Summary DMO is a mortgage bond CEF that outclasses its competition and is well priced after a rough few months. I liked DMO in September. I like it more now. I liked DMO in September. I like it more today. When I last wrote about Western Asset Mortgage Defined Opp (NYSE: DMO ) I considered it to be the best of the mortgage-bond closed-end funds. It was selling at a small premium at the time, something I will generally avoid. But that premium was only 0.2%, so I decided to buy it anyway. It has been tracking down since, but that only makes me like it more. I’ve been watching it closely and am likely to add to my position before the end of the year. At the December 1 close, DMO had moved up smartly on the day (1.6%), but since that mid-September article, the fund is down -4.64% at market price and -2.55% at NAV. Why buy into a falling position? Let’s begin answering that question by having a look at how DMO compares to the entire fixed-income CEF category generally and mortgage-bond funds specifically. DMO vs. Its Categories This first chart shows total returns and distribution yields for DMO, along with median values for mortgage-bond CEFs (n=10) and all fixed-income CEFs (n=111). (click to enlarge) First thing to note here is that the past month and year have not been good to fixed-income CEFs across the board. This has been part of a broad trend for high-yield bonds. The large high-yield bond ETFs, iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond (NYSEARCA: HYG ) and SPDR Barclays High Yield Bond (NYSEARCA: JNK ), and the mortgage-bond ETF, iShares Mortgage Real Estate Capped ETF (NYSEARCA: REM ), are down comparable amounts. It doesn’t take intense scrutiny to see that DMO is beating its categories in all recent performance metrics. In the face of these numbers, I’m not terribly concerned about the dip since September. This is particularly evident if we turn our attention to NAV returns. Not that I like it, mind you, but I do not see it as cause for concern. Where everything else is negative, save REM’s meager 0.18% uptick for the past month, DMO’s NAV is solidly in the green. And NAV is what really counts in my view. But most of us look to a mortgage bond fund for income, not necessarily capital gains, right? DMO is yielding over 10% where the median mortgage-bond and fixed-income CEFs are paying 7.0% and 8.4%, respectively; and the high-yield bond ETFs are yielding near 6%. Only REM is paying more, but it is doing so with a consistent erosion of capital as we see in this price chart. (click to enlarge) Income investors will often give lip service to not caring about total return. If you’re investing in the likes of REM, I can see why you’d want to resort to that justification. You can, if you’re so inclined, look at REM in isolation in the total return chart and maybe feel okay about it. It has, after all, returned 35%, or would have done so had you been reinvesting dividends at no transaction costs. But look at that price chart above it. The 34% loss there is, in fact, a 34% loss of your capital if you invested in REM for current income five years ago. Sure, it’s been paying out a ton, but it’s been your own money in large measure, and you’ve had to pay taxes on it. If you had invested in DMO instead, you would have received 10% or so a year income plus your capital would have grown by 18%. Of course if you reinvested the distributions (again, assuming that magical chart-universe where there is no cost for doing so) you’d have more than three times what you would have had from the high-yield bonds or REM. So, as I said about UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETN (NYSEARCA: MORL ) in September, you can get a better yield than DMO, but with DMO you get to keep your money. I’ll not go into MORL again, other than to note that there are a substantial number of Seeking Alpha income-seekers who will sing its praises, praises that are completely unjustified in my opinion. A more complete look at MORL is on my to-do list, so if you’re interested in my take on it, it should be on your screen soon. I hope I’ve at least begun to convince you that DMO is an outstanding performer in the mortgage-bond space. If you need more, there are additional comparative historical performance data (in particular comparisons to the other mortgage bond CEFs and MORL) in the September article to assist in your due diligence. Why do I like it more as of December 1? Well, I did like it even better the day before, but even with the December 1 gain, DMO is much more attractively priced than it was in September when my only hesitation was that it was priced at that small premium coming off an uncharacteristic discounted period. At that time, I thought the trend would continue and the premium would continue to grow, so I felt it was as good an entry as the fund was going to present for a while. Wrong, obviously; it’s even better now. Premium/Discount Dynamics DMO has moved from a small premium to a decent discount, a move accompanied by that modest decrease in NAV (-2.6%). Distribution yield is up 60bps from mid-September as a consequence. While -1.87% is not a particularly deep discount in the CEF universe, it is, in my view, excellent for a fund of this quality. And the discount is moving in the right direction, according to the Z-scores. (click to enlarge) Where the mortgage-bond and fixed-income categories are, despite their lackluster performances, less discounted than their means (positive Z-scores) over the past 3 and 6 months, DMO is solidly in the other direction. The current discount is almost 1½ standard deviations more negative than the three-month mean. As I noted, one does not expect a fund of this quality to be running a deep discount, so that -1.87% looks pretty good to me right now. If you accept that it is a high-quality fund, and you consider Z-scores to at least suggest a direction for mean reversion, DOM looks good here. Distribution Sustainability Finally, a word about the sustainability of the distribution. This is always a consideration in fixed-income CEFs. Many high yielders maintain their yields by returning investor capital. This cannot continue indefinitely and, all too often, such funds will be forced into making drastic distribution cuts that lead to sharp price drops. One indicator of distribution sustainability is UNII, Undistributed Net Investment Income. DOM reported UNII of $0.62/share at the end of September. Its distribution is $0.21/share monthly, so there is little indication of a problem on that front. Summary I continue to like DMO and think it remains one of the best income opportunities. It has faltered lately, but less so than its peers. It is paying an attractive distribution. And there is no indication that the distribution payment is at risk as the fund is holding a quarter’s distributions worth of UNII. I realize that there is a lot of uncertainty and anxiety regarding a changing interest-rate environment, but I do not see a truly disruptive change on the near horizon. I do not anticipate anything like a devastating blow from a 25 to 75 bps raise from the Fed over the next year, which is what I consider as most likely scenario. My one caution is that it is best accommodated in a tax-deferred account because, as with any bond fund, the distributions are ordinary income and receive no favorable tax treatment.