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Investors Need To Understand The Risks Of Smart Beta

By Rhea Wessel The low-yield environment has many investors seeking new sources of outperformance. One development has been the growth of so-called smart beta investments, a $400 billion ETF market with a strong flow of funds from both institutions and retail investors. But are such funds really “smart” and do they truly have the potential to boost performance? To answer such questions, CFA Institute Magazine turned to Nick Baturin, CFA , formerly head of portfolio analytics at Bloomberg. He also spoke at the CFA Institute Annual Conference in Frankfurt in 2015. In this interview, Baturin discusses the rise of smart beta, its counterpart “dumb alpha,” and the need for investors to educate themselves about risks in this area. CFA Institute: First of all, what is smart beta? Nick Baturin, CFA : Smart beta investments are funds and ETFs that have a non-traditional weighting scheme that goes beyond cap weighting. There are many different types out there – equal-weighted, inversely risk-weighted, optimized to minimize risk, fundamental-weighted, factor tilts, dividend tilts, and dividend-weighted ETFs. There’s a whole taxonomy out there. The latest entrant in this space is a hybrid product which combines several themes into one. An example is the iShares enhanced index funds. These are active funds and they trade based on some of BlackRock’s research into well-known anomalies – the value anomaly, the quality anomaly, the size anomaly – and they optimize risk as well. They act like an active management quant fund but somewhat simplified. BlackRock does not give you all of their proprietary model insights that they use for their other actively managed quant funds. They give you a dumbed-down version of that. However, they’re also charging lower fees than for their actively managed quant funds. Another thing to note about smart beta indices: They have to rebalance a lot more often than passive buy-and-hold index funds, which are cap-weighted and typically rebalance just once or twice a year. You’ve talked about “dumb alpha.” What is that? There’s a lot of marketing hype going on. When I call smart beta “dumb alpha,” that’s a view that’s somewhat non-traditional. Obviously, it wouldn’t sit well with smart beta fund providers. I call it dumb alpha because traditional quantitative investors have known about these style tilts for several decades. They bet on factors such as value and momentum, quality and size. These have been used in quant investment strategies forever. I call them generic alpha factors rather than proprietary alpha factors. The difference between generic and proprietary is that proprietary cannot be easily replicated. You have some secret sauce, perhaps, at your own firm that only you know about, whereas with a value factor or size or momentum, everyone knows about it. You can implement this in a very straightforward manner. In that sense, it’s dumb alpha because you don’t need any complex implementation engine for it. What I’ve seen with smart beta is partially a marketing effort to rebrand these traditional generic alpha factors as smart beta funds. All they do is give you exposure to these traditional, generic quant factors, but in the ETF wrapper, and they charge a higher fee. So, basically, it’s a rebranding effort in my opinion. Is the higher fee justified? Well, the higher fee can be partially justified by the higher trading costs of these funds. And certain factors do have long-term outperformance records over the market portfolio. But you have to be very judicious. With a smart beta fund, the burden of decision as to what to invest in is no longer on the fund manager. It’s now on the investor. Should smart beta strategies be included in participant retirement plans? Fundamentally weighted funds bet on the value factor, but investors can also get value-factor exposure by investing in the Vanguard Value Fund, which is a cap-weighted fund which also gives you value exposure, but a lot cheaper. You have to be judicious. You cannot expect a retail investor to know the difference between smart beta and stupid beta and to evaluate the cost versus benefit tradeoff. If you call all smart beta ETFs “smart,” that becomes a confusing soup to choose from. You have momentum, you have value, you have quality, you have size; you have fundamental-weighted, risk-weighted. It’s a complicated array of products that is exposing retail investors to a lot more choices. This will take them a long time to learn about. I don’t think they are in a position to really drill down in much detail. Would I include smart beta in participant retirement plans? Possibly, but you have to select low-cost versions implementing well-known ideas that have been demonstrated to work over a long time and in different markets, like a value tilt. That’s a pretty solid factor. That’s one of the best ones out there. Is a fundamentally weighted index a good way to capture that? A fundamental index comes with additional attributes (factor exposures other than value) that are offered as a bundled deal. In that sense, a pure value tilt is probably a better exposure vehicle for retirement plans. If you are a retail investor, you are typically not sophisticated, and you respond to marketing and hype. It’s our job as investment managers to be honest with these investors and really explain performance beyond the hype. They have to know the risks and the rewards of investing in these products, and there are risks. The term smart beta is a great marketing slogan, and it has caught on. What are the risks? You may have a period of massive underperformance of a particular strategy. There’s a lot of academic research that says that actively managed funds collectively underperform passive cap-weighted indices in the long run. Vanguard founder John Bogle thinks that everything that’s not an index fund is a fraud. But does it mean that the market is truly efficient and there are no anomalies? No. There are anomalies. And there are risks – mainly, that any strategy will underperform. Let’s say everybody in the world piles into value strategies. Then value will stop working. The market-cap-weighted index is the only index that can theoretically be held by every investor in the market. You will all get the same exposure. But in the real world, there will always be some winners and some losers. After a lot of dollars flow into these smart beta funds, they will eventually stop working. We’ll have cut off the branch we were sitting on. What’s next in the world of smart beta? I’d say hybrid products that erase the boundary between active management and smart beta are where things are headed. Those are truly multi-factor, risk-aware investment strategies. These haven’t caught on just yet. The largest is just over 100 million in assets. That’s not a lot by the standards of the ETF market. But, nevertheless, these hybrid products that combine several anomalies in a risk-controlled way under one vehicle will become popular. It depends on the performance and the marketing. I think the marketing is a huge aspect of it all. We live in a low-yield environment with investors who are desperate to outperform the traditional indices and asset classes, so I think marketing has a huge role to play in whether or not these hybrid products catch on. What should investors watch out for in smart beta? There are definitely things to watch out for. I’d say don’t start out cold. You’ve got to educate yourself. Beware of risks. Beware of costs. Invest in more robust ideas, like value. Momentum isn’t robust. On that basis, my heart lies with lower-cost solutions that offer you a cheap value tilt. These are traditional cap-weighted value funds. They score highly for me because they are cheap and deliver on that factor tilt. There’s going to be periods of underperformance. At least over the very long term, you stand a chance of outperforming traditional cap-weighted indices. Disclaimer: Please note that the content of this site should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute.

Value Investor Interview: Huzaifa Husain

Note: This interview was originally published in the December 2015 issue of our premium newsletter – Value Investing Almanack (VIA) . Mr. Huzaifa Husain is the Head of Indian Equities at PineBridge Investments based in Mumbai. Since he joined the asset management company in 2004, Mr. Husain has been a key member of the team advising the PineBridge India Equity Fund (a Dublin domiciled India offshore fund). Prior to this, he was an Equity Analyst at Principal Mutual Fund and SBI Mutual Fund. Mr. Husain received a Post Graduate Diploma in Management (PGDM) from Indian Institute of Management (IIM) Bangalore and a B.Tech from the Institute of Technology (Banaras Hindu University). In this interview for the Value Investing Almanack , Mr. Husain shared how he found his calling in value investing, and reveals key insights about his investment strategy and the underlying thought process. Safal Niveshak (SN): Could you tell us a little about your background, how you got interested in investing so much to choose it as a career? Huzaifa Husain (HH): In 1997, when I completed my management education at IIM Bangalore, SBI Mutual Fund offered me a role as an equities analyst. Thus, began my career in equity investing. My management education did not prepare me for equity investing. We were taught how to mathematically manipulate numbers, especially daily stock prices, most of which had no conceptual backing. I remember in my first year on the job, I tried every possible trick – charts, CAPM, etc. – in the textbook to figure out how to predict which stock will do well. I failed miserably. One day a friend of mine told me to read the letters of Warren Buffett. That is possibly the best advice I ever got in my life. After that day, my investment philosophy has relied entirely on understanding the company, the people managing it and its prospects. Stock prices do not have any information other than what one can buy or sell the stock at. SN: Do you believe in the concept of circle of competence? If yes, how have you built it over the years? HH: Yes, of course. The success rate of doing an activity which is within the circle is much higher than that which is outside the circle. The circle is not a rigid one, though, and keeps expanding, albeit rather slowly. My first task in the late nineties was to research equity stocks in the pharmaceutical sector. So, I bought a drug index book and catalogued nearly all major diseases and the drugs used to cure them. These drugs were then mapped onto the companies which produced them to understand company fundamentals. Then, when Indian pharmaceutical companies started targeting generic markets in US in early 2000, I studied the Hatch-Waxman Act, various generic court case judgments, etc., to understand the potential opportunity and risks. Thus, I gained expertise into the pharmaceutical sector. Slowly I expanded it to another industry – telecoms – and studied the various technologies such as CDMA (Code-Division Multiple Access), GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications), etc. I also then brushed up my accounting knowledge as it plays an important part in understanding financials. In those days, there was a heavy debate on ESOP (employee stock ownership plan) accounting in the US and so I read and understood the corresponding accounting standards (FAS 123). Slowly and steadily the circumference of the circle expanded to include more industries, different accounting policies and different ways to evaluate management. The only way the circumference of the circle expands is by constantly accumulating experiences – either directly or by learning from others. SN: What are some of the characteristics you look for in high-quality businesses? HH: A high-quality business should require very little capital but generate a lot of capital and it should be able to maintain these favorable economics for a long time. The reasons for a business to achieve these economics are numerous. Most important is the management’s focus on improving its competitive advantage compared to its peers. A pertinent question here would be why are such practices not copied by others? One big reason is the culture of an organization. A culture of success is not as common as one would assume. There may still be cases where the best efforts of the management to succeed may still come to nothing. This can happen when competitors are irrational. This can also happen when the business itself is very complex. It is easy to estimate the costs and risks of making and selling shoes. It is probably not so easy to estimate the costs and risks of constructing a dam. SN: How do you assess a management’s quality, especially given that disclosure levels are not high and standardized in India? HH: Management quality is assessed on two dimensions – ability and integrity. Ability encompasses the way the management deploys the cash it generates. It could invest back into the business to strengthen the competitive positioning of the business, it could buy another company in the same business, it could invest in a new business or it could buy a company in a different business. One should be able to assess the ability of the management by evaluating the management’s actions of deploying cash. Integrity encompasses the way it treats shareholders. A management with high integrity will return excess cash back to shareholders. It generally would not overstate its financial numbers; most probably, it will understate them by reporting its numbers conservatively. In my experience, there is a high correlation between usage of conservative accounting policies and high integrity. I think disclosure levels in India are generally quite high and I have not faced any problem in judging the past history of management decisions. A simple discipline can be observed here – if the management is not willing to be transparent and honest, move on. SN: Well, let’s talk about valuations. How do you think about them, and how do you differentiate between ‘paying up’ for quality versus ‘overpaying’? HH: Good opportunities in investing are rare. A good opportunity is like searching for a needle in a haystack. One can, of course, wait for a day when there is a strong wind which will blow away the hay and make it very easy to find the needle. But then one has to be very patient as such days are few and far between. On the other hand, one typically will find opportunities to buy either a lousy business at cheap valuations or a good business at fair valuations. I would go for the latter. How much should one pay for a good business? Of course, I do not believe in overpaying because I can always put my money in a fixed deposit without risk. So, one should carefully evaluate various scenarios in which the investment can make money. I can try and put in some numbers for the future, find out cash flows, discount them with the next best alternative rate you can get and finally add a buffer to the price. It is quite educational if one does this simple exercise which some call reverse discounted cash flow (DCF). One important factor in doing this calculation is to make the right assumption of how much capital is required in the business. Generally, a good business which can generate high returns will not require a large amount of capital. Hence, such a business will have to pay the cash out, which means in applying a DCF model, the benefit of compounding will be absent and that would make a huge difference to the value. SN: How do you determine when to exit from a position? Are there some specific rules for selling you have? HH: One would exit for basically two reasons. First, if the original hypothesis itself turns out to be incorrect. One example is when we bought a company which was a market leader in the domestic industry and was generating a lot of cash flows. The industry was growing very fast and so was the company. It was available at reasonable valuations. Then one day, the management decided to take the cash on the books plus take on debt and buy a company internationally which had poor economics. The management thought it could take such a company and make it competitive. Unfortunately, it paid a price which presupposed that it would succeed in doing so. Hence, there was no upside left even if they succeeded. And the existing domestic business cash flows were now being used for this purpose instead of investing in the domestic business which needed enormous capital to grow. Since, this was a ‘game changing’ event, we decided to sell it. Second, something better can be done with the sale proceeds. This is tricky. It requires two decisions – selling an expensive name and buying a cheap name. We do it rarely as we do not think there are so many good companies out there that one can keep churning without lowering the quality of the portfolio. If we do it, we ensure that the valuation differential between the stock being sold and the stock being bought is quite significant. SN: Do you believe in investment checklists? If yes, what are the most important points in your checklist? HH: I do have a checklist. Broadly, there are three main items on my checklist – quality of business, quality of management, and price of the stock. An important aspect of this checklist is that it is applied sequentially. The reason is because a good manager may struggle to generate good profits out of a bad business. Paying a low price for a lousy business may also not turn out great. Hence, only when a business is deemed to have strong economics and quality management, is the price evaluated for attractiveness. SN: Apart from the qualitative factors, what are few of the numbers/ratios you look for while assessing the business quality? HH: A reasonable idea of how much capital is required to run the business is critical. The nature of capital employed – fixed versus working – makes a huge difference to the way the business is run. The returns generated on the capital employed irrespective of the leverage employed will demonstrate the quality of the business. Aggregating 10-20 years of financials gives one a good idea of how the money has been utilized. Cash flow efficiency (cash flow divided by profit) demonstrates the conservative nature of management in reporting their numbers. SN: When you look back at your investment mistakes, were there any common elements of themes? HH: Among the three things I look for in an investment – business, management and price – most mistakes happen in evaluating management. This happens especially if the management does not have a public history which can be evaluated. The typical management behavior which hurts investors is their overconfidence. Business managers rarely will admit that they cannot deploy the cash which the business is generating. They will find some or other use for cash and eventually deploy it in a poor business. Hence, it is best to use a higher threshold for management quality in case the business has historically retained most of the cash it generates. Also, public history of management is a very good guide. Don’t expect the management’s behavior will change because you bought the stock. It almost never will. SN: What tricks do you use to save yourself from behavioural biases? What are the most common behavioural mistakes you make? HH: Most mistakes in investment stem from lack of knowledge. When one is walking in the dark, other senses become heightened. Similarly, when one is operating in the field of investments and one does not know what one is doing, the basic human survival instincts (being with the crowd – herd mentality, avoiding danger – loss aversion, etc.) kick in. These instincts sometimes may mislead one in stock markets which is a massive melting pot of human emotions. Many advocate changing behavioural responses. I think if you try to do that you are up against thousands of years of evolutionary survival strategies. Instead, focusing energies on accumulating knowledge is a more reasonable task. SN: That’s a wonderful insight, so thanks! Any specific behavioural biases that have hurt you the most in your investment career? HH: Nothing specific. Over time, a better understanding of how incentives drive human behavior has helped me decipher the happenings around me. SN: How can an investor improve the quality of his/her decision making? HH: If the investor’s knowledge of the company is among the top 0.001% of people who have some kind of understanding of the company he/she is investing, the chances are that the decisions would be good. Hence, read everything you can lay your hands on relating to the company and its business. We actually do that when we buy a consumer durable or an automobile. I remember even though my father was no engineer, he used to ask people on two wheelers at a traffic signal what the mileage was before buying one. It is absolutely astonishing how much information one can glean if one puts in a slight amount of effort. The next aspect is that the investor should realize markets are not always rational. I feel this is easier said than believed. Investors while buying believe that the price is mispriced but once they have bought they forget that it can remain mispriced for a long time. Many would want the mispricing to be corrected as soon as they complete their purchase. Many would also pat themselves on the back if it does happen. But short-term movements of a market are near random. Hence, be prepared for the worst. For example, the investor should be prepared for a huge drop in the stock price post his purchase. It may or may not happen but if it does, he should be mentally prepared to act rationally. SN: How do you avoid the noise and the overload of information that is available these days? HH: If you carefully analyze the information overload, most of it is very short-term focused. Hence, if the time horizon of the investment is long, one needs to employ a filter which can eliminate short-term noise. After all, a company publishes only one annual report and declares four quarterly results every year. That is not much. SN: How do you think about risk? How do you employ that in your investing? HH: As an equity holder, one would lose all one’s money if the company goes bankrupt. Hence, avoid companies which have large debt loads. Avoid investing in a poor business. It is bad to lose money investing in a poor company. But it is worse to make money investing in them. The reason is, once you make money playing with fire, the chances are you will be attracted to it more often, and sooner rather than later, it will burn. Hence, avoid investing in such companies irrespective of the valuations. Remember no matter how well you think you can guess the future, it will not be as you predict. Hence, be prepared. SN: What’s your two-minute advice to someone wanting to get into stock market investing? What are the pitfalls he/she must be aware of? HH: Making money by equity investing is very difficult. Treat the stock market as a bazaar. Go with a list of things to buy. Make the list at home just as one would make a grocery list based on your nutritional needs. Don’t make decisions by watching the changes in the prices of stocks just as one would not decide to buy lemons because their prices are going up. Spend a lot of time deciding what to put on that list. One way to do it is to inculcate a phenomenal amount of curiosity in researching companies. SN: Which unconventional books/resources do you recommend to a budding investor for learning value investing and multidisciplinary thinking? HH: It is dangerous to read books especially on investing without reading about business history. It may cloud one’s view. Hence, I would recommend all budding investors read annual reports of companies for as far back as they can find. Read them across various companies over various time frames. They should be able to understand how companies have behaved over business cycles, how their valuations have changed, why did they succeed, why did they fail, etc. Once a vast amount of business history is read and understood, all one needs to read are the letters of Buffett and Poor Charlie’s Almanack to build a framework. Beyond that, remember what our vedas say on multidisciplinary thinking – आ नो भद्राः क्रतवो यन्तु विश्वतः (Let noble thoughts come to us from all sides). SN: What a wonderful thought that was! Any non-investment book suggestions you have that can help someone in his overall thinking process? HH: I find books written by Malcolm Gladwell quite interesting. Living Within Limits by Garrett Hardin has many interesting concepts on growth. The Corporation that Changed the World : How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational by Nick Robins literally chronicles the birth of capitalism. Reading judgments from the Supreme Court of India helps one understand how our Constitution works. An example would be the Kesavananda Bharati case which I believe should be a must read for every citizen of India. Reading various government ministries’ annual reports, regulatory reports (RBI as an example), global central banker speeches, global anti-trust filings – all these help one understand how different aspects interact. Finally, a study of human history is quite important. I would recommend Glimpses of World History by Jawaharlal Nehru. SN: Which investor/investment thinker(s) so you hold in high esteem? HH: Warren Buffett. Many have generated good returns in investing, but he has done it over larger and larger sums of money. He has never paid a dividend since 1967. That is what makes him a genius. SN: Hypothetical question: Let’s say that you knew you were going to lose all your memory the next morning. Briefly, what would you write in a letter to yourself, so that you could begin relearning everything starting the next day? HH: Personal life: Everything Professional life: Nothing SN: What other things do you do apart from investing? HH: Spend time with my family. SN: Thank you Huzaifa for sharing your insights with Safal Niveshak readers! HH: The pleasure was mine, Vishal.