Tag Archives: management

BUI: Has It Held Up In The Downturn?

I looked at BlackRock Utility and Infrastructure Trust not too long ago. Comparing it to UTG, the big difference was the use of options versus leverage. Is that not so subtle difference playing out as expected? One of my favorite utility and infrastructure closed-end funds, or CEFs, is the Reaves Utility Income Fund (NYSEMKT: UTG ). But it’s far from the only fund out there that focuses on this space, which is why readers asked that I look at the BlackRock Utility and Infrastructure Trust (NYSE: BUI ), a much younger entrant in the space. At the time I first looked at the two together I said I liked UTG better, but that BUI theoretically should hold up better in a downturn. Well, it’s time to look at how that’s playing out. Similar, but different UTG and BUI both invest in the infrastructure that makes our modern world work. That includes electric companies, but also things like water utilities, oil companies, airports, and railroads. Both take a pretty broad look at their niche. But, in the end, they both are looking to do a very similar thing. However, that doesn’t mean their portfolios are alike. For example, at the end of June, the energy space made up around 6% of UTG’s portfolio. That number at BUI was a far more meaty 24%. So similar, but different. Which is to be expected since the CEFs are offered by two different sponsors. However, there’s another notable difference here, too. UTG attempts to enhance returns via the use of leverage. BUI looks to boost returns, specifically income, via the use of an option overlay strategy. In a flat to slowly rising market these two approaches should probably produce similar results. In a fast rising market I’d expect UTG’s leverage to result in better returns. And in a down market, I’d expect BUI’s use of options to soften the blow of the decline. That’s what I’d expect, anyway. Now that we’ve seen the utility and other income-oriented sectors fall this year, what really happened? A mixed bag Year to date through August, the net asset value, or NAV, total return for UTG was a loss of 9.3%. BUI’s loss over that same span was a more mild 6.7%. On an absolute basis that’s not such a big difference, but on a percentage basis BUI “outdistanced” (perhaps under-lost?) UTG by around 25%. That’s a pretty big difference. All return numbers assume the reinvestment of distributions. So, on the whole, I’d say that the option overlay did perform as expected. To stress the point, the Vanguard Utilities ETF (NYSEARCA: VPU ) was also down over 9% over the year-to-date period through August. But pull back some and things get a little more interesting. Over the trailing year through August, VPU was essentially break even. UTG, meanwhile, was down 3.3%. BUI was down roughly 5.5%. What gives? For starters, both UTG and BUI have broader investment mandates than VPU. And UTG and BUI are stock pickers, using human intelligence (or not, depending on your opinion of active management) to select stocks. Put another way, VPU has a much tighter focus on utilities. It also doesn’t use leverage, which through a good portion of the time was a drag on UTG’s performance. So I can understand why it did better than BUI and UTG over the trailing year, which has been a pretty turbulent time in the markets for some of the additional areas in which these two CEFs have ventured. But why has BUI underperformed UTG by so much over the trailing year? The answer is most likely the previously mentioned weighting difference in the energy sector. Oil prices, and the stocks associated with the energy sector, started to fall around mid-2014. So, it makes sense that BUI, with a much heavier weighting in the sector, would be hit harder over the trailing year period. And it’s hard to say that the oil downturn is over, yet, either. Which adds a notable amount of risk to owning BUI relative to UTG. Who wins? So, in the end, this difficult period isn’t a clear win for BUI or for UTG. It kind of depends on what period you’re looking at and how you define success. For example, looking even further afield, BUI was down 5.5% over the past year, but that was much better than the Vanguard Energy ETF (NYSEARCA: VDE ) which was down over 30% even though BUI underperformed utility-focused VPU, which was pretty much break even over the span. If you liked the extra oil exposure BUI offered versus UTG when oil was doing well, it’s hard to complain when it starts to work against you. And then there’s this year, when utilities took a hit and UTG underperformed relative to BUI. With leverage adding a helping hand to the downside along the way at UTG and option income softening the blow at BUI. So the use of options did, indeed, appear to do what you’d expect. I still like UTG. It’s a solid fund with a long history of navigating volatile markets and rewarding shareholders along the way. BUI is really seeing its first serious stress test. That said, I think it’s holding up pretty well. And, at the end of the day, I don’t think either is a poorly run CEF. Looking at the two today, UTG’s discount is narrower than normal at around 2%-about half the normal 4% or so over the trailing three years. It isn’t cheap, but then investors are likely rewarding it for its strong historical performance. A flight to safety, if you will. BUI, meanwhile, is trading at a roughly 13% discount versus its trailing three-year average discount of 9.5% or so. It’s clearly the cheaper of the two funds. BUI is also offering a more generous distribution yield, at 8.6%. UTG’s distribution yield is a more modest 6.4% or so. Neither is outlandish, but UTG’s lower yield is likely to be more sustainable over the long-term. That said, if you are looking for yield and prefer wider discounts, BUI looks like the better play-but only if you believe the oil market has stopped falling… If you are conservative, UTG is still the one to watch. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Want To Fight The Fed? Here Are The Tools You Need

Summary Everyone says you can’t fight the Fed. While that might be ultimately true, you can fight the market participants. How to aggressively buy investments when everyone else is running away from them. Yes, the Fed will eventually raise rates. Have you noticed lately how many news articles are just absolutely hanging on every possible movement that the Federal Reserve “The Fed” could make lately? It’s as if the chairman sneezes, then the markets get pneumonia. Every single day, I read another headline anticipating this, predicting that. And usually over just a couple of words that anyone in that group of people who either work for the Fed or are former employees there have to say. Stop hanging on every possible chance that the Fed might raise rates this time around. Or the next. You’ll sleep better at night, and your portfolio, as well as your accountant will thank you for the smaller amount of churn. That said, stay vigilant with regard to what the market is doing. I was having a discussion about this with the International Society of Value Investors recently, and I put forward that the truth of the matter is, if everyone thinks something is going to happen, it usually doesn’t. It is still important to understand the nature of the businesses you invest in. As you know, I have been very bearish on leveraged investments overall, particularly the mREITs . Knowing that baseline interest rates can only go up is a legitimate reason to not build a large position in these holdings, even if the current yield makes that very tempting. However, some of you may have also be thinking that these knee-jerk reactions to the media are creating short-term opportunities that you can cash in on if you are quick. You’re right. You actually can fight the Fed. Well, indirectly that is. Passively. While you have no direct power to influence or predict rate changes, you absolutely can react to what traders are doing in the marketplace. I’m going to show you one of my favorite investments to do this in today. It’s all about taking advantage of the one thing that people who buy investments are most afraid of — volatility. There is a certain subset of the marketplace that is completely put off by volatility. They share a similar mindset with the portion of the population that never invests. When non-invested people are interviewed, they say that their greatest fear is that the price of the stock that they are investing in can go down. A certain number of new investors also still believe this. Exploit those fears. Most investors understand yield, but do not appreciate risk. Risk to other investors is typically perceived in one of two ways: the price of a security falling as described above, or for the investors willing to hold for the longer run, that dividend payments could be reduced or cut altogether. It’s this second scenario that created this particular opportunity. I want to begin here with a specific example that I took advantage of recently. It’s the Pimco High Income Fund ( PHK ) . There was a catalyst that set off a wave of selling. A dividend cut of just shy of 2 cents per share took the monthly payment down from $0.121875 to $0.103460. For the folks out there who aren’t lucky enough to own a thousand shares, round the payments down from 12 cents a month to 10 cents per share. Now here is where that fear process kicks in. The market had already been on edge about bond prices and the premium to net asset value that this fund was carrying. It might even have been because I told them they should be concerned. But I digress; before this cut had even occurred, PHK was down from its high of $13.69 back on July 8, 2014 to just $9.45 on September 1, 2015. The dividend cut was announced on September 2, 2015. Before the cut, this fund was already down 30.51% from the high. Here’s what followed: PHK data by YCharts So it dropped another -26.2% in a timeframe of less than two weeks. That is a compounded loss on price of -48.75%. I have been a holder of this fund since 2009. I didn’t sell my shares. On September 10th, I doubled down on the amount I was holding. On September 17th, I doubled the holding size again. Here’s what has happened since then: PHK data by YCharts To clarify what I’m saying, I took what had been a paper loss approaching 20% (my average loss had not been as large as the numbers I cited earlier due to techniques I’ll be explaining in just a moment) and turned it into a virtually breakeven point. So as of right now, I need to either make some sales and capture that windfall, or decide to sit on these shares at my now lower average cost, and continue to collect an annualized yield of 15%. I would have bought more on the 14th, but I had to wait for some trades to settle. But this is not my private journal to talk about the trades I’m making. I’m here to teach you how to do this yourself. So, onto those tools I mentioned. Tool #1: You need cash. You should never be, at any time, fully invested in the stock market. What I mean by “Fully invested” is a portfolio that contains only stocks. Something should be in there that is not correlated to stock market risk. For me, that’s 20% in safe bonds. I use the Vanguard Total Bond Market Fund ( BND ) for this purpose. I was also sticking to an additional 5% allocation in junk bonds like the Pimco fund above, and various other high yield investments. Bonds have a market risk of their own, but it tends to move against the grain of stocks. You can also hold precious metals or just plain old cash if you want. Whatever your choice is, it needs to be a very liquid holding that can be quickly converted into cash. Do not use a leveraged fund for this purpose. You are hedging against loss here, so it is important that there no outside factors that could destabilize this holding. The market is very good at analyzing the past, but very bad at predicting the future. Lots of people understand the inflation risk that bonds carry, and that’s also why I haven’t been holding a higher percentage of them, but they still have the advantage of protecting you from stock market volatility. As it turns out, however, protection is not what you are seeking here. Cash/Bonds might have the disadvantage of losing buying power due to inflation, but when the stock market dives, they gain lots of buying power because the price of your bonds goes up. It is during that volatility that you strike. You sell some of the gain you just received on your “safe” investment, and transfer it into the “risky” investment. All of a sudden those safe bonds that I had on the side earning 3% a year are now earning me 15% from the exchange. That is not a loss in buying power, friends. Mark Cuban has a famous video interview where he is quoted as saying ” Diversificaion is for idiots “. What he’s really talking about is using a large cash position to jump on opportunities. If you have some free time, have a look. He is brilliant, if not just a little abrasive. Tool #2: You need to understand what you own. You can’t just go out there and buy everything based on dividend yield. I had already been through Pimco’s balance sheets long before I made the decision to buy more. I talk about it in this article here . I already knew that I wanted to own more of this fund, I was just waiting for the right price to get more. That is true of every holding in my portfolio. And I am constantly working at getting a better understanding of it. You have to keep reading, keep doing everything you can to get the best possible understanding of how the business or fund operates. Remember when I talked about Prospect Capital Corp. ( PSEC ) a few months back ? I was basically employing this exact strategy in accumulating their shares when the entire rest of the marketplace hated them for cutting their dividends. Now I have an average gain of almost 7% on share price, and am continuing to receive an annual dividend yield of 12.7%! Tool #3: You need self control. The percentages I mentioned above based on asset allocation were decided ahead of time. I have held larger percentages of bonds in the past, and also less. But the point of this is that once you decide what your allocation should be, stick to it tightly. I want this article to serve as a personal admission of being guilty of abandoning this tool earlier this year. I took a very large position in Mattel ( MAT ) , at one time as much as 50% of my portfolio. As a result, I did not have resources available to cost average as I wanted to when the price fell more over the year. I lucked out on this a little bit because of increases in my Nintendo ( NTDOY ) and Chevron ( CVX ) shares. Had I stuck to this advice, I would have had the tools at the right time to get more Mattel shares for a lower price. Maintaining a smaller allocation to that stock would have forced me to wait until the price dropped enough to act. So, you know, do diversify. At least a little. Fortunately, I’m getting back on track now. Also determine a threshold where you will commit to make changes as needed. For myself, I make sales when the amount I have invested in bonds either rises or drops by 5% as a percentage of my total investments. So for example, if I have a 20%/80% portfolio, I start looking for stocks to sell if the ratio becomes 15% Bonds/85% Stocks. Don’t stress about any particular holding showing a small loss during that time. What should ultimately happen in each exchange of assets, is your income should increase. The goal here is to constantly work towards a rising income from stock and bond dividends. I mentioned that I was down less than the market drop on PHK. That’s because I have been shifting funds in between these holdings over time. This current sell-off is at least the third time since 2009 that I’ve been able to take advantage of a quick sell-off to lower my cost on this fund. I have also sold shares when they recovered to get my percentages back in line. Trade fees are a concern here, so the purchase/sell sizes need to be meaningfully large to offset those costs. Otherwise, turn off dividend reinvesting and use a combination of that money and income from your job to add money to where it is needed; don’t focus on selling for the time being. There are apps out there like Robinhood that will let you trade completely for free, as well as Loyal3.com. Tool #4: You need to act quickly when the opportunity is there. We’re coming full circle now. So continuing on here about PHK, with regards to that dividend cut. I think a large number of people more or less expected that it would be cut at some point. But remember that part above about the already reduced price leading up to the cut? Look to the past as your guide. People had been willing to pay as much as $13.69/share when this fund would have given them a yield of 10.68%. The price has fallen a total of -48.75% to $6.87/share, giving you a forward yield of 18% even after that dividend cut. To get the same 10.68% yield, the fund would need to come up to $11.62/share. That is the upper limit of the “bullish” price, a difference of $4.75 above $6.87. Let’s meet the market halfway and we have a safe investment here below about $9.25. In other words, the market tried to anticipate the Fed movement, but they overdid the selling. I made a bullish bet that even if they were right, I would still end up ahead enough from dividends that I would not regret the decision. So I will continue to hold these shares until that price point is reached, my bond allocation is out of whack, or the structure of the fund changes, in which case I will need to perform more analysis. I am genuinely not concerned with inflation when I am earning a yield on cost of 15%. The premium to NAV is not a concern; this is what I’m actually receiving for my invested dollars. Incidentally, I rate PHK a buy under $9 . That’s all for today. More will be coming soon though. This article is going to have a follow-up piece discussing some other opportunities that are out there in closed-end funds. I am going to lay out the most volatile but dependable funds I can get my hands on, so that you can have ideas at your fingertips for what to invest in when the time is right. Follow me for now, and thanks for reading! Editor’s Note: This article discusses one or more securities that do not trade on a major U.S. exchange. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks. Disclosure: I am/we are long PHK, NTDOY, MAT, CVX, PSEC. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

The Active Share Debate: AQR Versus The Academics

By Jack Vogel, Ph.D. There is an interesting discussion in the geeky world of academic finance literature between the intellectual muscle at AQR and academia. The discussion revolves around the following question: ” Does Active Share matter? ” This is an important topic for active ETFs and Mutual Funds in the marketplace. The original paper on this measure was written by Cremers and Petajisto and was published in the Review of Financial Studies in 2009 (top finance journal). Links to the paper can be found here and here . The abstract of the paper is the following: We introduce a new measure of active portfolio management, Active Share, which represents the share of portfolio holdings that differ from the benchmark index holdings. We compute Active Share for domestic equity mutual funds from 1980 to 2003. We relate Active Share to fund characteristics such as size, expenses, and turnover in the cross-section, and we also examine its evolution over time. Active Share predicts fund performance : funds with the highest Active Share significantly outperform their benchmarks, both before and after expenses, and they exhibit strong performance persistence. Nonindex funds with the lowest Active Share underperform their benchmarks. Main Finding of the paper: For non-index funds, the higher the active share, the better the performance. We tend to agree, as we have talked about diworsification in the past. However, just because a manager creates a more active portfolio (a necessary condition for outperformance ), this doesn’t imply an active manager will actually have outperformance. The team at AQR (Frazzini, Friedman, and Pomorski), in a forthcoming article in the Financial Analyst Journal (link to the paper is here ), address this question. The abstract is the following: We investigate Active Share, a measure meant to determine the level of active management in investment portfolios. Using the same sample as Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013) we find that Active Share correlates with benchmark returns, but does not predict actual fund returns ; within individual benchmarks, it is as likely to correlate positively with performance as it is to correlate negatively. Our findings do not support an emphasis on Active Share as a manager selection tool or an appropriate guideline for institutional portfolios. Main point of the paper: Active share should not be used as a manager selection tool. Basically, for a given index, they find that active share cannot be used as a reliable tool to identify out-performance. So is Active Share a waste of time? As Lee Corso says every Saturday morning during College Gameday, “Not so fast!” The two authors of the original paper, Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto were quick to shoot down the AQR findings. Here is the executive summary from Antti Petajisto: All of the key claims of AQR’s paper were already addressed in the two cited Active Share papers: Petajisto (2013) and Cremers and Petajisto (2009). 1) The fact about the level of Active Share varying across benchmarks has been widely known for many years. Its performance impact was explicitly studied and discussed in the first drafts of Petajisto (2013) back in 2010, and the performance results remained broadly similar. The reason for the apparent discrepancy is AQR’s choice of summarizing results by benchmark, which effectively gives the same weight to the most popular index (S&P 500, assigned to 870 funds) and the least popular index (Russell 3000 Growth, assigned to 24 funds), which is not sensible as a statistical approach. 2) The issue about four-factor alphas varying across benchmark indices does nothing to change the fact that higher Active Share managers have been able to beat their benchmark indices. However, it does raise an interesting point about the four-factor approach to measuring performance, and in fact my coauthors and I wrote a long and detailed paper about this exact issue first in 2007 (published later as Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2013)). 3) AQR’s researchers argue that there is no theory behind Active Share and they remain mystified by the differences between Active Share and tracking error. It is unfortunate that they have entirely missed the lengthy sections of both Active Share papers that discuss this exact topic: pages 74-77 in Petajisto (2013) and sections 1.3, 3.1, and 4.1 in Cremers and Petajisto (2009). The short answer is that Active Share is more about stock selection, whereas tracking error is more about exposure to systematic risk factors. So clearly ignoring large and essential parts of the original Active Share papers is simply not the way to conduct impartial scientific inquiry. If that executive summary wasn’t scathing enough, Martijn Cremers actually wrote a paper titled ” AQR in Wonderland: Down the Rabbit Hole of ‘Deactivating Active Share’ (and Back Out Again?) ” Here is the abstract: The April 2015 paper “Deactivating Active Share”, released by AQR Capital Management, aims to debunk the claim that Active Share (a measure of active management) predicts investment performance. The claim of the AQR paper is that “neither theory nor data justify the expectation that Active Share might help investors improve their returns,” arguing that previous results are “entirely driven by the strong correlation between Active Share and the benchmark type.” This paper’s first and main aim is to establish that the AQR paper should not be interpreted using typical academic standards. Instead, our conjecture is that this AQR paper falls into a wonderfully creative but altogether different genre, which we label the Wonderland Genre, as its main characteristic seems to be “Sentence First, Verdict Later.” For example, the results in the AQR-WP cannot be taken at face value, as the information that is not shared reverses their main conclusion. Secondarily, we consider the plausible claim that benchmark styles matter and find that controlling for the main benchmark style, the predictability of Active Share is robust. While Active Share is only one tool among many to analyze investment funds and needs to be carefully interpreted for each fund individually, Active Share may indeed plausibly help investors improve their returns. Thirdly and finally, we impolitely consider why AQR may not be a big fan of Active Share by taking a look at the AQR mutual funds offered to retail investors. We find that these tend to have relatively low Active Shares, have shown little outperformance to date (with performance data ending in 2014) and thus seem fairly expensive given the amount of differentiation they offer. So who is the winner in the debate? The answer is both are probably correct at some level. More concentration (less diworsification) probably has higher active share and in the past had higher returns. However, one cannot just take any random selection of stocks and expect to outperform, the style of the investment matters, which was AQR’s argument (we prefer Value and Momentum ). Let us know what you think! Link to the original post on Alpha Architect