Tag Archives: closed-end-funds

Junk Bond CEFs Yielding 9% And Poised To Benefit From Rising Interest Rates (Part 1)

Summary In the high yield bond carnage, there is a group of funds that has gone oversold despite their insulation from rising interest rates. These funds do not borrow money to invest, so rising interest rates will not negatively impact their net investment income (NII). There remains risk to these funds’ NAV from further declines in the bond market, but dividends are safe for all but one fund. Junk bond markets have gone through a panic and are now in a lull, although many expect more turbulence with future interest rate hikes hurting both the value of issued debts and the borrowing costs of levered closed-end funds. There is a small group of non-levered CEFs that invest in junk bonds but do not use leverage, thereby insulating themselves from higher borrowing costs that will narrow spreads and impact their net investment income in much the way that earnings are hindered by mREITs and BDCs who depend on a spread between low borrowing costs and high investment income from debts. (click to enlarge) Source: Google Finance, SEC Edgar Instead, these funds focus on the high yield market and pass on net investment income to shareholders without borrowing to boost returns. Despite that, these funds’ distribution yields are familiar to investors of levered CEFs, ranging from 4.5% to 12.28%. These funds are: the MFS Special Value Trust (NYSE: MFV ), the Putnam High Income Securities Fund (NYSE: PCF ), the Western Asset High Income Opportunity Fund (NYSE: HIO ), the Western Asset High Yield Fund (NYSE: HYI ), and the Western Asset Managed High Income Fund (NYSE: MHY ). Despite their lower risk profile, these funds have suffered declines similar to levered CEFs, with double-digit declines in the past year across the board, and most losses incurred in the last six months: (click to enlarge) Source: Google Finance With the exception of MFV, these funds were relatively strong performers and were outperforming many levered CEFs thanks to their lower risk profile until the summer. Then as yields rose sharply for high yield debt and default rates continued to rise, these funds joined the junk sell-off to reach their 52-week lows. Source: Moody’s The increase in yields is in part a result of higher defaults and credit downgrades across the market, and has also caused NAVs for these funds to fall alongside all other junk bond funds. This dynamic means that these funds’ current discount to NAV is in fact close to its highest discount in the last year, despite being near 52-week lows: (click to enlarge) Source: CEFA’s Universe Data Is the Risk There? There remains a risk that, if yields rise and bond values fall, the NAV of these funds will decline. However, there is not a commensurate risk of NII declines for two reasons. Firstly, higher borrowing costs are a non-issue for these funds. For funds that are 40% levered or more, higher borrowing costs could damage their ability to make a profit from borrowing to buy junk bonds. What’s more, funds that will need to de-lever because of fears of declining NAVs will be forced to sell off when values are plummeting, causing a similar dynamic that resulted in the shuttering of bond funds like Third Avenue’s . This is a non-issue for these non-levered CEFs. Without borrowing costs or redemptions an issue, they do not need to sell issues unless their NII-to-distribution coverage falls below 100%, which is currently not the case in any of these funds except for MFV. (I will discuss NII coverage of these funds in a future article). With the exception of MFV, this is a rare group of funds which investors can purchase without fears of declining NAVs resulting in distribution cuts. With a sustainable yield of around 9%, these funds are worth considering as an option for immediate and reliable income. Avoid MFV The only fund of this group that is under-earning its distributions is MFV. This is in part due to a recent change in its investment strategy that allows it to focus more on equities in addition to debt: The fund currently has an investment policy that MFS normally will invest the fund’s assets primarily in debt instruments. Effective on December 9, 2015, that policy will be changed to provide that MFS normally invests a majority of the fund’s assets in debt instruments. The change allows the portfolio management team greater flexibility to increase the fund’s exposure to equity securities. There are no other changes to the way the fund is being managed. The good news about this shift is that it will allow the fund to avoid the turbulence of the high yield market with greater flexibility to diversify into equities. The bad news is that this will negatively impact the fund’s immediate income and make it more dependent on capital gains-and active trading-to maintain payouts. Currently, the fund has devoted a third of its assets into equities, limiting its income producing opportunity: (click to enlarge) At the same time, the fund’s equity allocations are slightly skewed towards financial services companies; an ironic decision, considering these companies will benefit the most from rising interest rates: (click to enlarge) It is unclear why the fund’s management has decided on this shift and chosen what very may well be near the bottom of the junk bond market to do so; a decision to shift towards equities earlier in 2015 would have demonstrated much more foresight. So Which to Choose? In part 2 of this series I will discuss the credit quality and income durability of the other funds, but suffice to say for now each currently has NII in excess of its distributions, with coverage ranging from 107% to 128%: (click to enlarge) The relatively low yield on PCF, combined with its high distribution coverage, means that it is unlikely to cut dividends in the short term as it did in 2012, 2013, and 2014, but it also makes the fund’s income stream relatively low compared to HIO HYI, and MHY. In the cases of these funds, distribution coverage is currently solid, making any of these a worthwhile addition to a diversified high yield income portfolio.

Source Capital: Big Change Is Coming At This Closed-End Fund

SOR has a long and solid history. But the long-time portfolio manager has retired. The portfolio remake in the wake of his retirement changes everything. Source Capital (NYSE: SOR ) is one of the old timers in the closed-end fund, or CEF, world. Over the long haul it’s done pretty well, using a focused portfolio to opportunistically invest in small- and mid-cap companies with high returns on equity. But now that the manager is has retired, throw that history out. Source Capital’s advisor, FPA Group, is changing everything . Out with the old Source Capital’s now-retired manager was Eric Ende. He had been with FPA since 1984 and worked closely with the fund’s previous manager. He took over the fund in 1996 and basically kept running the fund the same way it had been run previously. But Ende has now retired. SOR data by YCharts Unlike the last manager transition, which was nearly 20 years ago, there’s no smooth hand off planned. FPA is taking an entirely new approach with the fund. That’s big news that current investors shouldn’t ignore. For starters, the fund will shift from an all-equity portfolio to a balanced portfolio that mixes stocks and bonds. Stocks will vary from 50% to 70% of assets and bonds will live in the range of 30% to 50%. This, in and of itself, isn’t a bad thing. But it is a vast change from the previous all-stock focus and shareholders need to be aware of the remake. Moreover, Source will no longer be keyed in on small- and mid-cap stocks. Over the next year or so the closed-end fund will be shifted to a globally diversified large-cap focus. Again, not a bad thing, per se, but a big change from what the fund had been doing for decades. There’s also a not-so subtle shift from what was more of a growth bias to a value approach that’s going to be part of this transition. There’s a couple of take aways here. The first is that the closed-end fund’s historical performance isn’t a useful guide anymore. That performance was built on an investment approach that no longer exists. So, for all intents and purposes, Source Capital should be looked at as a new fund. Second, the changes taking place will have a major impact on shareholders financially. For example, FPA expects 100% of the fund to turnover next year. Thus, every stock holding is set to be sold as it resets the portfolio to a new baseline. That will increase trading costs, but, more important, will lead to as much as $39 a share in distributions in 2016, according to FPA. Source Capital’s NAV was recently around $76 a share, so this is a really big event. And expect every penny to be taxable. Source is also going to initiate a stock repurchase program with the aim of reducing the closed-end fund’s discount to it net asset value. That discount is only around 10% right now, so it’s not a huge discrepancy. In fact, a 10% discount is the trigger for the buyback and about the average discount over the trailing three years. So this probably won’t be a big change. But combined with the portfolio remake and expected capital gains distributions, this has the potential to further shrink Source Capital over time. That could lead to higher expenses as there’s fewer assets over which to spread the costs of running the fund-which will now be run by a team of five managers. What should you do? If you’ve owned Source Capital for years, you need to rethink your commitment to the fund. It is no longer the same animal. Moreover, there’s no track record to go on anymore for this CEF and the next year is going to be one of material portfolio change. That, in turn, will lead to a large tax bill. If you like the idea of owning a balanced CEF, you might want to give the new approach some time to prove itself. But don’t look at the next year or so as the start of the new approach-the management team will need around a year to get the fund repositioned. You’ll need to sit through the transition and then start examining performance, perhaps using January 2017 as a “start” date for tracking the new approach. In other words, for a year or so, there’s no way to really know what you own here. If you don’t like the new approach or don’t want to sit through the portfolio makeover, then you might want to sell sooner rather than later. In the end, this is a big change and if you don’t buy in to it for any reason, you should get out. Yes, that could have significant tax implications for your portfolio, but the makeover is going to lead to a tax hit anyway.

A Rate Hike Will Threaten This Bond Fund’s Reach For Yield

Summary HYT has moved towards higher duration issues to maintain distributions, making it more heavily exposed to a rate hike than other high yield funds. HYT’s dividend history and its current failure to earn income to cover distributions indicate a rate cut in 2016. Nonetheless, there is an opportunity to purchase HYT when the market discounts its underperformance too heavily — although that time has not come quite yet. BlackRock Corporate High Yield Fund (NYSE: HYT ) is a thinly traded and often overlooked closed-end fund that seeks consistent high income to shareholders through active capital allocation in the high yield taxable bond and debt derivative universe, with a smattering of equity on the side. To its credit, the fund has a solid track record of paying special dividends that have driven its total yield above 8% for most of its history since inception. This must be counterbalanced by a consistent decline in dividends and a fall in NAV that make it suspect for the income-seeking investor. Currently, the fund deserves attention because a recent dividend cut for HYT and turmoil in the high-yield market as a whole have generated interest in just about any high-yielding CEF. But there is cause for caution. The Dividend History Unfortunately, regular dividends have been consistently falling for this fund for a long time: (click to enlarge) In 2015, shareholders faced a 7.3% dividend cut after similar cuts came to the fund in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Dividends have fallen 41% since the fund’s inception, and the fund’s market price has fallen by a third. The Capital Losses Some CEF investors like to catch funds that trade at a discount to NAV using the logic of value investors: get dollars when they’re on sale for 80 cents. In addition to the falling dividends HYT pays out, there is another reason why this strategy will not work with HYT. The fund’s overall capital losses are not abating. According to the fund’s most recent annual and semi-annual reports , the fund has lost 7.4% of its value from June to September. Over a one-year period to September, the fund lost 3.14% of its NAV. Since then, the fund has lost another 0.6% of its NAV. Greater Exposure to Rising Rates We can largely attribute these losses to a cratering in the high yield market, which has also caused a distressing decline in the NAV of high yield funds such as Pimco High Yield Fund (NYSE: PHK ) and caused me to sell my holdings in that fund (I discuss this decision here ). In the case of PHK, management seems to be preparing for this fall in junk debt values by shifting the portfolio towards shorter duration holdings at higher yields. In theory, this will free up capital for new issues at higher rates if the Federal Reserve raises rates in December or early next year. In the case of HYT, this is not management’s strategy. In September, HYT had 75% of its holdings with maturities ranging between 3-10 years, with over half having maturities between 5 and 10 years. In June, 68% of its holdings were in the 3-10-year maturity window, with 44% in the 5-10-year maturing range. This means there is now a higher risk of HYT losing more of its NAV if the Federal Reserve raises interest rates and rates for high yield debt goes up as well. Even if the Fed doesn’t raise rates, if the market worries about higher default rates due to declining profitability on the stronger dollar, or because of cheap oil, or any other of the myriad reasons that have driven a fall in the high yield market in 2015, HYT is more exposed than PHK and other actively managed high yield funds. The CLO Bet HYT is also making another small bet by moving into CLO investments. In its last annual report, HYT disclosed approximately $24.5 million in CLO investments, which is over half of its $49.5 million invested in asset-backed securities. On the plus side, CLOs remain only 2% of HYT’s total portfolio. There is potential for credit spreads to narrow if the Federal Reserve does raise interest rates and causes other interest rates, such as LIBOR, to follow suit, but this will have significantly less impact on HYT than on other high yield funds, both in the CEF and BDC universe, which have invested more aggressively in CLOs to boost returns. A good example of a much higher risk high yield fund that has seen weak NAV growth and high market value declines based on CLO exposure is Prospect Capital (NASDAQ: PSEC ). Their high CLO holdings are discussed in this prescient article by BDC Buzz. PSEC has fallen 12.7%, excluding dividends, since BDC Buzz’s article (although it was by no means his first warning on the dangers in that company). For HYT, this means its CLO holdings are relatively conservative. On the surface, this sounds good; but they are in fact so conservative that it is difficult to determine the purpose of holding such a small portion of the portfolio in these volatile assets. Additionally, many of those CLOs are in small and middle-market companies or BDCs that service the small and middle-market companies, again compounding HYT’s exposure to companies that are more likely to suffer higher default rates. For example, as of its September report, HYT held $2.1 million in asset-backed securities whose counterparty is Ares CLO Ltd. and another $877,000 to WhiteHorse subsidiaries of H.I.G. Capital, a diversified private equity investment firm. Matching Income to Distributions Since CLOs pay a higher yield than market-issued bonds, these are part of the fund’s overall strategy to make income match distributions. Unfortunately, the fund is still falling slightly short of its payout. Since March, the fund has paid $1.21 million of its distributions as a return of capital and its dividend coverage has remained below 85% for five months. Its current ROC is a small fraction of the overall value of the fund and is by no means a cause for alarm at the present time. However, it does indicate the strong likelihood of another dividend cut in 2016 as we have seen over the past few years, meaning investors should calculate their expected income from this fund not based on its current yield but on its likely future yield. Also, because of the long duration of the fund’s holdings, its ability to churn into higher yielding new issues will be limited, making it even less likely to enjoy a higher rate of income on its holdings if yields on corporate debt rise next year. Discount to NAV When deciding whether to purchase HYT or not, investors should also consider the fund’s discount or premium to NAV and how this is likely to trend in the future. Except for a brief spell in 2012, the fund has always traded at a discount, and its current discount is the steepest it has been since 2008. (click to enlarge) The fund’s current 13.47% discount is slightly above the 52-week average of 12.37%, although the last year’s tumultuous and volatile high yield bond market may make the last year’s average a less reliable indicator of timing a purchase in this fund than in the past. While investors looking for mean reversion may be tempted to buy as its discount seems curiously low, the above considerations about portfolio duration, ROC, and poor positioning for rising rates should make investors pause before jumping in. Conclusion HYT is not positioning itself for a rising interest rate environment and has seen a steep discount to NAV priced in as a result. Additionally, the fund’s consistent dividend cuts mean that it cannot be purchased as a source of reliable income. However, it can be purchased when the market undervalues its income potential. A careful analysis of the fund’s shift of its bond holdings by duration and a closer understanding of its allocations to CLOs and its exposure to smaller companies is necessary before making a purchase on this name.