Tag Archives: earnings-center

GSAM Makes The Case For Multimanager Alternatives

By DailyAlts Staff Record-low interest rates and historically high stock valuations have more and more investors considering liquid alternative investments, which Goldman Sachs Asset Management (“GSAM”) defines as “daily liquid investment strategies” that seek to deliver “differentiated returns from those of core assets” and the potential to mitigate overall portfolio risk and severe drawdowns. In a recent Strategic Advisory Solutions white paper, GSAM makes the case for a multimanager approach to liquid alternative investing – through single turnkey multimanager funds, allocations across multiple managers of the investor’s choosing, or a combination of both. Why Diversify an Alternatives Allocation? GSAM categorizes the liquid alts universe into five peer groups: Equity long/short Event driven Relative value Tactical trade/macro Multistrategy As shown in the table below, the median returns of each peer group have very little persistence from year to year. Therefore, by diversifying across peer groups, investors can avoid the highs and lows of any given year in any given strategy. Building from Scratch One approach to diversifying across liquid alternative peer groups is to “weave” several liquid alts into a “unified portfolio construction framework.” This approach may be best for investors seeking to express high-conviction market views of their own, or for those who possess deep knowledge of particular strategies and managers. But in GSAM’s view, the process of selecting liquid alts requires expertise in the asset class, knowledge of manager capabilities, and judgment of manager and strategy risks, among other things. This makes the “build” approach research-intensive, which may be a bit much for many investors. Turnkey Solutions On the opposite end of the spectrum is the “turnkey” approach – a pre-assembled package of alts, such as a multimanager alternative mutual fund. In this approach, investors effectively outsource the research-intensive process cited above to professional managers. On the downside, investors employing this approach don’t get a customized allocation, which means that their specific investment needs could potentially be better-served. What are some other risks to the multialternative approach? GSAM lists several, including: Performance may depend on the ability of the investment advisor to select, oversee, and allocate funds to individual managers, whose styles may not always be complementary. Managers may underperform the market generally or underperform other investment managers that could have been selected instead. Some managers have little experience managing liquid alternative funds, which differ from private investment funds. Investors should be mindful of these and other risks, according to GSAM. The Best of Both Worlds? GSAM calls combining the “build from scratch” and “turkey” approaches “Buy & Build.” This hybrid approach generally entails complementing a multialternative fund with one or more high-conviction managers the investor believes can potentially contribute to specific investment objectives. This “middle ground” between pure customization and an off-the-shelf solution gives investors additional flexibility with a fraction of the research-intensity. Conclusion In conclusion, GSAM states the company’s belief that multimanager strategies have the potential to help investors pursue additional sources of returns and to diversify their alternative investment allocations. In the firm’s view, investors who are new to investing generally opt for the single package approach to multimanager investing, while more experienced liquid alternative investors often consider building from scratch. The important thing, in GSAM’s estimation, is to understand the potential that liquid alts offer as an additional driver of portfolio returns. For more information, download a pdf copy of the white paper . Jason Seagraves contributed to this article.

Has Risk Parity Jumped The Shark? Asness Says No

By DailyAlts Staff According to AQR’s Cliff Asness, anyone who thinks risk parity caused the massive selloff in August has gone “all tinfoil-hat”. A better argument against risk parity, Mr. Asness concedes, is the fact that it has underperformed over the past several years. But is this underperformance a result of the strategy having jumped the proverbial shark ? Or is it simply a bad run to be expected with any strategy? Not surprisingly, Mr. Asness thinks it’s probably the latter, and this is the view he articulates in ” Putting Parity Performance into Perspective ,” the alliterative latest in his Cliff’s Perspectives series of white papers. Risk Parity Basics Mr. Asness takes the first few paragraphs of the paper to refresh readers on the basics of risk parity : “an alternative long-term strategic asset allocation” used to “diversify a more traditional equity-dominated allocation.” Rather than weighting holdings by market cap, risk parity weights them based on their anticipated contribution to overall portfolio risk – and in order to achieve the right mix, this means leverage is used to ramp up low-risk fixed-income holdings. From Cliff’s perspective, risk parity offers a “real but modest long-term edge” over traditional approaches because many investors are “too averse” to applying leverage. Risk parity is often described as an “all-weather” solution, succeeding regardless of the broad market’s ups and downs, and Mr. Asness believes this is true – on average . Unfortunately, we’re not living in “average” times, and as a result, risk parity has underperformed since 2009. Longer-Term Returns It’s impossible to do true risk parity back-testing as far back as 1947, so AQR uses “Simple Risk Parity” for historical analysis. The firm’s findings indicate that the “real but modest long-term edge” that risk parity enjoys over indexing really adds up over time. This is evident in the image below, which charts the cumulative excess return of Simple Risk Parity over the past 68 years: The image above shows Simple Risk Parity’s excess returns above cash. The image below shows its excess return above a “60/40” stock/bond portfolio. This helps put the strategy’s underperformance since 2009 into longer-term historical perspective: Forward Outlook Risk parity is designed to diversify away from equity risk. Instead of adding equities to a portfolio in pursuit of desired returns, risk-parity strategies favor using leverage to ramp up fixed-income risk. With equities outperforming for the past six years, it should be no surprise that risk parity has underperformed. Moreover, risk-parity strategies have also been slammed by the bear market in commodities, whereas “60/40” portfolios don’t even have direct exposure to that asset class. But do these facts mean that risk parity’s happy days are over? Not in Cliff Asness’s view. He suggests that the recent underperformance is of the sort that’s to be expected with long-term strategies, and adds that periods of underperformance are often followed by periods of outperformance. The problem, as he sees it, is that short-term periods of poor performance can feel awfully long – and this can lead to investors bailing at the wrong time. If traders have tactical reasons for wanting to allocate away from risk parity, that’s one thing – but selling because of painful results that should be expected from time to time is unwise, in Asness’s view, even if resisting the urge to do so is “one of the hardest but most important parts” of an investment professional’s job.

Understanding Covered Call CEFs

Barron’s recently had a favorable write up on closed end funds that one way or another use a covered call strategy as a means of providing income. The article proposes that volatile markets like now are a good environment for this niche and that the call premium can help mitigate the impact of large declines. I think both points are flat out wrong. The history here is that they do well in rising markets. By Roger Nusbaum, AdvisorShares ETF Strategist Barron’s recently had a favorable write up on closed end funds that one way or another use a covered call strategy as a means of providing income. Where the article focused on CEFs, the yields can be quite high because of the leverage that CEFs often use as well as returning capital, when necessary to maintain a payout. It is also worth noting that there are traditional funds that sell calls and ETFs that sell calls and puts too for that matter. I wrote about these quite a few times in the early days of Random Roger. The history of them shows long stretches where they do very well then long periods where they get pounded and then repeats. Based on chart below they got crushed in 2008 and the dividends were cut on many of them and neither the prices or payouts have recovered since. The article tries to make the case that volatile markets like now are a good environment for this niche and that the call premium can help mitigate the impact of large declines. I think both points are flat out wrong. The history here is that they do well in rising markets. The chart from Google Finance captures a whole bunch of them over a ten-year period. I removed the symbols for compliance reasons but finding funds in this space should be easy to do. If you play around with the time periods you will see they did very well in 2006 and far into 2007, 2009 well into 2010 and then a three year run from 2012-2014. As mentioned the got crushed during the bear market, did badly in 2011 and are having mixed results in 2015. (click to enlarge) I would have no expectation that these funds can buffer a stock market decline. These are income vehicles but they track the equity market higher to an extent (they correlate but don’t keep up) and I would bet they get hit hard in the next bear market but probably not as hard as 2008. Part of the equation in 2008 was a shutting down of bond markets which impacted CEFs in terms of accessing leverage. I don’t expect that to repeat but I would want sell in the face of a bear market as a 30% decline seems plausible for these funds in a down 40% world. Obviously there would be income vehicles to keep in a bear market but I don’t think these are one of them. Where they do well, then do poorly, they will do well again, maybe after the next bear market maybe sooner but anyone interested in this space probably needs to be willing to be tactical and be willing to sell after a period of their doing well. Interest rates have a very good chance of remaining inadequate for many years even if the Fed does hike rates this month. Attempting to be tactical is not right for everyone but I do think that the way investors get their yield will probably include market segments that require a more active and tactical approach.