Tag Archives: management

Have The Robots Broken The Stock Market?

As more and more economic data comes out, it is becoming clear that China really isn’t having much of an impact on the US economy. Today’s initial jobless claims is about as real-time as it gets, and they’re near all-time lows. So now, Monday’s flash crash is becoming an even hotter topic. Here’s my experience, and why more human involvement might not be such a bad thing. The markets were sloppy last week, and we went out on a bad note. Sentiment was very negative. And when Chinese stocks continued to crash on Sunday, it looked like we might be on the verge of something nasty. Uncertainty was everywhere. And then the robots took control. I watched the futures market almost all night on Sunday, and we were seeing 100-point moves in the Dow Futures contract within a few minutes. This was not human controlled. And it was not rational. I reached out to a friend of mine who has some experience in High Frequency Trading, and here’s what he said to me: ” I am beginning to wonder if certain algorithms don’t get confused during these liquidity events. This week’s trading looked like momo [momentum] algos chasing price which turned into a positive feedback loop on itself until the system just crashed. ” That statement resonated with me. After all, I’ve traded through the rise of the robots, and I used to specialize specifically in illiquid markets, but I don’t recall anything quite like this other than the Flash Crash of 2010. When I woke up on Monday morning and watched the market open, I’d never seen so many broken positions. There were dozens of ETFs trading at 25-50% discounts to their NAV. I was buying the Schwab U.S. Mid-Cap ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHM ) at a 25% discount. (click to enlarge) That is, I was playing market maker with my small asset management business in a broken market, because I looked at the prices and I knew for a fact, without seeing the Intraday Indicative Value of the ETF, that we were trading at irrational discounts. The robots failed to do that. Humans like myself, who have traded in these kinds of markets before, are like first responders. We run into the fire when everyone else is running away from it. Had there been more human market-making involvement that morning, I doubt this price discrepancy would have even occurred. I am certainly not against the rise of the robots and the technological progress we’re making, but some of the developments of the last few years do make me wonder if we’re relying a bit too much on the robots at times… Disclosure: My firm is net long SCHM (and has been for a long time) in many accounts. P.S. – I should add that this does not add credence to some of the commentary that ETFs are illiquid or inefficient products. In fact, ETFs traded precisely how we should have expected them to. And when some underlying positions didn’t open, many irrational sellers sold into the panic. This was not a product error. This was a human error. I wasn’t the only one who recognized this error in real-time.

A Closer Look At Suburban Propane Partners’ Results And Cash Flows As Of 6/30/15

SPH benefited from lower oil prices; it did not pass on to its customers all the benefits of lower propane costs thus increasing gross margin to 57% in 3QFY15 . Distributions coverage at 1.09x in the TTM ended 6/30/15; sustainable DCF shows a marked improvement over the prior TTM period. SPH has demonstrated less volatility and has performed better than the Alerian MLP Index over the past 12 months. SPH may not provide substantial distribution growth and may underperform the index if we see sustained increases in MLP price levels. But the ~10% yield appears secure, the valuation multiple is lower, and it is less leveraged. This article focuses on some of the key facts and trends revealed by results recently reported by Suburban Propane Partners LP (NYSE: SPH ). The quarters are noted with an FY designation because SPH’s fiscal year ends in September. Its third quarter of fiscal 2015 ended on 6/30/15 and is designated as 3QFY15. The article evaluates the sustainability of the partnership’s Distributable Cash Flow (“DCF”) and assesses whether SPH is financing its distributions via issuance of new units or debt. SPH is organized into 3 principal business segments. The propane segment, which generates the bulk of SPH’s revenues and cash flows, is primarily engaged in the retail distribution of propane to residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural customers and, to a lesser extent, wholesale distribution to large industrial end users. The fuel oil and refined fuels segment is primarily engaged in the retail distribution of fuel oil, diesel, kerosene and gasoline to residential and commercial customers for use primarily as a source of heat in homes and buildings. The natural gas and electricity segment is engaged in the marketing of natural gas and electricity to residential and commercial customers in the deregulated energy markets of New York and Pennsylvania. SPH is also engaged in other activities, primarily the sale, installation and servicing of a wide variety of home comfort equipment, particularly in the areas of heating and ventilation. SPH’s business is highly seasonal. It typically sells ~ 2/3 of its retail propane volume and ~ 3/4 of its retail fuel oil volume during the peak heating season of October through March. Consequently, the bulk of sales and operating profits are concentrated in the quarters ending December and March (the first and second quarters of the fiscal year). In the quarters ended June and September SPH typically reports losses. Cash flows and DCF coverage ratios are typically highest during the quarters ending March and June; this is when customers pay for product purchased during the winter heating season. SPH’s profitability is largely dependent on volumes generated by its retail propane operations and on the gross margin it achieves on propane sales – the difference between retail sales price and product cost. Table 1 shows volumes and gross margins for the 8 most recent quarters: (click to enlarge) Table 1: Figures in $ Millions, except gallons and percentages. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Volumes and earnings for 3QFY15 were adversely affected by unseasonably warm weather during much of 3QFY15 (16% warmer than normal and 6% warmer than 3QFY14 in areas served by SPH). In addition, the timing of the much colder than normal temperatures in March 2015 led to additional deliveries during 2QFY15, obviating the need for further deliveries in 3QFY15 to many customers. Propane prices in 3QFY15 fluctuated between $0.32-$0.57 per gallon and, on average, declined by 55.9% vs. 2QFY15, in line with the dramatic declines in crude oil and natural gas prices as prices. Lower propane prices benefit SPH’s customers and affect SPH by decreasing both its revenues and cost of goods sold. The impact on gross margin may vary; in 3QFY15 gross margin increased to 57% of revenues compared to 46% in 3QFY14 because SPH did not pass on to its customers all the benefits of lower propane costs. However, gross margin declined in absolute dollar terms ($126 million vs. $136 million) due to lower volumes. DCF and adjusted earnings before interest, depreciation & amortization and income tax expenses (“Adjusted EBITDA”) are the primary measures typically used master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) to evaluate their operating results. Making comparisons between MLPs is difficult because of lack of standard definitions these terms (a recent article discusses some examples). It is even more so in the case of SPH because it does not measure its results in terms of DCF and does not provide DCF data. However, SPH does provide Adjusted EBITDA figures: (click to enlarge) Table 2: Figures in $ Millions except per unit amounts, percent change and gallons sold. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Net income included expenses of $1.1 million and $4.3 million in 3QFY15 and 3QFY14, respectively, related to integration of the retail propane business acquired from Inergy L.P for ~$1.9 billion in August 2012. For 3QFY14, net income also included an $11.6 million loss on debt extinguishment. Adjusted EBITDA excludes the effects of these charges, as well as the unrealized (non-cash) mark-to-market adjustments on derivative instruments. SPH was able to decrease its investment in working capital in the trailing twelve months (“TTM”) ended 6/30/15, with lower commodity prices significantly reducing both inventories and accounts receivable. This resulted in a sharp increase in net cash from operations, as shown in Table 3: Table 3: Figures in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. To enable comparison of DCF, investors must generate their own estimates because, as previously noted, SPH does not utilize this metric. Table 4 below provides my estimate of sustainable DCF generated by SPH in the periods under review, as well as my estimate of what SPH’s reported DCF would have been had it adopted a methodology similar to that used by some other MLPs (see article titled ” Distributable Cash Flow” ). Most of the MLPs I follow exclude working capital changes, whether positive or negative, when deriving their reported DCF numbers. This is one of the differences between DCF as is typically reported by MLPs and sustainable DCF. The relevant numbers for SPH are as follows: Table 4: Figures in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. The two corresponding coverage ratios are as follows: Table 5: Figures in $ Millions except coverage ratio. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. For the TTM ended 6/30/15 there were no material differences between DCF (excluding the impact of working capital changes and risk management activities, as it is generally reported by MLPs) and what I call sustainable DCF. Coverage of distributions ratio was positive (above 1x). Sustainable DCF shows a marked improvement over the TTM ended 6/30/14, primarily due to $82 million that was required for working capital in that earlier period. Table 6 presents a simplified cash flow statement that nets certain items (e.g., acquisitions against dispositions, debt incurred vs. repaid) and separates cash generation from cash consumption in order to get a clear picture of how distributions have been funded. It provides further insights on changes in coverage ratios. (click to enlarge) Table 6: Figures in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Table 6 indicates that net cash from operations, less maintenance capital expenditures, exceeded distributions by $104 million in the TTM ended 6/30/15, but fell short of covering distributions by $63 million in the TTM ended 6/30/14. Cash reserves were used to fund the shortfall. Table 7 provides selected metrics comparing the MLPs I follow based on the latest available TTM results. Of course, investment decisions should be take into consideration other parameters as well as qualitative factors. Though not structured as an MLP, I include KMI as its business and operations make it comparable to midstream energy MLPs. As of 08/26/15: Price Current Yield TTM Adjusted EBITDA EV / TTM Adj. EBITDA IDR- Adjusted EV/Adj. EBITDA Long-term debt (net of cash) to TTM Adj. EBITDA Buckeye Partners (NYSE: BPL ) $69.00 6.74% 844 14.7 14.7 4.2 Boardwalk Pipeline Partners (NYSE: BWP ) $12.89 3.10% 672 10.0 10.1 5.2 Enterprise Products Partners (NYSE: EPD ) $27.29 5.57% 5,239 14.6 14.6 4.1 Energy Transfer Partners (NYSE: ETP ) $46.86 8.83% 5,308 9.0 10.4 5.2 Kinder Morgan Inc. (NYSE: KMI ) $30.80 6.36% 7,373 15.2 15.2 6.0 Magellan Midstream Partners (NYSE: MMP ) $68.29 4.33% 1,102 17.1 17.1 3.0 Targa Resources Partners (NYSE: NGLS ) $27.38 12.05% 1,065 9.5 10.7 4.8 Plains All American Pipeline (NYSE: PAA ) $33.23 8.37% 2,229 10.3 12.8 4.3 Suburban Propane Partners $35.74 9.93% 332 9.8 9.8 3.3 Williams Partners (NYSE: WPZ ) $37.52 9.06% 3,681 10.6 12.3 4.6 Table 7: Enterprise Value (“EV”) and TTM EBITDA figures are in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Note that BPL, EPD, KMI, MMP and SPH are not burdened by general partner incentive IDRs that siphon off a significant portion of cash available for distribution to limited partners (typically 48%). Hence multiples of MLPs without IDRs can be expected to be much higher (see Table 4, column 5). In order to make the multiples somewhat more comparable, I added column 6, a second EV/EBITDA column. I derived this column by subtracting IDR payments from EBITDA for the TTM period. Other approaches can also be used to adjust for the IDRs of the relevant MLPs. In prior articles I expressed concerns regarding the susceptibility of SPH to weather conditions, volatile commodity costs, customer migration to natural gas or electricity, difficulties encountered by SPH in passing on higher propane costs to its customers, flat distributions since February 2013 and lack of a clear path to achieving distribution growth. These concerns are still valid, although some are mitigated by lower oil prices. But while the midstream MLP universe has been violently shaken by the decline in the price of oil, SPH has demonstrated less volatility and has performed better than the Alerian MLP Index over the past 12 months (19.5% decrease in unit price vs. a 35.5% decline in the index). Furthermore, the outperformance has been consistent whether measured on a 12-months, year-to-date, 6-months, 3-months or 1-month basis. Although SPH may not offer distribution growth and will probably underperform the index if we see sustained increases in MLP price levels, its ~10% yield appears secure, its valuation multiple is lower and it is less leveraged (3.3x long terms debt, net of cash, over TTM EBITDA). Investors brave enough to broaden their exposure to midstream energy MLPs should consider initiating, or adding to, positions in SPH. Disclosure: I am/we are long EPD, ETP, MMP, NGLS, PAA. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Fidelity Equity Dividend Income: I’d Rather Own A CEF

FEQTX changed managers in 2011 looking to spruce up performance. Although there has been improvement, the results have been middling. If you are looking for income, you might be better off with a CEF. Mutual funds are generally the top-of-mind way for investors to quickly gain access to professional management. However, the Fidelity Equity Dividend Income (MUTF: FEQTX ) shows why you need to be cautious when you go down this route. In the end, if you are looking for dividend income, there are better options out there. Turning to a new leader FEQTX changed managers in late 2011 with the goal of shaking things up at a fund that had been lagging and, generally, not living up to its name. That means that 2011 and part of 2012 were really a transition period as new manager Scott Offen put his mark on the fund. So he’s got about three years of performance under his belt with a portfolio he created. The fund’s objective is reasonable income and capital appreciation. Reasonable income is defined as a yield above that of the S&P 500 Index. FEQTX’s trailing yield is roughly 2%. For comparison, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust’s (NYSEARCA: SPY ) yield is about 1.9%. So I guess it lives up to its definition of reasonable yield, but that may not be your definition. Searching for stocks, Offen looks for , “…companies that deliver attractive, above-market dividend income and provide exposure to conservative earnings-growth potential with relatively low volatility.” He likes companies with, “…high or improving returns on capital and companies with strong balance sheets, including cash on hand…” As a shareholder, these are the types of things you’d like a manager to look for. The fund tilts toward value stocks, which isn’t surprising since Offen’s last gig was at a value fund. The interesting thing here is that the manager cautions that focusing too much on yield is dangerous. He highlights the banking sector during the 2007 to 2009 recession as a cautionary tale. And while that’s a worthy warning, 2% isn’t a material yield and it certainly isn’t much more than an index is offering, so income investors looking at, or in, this fund have a right to wonder if they are getting their money’s worth. Performance is so-so The problem is that performance relative to the S&P isn’t all that great. Over the trailing three years through July, FEQTX’s annualized return, which includes reinvested distributions, is around 14.7%. The SPY’s annualized return over that span is nearly 17.6%. Both have roughly similar standard deviations and FEQTX’s Beta is nearly 0.95, meaning it moves roughly in line with the S&P. (SPY, as you might expect, moves in lock step with the S&P.) So there’s little yield advantage, no performance advantage, and the same amount of risk. Although the expense ratio of around 0.60% is low for a mutual fund, the extra expense isn’t worth it when you could by SPY, get better performance and a similar yield, and pay just 10 basis points or so in expenses. A better alternative? This is why you shouldn’t get sucked in by a fund name. I’m not suggesting that FEQTX is a bad fund, per se, just that it isn’t compelling enough compared to other options. That said, I don’t believe it lives up to the words “dividend income,” which are found in its name. If you own the fund or are looking at it, you’ll basically be getting something on an index clone at greater cost. Why not shift gears and look at a completely different space? For example, you might consider the Nuveen S&P 500 Buy-Write Income Fund (NYSE: BXMX ). This fund was created through the merger of two older Nuveen closed-end funds late last year and now has the goal of tracking the S&P while writing index options to generate current income. It doesn’t have a long track record, to be sure, but it has put up decent results so far. First off, the distribution is around 7.6%, well above that offered by the index and FEQTX. And year to date through July, BXMX’s return is nearly 6.2% while SPY is about 3.4% and FEQTX is just 1.3%. A big difference, however, is in the expense ratio, which is just under 1%. But based on performance so far under the new investment strategy, you are being rewarded for that. The biggest risk, of course, is that the new strategy is untested. Which is a legitimate concern. That said, writing options should mute downside risk since in a falling market option income will offset capital losses. At least that’s the theory, anyway. Time will be the true test of this, meaning that you’ll need a little faith if you choose to own BXMX. But with a discount of nearly 7%, you are getting a little protection built in by buying below the actual value of the portfolio. Looking at that a little closer at recent performance, since the last few months have been pretty rough, BXMX’s trailing daily return over the last three months through August 26th was a loss of almost 4.2%. The S&P over that same span fell just under 7.3%. Over the trailing month through August 26th, BXMX was down about 5.1% and the index was down nearly 6.5%. So, through the current turmoil anyway, BXMX seems to be holding its own. Note, too, that upside performance should be muted in a roaring bull market because of the use of options. This year’s sideways market is really a good space for option writing. So the strong out of the gate performance really shouldn’t be taken as an indication of future performance. But income should always be notable. Not the only option That said, BXMX is just one option. It seems like a compelling one compared to FEQTX, but there are other closed-end funds with compelling yields and performance histories. That said, the real point here is to make sure you understand what you own. That’s particularly true of mutual funds where a fund may not be living up to its name. If you find you are an income-oriented investor stuck in such a fund, consider shifting to closed-end funds. You might find you are willing to pay a little more for a higher level of income-that’s especially true when the fund you own is simply tracking a broader index. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.