Tag Archives: etfs

Why Hasn’t Active Investing Outperformed Passive Investing In Recent Years?

By Jason Voss, CFA Over the last several months, I’ve explored why active investing has been unable to outperform passive investing in recent years. My series is called Alpha Wounds, and so far, the issues covered are the unintended consequences of benchmarks on active management, the poor measurement techniques of investment industry adjuncts, and the lack of diversity in the human resources portfolio . In this week’s CFA Institute Financial NewsBrief , we decided to ask our readers their explanation for the lack of active management outperformance. Rare for our polls, we included a large number of options to try and capture a wide swathe of opinions. The options provided appear to have successfully reflected the broad range of views, as 90% of the 743 respondents selected one of the specific choices rather than “other”. Because it is difficult to know the precise reason for choosing the “other” category, it makes sense to recalculate the percentages without including “other”. These modified results are the ones listed in parentheses below. Note: We did receive one e-mailed response from a reader who opted for “other”. The reader explained, “I marked ‘other’ [because] the market is illogical, so trying to apply logic is bound to fail.” Why has active investing been unable to outperform passive investing in recent years? (click to enlarge) Active Managers Can Do Nothing to Outperform About 24% (27%) of respondents believe that the reason for active management’s underperformance is the deleterious effects of high fees on net performance . This is not surprising, given the large number of studies highlighting this fact. Many asset management firms are, in fact, trying to reduce their expenses to mitigate this alpha drag. Another 15% (16.5%) believe that individual investment managers cannot compete with the wisdom of financial markets. Combined, this means that about 40% (43.5%) believe that no matter what active managers do, they cannot beat passive investment strategies. Active Managers Can Do Something to Outperform Of the remaining five options, 10% (10.8%) believe that the concentration of top stocks in indices detracts from the success of active managers. For those not familiar with the argument, it recognizes that indices have built in momentum effects because many of them are market capitalization-weighted. Indices are, effectively, “must buy” lists of securities that create demand, not because of fundamentals, but because passive strategists must buy the securities in order to closely track their index. Controlling for these momentum effects is outside the specific capabilities of active managers as security prices advance. When indices fall, however, active managers not invested intimately with the securities in the index should be able to avoid some of the downside. What hope do active managers have of beating passive strategies? Together, the four remaining options provide some insight. Most importantly, according to 18% (20.2%) of respondents, active managers should minimize their use of benchmarking, style boxes, and tracking error, which lead to a sameness of results. Next, 13% (14.7%) believe that active managers are guilty of short-termism and need to change their investment time horizon and lower turnover. Incidentally, lowering turnover reduces trading costs and will reduce the expense ratio of active funds. Increasing diversity of opinion in active management is believed by about one in 20 respondents (5.5%) to be critical for improving success. Lastly, approximately 5% (5.2%) of those polled think that active managers should improve their due diligence to better compete with passive strategies. Active vs. Passive Tug-of-War Taken together, the above four tactics, all well within the purview of active management, represent about 46% of total responses as compared with the roughly 44% of responses from those who believe active strategies can never beat passive ones. This result indicates a tug-of-war between camps and, to my mind, reflects the conversation occurring in the financial community in the long-running active vs. passive debate. Disclaimer: All posts are the opinion of the author. As such, they should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute or the author’s employer.

Following The Smart Money For Asian Stocks Beyond 13Fs

Summary Filing form 13F, the reporting of holdings for institutional investment managers with investment discretion over $100 million or more in stocks, is unique to the U.S. It is possible to utilize a piggybacking strategy for idea generation in Asia, if you know who and how to follow. I utilize a 360-degree idea generation process via screens, insider trades, 13Fs, fund manager letters, analyst reports, blogs, forums among others. Following The Smart Money In Asia In the U.S., institutional investment managers with investment discretion over $100 million or more in stocks have to file 13Fs declaring their holdings (long only) with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission within 45 days of every quarter. This has indirectly made the investment strategy of cloning the portfolios of well-known and successful fund managers a reality. Even for investors who do not believe in replicating the positions of their favorite investors in full, they might still generate potential investment ideas by taking a peek at the investors’ holdings. Since I invest in both Asian and U.S. stocks, I have always thought about the possibility of applying certain aspects of this piggybacking strategy in the Asian context and this is precisely the focus of this article. In the sections below, I will provide a few examples of generating Asian stock ideas by following the smart money. That being said, it is intriguing that while I generated most of my stock ideas via quantitative screens, my investments and calls were validated to a large extent by similar positions that other fund managers and investors held. I will share some of these past and current stock ideas below. Following U.S. Investors Vested In Asian Stocks An increasing number of U.S. funds are investing in Asia-listed stocks. While they do not have to file 13Fs for these non-U.S. holdings, it is possible to uncover these hidden gems by reviewing mutual funds’ shareholder reports and hedge funds’ investor letters (assuming that they are accessible). Let me illustrate this with some examples. Oriental Watch Holdings Ltd ( OTC:ORWHF ) (0398.HK) was the first Asia-listed stock which I wrote about here on Seeking Alpha. Oriental Watch simply just appeared on my net-net screens one day, and it appeared to be attractive given its long-term profitability and dividend track record and the value of its self-owned properties. I was not alone in my views on Oriental Watch. Tweedy Browne, Benjamin Graham’s former broker which subsequently made its foray into fund management as a classic Graham value manager (read “The Little Book Of Value Investing” by Christopher Browne if you are interested about understanding the firm’s investment philosophy), first disclosed its stake in the stock in its Q3 2013 commentary , and referred to it as “a luxury retailer and a classic Ben Graham net current asset microcap stock, which at purchase was trading at two-thirds of its net cash and inventories.” As of June 30, 2015, Tweedy, Browne Global Value Fund and Tweedy, Browne Global Value Fund II held 7,364,000 and 3,348,000 shares of Oriental Watch, respectively. Other Hong Kong-listed stocks currently held by Tweedy Browne include Great Eagle Holdings Ltd ( OTCPK:GEAHF ) (41 HK), Hengdeli Holdings Ltd ( OTCPK:HENGY ) (3389 HK), Miramar Hotel & Investment ( OTC:MMHTF ) (71 HK) and Tai Cheung Holdings Ltd ( OTC:TAICY ) (88 HK). Tweedy Browne also holds shares in a Japanese net-net, Shinko Shoji ( OTCPK:SKSJF ) (8141 JP), which I briefly wrote about here . Besides reading investor letters and shareholder reports of U.S. funds investing globally, one can also follow individual fund managers on their social media platforms such as blogs. Travis Wiedower, Managing Director of Wiedower Capital, a small value-oriented investment firm, writes a blog (called Egregiously Cheap) and he recently wrote an article titled “Oriental Watch: Deep Value at its Finest”. In the article, Travis refers to Oriental Watch as a “company selling for ~35% of liquidation value that has a clear route back to profitability.” This is the first Asia-listed stock that Travis has written about, and I hope he can share more such ideas in the future! Following Asian Fund Managers Directly Asian mutual funds will disclose their holdings periodically in quarterly or semi-annual shareholder reports, which are typically available on their respective websites. For Asian hedge funds, I will be on the lookout for any interviews that the fund managers have done or investor letters that they have made available. Ronald Chan will probably be a familiar name to my readers. Ronald Chan is the author of the book “The Value Investors: The Lessons From The World’s Top Fund Managers, which I have quoted a couple of times in my previous articles. Ronald is also the author of another book “Behind the Berkshire Hathaway Curtain: Lessons from Warren Buffett’s Top Business Leaders,” where he interviewed the top managers of Berkshire Hathaway’s subsidiaries. It is obvious from these two books that Ronald is a value investor; he is currently the Chief Investment Officer of Chartwell Capital based in Hong Kong, which he started in 2007. In a Barron’s interview published in November 2014, Ronald spoke about some of his holdings, including Oriental Watch (I am using the same stock as an example to illustrate that implementing a piggybacking strategy in Asia is more difficult compared with the U.S., but not impossible if one knows where to look). Ronald has this to say about Oriental Watch: Oriental Watch is a classic Benjamin Graham example where its assets are trading much higher than its market cap. Its market cap is about HKD900 million. Its retail properties are worth HKD650 million. The watch inventory, which is 70% Rolex, has a value of HKD1.8 billion. Add cash, minus debt, I think it’s worth HKD2.4 billion. I can sleep at night because I know that it has good inventory and the retail locations that are worth a fortune. This is a classic asset-driven, asset-backed idea which no one looks at! In his interview with Barron’s, Ronald also highlighted the following Asian stocks: Hyundai ( OTC:HYMPY ) (005380.KS), Kia ( OTC:KIMTF )(000270.KS), Central China Real Estate (832 HK) and Dynam Japan Holdings Co. Ltd. ( OTC:DJPHF ) (6889 HK), a Magic Formula stock which I wrote about here . Cederberg Capital is another Asian fund that I follow. On its website , Cederberg Capital outlines its investment approach as follows: “Cederberg Capital utilizes a disciplined value-oriented approach in order to protect capital during periods of market declines and to maximize returns in the long run.” In Cederberg Greater China Equity Fund’s Q2 2015 letter, Managing Director Dawid Krige also commented on the firm’s investment philosophy: We are value investors at heart. However, we aren’t looking for Ben Graham’s “net-nets” or the “cigar butts” of the early-Buffett years. In our experience “cheap” often stays cheap in China, hence we are better off buying undervalued quality, i.e. good businesses managed by trustworthy people. We love growth, if through our research we can gain confidence about the likelihood it will be realised. However, we are careful not to overpay for growth, hence we always insist on a significant margin of safety, regardless of a company’s growth potential. Past and present investments that Cederberg Capital has profiled or commented on in its letters include Kweichow Moutai (600519 CH), which owns the top Maotai liquor brand in China, and Clear Media ( OTC:CRMLY ) (100 HK). Clear Media was a past investment of mine which I successfully exited with a 80% return in 14 months in August 2014, inclusive of a special dividend. Clear Media was an outdoor media company with dominant bus-shelter advertising network; it boasted an unique mix of deep value and wide moat characteristics. At the point of my purchase, Clear Media traded at 3x EV/EBITDA, with net cash accounting for close to half of market capitalization. Its business and attractive returns on capital were protected by high barriers to entry due to local regulatory approvals required for construction and maintenance of bus shelters. However, it is unfortunate (for investors like us) that Cederberg Capital has decided to “limit discussions of existing holdings to protect our intellectual property and to mitigate any behavioral biases, though we will continue to discuss investments we’ve exited in future letters.” Nevertheless, I look forward to reading Cederberg Capital’s future letters to learn about the firm’s past “case studies.” Replicating Guru Investors’ Potential Buys In Asia Via Quantitative Screening Walter Schloss is one of the deep value investors that I admire and seek to emulate, particularly considering that he has the longest and most consistent investment track records among his peers. However, it is regrettable that Walter Schloss stopped managing money in 2001 (partly due to the fact that cheap U.S. stocks became hard to find), and he never invested in Japan or Asian stocks given concerns over differences in politics, language and regulations. Nevertheless, I thought hard about what Walter Schloss could have potentially bought in Asia if he applied his stock selection criteria for U.S. In an article titled “Walter Schloss’ Japan Shopping List For Deep-Value Stocks” published here , I did a screen based on Schloss’ 16-point “investment checklist” and found 20 Japanese stocks and 299 Asian stocks that will meet his stock selection criteria of trading near historical share price lows, being valued at a discount to net asset value and having debt-to-equity ratios below 1. Looking ahead, I plan to try to replicate other investors’ investment strategies in Asia using screens and sharing the results with my readers and subscribers. Concluding Thoughts Personally, I don’t subscribe to the view of cloning any investor’s portfolio lock, stock and barrel, even for U.S. stocks. The reason is that there are various complications involved with piggybacking such as time lag, average purchase cost and portfolio sizing. In the Asian context, a complete cloning approach is even more risky, considering that it is more difficult to track any individual fund manager’s exact holdings and buy/sell history with reasonable accuracy. Instead, I advocate that investors use fund managers’ holdings as either an idea generation tool or an alternative form of validation of one’s original investment thesis. Note: I utilize a 360-degree process to generate investment ideas, including screens, insider trades, 13Fs, fund manager letters, analyst reports, blogs, forums among others. Subscribers to my Asia/U.S. Deep-Value Wide-Moat Stocks exclusive research service get full access to the list of deep-value & wide moat investment candidates and value traps, including “Magic Formula” stocks, wide moat compounders, hidden champions, high quality businesses, net-nets, net cash stocks, low P/B stocks and sum-of-the-parts discounts.

How To Use Active Funds In A Diversified Portfolio

Active management has been out of favor for a while-high fees, high tax burdens, and poor long-term performance. But with the slow rise of actively managed ETFs, which have lower costs and more tax efficiency than traditional active mutual funds, the gateway to active management has potentially been reopened. This is certainly a positive move, but cheaper more tax-efficient active funds don’t answer the question of how should one use active exposures in a portfolio. We address this question in this post and propose several reasonable approaches one can take to incorporate active ETFs in to a diversified portfolio: Core-Satellite: The core of the portfolio is cheap index funds, the satellite funds are concentrated active ETFs. High-conviction: The core is active ETFs, combined with strategies and asset classes that tend to work well at different times. Let’s dig into each of the approaches in more detail. Core-Satellite Approach: The Core-Satellite approach is fairly simple – for the “core” of the portfolio (let’s say 80%), invest in passive index funds. For the “satellite” of the portfolio (the other 20%), invest in highly active ETFs. Additional information can be found from the CFA institute and Vanguard . Why would this be good for an advisor or a DIY investor? One issue with going “all-in” on actively managed ETFs is that they tend to have a large deviations around an index (i.e., tracking error). For advisors who have to answer to short-horizon clients that review their accounts daily (or DIY investors who always compare themselves to an index), tracking error can create angry clients very quickly. The core-satellite approach may be optimal in this situation, because, by construction, a large part of the portfolio is allocated to passive index funds, which always keep the portfolio roughly inline with broad benchmarks. This core-satellite approach will lower tracking error of the overall portfolio, but give clients a shot at outperformance over time. How much is dedicated to passive and how much is dedicated to active really depends on the client-advisor relationship and the amount of time the advisor spends educating clients on thinking long-term when it comes to portfolio performance. The details of creating an effective core-satellite approach can get complex, but we outline some basic principles of concepts related to a core-satellite approach here . High-Conviction: The high-conviction approach is the approach we take with our personal wealth and most of our clients. Why we take this approach is described here and here . In this approach, the passive part of the portfolio does not exist because it is effectively captured in a long-only diversified portfolio already. There are many active strategies available, but we believe that Value and Momentum are the best long-term bets when it comes to active management. Of course, the problem with high-conviction active portfolios is they aren’t the entire market, and can gyrate wildly around an index. If an advisor has short-term focused investors and the gyration is positive, you’re a hero, but if short-run performance is negative, you no longer have a career in asset management-yikes! We recommend that advisors building a high-conviction active portfolio combine a variety of top-shelf concepts so they help diversify their client’s exposures and also so they limit their own career risk (unless this isn’t a factor because of unique clients). Sounds great, but if high conviction has a higher expected risk-adjusted return, why diworsify? Consider high conviction value investing, which sounds so simple – buy the cheapest highest quality stocks you can find. The problem with these strategies is they can underperform for long stretches of time! After 6 years of underperformance, are you really going to stick with the strategy? For most advisors (and their clients) and DIY investors, the answer would be NO! So diversifying across high-conviction active ideas is critical! Ideally we could find strategies that work well at different times, and then just allocate a portion to each of the strategies. For example, as shown here and here , Value and Momentum tend to work well at different times. So one might consider investing in BOTH value and momentum, as opposed to focusing on the absolute merit of one over the other. Conclusion: Overall, we outline two reasonable approaches to using high conviction active ETFs: Core-satellite and high-conviction. For those advisors and investors who want to track an index and hope to beat the market by a small amount, the core-satellite approach may be the best route. For advisors and investors who are not as concerned with more informed clients and less short-run career risk, the high-conviction route may be a better approach. Good luck.