, and even the most extreme possible reading of SKEW implies only a 3% implied probability of one. While changes in demand for out-of-the-money puts is certainly related to fear of tail events, I believe that it is implausible to argue that it can be predictive of them. Much demand for deeply-out-of-the-money puts is inherently “lumpy,” as a new product is launched or a seasoned product’s hedge must be rolled. How Does SKEW Differ from the VIX? The relationship between SKEW and the VIX is an obvious question. The difference was quite significant in the period illustrated here: the linear regression on the VIX trended downward, so they had mildly negative correlation at -0.20, and the VIX was more volatile (σ = 8.0% vs. 2.5%): Over this 6½ year period, the S&P 500’s correlation with the VIX was -0.77, and 0.22 with SKEW, but over shorter periods correlation varied ─ not so dramatically for the VIX, which has a pretty stable correlation with the S&P 500 over time, but very considerably for SKEW: The low correlation between SKEW and the S&P 500, and especially the very substantial variability of the relationship (peak 0.63 and trough -0.17 around the 0.22 average) support my contention that SKEW has little predictive power for the S&P. This should not be so terribly surprising, since the skewness of S&P 500 returns is itself far from stable over time. Comparing this chart with the charts above suggests that SKEW is not even an especially strong indicator for S&P 500 skewness: Note that this chart uses a longer rolling time period. The 90-day results were so volatile as to be virtually unreadable ─ even using 260 data points, the standard error of skewness is 14.9%. The calculation of standard error of skewness is so generous to uncertainty that it constitutes yet another reason to be doubtful of the predictive value of the CBOE Skew Index. There are some other differences between SKEW and the VIX that have attracted comment ─ in particular, when the former spikes, it tends to do so in isolated, one-day spurts, and promptly returns to its earlier level, while the VIX tends to sustain elevated or depressed levels over the course of a week or two. Thus, when SKEW dropped 16 points on October 15 last year, it snapped back completely the next day. In contrast, the VIX spiked upward on the 9th, and did not recover its earlier level until the 23rd. This has been interpreted as the difference between expectation of elevated but still “normal” volatility (

VAW Is A Great Idea, But The Portfolio Is Not Optimized For The Lowest Risk In The Sector

Summary VAW has a great expense ratio that makes it seem appealing at first glance. When I get into the holdings, I have to question their use of FCX rather than combining RIO or BHP with XOM to replicate mining and oil. With a weak dividend yield, high volatility, and high correlation to the S&P 500, I don’t see a long term holding. The ETF may be a solid option for making short term bets on the direction of the sector. The Vanguard Materials ETF (NYSEARCA: VAW ) offers investors a concentrated sector exposure. The holdings are fairly concentrated within the portfolio, but it is a Vanguard fund with a .12% expense ratio which makes it worthy of consideration Does VAW provide diversification benefits to a portfolio? Diversification benefits are primarily a factor of correlations and variance of returns. Looking back to January 2004 the correlation between VAW and the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF ( SPY) was 88% and the volatility for VAW was substantially higher at 25.4% compared to 19.4%. Due to the high correlation and high variance, it is not feasible to use VAW to reduce the risk at the portfolio level unless the starting level of risk was exceptionally high. If the core holding in the portfolio is representing the S&P 500 or the a broad market index, the position in VAW increases the total volatility. Yield & Taxes The distribution yield is 1.86%. That is not high enough to be considered for a dividend growth investor, but the volatility would have made this portfolio less desirable for those dividend growth investors and retirees anyway. Market to NAV The ETF is at a .01% discount to NAV currently. Premiums or discounts to NAV can change very quickly. Liquidity is not terrible, but an average volume around 60,000 shares is not as high as investors might be expecting for a Vanguard fund. Largest Holdings The chart below shows the top 10 holdings: (click to enlarge) The diversification within the ETF is not very strong if we are simply looking at the percentage of the portfolio in each company. On the other hand, if we look at the operations of the individual companies the picture changes materially. For instance, Freeport-McMoRan (NYSE: FCX ) is in my portfolio and regularly helps me lose money. I’m not too happy about that last sentence either, but the portfolio values don’t lie. Freeport-McMoRan is heavily invested in copper mining and oil drilling. The other companies offer investors very different exposure. While the fund is concentrated on the “Materials” sector, the individual companies are still fairly different. If the intent was to own a mining company, I’m a little surprised that Vanguard did not choose to hold shares in a more stable mining company such as BHP Billiton (NYSE: BHP ) or Rio Tinto (NYSE: RIO ) since they both have more diversified mining portfolios and lower cost operations. I assume they did not select Freeport-McMoRan for the oil exposure because they could have picked a much more stable like Exxon Mobile (NYSE: XOM ) if they were trying to include oil exposure. Volatility Comparison To show how much more volatile FCX is compared to using a combination of Rio Tinto and Exxon Mobil, I pulled the following chart from Investspy: (click to enlarge) For comparison sake I set the weight on FCX to 50% and the weights on RIO and XOM to 25% each. While Rio Tinto and Freeport-McMoRan had similar levels of volatility over the sample period, Rio-Tinto would have given the mining exposure with a smaller allocation so the oil exposure could be picked up by XOM. In this simple example FCX would have contributed 61.5% of the risk and XOM and RIO would have combined to contribute only 39.5%. This is a function of XOM simply being a much safer play for including oil exposure in the portfolio. If the oil exposure is not wanted, then the use of Freeport-McMoRan feels pretty strange. Conclusion VAW has a great expense ratio but it simply brings too much volatility for having such a high correlation with the S&P 500. When it comes to selecting companies for the portfolio, it seems like part of the risk stems from selecting companies that are riskier than necessary for creating the desired exposure. I’d rather see VAW modify the portfolio to get the “materials” sector exposure with as little volatility as possible. As it stands, VAW seems like a more useful ETF for making bets on sector movements than as a long term tool for generating wealth with the lowest level of risk possible for the expected returns. Disclosure: I am/we are long FCX. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: Information in this article represents the opinion of the analyst. All statements are represented as opinions, rather than facts, and should not be construed as advice to buy or sell a security. Ratings of “outperform” and “underperform” reflect the analyst’s estimation of a divergence between the market value for a security and the price that would be appropriate given the potential for risks and returns relative to other securities. The analyst does not know your particular objectives for returns or constraints upon investing. All investors are encouraged to do their own research before making any investment decision. Information is regularly obtained from Yahoo Finance, Google Finance, and SEC Database. If Yahoo, Google, or the SEC database contained faulty or old information it could be incorporated into my analysis.