Tag Archives: etfs

Smart Beta, Dumb Money And EMH

Someone asked me about Smart Beta in the forum the other day and I got to thinking about this. Indexers are all basically chasing some form of beta. But some indexers chase beta in stupid ways and some indexers chase beta in smart ways. An increasingly common example of this is the many forms of factor investing that have become popular in recent years (in case you haven’t noticed, I don’t like factor investing – see here and here ). I am generalizing, but I tend to believe that factor investing is just a new clever way to get people to pay higher fees for owning index funds. Now, this particular reader asked about the profit factor so I went exploring. It turns out that there are more than a few ETFs that track this profit factor. The largest one is the WisdomTree MidCap Earnings ETF ( EZM), which has 770 million in assets and “seeks to track the investment results of earnings-generating mid-cap companies in the U.S. equity market.” So, I go and compare this fund to the Russell Mid-Cap Index. It actually appears to be beating the index since inception, but it has a 99% correlation. Something doesn’t smell right about that. So, I look under the hood and find that it actually deviates from the Mid-Cap Index quite a bit. While the Mid-Cap Index has an average market cap of 10.5B this fund has a market cap of just 4.2B. Ah, so there’s the outperformance. It’s not profits, it’s just higher risk smaller cap stocks. And if you layer on the Russell 2,000 Small Cap Index, whose market cap is 1.5B, you get a near perfect replica of EZM. This is precisely what I expected given that I’ve run some version of this experiment almost every day for the last few years when assessing people’s portfolios. The kicker is, this fund isn’t “smart” at all. The only thing that’s smart about it is that it deviates from the Russell Mid-Cap Index giving it the appearance of better performance. And so what we have here is a sort of sad case of dumb money chasing market inefficiency and proving that the only thing inefficient here is their factor chasing charade. And in doing so they’re paying 0.38% per year for a fund that costs as low as 0.07% elsewhere. That’s almost $2.5 million in annual fees being flushed down the drain there. And that’s just one fund out of a growing list of hundreds and maybe thousands. I’d laugh if it didn’t make me sad. Share this article with a colleague

Messy Fund Managers Create An Illusion Of Skill

Mutual fund rating services divide mutual funds into categories based on their investment style. This helps investors compare the performance of one style to another and helps them compare the performance of individual funds in a particular style. While useful in many ways, this methodology can also create the illusion of superior performance when none exists. Among the most familiar investment style tools is the Morningstar Style Box, a nine-square grid that provides a graphical representation of a fund’s investment style. For stock funds, it classifies funds according to primary market capitalization (large, mid and small) and investment style (growth, core and value). Morningstar (NASDAQ: MORN ) tracks the performance of securities in the nine style boxes, creates style indices, and then compares fund performance to these indices. According to Morningstar magazine , the average actively managed US equity fund performance has fallen short of its comparable style box index in all nine categories over the past five years ending in June 2015. However, there are times when a majority of active managers appear to perform better than a style box index. Over the past three years, surviving large-cap value managers have fallen into this category by outperforming their benchmark index 62.7% of the time. See Figure 1 below. Outperformance by a majority of managers in a particular style is often followed by calls from the fund community to use active management in that style. There are those who begin to argue that the market is inefficient in certain areas. They say indexing doesn’t work in these styles and that active management works better. Don’t take these periods of active manager outperformance at face value. It is an illusion that is expected to fade over time. What’s actually occurring is the difference between pure style index returns and messy active manager returns. Style indices represent a pure selection of securities driven strictly by empirical measurements, while fund managers are often messy in their portfolio constructions. For example, the only securities you’ll find in a small-cap value index are small-cap value stocks. In a small-cap value fund , a manager may choose to extend into other style boxes by drifting outside of the pure style. (The fine print in the fund prospectus typically allows for this.) A fund with messy style drift often compares favorably to the style it is benchmarked against when the benchmark is lagging other styles. When enough fund managers in a category are messy in their stock selection, and the benchmark style performs poorly relative to adjacent styles, it creates a period when active style-drifting managers appear to be a better option for investors. This is a temporary illusion of superiority that is not expected to persist. Figure 1 compares the three-year performance of Morningstar Style Box returns to the percentage of managers outperforming their style index benchmark. The X-axis represents the three-year annualized Morningstar style index return and the Y-axis represents the percentage of managed funds that outperformed each style. Figure 1: Morningstar Style Box Performance and Percentage of Managers that Outperformed. Three years ending June 30, 2015. (click to enlarge) Source: Morningstar magazine, August/September 2015, chart and regression by R. Ferri Figure 1 graphically illustrates the relationship between style performance and the ability of active fund managers to outperform the style. Mid-cap Value ( MV ) earned 20.7% annually and outperformed all other styles; MV managers had a very difficult time outperforming this index and succeeded only about 9% of the time. In contrast, Large-cap Value (LV) earned 14.1% annually and was the worst-performing style index; LV managers had an easier time outperforming, winning about 63% of the time. The regression is close to 85%. This means the percentage of managers who outperformed in each style is highly correlated with the relative performance of the style index. The greater a style index outperforms adjacent styles, the fewer managers outperformed in that style and vice versa. This observation isn’t new in mutual fund analysis. William Bernstein wrote about the phenomenon in 2001 article, Dunn’s Law Review : The Life and Times of “Core and Explore,” in which he noted, “[T]he fortunes of indexing a particular asset class depend on its performance relative to other asset classes.” The concept was expanded by William Thatcher in a 2009 article, When Indexing Works and When It Doesn’t in U.S. Equities: The Purity Hypothesis . Both articles indicate an inverse relationship between a style’s relative performance to other styles and active management’s ability to outperform in style. This brings us to a couple of important questions. First, when do a majority of active managers outperform a poor-performing style? Second, can managers time styles and position their portfolios accordingly and make it worth investing in messy active funds? Tables 1, 2 and 3 help answer the first question: When do a majority of active managers outperform a poor performing style? The yellow box with the red numbers in each table represents the percentage of managers that outperformed that style over a three-year period ending in June 2015. The red box represents the performance of the Morningstar style index for that category. The green box represents the performance of surrounding Morningstar style indices. (click to enlarge) Table 1 indicates Large Cap Value (LV) managers had a great run over the three-year period ending June 2015. Almost 63% of active manager beat the Morningstar Large Value Index return of 14.1%. It’s easy to see why. The green areas in Table 1 represent the performance of adjacent styles indices: Large Core (18.3%), Mid Core (19.9%), and Mid Value (20.7%). All three had notably superior performance to Large Value. Any messy LV managers who invested outside of, but near the LV style index constituents would have added performance to their portfolio. Table 2 shows the opposite story for Mid Cap Value ( MV ) managers. Only 9.0% outperformed their style index. MV was the highest-performing style of the nine style boxes, so any messiness on the part of MV managers would have hurt their performance relative to the style index – and it did. Table 3 represents Small Cap Value (SV) managers, 33.6% of whom outperformed the Small Cap style index. Although the index performed satisfactorily at 17.0%, it underperformed the adjacent style indices, but not by as wide a margin as LV in Table 1. Accordingly, there was some benefit to active SV manages, but not enough to increase their win rate over 33.6%. This latest evidence substantiates what Bernstein and Thatcher have indicated in the past: It appears there is no truth to the cliché that the market is inefficient in one style and not another. It’s about style performance relative to adjacent styles, and how messy managers are about remaining within a style in their equity selection. Active fund managers look superior when their benchmark style performs poorly relative to adjacent styles, and they look bad when their benchmark style outperforms adjacent styles by a meaningful amount. Eventually, this all comes out in the wash. Active managers in every style have underperformed by about the same percentage. Please see The Power of Passive Investing for more analysis on this topic. The second question is easier to answer: Can active managers time styles and position their portfolios accordingly? They cannot. If they could, today’s Morningstar active versus passive results would show improvement since the time Bernstein wrote about it. But it has not. Managers do not appear to have persistent skill in timing investment styles. Mutual fund rating services help investors compare the performance of one style to another by creating style indices, and they help investors compare the performance of funds within a particular style. But raw data can create the illusion of superior performance when none exists. You’ll need to dig deeper into a manager’s performance to determine if he or she truly has ongoing skill or if it’s just an illusion. Disclosure: Author’s positions can be viewed here .

This Small-Cap International ETF Is Really Growing On Me

Summary SCHC has incredible diversification within the holdings. The ETF needs to be combined with domestic equity ETFs and bond ETFs to be at its best. The expense ratio is higher than most of the ETFs I’m considering, but .18% is better than most international ETFs. I may need to sell off some VNQI and add some SCHC. Investors should be seeking to improve their risk adjusted returns. I’m a big fan of using ETFs to achieve the risk adjusted returns relative to the portfolios that a normal investor can generate for themselves after trading costs. I’m contemplating changing the way I structure my portfolio and I’m going to be analyzing several of the ETFs that I am considering. One of the options is the Schwab International Small-Cap Equity ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHC ). I’ll be performing a substantial portion of my analysis along the lines of modern portfolio theory, so my goal is to find ways to minimize costs while achieving diversification to reduce my risk level. Expense Ratio The expense ratio is .18% which is one of the higher expense ratios out of the ETFs I’m consider, however it is vastly lower than many international options and is in a fairly small niche with targeting small-cap international equity. Most international equity funds would simply hold the international companies with larger market capitalizations. This ETF is nice because it allows investors a different exposure. Largest Holdings The internal diversification is out of this world. There are no holdings higher than 1% and only 1 that is higher than .45%. For getting diversification of holdings into the portfolio SCHC is a very impressive option. (click to enlarge) The diversification includes over 1600 companies which is more than I can recall for any of the international ETF options I’ve considered. Investors should be aware that during periods of financial stress in the international markets the correlation of returns is increased so SCHC may exhibit high correlation despite having very different holdings. I would treat that correlation as a market failure and just keep rebalancing the portfolio as necessary. Even if the high correlation in international investments is a market failure that does not reflect underlying value, remember that values can remain irrational for longer than some investors can remain solvent. Building the Portfolio I put together a hypothetical portfolio using only ETFs that fall under the “free to trade” category for Charles Schwab accounts. My bias towards these ETFs is simple, I have my solo 401k there and recently moved my IRA accounts there as well. When I’m building a list of ETFs to consider I want to focus on things I can trade freely so that I can keep making small transactions to buy more when the market falls. Within the hypothetical portfolio there are no expense ratios higher than .18%. Just like trading costs, I want to be frugal with expense ratios. The portfolio is fairly aggressive. Only 30% of the total is allocated to bonds and I would consider that the weakest area in the portfolio. I’d like to see more bond options (with very low expense ratios) show up on the “One Source” list for free trading. (click to enlarge) A quick rundown of the portfolio The Schwab U.S. Dividend Equity ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHD ) is a dividend index. The Schwab U.S. Broad Market ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHB ) is a broad market index. The Schwab U.S. Large-Cap ETF (SCHX ) is focused on blended large cap exposure. The Schwab International Equity ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHF ) is developed international equity. The Schwab Emerging Markets ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHE ) is emerging market equity. The Schwab U.S. REIT ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHH ) is domestic equity REITs. The Schwab U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHZ ) is a remarkably complete bond fund. The SPDR Barclays Long Term Treasury ETF (NYSEARCA: TLO ) is a long term treasury ETF. The PIMCO 25+ Year Zero Coupon U.S. Treasury Index ETF (NYSEARCA: ZROZ ) is an extremely long term treasury ETF. Notice that the 3 international equity ETFs have only been weighted at 5% while the broad market index has been weighted at 25%. I find heavy exposure to international equity to bring more risk than expected returns so I try to keep my international exposure low. I prefer no more than 20% in international equity. Plenty of domestic companies already have enormous international operations so the benefit of international diversification is not as strong as it would be if the markets were isolated from each other. Risk Contribution The risk contribution category demonstrates the amount of the portfolio’s volatility that can be attributed to that position. When TLO and ZROZ post negative risk contribution it is because the negative correlation to most of the equity holdings results in the long term treasury ETFs reducing the total portfolio risk. In my opinion, this is the best argument for including them in the portfolio. Correlation The chart below shows the correlation of each ETF with each other ETF in the portfolio and with the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ). Blue boxes indicate positive correlations and tan box indicate negative correlations. Generally speaking lower levels of correlation are highly desirable and high levels of correlation substantially reduce the benefits from diversification. (click to enlarge) Best Partners SCHC stands to benefit from being mixed with bond funds. The longer bond funds such as TLO and ZROZ exhibit the strongest negative correlation at -.42 and -.44 respectively. To reach a more optimal portfolio when using SCHC it would be wise for the investor to use a material allocation to bonds. Within the equity investments the lowest correlations are SCHH and SCHD. When I first looked at SCHC last year, I didn’t like it as much because the .18 expense ratio was higher than I wanted to pay on my ETF investments. I do have a strong desire for low expense ratios, but I think SCHC is investing in a smart area. Small capitalization was a great area for indexing in the U.S. market for a long time before investors caught on and widespread use of whole market indexes and broad market indexes allowed the average investor to gain effective small-cap exposure. While the international markets used in SCHC are reasonably developed, there may still be some outperformance in those markets. At the very least, there are 1600 companies that won’t get heavy exposure anywhere else in my portfolio. Conclusion I like SCHC now more than I did when I first looked at it. Perhaps it is simply seeing the market fall in August, but I’m placing a larger emphasis on designing my portfolio to be simple for rebalancing and to drive the portfolio volatility down. Currently all of my international equity exposure is through SCHF and the Vanguard Global ex-U.S. Real Estate ETF (NASDAQ: VNQI ). I’m contemplating selling off the VNQI and reallocating it to Schwab funds to make my portfolio easier to rebalance and to take advantage of lower expense ratios. I like the use of international REITs in VNQI, but I don’t like the expense ratio of .24%. I may initiate a small long position in SCHC in the near future. As of submission, I have a small limit buy order entered that is significantly below the market price. If shares take a sudden fall, I will be starting a small position. Disclosure: I am/we are long SCHB, SCHD, SCHF, SCHH, VNQI. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: Information in this article represents the opinion of the analyst. All statements are represented as opinions, rather than facts, and should not be construed as advice to buy or sell a security. Ratings of “outperform” and “underperform” reflect the analyst’s estimation of a divergence between the market value for a security and the price that would be appropriate given the potential for risks and returns relative to other securities. The analyst does not know your particular objectives for returns or constraints upon investing. All investors are encouraged to do their own research before making any investment decision. Information is regularly obtained from Yahoo Finance, Google Finance, and SEC Database. If Yahoo, Google, or the SEC database contained faulty or old information it could be incorporated into my analysis.