Tag Archives: investing

TerraForm Will Survive, But Needs To Slow Down

Summary TerraForm Power’s stock has plunged 70% year to date. The market value was high due to its aggressive expansion plan. The company will survive, but needs to slow down. If you’ve believed in SunEdison (NYSE: SUNE ) and TerraForm Power Inc.’s (NASDAQ: TERP ) growth story and have been a shareholder of either company, you’ve probably had a hard time falling asleep at night. It’s been devastating for TerraForm’s shareholders, as the shares have plunged over 70% year to date. So, what makes investors worried even when the company has been able to grow its CAFD (cash available for distribution) and raise dividends consistently since it went public in July 2014? (click to enlarge) (Source: TerraForm Power Investor Presentation) TerraForm only had 808 MW in projects generating $107 million in CAFD initially. After only one year, the company now has over 1900 MW in assets, with a projected $225 CAFD in 2015. The project pipeline and cash flow distribution growth are impressive, but not the stock price. Expansion comes at a price. Clearly, the market now focuses on TerraForm’s liquidity and balance sheet, believing the company’s rapid expansion is sustainable. First of all, I would like to estimate how much money the company is obligated to pay (up to December 2016), based on its scheduled debt repayment, projected dividend distribution and committed funds for acquisitions. Current portion of long-term debt and lease obligation: $115 million (to be paid by September 2016) Invenergy acquisition: $2.05 billion Vivint Solar (NYSE: VSLR ) deal: $962 million Payments (2016) on maturities of long-term debt as of September 30: $58 million Dividend payment: $112 million (based on 80 million class A common stock outstanding) Interest payment and some other payments, based on its agreement with SunEdison (IDRs) In total, TerraForm needs to come up with approximately $ 3.3 billion for its acquisitions, debt repayment, lease obligations, dividend payment and other payments in the next 12 months. To put it in perspective, the company generated $105 million cash from operating activities in the first nine months, and it expects to generate $225 million of CAFD for 2015. So, the question is: Has TerraForm addressed funding shortfalls, if there are any? Let’s take a look at the company’s current financing plan: Unrestricted cash: $821 million (including $160 million in UK refinancing proceeds) Revolver: $725 million Project debt (CA Ridge): $174 million TERP Holdco Capital: $388 million Assumed project debt: $358 million (subject to lender consent) Project debt/Term loan/Holdco bonds/Warehouse facilities: $1.27 billion (in progress) Including the $1.27 million financing options in progress, TerraForm has about $3.6 billion available to fund its commitments and fulfill other obligations, if needed. The management is quite confident that all financing will be made available by Q1 2016. This seems quite desperate, as the company plans to deplete all its cash and most likely its revolver for acquisition and debt repayment. TERP’s unrestricted cash on-hand is approximately $800 million and our liquidity available is approximately $1.5 billion. We have earmarked this cash and liquidity to fund our existing commitments, including the pending Invenergy and Vivint acquisitions. – TerraForm Power Q3 Earnings Call Transcript While TerraForm is capable of funding its obligations and acquisitions given listed options, this will further bury the company in heavy debt. Let’s not forget, the company still has about $2.4 billion long-term debt outstanding as of September 30, 2015. Senior debt 2023 – $950 million (Issued for First Wind and previous revolver repayment) Senior debt 2025 – $300 million (issued for Invenergy) Other project debt and construction financing – $1.28 billion After its acquisition of Vivint and Invenergy assets, TerraForm will have over $4 billion in debt, with little cash on hand. It will be difficult for the company to further grow its pipeline given its highly leveraged balance sheet and the current market sentiment. Even if TerraForm can obtain the needed capital in the near future, it will likely pay a much higher interest rate. Debt is usually cheaper than equity, but only to a certain point. Investors may argue that TerraForm will add another 1.4GW to its pipeline once the acquisition is completed. However, for companies like TerraForm, the payback does not happen overnight. If the company grows its CAFD 70% in 2016 (management refuses to provide a guidance for 2016, saying it will focus on closing deals first), it should generate approximately $95 million CAFD each quarter to pay dividend, interest expense and other obligations. Conclusion Financially and strategically, TerraForm Power went too far, too fast (following SunEdison’s path), and it needs to slow down. Corporate governance is another issue given its connection with SunEdison. As I am writing this, David Tepper, the founder of Appaloosa Management, just sent a letter raising concerns regarding conflict of interests between TerraForm and SunEdison. This is another important issue that investors need to pay attention to. TerraForm had financing lined up for its committed acquisitions, and should not have problems paying liabilities in the next few years. But it will have little room to grow in the short term given its highly leveraged balance sheet and depressed stock price. Clearly, investors now focuses more on the company’s financial strength rather than how fast it can grow its dividend and pipeline. Going forward, TerraForm should focus on the profitability of projects rather than blindly expanding by acquiring assets regardless of project quality. Sometimes we need to take a break and slow down, and I hope TerraForm has learnt this lesson.

Microcap Investing, The Ian Cassel Way

Note: This interview was published in the November 2015 issue of our premium newsletter, Value Investing Almanack . To gain instant access to more such interviews and other interesting stuff on value investing and business analysis, click here to subscribe now . Ian Cassel is the founder of MicroCapClub.com , which is an exclusive forum for experienced microcap investors focused on microcap companies (sub-$300m market cap) trading on the U.S. and Canadian markets. Ian has been investing in microcaps for 15 years and has been a full-time microcap investor since 2008. Ian looks to invest in great management teams running great businesses with a moat. He tries to invest in the best 5-6-7 companies he can find at all times. Ian founded MicroCapClub in 2011 to be a place for “real” and experienced investors in the microcap space to share ideas and learn from one another. When Ian isn’t researching stocks or administering MicroCapClub, you can find him reading, golfing, or shopping at Costco with his wife. Let’s now jump straight into the interview. Safal Niveshak (SN): Could you tell us a little about your background, how you got interested in investing and also about your wonderful blog microcabclub.com? Ian Cassel (IC): I’m 34 years old, married, and have a daughter. I live in the U.S. in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Lancaster is a rural community mostly known for our Amish people . I am not Amish. I’m a full-time private microcap investor, which is a fancy way of saying I only invest my own capital (no family, friends, or clients) and only in small public companies called microcaps. I started investing in 1997. My parents had saved me approximately $25,000 for college. This was all I was getting, so they felt they should let me know before I started applying to Universities. At the same time, I was getting more interested in the stock market. I had met my parents’ financial advisor who was telling me about exciting technology companies. After much deliberation, I decided to go to a local less-expensive University so I could also work full time and pay for my tuition as I went. This way I could invest the full $25,000 in these exciting tech companies. I was going to get rich! In 1999, I went to Millersville University (Major: Economics), and worked full-time for a local financial advisor (I answered the phones). When the tech bubble burst in 2001, I lost 80% of my money; however, this wasn’t the biggest lesson that I learned. The financial advisor I worked for had over 1,100 clients, and when the tech bubble burst I literally heard from all them. ‘every day’ for months I would go into work, the phones would start ringing and clients would yell, scream, cry etc. I was a human punching bag. After a couple weeks I grew numb to their emotions. I also realized at that very moment I didn’t ever want to manage other people’s money. Investing is hard enough dealing with your own emotions let alone those that don’t have the mental/educational constructs. My goal was to become a full-time private investor. I just needed time to allow my capital base to snowball. In 2001-02, I started looking at smaller and smaller companies and ended up in the microcap space. I stumbled on a microcap company called XM Satellite radio in 2002. I tell the full story in detail here . Short version is I met with management, invested the little money I had left at $1.78/share, and in 14 months the stock went to $34/share. It was 99.99% luck, but my love affair with microcaps was born. From that point on, I started focusing on microcaps. Soon after, I started visiting microcap companies doing physical stock research. I felt microcaps were the best place to gain exclusive public information that could give me an edge. I graduated from Millersville University in 2003, and went right into an MBA program at Villanova University. When I wasn’t in class I was talking to management teams and other microcap investors. I learned by losing my money over and over again. I graduated from Villanova University in 2005 and started working for a firm that advised microcap companies. After six months I quit and started my own advisory firm. You can learn more about that experience here . Advising microcap management teams gave me first-hand experience on what management teams go through from an investor-capital markets perspective. I enjoyed advising, but the goal was to quit as soon as I had enough capital to be a full-time private investor. In late-2008, in the middle of the great recession, I quit advising and became a full-time private microcap investor. I now invest primarily in North American microcaps under $300 million market cap. There are approximately 11,000 microcap companies in North America, so there are plenty of rocks to turn over. Let me now talk a bit about MicroCapClub that was founded in 2011 and was formed to be an exclusive forum for experienced microcap investors to exchange ideas, collaborate on due diligence, and learn from each other. Our focus is quality over quantity in everything we do. We only have 140 members. Over the last four years, members have profiled 50+ companies that have doubled or more. Our goal is to find great companies early. Due to demand from those that don’t have the ability and/or time to apply, we are launching a subscription product offering later this year. We also recently announced the first MicroCap Leadership Summit, which will be focused on creating better investors and finding great companies early. I’m honoured to have Sanjay Bakshi, Paul Lountzis, Chris Mayer, and others speaking at our inaugural event. On our MicroCapClub Blog, myself, my partner Mike Schellinger and a few other experienced microcap investors post educational content on microcap investing. The goal with our blog is to inspire, motivate, and educate others on microcap investing. You can find me on Twitter . My mind tends to think in 140 characters. I enjoy saying more with less words and sharing my thoughts on life and investing. SN: What a wonderful story that was, Ian. Thank you so much for laying bare about yourself and your past. You are a microcap investor now. So, what’s your broad investment philosophy, and how has it evolved over the years? IC: Warren Buffett, Peter Lynch, Joel Greenblatt and many others started their careers investing in microcaps. Some of the best performing public companies ever, including: Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A ) (NYSE: BRK.B ), Wal-Mart (NYSE: WMT ), Amgen (NASDAQ: AMGN ), Netflix (NASDAQ: NFLX ), etc. started as small microcap companies. I’m sure you have many other examples of this in India, but the key to outsized returns is finding great companies early. If I could sum up my investment philosophy in one sentence, it would be – My goal is to own the smallest, most illiquid, least institutionally owned, best businesses I can find that are run by intelligent fanatics. I’m a long-only, quality focused, concentrated investor, investing in the best 4-5-6 companies I can find. I will hold my position as long as the management executes. I believe in deep qualitative analysis and constant maintenance due diligence so that I always know what I own. My edge is knowing my positions better than most. This gives me the conviction to hold multibaggers and the ability to see when the story changes so I can sell before the masses. The key to outsized returns is finding great companies early, when they are small companies. When you are evaluating small companies, often times they don’t have a long operating history (3 years or less). The best performing companies in North America over the last five years include companies like BioSyent ( OTCPK:BIOYF ) (170-bagger), Xpel ( OTC:XPLT ) (243-bagger), and Where Food Comes From ( OTCQB:WFCF ) (93-bagger). These companies are still microcaps today. Hindsight is 20/20 and it’s easy to think, “Yeah I would have bought these companies five years ago.” I highly doubt that. If you were to look at these three companies five years ago you wouldn’t have touched them. These companies were literally trading at a $1 million market caps with little fundamental value. Reading their financial reports gave you very little foresight into the future. They weren’t obvious. With many microcaps you have to place your bet before you have full conviction. Earlier in my investment career, I would buy a full position all at once. This works when the company works, but you can lose a lot of money if you are wrong. The biggest change in my strategy is I now prefer to buy a full position over time as my conviction grows and as management executes. My biggest winners were companies where I was constantly averaging up . SN: That’s a wonderful strategy indeed – averaging up on quality stocks as your conviction builds up. Anyways, talking about microcap investing, how are the dynamics here different from say midcap of smallcap investing? Also, what excites you and worries you most in being a microcap investor? IC: Illiquidity is a big driver of outsized returns. It just so happens that most small public companies are illiquid. The main reason for this is larger pools of capital, mainly institutions, can’t invest in small illiquid companies. Even for smaller institutions managing $10-50 million, it is problematic buying a meaningful position. Many small microcaps trade $5,000-10,000-20,000 of volume per day. In addition, taking a $500k, $1m, $2m, position in a company might not move the needle for an institution. Warren Buffett started investing in microcaps, but quickly grew out of the space and was forced to look at bigger companies. Now Buffett admits, he can really only look at the largest 200 companies in the world because it’s the only way to move the needle. The microcap space is always losing its best investors, as they have to invest in bigger companies. Larger, smarter, money can’t invest in microcaps and this creates inefficiency. Accessibility to management is what got me hooked on microcaps. You can’t access management of larger companies. Evaluating microcap management teams are important for two reasons. First, the smaller the company the more you should focus on management and qualitative analysis. CEOs of small microcap companies tend to wear a bunch of hats, so their influence is much greater than larger companies. Microcap investing is really entrepreneurial investing. So not only “can” you talk to management, but you really “need” to talk to management. I’m cautious in saying this because not every small investor should expect to be able to call up and talk to management. The point I’m making is on quarterly conferences calls, etc. take advantage of the opportunity to ask good questions. Second, when you meet with management you gain incredible insight into how the operator thinks and solves problem. I’m looking to invest for the long-term so I need to understand the long-term vision. I’m a concentrated investor in illiquid investments, so you can always find something to worry about. I don’t worry about illiquidity ; I just worry about being right. If I’m right the companies will become liquid. This is why it’s imperative you know your positions better than most. SN: That’s a wonderful insight Ian, i.e., worrying about being right. Thanks for sharing! Anyways, do you believe in the concept of ‘circle of competence’ given your focus on microcap investing where every company might look like a different industry altogether? If yes, how have you built it over the years? IC: Yes, I believe in staying within your circle of competence. From time to time I meander outside my circle of competence and the market teaches me a lesson. Investing is a lifelong education and its teacher is loss. Many of your readers remember what Tom Watson Sr., founder of IBM (NYSE: IBM ) said, “I’m no genius. I’m smart in spots – but I stay around those spots.” There are 11,000+ microcap companies that trade on the U.S./Canadian markets. I personally only look to initially invest in microcaps