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Don’t Ride The Roller Coaster, Bet On It

With global markets (esp. EM) stumbling, the upcoming FOMC meeting, political instability worldwide, and weak US domestic data, it may be time to bet on an increase in volatility. September through December are going to be some of the most volatile months in the year. Several options for investors: ETFs/ETNs that track volatility, such as TVIX, VXX, UVXY, derivative strategies, or going bearish/long-term on stocks. What a summer it’s been and September is only half-way over. Just overnight (as of Sept. 14th, 2015), Asian markets dipped again on poor economic data, with the mainland Shanghai Composite (SHCOMP) ending on -2.67% (at one point, nearly falling under 3k) and the Nikkei Index falling under 18k at -1.63%. Unfortunately, for international investors, this is not news . With the stock market crash that started in June and the subsequent desperate attempts by the Chinese authorities to prevent the crisis from getting any worse, everyone can at least agree on one thing: the ‘Asian century’ is faltering (for the brief three decades that it lasted) and the annual 8% GDP growth figures are a thing of the past. And considering China’s is a pseudo-market system run by an aging regime that grew up out of the throes of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, recent events should come as a surprise to no one. From the real estate sector to the financials sector, China has been one giant bubble bound to burst. Below is the SHCOMP 1yr with Jean-Paul Rodrigue’s ‘phases of a bubble’ superimposed. (Source: Bloomberg Business) As to be expected, capital investment has been pouring out of China as illustrated below. And China’s isn’t the only market international investors need to be worried about. All of the emerging markets, especially the BRICS, are going to be very volatile. Between Brazil’s immense debt and failing presidency or Russia’s falling ruble and dependence on oil , emerging markets are going to be in quite a lot of pain in the coming months, especially since central banks are running out of options as most have already exhausted their QE (quantitative easing) measures. (Source: JPMorgan) (Source: Reuters & NASDAQ) Speaking of central banks, on September 16th-17th, the Feds will finally meet, in what was probably one of the anticipated and over-analyzed FOMC meetings in recent times, to discuss the results of their votes on a Fed rate hike. As grossly aggrandized as the possibility of a rate hike has been, it is an important element to consider, especially since EM countries gobbled up so much dollar-denominated debt back when it was cheap. Not only that, but the private-sector credit to GDP gaps in EM countries is growing fast; China’s alone is off 25.4% from its long-term trend, the highest of any major country, with Turkey and Brazil following close behind with 16.6% and 15.7%, respectively, far above the recommended ratio of less than 10%. A rate hike, which the CME Group predicts is a 75% probability for the upcoming meeting, is going to add to the enormous strain that the financial sectors of these countries will face. All of these factors piling up seem to spell doom-and-gloom for the rest of the world, but what of the U.S.? Well, to the excitement of the Fed, employment data, which was a serious concern during the 2008 financial crisis, is looking more and more positive month after month. As of August, the official unemployment rate fell to 5.1%, with some officials celebrating the return to ‘full unemployment’ levels . However, despite all the jubilation, productivity and actual GDP growth is still lagging way behind. Macroeconomic expert Chris Varvares estimates that “capital-equipment, software and buildings-per worker has grown just 0.3% a year so far this decade, by far the worst in at least 40 years.” Thus, real wages are also stagnant, as the yearly change rate is still hovering around 0-2% . With less cash to spend and winter months approaching, American consumers are not going to be rushing to get in line for Wal-Mart’s Black Friday sales, they’re going to be running to the banks to deposit and save. Great news for the banks, but bad news for consumption which drives the American economy. So, with the general consensus being that emerging markets will suffer greatly in the short-term at least, and that American consumer confidence and demand will slow as well, what does that mean for the average investor? Volatility. To determine volatility is to simply measure the size of changes in a security’s value over time, e.g. a higher volatility means larger fluctuations in a stock’s price in a short timespan. Volatility means different things to different people, that is, central bankers, for example, work to keep volatility at a minimum as part of their Dual Mandate to keep the prices of goods and services stable. However, speculators willing to take the risks involved can profit greatly from volatility…in the same way someone betting at the horse races can profit greatly betting on a lame horse, if you have the magic of foresight and/or are very lucky. But in all seriousness, certain investors can benefit in taking a smart position in indices which track volatility. (Source: Bank of International Settlements) (Source: Yahoo Finance) One such index tracker is the VelocityShares Daily 2x VIX Short-Term ETN (NASDAQ: TVIX ) which tracks two times the daily performance of the S&P’s 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index. The iPath S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures ETN (NYSEARCA: VXX ) and the ProShares Ultra VIX Short-Term Futures ETF (NYSEARCA: UVXY ) are more bearish options with lesser expense ratios (0.89% and 0.95% v.s. TVIX’s 1.65%) and there are even more options, such as inverse VIX ETFs (which are essentially the opposite, i.e. betting on stability). Now , before you get your contrarian pitchforks out, there are some points that I will concede. I think Dan Moskowitz of Investopedia puts it best – “the only way to win playing TVIX is by having impeccable timing.” Going long TVIX is a sure-fire way to lose money as common sense dictates high volatility is not a permanent condition. Even further, on the contrarian side of things, TVIX has depreciated 99.97% since its 2010 debut, 77.92% over the past year! Clearly, it is a very risky game to play, yes (but so is the lottery and that’s a multi-billion dollar industry). However , the timing is perfect now. With all the recent domestic political turmoil across the world, emerging markets crashing, and the Fed signaling a tightening of monetary policy, I cannot see, save for a miracle from the Feds, the markets getting by unscathed without a few twists and turns. And speculators would seem to agree with this. According to the CTFC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission), as of Sept. 1st, speculators achieved an all-time record of net long VIX futures contracts, with 32,239 contracts added, double the previous record set in early February and the largest ever bet on a rise in the VIX. This is very significant; even the contrarians who would immediately disregard it and go bullish on stocks in spite have to admit that. (Source: J. Lyons Fund Management Inc.) For the average investor out there (such as myself) staying long on stocks and bonds, sticking to ETFs, or cashing out may be some of the best options available to avoid getting strung along for the ride as the markets reel and spiral. But for you aspiring speculators, hedge fund managers, or simple millionaires, this might be a very profitable time to be betting on increased volatility. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

PCI: High Yield (10.5%), Historic Discount (14.6%), But An Uneven Recent Record

Summary PCI is the largest CEF by market cap in the taxable income category. PCI is paying a distribution yield of 10.5% and is priced at a historically low discount. The fund has suffered along with its category over the past year. Investors might ask if there is now value here. I began this series exploring taxable income CEFs with an overview of 105 CEFs in this category where I showed that the funds had been battered by the market, often well in excess of changes in net asset values. Some funds had cut distributions and the broad data suggest that others may follow. I am following up on that overview with a look at specific funds in the category. First up was the PIMCO Dynamic Income Fund (NYSE: PDI ) which I consider to be the best in the class in today’s skewed market. With this installment, I want to look at its sibling fund, the PIMCO Dynamic Credit Income Fund (NYSE: PCI ), which like many siblings, is fundamentally similar but distinctly different. I refer to the two funds as siblings because they share a similar lineage. They are young funds (May 2012 for PDI, Jan 2013 2013 for PCI) and the most recent additions to the PIMCO CEF line. The funds have similar sounding objectives, but unlike many sibling funds, come have at their objectives quite differently although there are signs that they are coming be more alike as they weather tough times in their category. Where PDI stood out as being at or very near the upper reaches of the group for many key metrics, PCI does not fare nearly as well. This chart shows its percent rank among the funds for various market characteristics. (click to enlarge) Figure 1 . PCI percent rank among 105 taxable, fixed-income CEFs. Liquidity This is an area where PCI outscored PDI but only by minor amounts. It is the category leader for market cap and ranks 3rd of the 105 funds considered for trading volume. But either fund has as much liquidity as one is likely to find among closed end funds. Discount Discount is a second category where PCI turns in a better number than PDI, at least in terms of absolute value. Its discount (-14.64%) ranks 65 of the 105 funds which have a median discount of -13.2%. The fact that a fund can be that deep into discount territory and still be outpaced by 1//3 of the category’s funds shows how difficult times have been for taxable income CEFs. The discount/premium Z-scores show us that this discount is not only deep, it is much deeper than its average value has been over the last 3, 6 or 12 months. (click to enlarge) Figure 2 . PCI Z-Scores for PDI and median values for the category. The discount has been on an expanding trend since early in 2014. Indeed, at its current value, PCI’s discount is at an historic low for the fund. (click to enlarge) Figure 3 . PDI Premium/Discount since inception (end month values). Discounts are without question appealing, and historically low discounts can be especially appealing, but one does not — or, I should say, should not — buy a CEF on the basis of discount alone. Distributions Fixed income CEFs are designed to provide regular income to their shareholders. Most pay out a stable distribution and managers are generally reluctant to reduce those distribution. To a large extend investors value the funds on the basis of those distributions. Here again, PCI is turning in better numbers than PDI. Its distribution at NAV is 8.98% (75% percentile for the category), slightly above PDI’s 8.72%. Its deeper discount pushes the distribution to shareholders well above PDI’s. It is currently paying 10.52% on the basis of its regular distribution; PDI pays 9.53%. The regular distribution currently stands at $ 0.16406/share. It was increased for the September 2015 payment from $ 0.15625/share a value that had been constant from the fund’s inception. This is a 5% increase. PCI has also paid out a special distribution in each of its two years of operation. In 2013 it was $0.36 and for 2014 it was $0.60. If one considers the special distribution, current distribution yield through the past twelve months is 13.14% which would place PCI at the 97%tile of the category. Figure 4. PCI. Regular and special distributions since inception. Of course the difference between the regular distribution at 10.52% and the regular plus full distribution of 13.14% is considerable, but is not predictive for future yield from the fund. The special distributions are special and variable. An investor cannot count on them. One indicator of expectations for a year-end special distribution is undistributed net investment income (UNII). This is where PDI excels, but PCI falls short. Cefconnect list PCI as having -$0.0656 in UNII. Not enough to cause real concern, but it is in negative territory which would indicate that a large year-end special distribution based on excess income will not be forthcoming in 2015. Summing up the distribution situation, PCI has an exceptionally high distribution yield driven in part by its large discount. It looks sustainable at this time. On the surface it is higher than that of PDI but when one considers the history and likelihood of special distributions in the mix, PDI is returning a greater yield. The other significant aspect of UNII is that it is a predictor of distribution stability and sustainability. This is obvious from the recent fall of the PIMCO High Income Fund (NYSE: PHK ) as documented in this recent article on Seeking Alpha . If you are concerned about the stability of distributions for any CEFs you may hold or be researching, I refer you to the cases explored there. Where PDI is at the top of the category for UNII/Distribution, PCI is only at the 37%tile. This has not prevented managers from raising PCI’s distribution, so I’m not inclined to see it as an indicator that the fund’s distribution is in trouble. If I were holding PCI I would be watching this metric carefully in the coming months. Fund Performance Actual return is a interesting facet of CEFs. On one hand there is return to an investor, which is the market return. On the other there is return on NAV which is the true indicator of how a fund is performing. Premium/discount status determines the differences between the two. PCI has outperformed only 38-39% of the category’s funds for total return on market price and NAV for the past year. This is far from an encouraging performance record, particularly when one considers that it has not been a good year for fixed-income. The median fund has a total return on NAV for the trailing twelve months of -0.2% and at market price it’s -5.98%. For PCI 1yr return on price is -7.2%. These returns show make an investor wary of PCI at this time. If tough times persist in fixed income, and there is ample reason to believe they might, declines in price (both at market and NAV) may continue to erode value for the fund’s investors. Add the fact of negative UNII (slight, but negative nonetheless) and PCI’s high yield begins to look much less attractive. I’ve been focused on PCI relative to PDI and the other funds in its category. I’ll now turn attention to PCI itself. What is the fund about. PDI has been operating for a bit over 30 months (inception date: 29 Jan 2013). It has a category-leading total net assets of $2.57B and its effective leverage of 42.44% is higher than all but one fund in the taxable income category. Management fees and other expenses are 1.382% excluding interest expense and 1.501% with interest costs (data from Pimco ). Morningstar compares its performance to Barclays US Aggregate Bond Total Return and its Multisector Bond category. It lists only 2014 and 2015 (YTD) comparisons and the fund underperformed in 2014 but is doing relatively well YTD. Fund Characteristics PCI has a broad investment mandate but is somewhat more focused than PDI. From the sponsor’s website : The fund will normally invest at least 50% of its net assets in corporate income-producing securities of varying maturities issued by U.S. or foreign (non-U.S.) corporations or other business entities, including emerging market issuers. Corporate income-producing securities include fixed-, variable- and floating-rate bonds, debentures, notes and other similar types of corporate debt instruments, such as preferred shares, convertible securities, bank loans and loan participations and assignments, payment-in-kind securities, zero-coupon bonds, bank certificates of deposit, fixed time deposits and bankers’ acceptances, stressed debt securities, structured notes, and other hybrid instruments. As for types of investments: The fund will normally invest at least 80% of its net assets (plus any borrowings for investment purposes) in a portfolio of debt instruments of varying maturities. The fund will normally invest at least 25% of its total assets (i.e., concentrate) in privately issued (commonly known as “non-agency”) mortgage-related securities.: And, “The Fund may normally invest up to 40% of its total assets in securities of issuers economically tied to emerging market countries. This definition is broad and flexible. Its successes or failures will depend on the abilities of management to handle that flexibility. Most of the management team (Daniel Ivascyn, Sai S. Devabhaktuni, Mark Kiesel, Elizabeth O. MacLean and Alfred Murata) has been place since the fund’s inception. Fund documents state that the fund “will normally maintain an average portfolio duration of between zero and eight years.” This is identical to PDI and Morningstar lists effective duration at 2.27 (unadjusted) and 3.91 (adjusted for leverage) which is about a half year longer than comparable durations for PDI. No information is provided on the portfolio’s credit quality. The fund’s holding by sector allocation on market value is (from the PIMCO website): This sector breakdown varies form that of PDI in one important element; PDI has twice as much of its portfolio in mortgage securities. For PDI mortgage securities comprise 2/3 of the portfolio; for PCI it is only 1/3 but that is a substantial increase in the last four months. I last looked at the two funds in May 2015. At that time PCI held only 0.11% in mortgage-back securities. Another change since May is in the geographic distribution of the fund’s portfolio. This chart from the May article shows where PCI was positioned at that time: Figure 5 . PCI. Geographical distribution of the fund’s portfolio in May 2015 (taken from Is It Time To Sell These PIMCO Closed-End Funds? ). Compare this distribution to the current distribution shown in the table below. The current geographical breakdown of the portfolio from Morningstar is: In less than 4 months time the portfolio has been repositioned to strongly favor U.S. bonds, while U.K. and Canada exposure has dropped precipitously from 3/8 of the portfolio to less than 4%. Brazil and Ireland did not even show up in May, now they represent more than 5% of the portfolio. This comparison illustrates the dynamic nature of PCI’s portfolio management. Brazilian bonds are currently the largest holding in the portfolio. With the recent downgrading of Brazil’s sovereign debt to junk status, management’s move into the sector may have been less than timely. The fund’s top 10 holdings sorted from PIMCO’s downloadable spreadsheet are: PCI shares the same risk factors facing PDI in the coming months. Interest rate risk with the on-going anxiety over rising interest rates is primary. The meltdown in emerging markets is also a factor. Each has been weighing on the space for some time. Together they have taken their toll on the fund’s NAV returns and, more severely, on the fund’s returns to investors at market. I do not expect the inevitable uptick in interest rates to be characterized by sudden and markedly disruptive increases. Rather I expect gradual changes that a well managed fund should be able to handle. Indeed, as rates do begin to rise, I would prefer to have my fixed-income allocation positioned to emphasize proven management. PCI’s managers have decreased duration over the past year and “has an outright short on the long-end of the curve” (June 30, 2015 Quarterly Commentary). I have been holding a position in PCI. While I am confident that the fund will continue to deliver excellent income I am concerned about the declines in principal and for the near-term future of the category itself. I am not concerned about the stability or sustainability of the distribution and am encouraged in this view by the small but meaningful increase in that distribution this month. The historically low discount is only of interest to a new buyer, and a new buyer may find value there. To someone holding the fund with no inclination to add to the position, the increasingly deep discount is more of a frustration. In summary, I will continue to hold the fund but if I were considering a new position in a taxable income CEF, I would be more likely to go with PDI, its older sibling, at this time. Disclosure: I am/we are long PCI, PDI. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: I remind readers that this article does not constitute investment advice. I am passing along the results of my research on the subject. Any investor who finds these results intriguing will certainly want to do all due diligence to determine if any investment mentioned here is suitable for his or her portfolio. As always I welcome your comments and critiques, particularly from those readers who have contrary opinions.

How To Avoid The Worst Style ETFs: Q3’15

Summary The large number of ETFs has little to do with serving your best interests. Below are three red flags you can use to avoid the worst ETFs. The following presents the least and most expensive style ETFs as well as the worst overall style ETFs per our Q3’15 Style ratings. Question: Why are there so many ETFs? Answer: ETF providers tend to make lots of money on each ETF so they create more products to sell. The large number of ETFs has little to do with serving your best interests. Below are three red flags you can use to avoid the worst ETFs: Inadequate Liquidity This issue is the easiest issue to avoid, and our advice is simple. Avoid all ETFs with less than $100 million in assets. Low levels of liquidity can lead to a discrepancy between the price of the ETF and the underlying value of the securities it holds. Plus, low asset levels tend to mean lower volume in the ETF and larger bid-ask spreads. High Fees ETFs should be cheap, but not all of them are. The first step here is to know what is cheap and expensive. To ensure you are paying at or below average fees, invest only in ETFs with total annual costs below 0.46%, which is the average total annual cost of the 281 U.S. equity style ETFs we cover. Figure 1 shows the most and least expensive Style ETFs. QuantShares provides 2 of the most expensive ETFs while Schwab ETFs are among the cheapest. Figure 1: 5 Least and Most Expensive Style ETFs (click to enlarge) Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings Investors need not pay high fees for quality holdings. The i Shares Enhanced U.S. Large-Cap ETF (NYSEARCA: IELG ) earns our Very Attractive rating and has low total annual costs of only 0.08%. On the other hand, the Schwab U.S. Small-Cap ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHA ) holds poor stocks. No matter how cheap an ETF, if it holds bad stocks, its performance will be bad. The quality of an ETFs holdings matters more than its price. Poor Holdings Avoiding poor holdings is by far the hardest part of avoiding bad ETFs, but it is also the most important because an ETFs performance is determined more by its holdings than its costs. Figure 2 shows the ETFs within each style with the worst holdings or portfolio management ratings . Note that there are no ETFs in the All Cap Growth and All Cap Value style under coverage. Figure 2: Style ETFs with the Worst Holdings (click to enlarge) Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings Ark, iShares, and Guggenheim appear more often than any other providers in Figure 2, which means that they offer the most ETFs with the worst holdings. Our overall ratings on ETFs are based primarily on our stock ratings of their holdings. The Danger Within Buying an ETF without analyzing its holdings is like buying a stock without analyzing its business and finances. Put another way, research on ETF holdings is necessary due diligence because an ETF’s performance is only as good as its holdings’ performance. PERFORMANCE OF ETF’s HOLDINGs = PERFORMANCE OF ETF Disclosure: David Trainer and Max Lee receive no compensation to write about any specific stock, style, or theme . Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.