Tag Archives: investment

Messy Fund Managers Create An Illusion Of Skill

Mutual fund rating services divide mutual funds into categories based on their investment style. This helps investors compare the performance of one style to another and helps them compare the performance of individual funds in a particular style. While useful in many ways, this methodology can also create the illusion of superior performance when none exists. Among the most familiar investment style tools is the Morningstar Style Box, a nine-square grid that provides a graphical representation of a fund’s investment style. For stock funds, it classifies funds according to primary market capitalization (large, mid and small) and investment style (growth, core and value). Morningstar (NASDAQ: MORN ) tracks the performance of securities in the nine style boxes, creates style indices, and then compares fund performance to these indices. According to Morningstar magazine , the average actively managed US equity fund performance has fallen short of its comparable style box index in all nine categories over the past five years ending in June 2015. However, there are times when a majority of active managers appear to perform better than a style box index. Over the past three years, surviving large-cap value managers have fallen into this category by outperforming their benchmark index 62.7% of the time. See Figure 1 below. Outperformance by a majority of managers in a particular style is often followed by calls from the fund community to use active management in that style. There are those who begin to argue that the market is inefficient in certain areas. They say indexing doesn’t work in these styles and that active management works better. Don’t take these periods of active manager outperformance at face value. It is an illusion that is expected to fade over time. What’s actually occurring is the difference between pure style index returns and messy active manager returns. Style indices represent a pure selection of securities driven strictly by empirical measurements, while fund managers are often messy in their portfolio constructions. For example, the only securities you’ll find in a small-cap value index are small-cap value stocks. In a small-cap value fund , a manager may choose to extend into other style boxes by drifting outside of the pure style. (The fine print in the fund prospectus typically allows for this.) A fund with messy style drift often compares favorably to the style it is benchmarked against when the benchmark is lagging other styles. When enough fund managers in a category are messy in their stock selection, and the benchmark style performs poorly relative to adjacent styles, it creates a period when active style-drifting managers appear to be a better option for investors. This is a temporary illusion of superiority that is not expected to persist. Figure 1 compares the three-year performance of Morningstar Style Box returns to the percentage of managers outperforming their style index benchmark. The X-axis represents the three-year annualized Morningstar style index return and the Y-axis represents the percentage of managed funds that outperformed each style. Figure 1: Morningstar Style Box Performance and Percentage of Managers that Outperformed. Three years ending June 30, 2015. (click to enlarge) Source: Morningstar magazine, August/September 2015, chart and regression by R. Ferri Figure 1 graphically illustrates the relationship between style performance and the ability of active fund managers to outperform the style. Mid-cap Value ( MV ) earned 20.7% annually and outperformed all other styles; MV managers had a very difficult time outperforming this index and succeeded only about 9% of the time. In contrast, Large-cap Value (LV) earned 14.1% annually and was the worst-performing style index; LV managers had an easier time outperforming, winning about 63% of the time. The regression is close to 85%. This means the percentage of managers who outperformed in each style is highly correlated with the relative performance of the style index. The greater a style index outperforms adjacent styles, the fewer managers outperformed in that style and vice versa. This observation isn’t new in mutual fund analysis. William Bernstein wrote about the phenomenon in 2001 article, Dunn’s Law Review : The Life and Times of “Core and Explore,” in which he noted, “[T]he fortunes of indexing a particular asset class depend on its performance relative to other asset classes.” The concept was expanded by William Thatcher in a 2009 article, When Indexing Works and When It Doesn’t in U.S. Equities: The Purity Hypothesis . Both articles indicate an inverse relationship between a style’s relative performance to other styles and active management’s ability to outperform in style. This brings us to a couple of important questions. First, when do a majority of active managers outperform a poor-performing style? Second, can managers time styles and position their portfolios accordingly and make it worth investing in messy active funds? Tables 1, 2 and 3 help answer the first question: When do a majority of active managers outperform a poor performing style? The yellow box with the red numbers in each table represents the percentage of managers that outperformed that style over a three-year period ending in June 2015. The red box represents the performance of the Morningstar style index for that category. The green box represents the performance of surrounding Morningstar style indices. (click to enlarge) Table 1 indicates Large Cap Value (LV) managers had a great run over the three-year period ending June 2015. Almost 63% of active manager beat the Morningstar Large Value Index return of 14.1%. It’s easy to see why. The green areas in Table 1 represent the performance of adjacent styles indices: Large Core (18.3%), Mid Core (19.9%), and Mid Value (20.7%). All three had notably superior performance to Large Value. Any messy LV managers who invested outside of, but near the LV style index constituents would have added performance to their portfolio. Table 2 shows the opposite story for Mid Cap Value ( MV ) managers. Only 9.0% outperformed their style index. MV was the highest-performing style of the nine style boxes, so any messiness on the part of MV managers would have hurt their performance relative to the style index – and it did. Table 3 represents Small Cap Value (SV) managers, 33.6% of whom outperformed the Small Cap style index. Although the index performed satisfactorily at 17.0%, it underperformed the adjacent style indices, but not by as wide a margin as LV in Table 1. Accordingly, there was some benefit to active SV manages, but not enough to increase their win rate over 33.6%. This latest evidence substantiates what Bernstein and Thatcher have indicated in the past: It appears there is no truth to the cliché that the market is inefficient in one style and not another. It’s about style performance relative to adjacent styles, and how messy managers are about remaining within a style in their equity selection. Active fund managers look superior when their benchmark style performs poorly relative to adjacent styles, and they look bad when their benchmark style outperforms adjacent styles by a meaningful amount. Eventually, this all comes out in the wash. Active managers in every style have underperformed by about the same percentage. Please see The Power of Passive Investing for more analysis on this topic. The second question is easier to answer: Can active managers time styles and position their portfolios accordingly? They cannot. If they could, today’s Morningstar active versus passive results would show improvement since the time Bernstein wrote about it. But it has not. Managers do not appear to have persistent skill in timing investment styles. Mutual fund rating services help investors compare the performance of one style to another by creating style indices, and they help investors compare the performance of funds within a particular style. But raw data can create the illusion of superior performance when none exists. You’ll need to dig deeper into a manager’s performance to determine if he or she truly has ongoing skill or if it’s just an illusion. Disclosure: Author’s positions can be viewed here .

Birchcliff Energy – Waiting For A Higher Gas Price

Summary Birchcliff’s production rate is higher than anticipated and has reached a new quarterly record. This allows the company to increase its production guidance and to reduce its capex guidance. I’m hoping for a long and harsh winter that will cause the natgas prices to spike, providing relief for Birchcliff’s balance sheet. Introduction As I remain convinced the oil and gas price won’t stay forever at the current levels (I even expect the gas price to increase a bit due to the construction of LNG plants to ship the gas to Europe and Asia where the price is 3-4 times higher), I have started to look for some interesting oil and gas companies. I came across Birchcliff Energy (OTCPK: BIREF ), a Canadian gas company (with some oil production as well) and decided to dig a bit deeper in this relatively large producer. Birchcliff is a Canadian company and has its main listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange with BIR as its ticker symbol. The average daily volume is almost 300,000 shares and the current market capitalization is approximately US$610M. The production rate continues to increase, but so does is the net debt Birchcliff had a pretty decent second quarter of this year as the average production during the quarter was almost 38,500 boe per day at an operating cost of just $4.53 per boe. This production rate is a new record for the company and emphasizes it’s still very focusing on expanding its production rate in order to build shareholder value. Source: press release In fact, the production growth was so impressive, Birchcliff’s management team has now increased the average production guidance for the fourth quarter of this year. Instead of producing an average of 39,000 boe per day, Birchcliff now expects to produce 41,000 barrels per day, a 5% increase. On top of that, I’m also expecting the production cost to continue to decrease a bit. I’m not complaining at all about the current cost of C$4.53 (US$3.4) per boe (which is an amazing result compared to the $5.25/boe in Q2 2014 and the $5.11/boe in Q1 2015), as the weak Canadian Dollar is definitely an advantage for Birchcliff Energy. (click to enlarge) Source: press release Despite the crash in the oil price (and the weaker gas price which is more important for the company as 86% of its production is natural gas), Birchcliff was able to realize a funds flow netback of just over $13 per boe which isn’t bad at all, considering the circumstances. Additionally, Birchcliff has now reduced its capital expenditure guidance from C$267M to C$250M (US$190M). This won’t be covered by the operating cash flow though as I’m not expecting the operating cash flow to be higher than C$175M (US$130M), so Birchcliff’s debt will very likely continue to increase. As of at the end of the second quarter, Birchcliff had drawn down roughly C$600M from its C$800M ($600M) credit facility, so it can draw down another C$200M (US$150M) to cover for the shortfall. The stronger-than-expected output provides a solid basis for next year Not only was Birchcliff able to increase its production guidance for the fourth quarter of the current year, this also bodes very well for next year. The increased production guidance for Q4 of 41,000 barrels per day is an ‘average’ daily production, and Birchcliff is expecting the exit production to be 41,000-42,000 boe per day, and this production increase will be underpinned by an updated of the company’s oil and gas reserves after seeing excellent production results from the horizontal wells drilled in the past 18 months. In fact, Birchcliff isn’t just hinting at a reserve increase, it says it expects the reserve increase to be ‘material’, so that should also have a positive impact on the NPV of the company as a whole. The winter season is coming closer, and those months are usually the best months for the gas price which could see a substantial price increase, boosting Birchcliff’s financial performance. It will be very interesting to see how the gas price will behave in the run-up to 2016, as a weak gas price will probably mean Birchcliff might have to defer some more capital expenditures as it knows it cannot stretch its balance sheet too much. Investment thesis Birchcliff’s financial performance will almost entirely be determined by the strength of the gas price in the upcoming winter. Whereas the gas price (Henry Hub) for delivery in September is trading at $2.64 , the futures for natural gas with delivery for January and February is trading at $3 and this will help Birchcliff’s financial performance. (click to enlarge) Source: CME Group I like Birchcliff’s limited exposure to oil (10% of its production) and focus on natural gas (86% of its output) and the next few quarters will be crucial for the company. I’m hoping for a long and harsh winter as that should bode well for all natural gas producers and result in a decent relief for its balance sheets. Editor’s Note: This article discusses one or more securities that do not trade on a major U.S. exchange. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, but may initiate a long position in BIREF over the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

2 New ETFs Track Cybersecurity Growth

Summary Since November 2014, two tactical ETFs tracking cybersecurity have been issued. CIBR offers a reasonable expense ratio and a portfolio of companies that have performed well over the past 5 years. HACK is widely traded and offers a NAV of more than $1 billion, although that comes at a price. Businesses involved in strategies, equipment and software designed to protect data and data networks are in great demand, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Hardly a month goes by without the announcement of a data breach, either in the business environment or in government. The risk to data security is not limited to the U.S., either – it is a global concern. It was just a matter of time before someone offered a tactical ETF that focused on companies involved in cybersecurity 1 – the term used to refer to the particular data risks inherent to information systems. There are now two such ETFs: PureFunds ISE Cyber Security ETF (NYSEARCA: HACK ) First Trust NASDAQ CEA Cybersecurity ETF (NASDAQ: CIBR ) In the following, I examine these two funds, comparing and contrasting their investment approaches. I will also provide an estimate of their growth potential over the coming year. HACK HACK is the older of the two funds by about 7 months. Its holdings, based on the index provided by International Securities Exchange, LLC (ISE), is divided between two sectors: Infrastructure Providers and Service Providers . Infrastructure Providers are companies that develop hardware and software for cybersecurity; Service Providers are companies the business models for which is “defined by its role in providing” cybersecurity services. 2 All holdings in the fund must meet the following criteria: 3 Cybersecurity activities are a key driver of the business; Must not be listed on an exchange in a country that employs restrictions on foreign capital investment; Must have a minimum market capitalization of $100 million; Must be liquid; 4 Must be an operating company (not a pass-through security). Weighting of the holdings is determined on two levels: sector exposure is determined by the aggregate market capitalization of the holdings in each sector, and companies within a sector are weighted equally. 5 Rebalancing and reconstitution are semi-annual, in June and December. 6 Dividends are expected to be distributed monthly, while capital gains will be paid annually. 7 CIBR CIBR has been on the market for just over one month, as of this writing. Its index is based on the Consumer Electronics Association ‘s (CEA) cybersecurity classification, which requires that companies satisfy one of the following: 8 Focus on developing technologies designed to protect computer and communications networks from attack and outside unauthorized use; Involvement in deploying cybersecurity technologies to government, businesses, financial institutions and other industries; Focus on protecting priority data from unauthorized external access and exploitation. A company is eligible to be a holding of the fund if it: 9 Is classified as a cybersecurity company according to CEA requirements; Is listed on an index-eligible global stock exchange; Has a worldwide capitalization of at least $250 million; Has a three-month daily average trading volume of at least $1 million; Has a minimum free float of 20% of outstanding shares available for public trading. (In the case of companies issuing more than one security, only one holding is permitted.) Weighting is determined by the holdings’ liquidity; liquidity is determined using the three-month average daily dollar trading volume for each company. The portfolio is rebalanced quarterly, in March, June, September and December; the portfolio is reconstituted , if needed, in March and September. 10 Dividends , if any, are to be paid quarterly; capital gains will be distributed annually. 11 A Word About Dividends I would not expect either fund to pay any dividends on the basis of income received by way of dividends from their holdings. Very few of the companies in either fund’s portfolio pay dividends (fewer than one-third, in fact), and both funds use up the dividend income in covering expenses. Of course, dividends are only one source of income for an ETF, other mony coming through capital gains and interest. 12 The Holdings One would expect there to be a significant overlap in the holdings of these funds, given their tight focus; in fact, 23 companies are common to both portfolios – just over two-thirds of each. Both funds are open to holdings purchased in foreign markets, and each fund currently has six such funds, overlapping in three. Despite the fact that HACK and CIBR utilize different weighting strategies, there are six companies common to the funds’ top-ten holdings: Palo Alto Networks, Inc. (NYSE: PANW ); Cisco Systems, Inc. (NASDAQ: CSCO ); Fortinet, Inc. (NASDAQ: FTNT ); Proofpoint, Inc. (NASDAQ: PFPT ); Imperva, Inc. (NYSE: IMPV ); and Trend Micro Inc. ( OTCPK:TMICY ). Performance One should not expect much in the way of reliable performance information from new ETFs, particularly one that is less than two months old. However, the following chart shows the two funds to be dancing to the same tune, as it were: The performance of the two funds has to be taken in the context of what has been a fairly disappointing 2015 – in particular, very poor conditions have prevailed since mid-July. 13 A dismal summer has seen HACK drop from a high of $33.60 (June 23) to a close of $27.17 (August 21) – a drop of 19.14%. CIBR has pretty much seen only the downside of the market. Portfolio Performance Since a new ETF, by definition, has no extended history, when considering the potential it might have, I believe it helps to take a look at its portfolio and see how that collection of holdings has performed historically. 14 With this in mind, the following chart shows the performance of CIBR and HACK, starting from August 2, 2010: 15 (click to enlarge) Given the fact that the two portfolios overlap by about 66% of their holdings, it is no surprise that the two seem to march in lock step. However, by August 2012, CIBR begins to gradually outperform HACK, ultimately besting it by 2770bps. On an annual basis, CIBR has a CAGR of 20.75% compared to HACK’s 18.02%. There is no clear reason why the CIBR portfolio should so clearly beat HACK’s. The addition of two extra holdings should not be that much of a factor; both portfolios contain foreign equities; for sake of comparison, the standards set for CIBR’s portfolio seem marginally more stringent than the requirements established for HACK. If number of holdings is the difference, it shouldn’t be a factor to consider in choosing either fund. The indices the funds are based on are fluid in terms of content, and companies may either be added to or subtracted from the universe determined by their eligibility criteria. I should expect both indices to increase as security becomes a more pressing concern. Expectations Based on the five-year performance of their respective portfolios, the following chart shows one course these funds may track over the coming year: 16 (click to enlarge) Interestingly, the spreadsheet factored in a drop in value this month, and we are coming off one of the worse weeks the market has seen in quite a few years. In the long term, however, both funds are projected to do quite well, with CIBR expected to outperform HACK by a significant margin. 17 Assessment Both funds have a lot going for them. First Trust has a respectable history of offering responsible, quality, funds. PureFund ‘s HACK is simply huge – its NAV is currently ~ $1.36 billion , and trading volume has been significant. If there is any cautionary factor in HACK’s data, it would be its expense ratio; currently, its ER is listed at 0.75% – over the ~0.65% average for indexed funds, and well over the 0.60% ER for its competitor, CIBR. Given its NAV, an ER of that size is going to eat into income, leaving very little left for investors; not that CIBR is going to offer much in the way of dividends. Both funds are, and will continue to be, driven by developments in the cybersecurity market, and I do not see any reason to believe that market is going to drop off any time soon. If anything, as “cloud” storage becomes more and more prevalent one should expect to see increasing demand for continued research in, and development of, security solutions. The existence of an active – and persistent – hacking community will see to that. All in all, I perceive CIBR to be the better bet at this point, but the funds are too close to be able to say the choice is compelling. Disclaimers This article is for informational use only. It is not intended as a recommendation or inducement to purchase or sell any financial instrument issued by or pertaining to any company or fund mentioned or described herein. All data contained herein is accurate to the best of my ability to ascertain, and is drawn from each Company’s Prospectus, Statement of Additional Information, and fact sheets. All tables, charts and graphs are produced by me using data acquired from pertinent documents; historical price data from The Wall Street Journal . Data from any other sources (if used) is cited as such. All opinions contained herein are mine unless otherwise indicated. The opinions of others that may be included are identified as such and do not necessarily reflect my own views. Before investing, readers are reminded that they are responsible for performing their own due diligence; they are also reminded that it is possible to lose part or all of their invested money. Please invest carefully. 1 Cybersecurity , in the broad sense, refers to “products (hardware/software) and services designed to protect computer hardware, software, networks and data from unauthorized access, vulnerabilities, attacks and other security breaches.” (HACK Prospectus , p. 2) HACK’s documentation refers to “cyber security,” (dividing the term into two words) while other sources use the single word. I endeavor to use the single word throughout. 2 HACK Prospectus , p. 2. 3 HACK Prospectus , p. 2. 4 This is not clarified in the Prospectus, but it is assumed to mean that the holdings must each be actively traded on the market. 5 HACK Prospectus , p. 2. 6 HACK Prospectus , p. 2. 7 HACK Prospectus , p. 13. 8 CIBR Prospectus , pp. 1-2. 9 CIBR Prospectus , p. 16. 10 CIBR Prospectus , p. 2. 11 CIBR Prospectus , p. 11. 12 My estimations of prospective dividends for new ETFs has been fairly good, so far, any difference between my calculation and the actual payments made being in the investors’ favor. 13 As I write this (Friday, August 21, 2015), the Dow has just finished the day down more than 500 points (-3.12%). 14 There are limitations to such a “backtest,” of course: it would be onerous, if not impossible, to apply a fund’s eligibility/selection criteria to the past – unless one has a lot of time and computing power, not to mention extensive access to databases. (This is why issuers of index-based ETFs pay out substantial amounts to license the indices their funds are based on.) Since not all companies currently in a portfolio have been in existence for extended period, matters of re-adjusting weightings becomes a substantial nuisance – except in the case of equal weighting. 15 Each portfolio was primed with a $25K “investment.” Each holding within the portfolio is weighted the same, throughout the trial, as it is currently weighted; in the case of companies entering the market later than August 2, the allocation they would have received is held in reserve until their entry into the portfolio. Portfolios were rebalanced and reconstituted quarterly. 16 The projection is based on the “forecast” function in Microsoft’s Excel which apparently bases its projections on an exponential trend line extrapolated from historical performance. 17 Note: these forecasts are generated by a spreadsheet, and are based on the historical performance of each fund’s portfolio holdings. This is not intended to reflect my own expectations of either fund. For my part – and as any responsible investor should realize – one cannot predict the future performance of any stock simply on the basis of past performance. At least, not with any degree of accuracy. The chart should be taken to reflect a potential tendency for future performance. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.