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The Altman Z-Score After 50 Years: Use And Misuse

By Larry Cao, CFA This is the second installment in my interview series with Edward Altman in which we discuss the most advisable and problematic applications of the Altman Z-score. For additional details of our conversation, check out the first installment. Larry Cao, CFA: It’s been almost 50 years since the Z-score was first developed. Would you suggest doing anything differently today? Edward Altman: Over the years, the so-called cutoff scores in the model has been retained by the people who applied the model. But in my opinion, that is not the best thing to do. Over time, I began to observe that the average Z-score of American companies mainly, but even global companies, began to get lower and lower. [The bond market] became more available for both investment grade and non-investment grade companies and companies periodically took advantage of low interest rates to raise their leverage. As a result, the financial risk of companies began to increase. Also with global competition, companies’ profitability began to diminish. And so the average Z-score became lower and lower, which meant that more firms would have been classified as likely bankrupt using the Z model if we kept the original cutoff scores. In order to modernize the model, we needed bond-rating equivalence of the scores, which changes constantly and adds on an updated nature to the interpretations of the scores. We now think the most important attribute of the Z model is the probability of default (PD), not the zone classification – safe, grey, or distress. We do it in a two-step process. We get the PD from the score of the company, whether it be from Z, or Z prime, or Z double prime. And then we look at the bond rating equivalent as of that point in time. For example, 2015 – the average B-rate company has a Z-score [of] about 1.6. That would be in a distress zone back in 1968. But today, B is a very common bond rating for many companies. In fact, globally it’s probably [the] most dominant junk rating category. If you rated all companies in the world, the average would probably be about B if they had a rating. And so we ascribe a probability of default based on a bond rating equivalent by looking at the historic incidence of default given a B rating at birth. Cumulatively, I can tell you, from one to 10 years, what the likelihood of default is given a bond rating equivalent. So no longer do we only look at the cutoff scores for the three zones of credit worthiness. Okay, bond rating equivalent is in and cutoff scores are out. What mistakes do you see practitioners making in using the Z-score today? To this date, I would say the vast majority of people are misusing the Z-score because they are applying it across the board regardless of the sector, the industry. And what we found over the years is that non-manufacturers, especially in certain industries like services or retail, have on average higher Z-scores than manufacturing companies. My advice for users is if you are outside the United States, and particularly if you are not a manufacturer, you should look at Z” and its bond rating equivalence approach for ascertaining a PD. Would you say the value of the Z-score is more in its methodology or the score itself? That’s a great question, Larry. Yes, I’ve always argued it’s better to use a local model rather than the original US model. And I’ve done it myself. I’ve personally built models in Brazil, Australia, France, Italy, and Canada. And you will find references to models almost anywhere in the world in the literature. It’s a pretty easy methodology for Ph.D students and practitioners to adapt to a different environment. But then again, even if it isn’t the best model that could be built for service companies or energy companies in 2016, it’s still a good benchmark and has retained its accuracy. If I had the time, I would build the model for Malaysian companies or Indonesian companies or Hong Kong companies or Asia all together. I suppose that there are good researchers there who might just attempt that! Will there be a data issue? For a lot of these countries, the history may not be there. They don’t have bond rating equivalence. That’s exactly right. That’s a very good point. The bond rating equivalence in almost all cases has to be derived from data from the United States. We have lots of defaults, lots of bankruptcies in the US, so you can get probability distributions based on ratings that have a fairly large sample. You can’t do that in emerging markets or countries like Australia, where they haven’t had a recession since the early 1990s. So yes, people said I should have continually updated the Z model but that means you have to keep publishing the updates. People have to find it. People have to use it and test it. It’s much easier to just periodically test the model, and to even build new models that incorporate the lot of data from the relevant countries and industries and combine this firm data with market value measures and possibly even macroeconomic data. What advice do you have for practitioners who want to build their own version of the Z-score model? For example, what’s your secret sauce for putting together the sample? Although the methodology is pretty straightforward, there are subtleties to it. You need a sample of healthy companies and unhealthy companies. There are issues such as sample size. Should [there] be [an] equal number in the two groups or should there be more representatives of the population – 99% non-default, 1%, 2%, or 3% default, depending on the time period? Should they all be manufacturers? Should they be a cross section of industries? Disclaimer: Please note that the content of this site should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute.

Income Investors In Risky, Energy-Related Products Get Creamed

Brokers who pitched energy based structured products during the recent oil boom to conservative clients will be flooded with phone calls from angry clients. As the price of oil has crashed from $100 a barrel less than two years ago to below $30 on Thursday, investors who bought structured products looking to generate income have been crushed. The pain felt by investors in the futures market, energy partnerships, high-yield corporate bonds and the shares of oil and gas companies is well known, noted Wall Street Journal columnist Jason Zweig last weekend. But the plummeting price of oil is also “wreaking havoc” on opaque and complex structured products tied to the price of oil, Zweig reported. In 2015, the biggest names on Wall Street, including Bank of America (NYSE: BAC ), Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS ) and Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS ), issued at least 300 so-called “structured notes,” which are short-term borrowings with returns linked to the price of oil or other energy-related assets. Remember those heady days, just a year ago? It was a perfect time for Wall Street to pump out high-risk products and sell them to Mom and Pop investors. The stock market had gone up in almost a straight line since March 2009, the depths of the credit crisis. The demand for commodities seemed vast, and the U.S. energy industry, with the boom in fracking, looked invincible even though oil prices had started to slide. Those structured securities issued last year total at least $1.3 billion, with most maturing later this year. Investors have a bit of time for oil to bounce back, however, if that bounce doesn’t happen, expect a flood of investor complaints to be filed against the brokers and broker-dealers who sold the structured notes. The allure of the notes and structured products is that investors can make a lot of money if oil goes up just a smidge, with some notes tripling gains at a capped rate. But in some cases there is no protection on the downside, so investors will see “dollar for dollar losses, without limit,” if the fund goes down, noted Zweig. But getting back to even will not be easy, noted one analyst cited by Zweig. “They vast majority of them are underwater,” said the analyst. “And a lot are materially underwater. On many of them, you’d need a 50% to 100% jump in the price of oil from today’s levels to get to break-even.” “This is not really an investment strategy so much as a wager on which way oil prices are going,” another analyst told Zweig. “And some of the risks and costs of that wager are masked by the complexity of it.” Hidden risks and costs, a complicated investment structure based on derivatives – readers, these are red flags in any market. “Many people who thought they were buying black gold on the cheap appear to own a black hole instead, with limited means of escape,” concludes Zweig. We couldn’t agree more. Zamansky LLC are securities and investment fraud attorneys representing investors in federal and state litigation against financial institutions. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

First Trust To Launch Second Actively Managed Commodity ETF

In 2013, First Trust launched the actively managed First Trust Global Tactical Commodity Strategy ETF (NASDAQ: FTGC ), a fund that takes long positions in commodity futures. The time since has been difficult for commodities markets, and as a result, FTGC’s performance has suffered along with other funds in the category: For the year ending January 31, for instance, the ETF has returned -20.52%. However, these returns ranked in the top quintile of funds in its category. Long and Short Positions Perhaps in response, First Trust’s second actively managed commodity ETF – for which it filed paperwork with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on January 28 – will pursue an absolute returns strategy . This means the fund will take both long and short positions in pursuit of positive returns, irrespective of benchmarks, while aiming for lower volatility than traditional funds. The ability to take short positions will obviously help the fund produce positive returns, should commodities remain in a bear market. A long/short approach in the commodity sector has been very effective for the LoCorr Long/Short Commodity Strategy Fund (MUTF: LCSAX ), one of the few long/short commodity fund competitors in the mutual fund and ETF space. That fund has bucked the downdraft in the commodities markets and has generated annualized returns of 12.79% over the past 3-years through January 31. Offshore Subsidiary Like FTGC (and many other funds that use commodity futures), the new fund will invest up to a quarter of its assets in a subsidiary based in the Cayman Islands. This subsidiary will invest in commodity-based futures contracts, with certain tax advantages, while the remainder of the fund’s assets will be invested in cash and short-term debt. Commodities markets have been struggling, largely due to the extreme bear market in crude oil, but this has actually led to increased interest in actively managed commodity funds. As pointed out by ETF.com, Elkhorn and Van Eck have both filed for such funds over the past few months, but First Trust’s new fund is the first to include a short component. This, combined with the firm’s pedigree as the first to launch an actively managed commodities ETF of any kind lends gravitas to the new fund, which will be known as the First Trust Alternative Absolute Return Strategy ETF. Jason Seagraves contributed to this article.