Tag Archives: ideas

Investors Continue To Shy Away From Below-Investment-Grade Debt Funds

Mutual fund investors have been voting with their wallets on lower-quality bond funds. Funds in Thomson Reuters Lipper’s High Yield Funds and Loan Participation Funds classifications have seen their coffers shrink on a fairly consistent basis since the second half of last year. The net outflows for each have intensified as of late; High Yield Funds has suffered negative flows in 14 of the last 15 weeks (-$17.5 billion), and Loan Participation Funds is currently in a downward spiral of 22 consecutive weeks of net outflows (-$14.4 billion). This recent activity is the continuation of a longer-term trend; High Yield Funds has not experienced a positive annual net inflow since 2012 (+$21.1 billion), while Loan Participation Funds last took in net new money on an annual basis in 2013 (+$57.4 billion). During this latest run the largest net outflows among the high-yield fund universe belonged to some of the more well-known names in the field. The Ivy High Income Fund (MUTF: IVHEX ) (-$1.3 billion), the American Funds American High-Income Trust (MUTF: AHIFX ) (-$1.1 billion), and the PIMCO High Yield Fund (MUTF: PHLPX ) (-$1.0 billion) all saw over a billion dollars leave the fold. Trailing slightly behind this lead group were the BlackRock High Yield Bond Portfolio (MUTF: BHYAX )(-$911 million) and the JPMorgan High Yield Fund (MUTF: JHYUX ) (-$709 million). Similar to the high-yield fund universe, the most significant net outflows for loan participation funds over the most recent tracking period have been concentrated in a handful of funds. Since the start of the fourth quarter of last year there have been four funds whose negative flows have been significantly greater than the rest of the universe: The Oppenheimer Senior Floating Rate Fund (OOSA) (-$2.0 billion), the Fidelity Advisor Floating Rate High Income Fund (MUTF: FFRHX ) (-$1.3 billion), the RidgeWorth Seix Floating Rate High Income Fund (MUTF: SAMBX ) (-$1.1 billion), and the Eaton Vance Floating-Rate Fund (MUTF: EVBLX ) (-$960 million). Click to enlarge

A New Leading Indicator Of Stock Market Direction

Click to enlarge I just discovered a new leading indicator of U.S. stock market direction, and I’d like your thoughts on its efficacy. The following graph shows the history of the indicator going back to 1998. It forecast the market declines in 2000 and 2008, and is currently forecasting another market correction. A high indicator precedes a market sell-off. A low indicator signals a recovery, and a flat indicator is a predictor of average returns. The returns shown in the graph are the average quarterly returns over the year following the indicator date. They’re rolling 4-quarter averages. Click to enlarge The Indicator I created and maintain the Surz Style Pure indexes that break the stock market into large, middle and small, and within each of these sizes into value, core and growth. Morningstar style boxes use a similar approach, and were introduced several years after I launched my indexes. My index definition for large companies is the top 65% of the market. I sort the 6000 companies in the U.S. stock market by capitalization and start adding until I get to 65% of the total capitalization. I’ve recently noted that the breakpoint for large companies has recently reached its highest point ever – $22 billion. A large company, by my definition, is currently above $22 billion. There are currently 227 U.S. companies that meet this rule, with total capitalization of $16 trillion, which is 65% of the $25 trillion total market size. This large company breakpoint is the indicator shown in the graph above. It has successfully predicted the last two market cycles, and is signaling that a major market decline started last year with more to come. This supports my prediction for a 19% loss in 2016 based on pure fundamentals. So why does this breakpoint indicator work, and most importantly will it work this time? Here are some possible explanations: Mega cap market domination is cyclical, and the (capitalization-weighted) market goes where the mega caps go. It’s just another measure of overpricing, big companies becoming too expensive. Investors flee to the safety of big companies when they’re worried, and worry ultimately turns into panic. It’s not a leading indicator at all. The apparent correlations are spurious. What do you think? Have I stumbled onto something? What is it telling us about 2016? Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

The New Definition Of Investment Manager Success: How To Tell Who’s Winning

It’s become self-evident recently that peer groups suffer from “loser bias” because the majority of active managers underperform their benchmark. Beating the losers is not a “win.” Peer group comparisons simply don’t work anymore. Beating the benchmark is a good beginning, especially when combined with a statistical test of significance called a “Success Score.”. If intermediaries continue to use peer groups, as is likely the case, investors will continue to be disappointed because they’ll continue to hire losers. In the “good old days,” investment managers had two shots at winning. They could beat their index or they could beat the median manager in their peer group. That peer group thing doesn’t work anymore. Due to the popularity of passive ETFs and the emergence of Robo Advisors, there is only one pertinent yardstick – beating the benchmark. Unfortunately , less than 20% of active managers achieve this measure of success. This active manager failure renders peer groups worse than useless. It is now well-understood that peer groups suffer from “loser bias,” in addition to survivor and classification biases. Loser bias is the reality that more than 80% of the managers in a peer group are losers since they fail to beat their benchmarks. Beating the losers is like winning the prize for best ballerina in Waco. Investors need to demand better. So the new definition of “success” is beating the benchmark, but there’s more to winning than this simple measure. We want to know that success is not just luck, that it is likely to repeat in the future. That’s where statistics and “Success Scores” come in. We call it a “win” if the outperformance of the benchmark is statistically significant. Success Scores are the statistical significance of benchmark outperformance. A facsimile of a peer groups is created by forming all the portfolios that could be formed from the stocks in the index. A ranking against these Success Scores in the top decile is significant at the 90% confidence level – we can be 90% sure that it wasn’t just luck. Success Scores are bias free and available a day or two after quarter end. It’s not enough to beat the benchmark. An investment manager needs to beat his benchmark by a significant amount to be a true winner. Success Scores are especially worthwhile for hedge fund managers since peer groups of hedge funds are just plain silly. The tradition of disappointment in active managers will continue if clients (investors) allow it to continue. Clients deserve better,but they need to know how to get it. Investors need to understand their advisor’s due diligence process and to be concerned if it includes peer group comparisons. In other words, investors should seek out advisors who employee contemporary due diligence tools if they are relying on their advisor to select good investment managers. Here are some facts every investor should know: Based on Dr. William F. Sharpe’s “Arithmetic of Active Management”, 50% of active managres should beat their benchmark. The fact is only 20% beat their benchmark, far below expectations. The search for “alpha” uses regression analysis. “Alpha” is the Greek letter for the intercept. It is well-documented that it takes at least 50 years for a manager with “average” skill to deliver a statistically significant alpha. By contrast, “Success Scores” can provide significance for very short periods, like one year. 70% of managers are active, not passive. Towers Watson, a prestigious investment consulting firm, says this number should be closer to 30%. There are too many active managers. Approximately 40% of funds in a peer group don’t belong because they’re different. This problem is called Classification bias. For hedge fund peer groups, most funds don’t belong because hedge funds are unique, which by definition means without peers. Knowledge is power. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.