Tag Archives: etfs

Asset Class Update: Is Diversification Still A Free Lunch?

One might be led to believe that underwhelming performance in the large-cap benchmark might imply overwhelming performance elsewhere. When the bulk of risk asset classes are firing on all cylinders in a strong economy with reasonable valuations and desirable credit spreads, I am more inclined to pursue the free lunch of greater diversification. Right now, however, diversification across asset types and within asset types is a hindrance. According to Barry Ritholtz of Ritholtz Wealth Management, a frequent contributor to CNBC as well as Bloomberg, ” the beauty of diversification is that it’s about as close as you can get to a free lunch in investing.” Since 2011, however, investors who diversified in stocks outside of the U.S. and who diversified across other asset types (e.g., commodities, currencies, gold, pipeline partnerships, etc.) have consistently underperformed the plain vanilla approach of owning the S&P 500 SPDR Trust (NYSEARCA: SPY ) alongside a modest buffer of Vanguard Total Bond Market (NYSEARCA: BND ). Of course, the S&P 500 itself has struggled year-to-date (through 11/16). The price has essentially flat-lined over ten-and-a-half months at 0%. It follows that one might be led to believe that underwhelming performance in the large-cap benchmark might imply overwhelming performance elsewhere. After all, this is where diversification should shine. So, then, has the “free lunch” of diversification finally make a comeback? Hardly. Consider the list of 16 asset types and accompanying exchange-traded vehicles in the table below. An investor or money manager who dutifully maintained an allegiance to diversifying across asset classes (e.g., stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, etc.) as well as within those classifications (e.g., small, large, foreign, domestic, short, long, investment grade, higher-yielding, etc.) is not being rewarded for the effort. In some corners, the risk-adjusted negative returns might be superior to the risks associated with a large-cap-only portfolio. After four years, however, faith in the free lunch of diversification may be dissipating. It gets worse. As the end of 2015 approaches, tax-loss harvesters may decide that it is better to get rid of year-to-date losing propositions such as the iShares Russell 2000 ETF (NYSEARCA: IWM ), the Vanguard FTSE Emerging Markets ETF (NYSEARCA: VWO ), the iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: HYG ), the SPDR Gold Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: GLD ) and the Vanguard REIT Index ETF (NYSEARCA: VNQ ). Meanwhile, the proceeds may flow back into the large-cap stock arena, where marginal gains still look better on paper than the losses from the less-than-desirable diversified results. On the other hand, you might not want to bet the house on a Santa Claus rally for the S&P 500 either. Granted, the large-cap barometer rocketed more than 10% off its 2015 lows (1867) in October, but it has been unable to make it back to its record high (2130) set in May. Why didn’t U.S. large-company stocks fully recover? The narrow breadth in risk asset leadership has acted like an anchor on the biggest of the big corporations. In other words, if mid-caps, small-caps, micro-caps, emerging markets, foreign developed markets, pipeline partnerships, REITs and high-yield bonds are all going to get knocked out like Ronda Rousey in the “Octagon,” there’s certainly no guarantee that large corporate shares will buck the prevailing trend. A faltering global economy (macro-econ), equity overvaluation (fundamentals) and weakening marker internals (technicals) led me to reduce risk before the August sell-off . For example, most moderate growth and income clients may have had 65%-70 stock (e.g., large, small, foreign, etc.) and 30%-35% income (e.g., short, long, investment grade, cross-over, higher-yielding, etc.). We shifted to 50%-55% equity, 25% bond, and 20%-25% cash to lower the exposure to risk assets of any kind. Equally important, we lowered the risk profile itself, where stocks were primarily domestic and bonds were primarily intermediate investment grade. The technical retest of the September lows coupled with key moves about trendline resistance led us to bump the large-cap equity component up to 60%, while leaving the 25% investment grade and 15% cash intact. That said, the current profile is still less exposed to risk than 65%-70% growth (e.g., large, small, foreign, etc.) and 30%-35% income (e.g., short, long, investment grade, cross-over, higher yielding, etc.). When the bulk of risk asset classes are firing on all cylinders in a strong economy with reasonable valuations and desirable credit spreads, I am more inclined to pursue the free lunch of greater diversification. Right now, however, diversification across asset types and within asset types is a hindrance. For a 60% (mostly large-cap domestic), 25% bond (mostly investment grade) and 15% cash/cash equivalent mix , I am employing stock ETFs like the iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA: IVV ), the iShares MSCI USA Minimum Volatility ETF (NYSEARCA: USMV ) and the Technology Select Sector SPDR ETF (NYSEARCA: XLK ). I am also using bond funds like the iShares 3-7 Year Treasury Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: IEI ), the SPDR Nuveen Barclays Municipal Bond ETF ( TFI) and the Vanguard Total Bond Market ETF ( BND ). For Gary’s latest podcast, click here . Disclosure: Gary Gordon, MS, CFP is the president of Pacific Park Financial, Inc., a Registered Investment Adviser with the SEC. Gary Gordon, Pacific Park Financial, Inc, and/or its clients may hold positions in the ETFs, mutual funds, and/or any investment asset mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell or hold securities. At times, issuers of exchange-traded products compensate Pacific Park Financial, Inc. or its subsidiaries for advertising at the ETF Expert web site. ETF Expert content is created independently of any advertising relationships.

Oxford Lane Capital And Eagle Point Keep Churning Out The Cash, While High Yield Market Jitters Drag Down NAVs

Summary As high yield bond and corporate loan markets continue to be hammered by nervous investors, funds like OXLC and ECC have seen their NAVs drop even more. This is a natural result of their leverage, but essentially is irrelevant to their ability to generate cash flow and make their dividend payments. These are tough vehicles for some retail investors to understand and appreciate, but offer impressive income potential to those willing to make the effort. As the proverbial blood continues to run in the streets of the high yield bond and leveraged loan markets (because of a range of fears related to the Fed increasing rates, the world economy slump, etc.) the non-investment grade companies that comprise those markets continue to go about their business, making their interest and principal payments. This translates into strong cash flows and high distributions for Oxford Lane Capital Corporation (NASDAQ: OXLC ) and Eagle Point Credit (NYSE: ECC ), the two closed end funds that specialize in buying collateralized loan obligations (“CLO’s”). CLO’s are leveraged, special purpose vehicles that function like “virtual banks,” buying and holding senior, secured floating-rate loans to non-investment grade companies. (This is the same cohort of companies that issues high-yield bonds. But whereas high-yield bonds are unsecured and typically recover only 20-30% in the event of the issuer’s default, senior secured loans have historically recovered 70-80% in the event of default, so the overall credit loss on a portfolio of loans over time is less than half the credit loss on a portfolio of high yield bonds.) Both ECC and OXLC put out quarterly reports yesterday and followed up with investor conference calls this morning. In both cases the messages were similar, that the market for the assets they hold – CLOs and the loans held by CLOs – are way down, the cash flows from those assets continue strong, and the reinvestment opportunities for CLOs in the loan market are very attractive. But the strong income prospects this represents (OXLC yields over 22% and ECC over 14%) are not enough to offset the fears of many closed end fund investors, who remain fixated on the net asset values (NAVs) of both funds. These have dropped in recent months to reflect the depressed markets for their underlying assets. Here is why the NAV of a CLO fund would drop as the market for its underlying assets drops. Suppose the equity in a typical CLO is leveraged 10 times. If the market for the loans held by that CLO drops by 1%, then the mark-to-market or “paper loss” to the equity of the CLO will be 10 times 1%, or 10%. This means that investors should not be surprised to see NAVs of ECC or OXLC fall at about ten times the rate as the drop in market prices in the loan market. None of the drop however, has any relation to the ability of the portfolio to generate the cash needed to pay distributions. Investors who can understand that and be comfortable with it can appreciate the opportunity these funds represent for income investors. But be prepared for a potentially volatile ride in terms of market value, although many of us who have owned the funds for awhile may feel – given the current entry point versus where we got in – that today’s new investors will have a smoother ride than we did.

After Value, Dividend And Quality, Momentum Has Also Started To Lag

Summary Large groups of Value, Dividend and Quality stocks have been lagging the market for one year. Momentum was a good place to hide until September. The last weeks have been harmful for Dividend and Quality stocks. A previous article published on 9/1 pointed out that groups of stocks broadly selected on value, dividend and quality criteria have been lagging the benchmark since the 3rd quarter of 2014. To spare you the time of reading it, this was the conclusion: In the recent months, a wide outperformance of momentum stocks has been detrimental to value, dividend and quality stocks. The recent correction was beneficial to dividend stocks excess return, but value and quality are still lagging. This fashion in momentum explains why a lot of investors with portfolios based on value and quality factors have underperformed the market in the recent months. The trend started in June 2014, and accelerated in June and July 2015. This phenomenon is not limited to a small group, it is widely spread in the 100 best stocks of the S&P 500 index (NYSEARCA: SPY ) in each investing style category. These categories are simplified by taking the top 20% of the S&P 500 ranked on a unique factor. The top 20% of value stocks is defined as the 100 S&P 500 stocks with the lowest price/earnings ratio (P/E trailing 12 months, excluding extraordinary items). The top 20% of dividend stocks is defined as the 100 S&P 500 stocks with the highest yield. The top 20% of quality stocks is defined as the 100 S&P 500 stocks with the highest return on equity (ROE trailing 12 months). The top 20% of momentum stocks is defined as the 100 S&P 500 stocks with the highest price increase in 1 year (250 trading days). Variations in the relative performance of such large groups of stocks may be random on short periods. When they are consistent on long periods, they denote a behavioral change in the market. My aim here is to observe and quantify this change, not to explain it. Hereafter you can see the equity curves and statistics of the four “top 20%” groups for the last 3 months. The lists are updated and equal-weighted on market opening of the first trading day every week. Dividends are reinvested. Top 20% Value: (click to enlarge) Top 20% Dividend: (click to enlarge) Top 20% Quality: (click to enlarge) Top 20% Momentum (click to enlarge) The next table gives the annualized excess return over SPY of the top 20% group for each category since 1/1/1999, then on the last 12 months, 6 months, 3 months and 1 month. Annualized excess return of the top 20% stocks in… Since 1999 Last 12 months Last 6 months Last 3 months Last month Value 6.89% -7.67% -12.58% -10.4% -12.99% Dividend 5.37% -4.22% -5.93% -2.6% -34.16% Quality 4.91% -2.53% -7.49% -9.69% -30.14% Momentum 3.63% 4.45% 6.45% -2.2% -16.64% The long term outperformance of all groups confirms that investors following any of these investing styles can get a positive statistical bias. This has been documented in countless academic publications. Value investing has an edge over other styles. However, value stocks have been lagging for more than 1 year (since June 2014 exactly). The sector meltdown in energy and some basic materials companies is an incomplete explanation: it is accountable for less than half of the negative excess return of value stocks on this period. The relative loss has accelerated a bit in the last month. Dividend and quality stocks have also been lagging for at least one year, and their underperformance has accelerated considerably in the last month. Momentum stocks have been outperforming their own historical excess return for at least 1 year, but they did worse than SPY in the last 3 months, and especially in the last month. Conclusion Until September, we could interpret the situation as a transfer of excess return from value, quality and dividend to momentum. Lately, momentum has also underperformed and the benchmark index has done better than the 4 groups of stocks representing classic investing styles. After looking at data before the 2 major downturns since 1999, my previous article concluded that such patterns don’t seem to be clues to identify a market top. There are cycles of variables amplitudes and time frames in asset classes, sectors and investing styles. On the long term, value, dividend, quality and momentum offer a statistical bias. On the short term, investors following quantitative or discretionary strategies based on these styles may experience more frustration before getting back their edge. Updates I plan to publish updates on investing styles performance. If you don’t want to miss the next one, click “follow” at the top of this article. Data and charts: portfolio123