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Exploring The Highest-Yielding, Dividend-Raising Utility

In a screen for the highest-yielding, dividend-raising utility I came across a Houston-based company with a 5%+ dividend yield. This company has provided solid investment results over the past decade. This article looks at what you might expect moving forward based on the company’s commentary. For dividend-oriented investors, David Fish’s list of Dividend Champions, Contenders and Challenges is the place to get your bearings. It’s nice because it provides you with a great subset of the types of securities you might be looking for: companies that have not only paid but also increased their dividend payments for at least 5, 10 and 25 years. Still, there are hundreds of names from which you can explore. As such, it can be helpful to whittle down the list to discover pockets of the investing world one by one. As an example, you might organize the list by utilities and then by “current” dividend yield. Naturally screens come with a bevy of limitations, but for exploration sake they work quite well. If you completed this exercise, you would notice that CenterPoint Energy (NYSE: CNP ) happened to be the highest-yielding, dividend-raising utility. Let’s explore. Tracing its roots back to 1866 , CenterPoint Energy began as the Houston Gas Light Company. Today the company has more than 7,400 employees serving more than 5 million customers. The business operates in four basic areas: natural gas distribution, electric transmission, natural gas sales and heating and cooling services. The largest segment is the Texas utility serving the Houston area, hence the utility category. However, the company also has a 55.4% limited partner interest in Enable Midstream Partners (NYSE: ENBL ), a natural gas and crude oil infrastructure pipeline. Incidentally, this also explains why CenterPoint has an above average yield – even when compared to other utilities. The payout ratio is well above average, and the share price has declined materially during the last year. Let’s take a look at the company’s history moving from 2005 through 2014:   CNP Revenue Growth -0.6% Start Profit Margin 2.3% End Profit Margin 6.6% Earnings Growth 11.7% Yearly Share Count 3.7% EPS Growth 8.7% Start P/E 19 End P/E 17 Share Price Growth 6.9% % Of Divs Collected 54% Start Payout % 60% End Payout % 67% Dividend Growth 10.1% Total Return 10.0% The above table demonstrates an interesting story. On the top line the company actually had lower revenues in 2014 as compared to 2005. Yet this alone did not prevent the company from generating solid returns. The quality of those sales improved dramatically, resulting in total earnings growth of nearly 12% per year. Ordinarily this number is boosted by a reduction in share count. In the case of utilities, the opposite usually occurs. CenterPoint Energy has been no exception: increasing its common shares outstanding from about 310 million in 2005 to almost 430 million last year. As such, the earnings-per-share growth trailed total company profitability – leading to almost 9% average annual increases. Investors were willing to pay a lower valuation at the end of the period, resulting in 6.9% yearly capital appreciation. Moreover, investors saw a 3% starting dividend yield grow by 10% annually, resulting in total returns of about 10% per annum. In other words, despite the lack of revenue growth and P/E compression, shareholders still would have enjoyed a solid return. This was a direct result of strong underlying earnings growth and a solid and increasing dividend payment. Moving forward, looking at the investment with a similar lens can be helpful. Since the end of 2014, both the share price and expected earnings have declined materially as a result of the broader energy environment. For this fiscal year the company has provided full-year earnings guidance of $1.00 to $1.10 per diluted share – well below the $1.40 earned last year. Still, the company has indicated that it expects to keep the dividend at its current rate, resulting in a 90%+ payout ratio for the time being (this simultaneously equates to 60% to 70% utility operations payout ratio). Moreover, CenterPoint has indicated that it expects to grow its dividend in-line with EPS growth (forecasted at 4% to 6% annually) through 2018. This isn’t speculation on my part or a collection of analyst’s estimates. Instead, its what the company is telling you to expect. Granted they could certainly turn out to be incorrect, but it should be somewhat reassuring given their greater stakes, more to lose, higher company knowledge, etc. Here’s what the next three years of dividend payments could look like with 5% annual growth: 2016 = $1.04 2017 = $1.09 2018 = $1.15 In total an investor might expect to collect $3.28 in aggregate dividend payments, or roughly 18% of the recent share price. Without any capital appreciation whatsoever, this would equate to 5.6% annualized returns. With a future earnings multiple of say 17, this would equate to a total yearly gain of about 8.9% over the three-year period. This is how I’d begin to think about an investment in CenterPoint Energy. You might perform a similar screen and come across the company. Yet this alone does not mean that it’s a worthwhile opportunity. Just because a company has an above average yield doesn’t mean that it’s a great investment. There are other factors at play. However, it does mean that the “investing bar” is relatively lower. A higher starting dividend yield, especially when coupled with reasonable growth, means that a good portion of your return will be generated via cash received. In this case you could see 5% or 6% annual returns without any capital appreciation. From there, if capital appreciation does come along, your investment returns start to approach the double digits. Finally, it’s important to be prudent in these assumptions as the slower growing nature of the business creates an out-sized emphasis on the valuation paid. You could see years of slow or moderate growth outweighed by compression in the earnings multiple. As such, a cautious approach is likely most sensible: expecting to receive a solid and above average dividend yield without the simultaneous anticipation of wide price swings to the upside.

What Happens In The Real World: The Average Joe Broad Market Portfolio Q3 Update

Summary About the Average Joe broad market portfolios. The Q3 drop in the major averages. The results of the portfolios. Introduced to the SA audience earlier in the quarter ( here ), the Average Joe Broad Market portfolio(s) seek to provide a methodology and platform for the Average Joe to perform real world comparisons to the broader market. Since these are passively managed portfolio(s) requiring little interaction, they can also be used to amass a decent retirement account with a minimalist approach. There a lots of ways to make money out there. Some of them are a bit slower. Alright, a lot slower. The third quarter of 2015 is now in the books so let’s review the changes and results to the portfolios. The AJ Broad Market Portfolio concentrates its investments in three broad market index funds, the State Street Global Advisor’s SPDR S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ), Invesco’s Powershares QQQ (covering the NASDAQ 100(NASDAQ: QQQ ), and another State Street Global Advisors product covering the Dow Jones Industrial Avg., the SPDR Dow Jones Industrial Average (NYSEARCA: DIA ). A new portfolio was started each year beginning 1/1/2000 with weekly data provided by Yahoo (Author’s note: Yahoo weeks are listed as the “week of _____.” These portfolios therefore are not on a fiscal nor calendar quarter. Instead, they begin with the first Monday of every quarter and end on the last day of the week of the last Monday of the quarter. This could actually fall into the following calendar quarter as it does in this Q3 review.). For other rules applied to the input of cash and the methods used to make purchases, please see Part 1. About the Averages The S&P 500 began the fiscal quarter at 2076.72 and ended down 125.36 (-6.036%) to 1951.36. While this is a steep drop for the quarter, the October 2nd fiscal close puts the decline for the year at a more manageable -4.57%. In an article/video published on 10/5 on Yahoo, Estimize ( estimize.com ), the open financial estimates platform, reported that current expectations for S&P 500 Q3 earnings will reflect a 2.2% decline. That leads to a big question. Are the earnings baked into the prices yet or do we still have more losses ahead. The NASDAQ 100 followed suit for the quarter dropping 152.7 from the beginning of the quarter (4420.15), ending at 4267.45 (-3.454%). The index is still in positive territory for the year, but trimming its gain to just 54.07 points or 1.283%. The Dow Jones Industrial Average continued the trend for Q3, losing 1288.04 points to finish at 16472.37. This is a -7.252% drop for the quarter and a -7.132% drop for the year. The Average Joe Broad Market Portfolios With a new portfolio starting every year since 2000, there’s never a shortage of data to crunch. First, let’s start with the beginning and ending positions of each fund. Fund Start SPY Shares End of Q2 SPY Shares End of Q3 QQQ Shares End of Q2 QQQ Shares End of Q3 DIA Shares End of Q2 DIA Shares End of Q3 2000 54 54 55 55 46 54 2001 46 46 46 46 38 46 2002 38 38 38 38 38 38 2003 31 39 31 31 31 31 2004 31 31 23 23 23 23 2005 23 23 23 23 19 19 2006 19 19 19 19 15 15 2007 15 15 15 15 11 15 2008 11 11 11 11 11 11 2009 11 11 11 11 7 7 2010 7 7 7 7 7 7 2011 5 7 5 5 5 5 2012 5 5 3 5 3 3 2013 4 4 2 2 2 2 2014 2 2 2 2 1 2 2015 1 1 1 1 1 1 Next, the update on the values including input, quarterly gain/loss and gain/loss since portfolio inception. Fund Start Portfolio Value End of Q2 Q3 Cash Input Cash Position Investments Value Total Value Q3 Gain or Loss Q3 % G/L G/L since Inception 2000 $26,021.14 $585.00 $136.08 $25,137.33 $25,273.41 ($747.74) -2.87% $9,162.41 2001 $22,599.90 $507.00 $533.42 $21,324.68 $21,858.10 ($741.79) -3.28% $8,050.10 2002 $18.821.95 $455.00 $661.12 $17,616.04 $18.277.16 ($544.79) -2.89% $6,451.16 2003 $16,645.10 $403.00 $273.46 $15,930.90 $16,204.36 ($440.74) -2.65% $6,152.36 2004 $13,170.75 $351.00 $603.34 $12,222.26 $12,825.60 ($344.75) -2.61% $4,336.60 2005 $10,888.78 $299.00 $623.81 $10,004.02 $10,627.83 ($260.95) -2.40% $3,493.83 2006 $ 8,790.39 $247.00 $432.99 $ 8,149.70 $ 8,582.69 ($207.70) -2.36% $2,595.69 2007 $ 7,149.38 $221.00 $ 76.86 $ 6,953.70 $ 7,030.56 ($118.82) -1.66% $2,008.56 2008 $ 5,921.86 $195.00 $728.06 $ 5,099.38 $ 5,827.44 ($ 94.41) -1.59% $1,670.44 2009 $ 5,104.82 $169.00 $588.54 $ 4,441.06 $ 5,029.60 ($ 75.22) -1.47% $1,627.60 2010 $ 3,711.20 $143.00 $424.97 $ 3,245.06 $ 3,670.03 ($ 41.17) -1-11% $ 919.03 2011 $ 2,807.31 $117.00 $ 72.60 $ 2,707.88 $ 2,780.48 ($ 26.83) -0.96% $ 576.48 2012 $ 2,112.36 $104.00 $112.27 $ 1,988.74 $ 2,101.01 ($ 11.36) -0.54% $ 353.01 2013 $ 1,488.12 $ 91.00 $186.71 $ 1,317.14 $ 1,503.85 ($ 6.93) -0.47% $ 163.85 2014 $ 962.40 $ 78.00 $ 56.42 $ 927.16 $ 983.58 $ 21.18 2.20% ($ 5.42) 2015 $ 614.91 $ 65.00 $190.02 $ 463.58 $ 653.60 $ 38.69 6.30% ($ 36.40) And the dividend and yield data: Fund Start Dividends Received Q3 Yield (on Value) Yield (on Cost) 2000 $123.46 1.90% 2.75% 2001 $109.31 1.93% 2.92% 2002 $ 93.47 1.99% 2.98% 2003 $ 76.25 1.83% 2.77% 2004 $ 64.60 1.93% 2.96% 2005 $ 51.76 1.90% 2.86% 2006 $ 41.93 1.91% 2.74% 2007 $ 34.29 1.92% 2.59% 2008 $ 27.06 1.83% 2.88% 2009 $ 22.25 1.74% 2.88% 2010 $ 17.22 1.86% 2.74% 2011 $ 12.30 1.75% 2.18% 2012 $ 9.89 1.87% 2.32% 2013 $ 6.93 1.86% 2.32% 2014 $ 4.44 1.85% 1.87% 2015 $ 2.46 1.60% 1.95% Current Expectations The intent of these portfolios is to show the real results of the market, one that even the little guys, the average Joe’s can build. It will amass to wealth over time, but it is slow moving and prone to many whip-saw antics in the short run. This quarter is a perfect example of how a quarter can change long-term projections. The tables below shows the current growth rate and the expected portfolio value at 20, 25, 30 and 35 years based on the Q2 and Q3 closes. The Q3 dip did considerable damage to the older portfolios while the newer ones fared better based on the size of the cash input rather than market changes. 2000 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 8.4353% $54,269.54 $112,121.92 $214,894.36 $389,271.82 Q3 7.4110% $49,722.27 $100,719.91 $188,832.05 $333,778.68 Difference -1.0243% ($ 4,547.27) ($ 11,402.01) ($ 26,062.31) ($ 55,493.14) 2001 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 8.9419% $56,744.68 $118,457.28 $229,688.59 $421,488.74 Q3 7.7992% $51,377.73 $104,834.63 $198,151.43 $353,429.82 Difference -1.1427% ($ 5,366.95) ($ 13,622.65) ($ 31,537.16) ($ 68,058.92) 2002 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 8.9246% $56,657.42 $118,232.41 $229,159.78 $420,328.64 Q3 7.7529% $51,176.13 $104,331.32 $197,006.19 $351,003.16 Difference -1.1717% ($ 5,481.29) ($ 13,901.09) ($ 32,153.59) ($ 69,325.48) 2003 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 9.9939% $62,427.06 $133,331.41 $265,246.35 $500,865.21 Q3 8.7847% $55,959.67 $116,438.32 $224,950.44 $411,116.55 Difference -1.2092% ($ 6,467.39) ($ 16,893.09) ($ 40,295.91) ($ 89,748.66) 2004 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 9.3866% $59,052.89 $124,444.74 $243,866.38 $452,819.50 Q3 8.0701% $52,581.31 $107,852.39 $205,048.52 $368,112.68 Difference -1.3165% ($ 6,471.58) ($ 16,592.35) ($ 38,817.86) ($ 84,706.82) 2005 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 9.6044% $60,232.88 $127,534.63 $251,255.28 $469,317.85 Q3 8.2226% $53,276.59 $109,605.63 $209,079.28 $376,747.06 Difference -1.3818% ($ 6,956.29) ($ 17,929.00) ($ 42,176.00) ($ 92,570.79) 2006 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 9.4431% $59,356.13 $125,236.94 $245,756.14 $457,028.17 Q3 7.9500% $52,042.67 $106,499.14 $201,949.24 $361,500.35 Difference -1.4931% ($ 7,313.46) ($ 18,737.80) ($ 43,806.90) ($ 95,527.82) 2007 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 9.5552% $59,963.08 $126,826.43 $249,557.47 $465,516.79 Q3 8.0202% $52,356.29 $107,286.55 $203,751.34 $365,342.29 Difference -1.5350% ($ 7,606.79) ($ 19,539.88) ($ 45,806.13) ($ 100,174.50) 2008 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 10.4279% $65,006.71 $140,230.05 $282,110.25 $539,404.49 Q3 8.6808% $55,449.00 $115,129.74 $221,891.10 $404,446.28 Difference -1.7471% ($ 9,557.71) ($ 25,100.31) ($ 60,219.15) ($ 134,958.21) 2009 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 12.8882% $82,817.34 $190,156.98 $410,397.39 $848,582.02 Q3 10.8746% $67,820.57 $147,855.41 $301,011.00 $583,235.22 Difference -2.0136% ($14,956.77) ($ 42,301.57) ($ 109,386.39) ($ 265,346.80) 2010 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 11.3194% $70,792.82 $156,020.83 $321,542.12 $631,570.31 Q3 9.0629% $57,359.89 $120,045.72 $233,431.60 $429,717.73 Difference -2.2565% ($13,432.93) ($ 35,975.11) ($ 88,110.52) ($ 201,852.58) 2011 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 11.0573% $69,020.03 $151,137.06 $309,226.75 $602,488.89 Q3 8.3983% $54,094.82 $111,678.09 $213,866.13 $387,051.38 Difference -2.6590% ($14,925.21) ($ 39,458.97) ($ 95,360.62) ($ 215,437.51) 2012 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 11.3342% $70,894.80 $156,302.99 $322,256.82 $633,266.39 Q3 7.9611% $52,091.81 $106,622.44 $202,231.19 $362,100.92 Difference -3.3731% ($18,802.99) ($ 49,680.55) ($ 120,025.63) ($ 271,165.47) 2013 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 10.0768% $62,908.74 $134,612.77 $268,361.34 $507,942.33 Q3 6.1444% $44,837.55 $ 88,828.93 $162,473.94 $279,438.99 Difference -3.9324% ($18,071.19) ($ 45,783.84) ($ 105,887.40) ($ 228,503.34) 2014 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 4.3849% $39,170.40 $ 75,523.24 $134,060.28 $223,109.02 Q3 -0.0829% $27,668.78 $ 50,273.02 $ 83,687.16 $130,019.77 Difference -4.4678% ($11,501.62) ($ 25,250.22) ($ 50,373.12) ($ 93,089.45) 2015 Start Quarter Growth Rate 20 year Value 25 year Value 30 year Value 35 year Value Q2 -5.5230% $21,424.38 $ 37,624.45 $ 60,433.49 $ 90,530.88 Q3 -9.7270% $17,664.10 $ 30,381.94 $ 47,773.74 $ 70,100.49 Difference -4.4678% ($ 3,760.28) ($ 7,242.51) ($ 12,659.75) ($ 20,430.39) With apologies to the Las Vegas Convention and Visitor’s Authority for paraphrasing their slogan, What happens in the “Real World”, happens.

ETF Issues: What You Don’t Know Might Hurt You

ETFs can be great options for investors. But you have to know what you are buying. iShares, for example, isn’t making that easy, though it’s doing the best it can. Exchange traded funds, or ETFs, are an incredible work of human ingenuity. They are pooled investment vehicles that trade close to net asset value while being traded all day long. And while there are good reasons to like these hot products, there are also reasons to dislike them. And a single data point provided by iShares shows one of those reasons. I don’t hate ETFs To start, I don’t hate ETFs. I just don’t like them as much as most investors seem to. And certainly not as much as Wall Street does, based on how many ETFs have been brought to market in recent years. Yes, they are cheap to own and provide quick and easy diversification. But it’s so easy to buy an ETF that people aren’t looking closely enough at what they are buying. That may not matter much if you pick up the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ), a clone of the S&P 500 Index. But with more and more esoteric ETF product being created by rabid Wall Street salesmen, taking the time to get to know what you own is starting to matter more and more. For example, I recently wrote about the fine print in the prospectus of the Global X Yieldco Index ETF (NASDAQ: YLCO ). Essentially, this ETF is focused on buying 20 stocks in a new and niche sector that doesn’t really have 20 stocks to buy. YLCO is all about the story, not so much about the substance, in my eyes. Maybe YLCO will be a great ETF at some point, but right now it’s a risky proposition that all but the most aggressive investors should avoid. So, yes ETFs can be good. But Wall Street has been perverting this goodness in an attempt to make a buck. iShares isn’t evil But don’t think it’s only exotic fare about which you need to be concerned. Even more “normal” stuff can lead you astray. For example, the iShares NASDAQ Biotechnology ETF (NASDAQ: IBB ) has some problems of its own. Now iShares is the ETF arm of giant asset manager BlackRock (NYSE: BLK ). And, for the most part, BlackRock is a stand up company. But that doesn’t mean every product it sells is a good investment option. For example, a quick look at IBB’s overview page shows a P/E ratio of 25. That might not be too surprising given that biotech companies are high growth. You wouldn’t expect a P/E of 10 for this group. In fact, you might even say it’s on the low side for the sector, which is known for housing money losing companies looking for a big score via the creation of new drugs. Which is why you should click the little information icon next to that P/E stat. That’s where you’ll learn that the P/E ratio doesn’t include companies that don’t have earnings. So, essentially, the P/E really tells you less about the ETF’s portfolio than you might at first believe. Interestingly, the same issue pops up throughout iShare’s data on P/E. For example, the iShares U.S. Oil & Gas Exploration & Production ETF (NYSEARCA: IEO ) has a P/E that’s listed at a little over 8. With 70% of its assets in the oil and gas exploration sector, where companies are bleeding red ink, you have to step back and wonder what’s going on. A low P/E makes sense for an out of favor sector, but does that average really tell you the whole story? The thing is the warning about P/E is a standard disclosure on the iShares site and holds true for everything from a niche biotech fund to the company’s S&P 500 Index clone. And iShares really isn’t doing anything malicious. It’s a database issue. You can’t calculate a meaningful P/E if a company doesn’t have any E to work with. So in order to get the job done, in this case calculating an average P/E, you toss the garbage numbers. And, thus, you create a P/E by using only those companies with earnings. Which, unfortunately, biases the number you have just created so that it may offer a misleading picture of the portfolio. So I’m not hating on iShares, there’s not much else it could do to provide site-wide data. And at least it goes the extra step of disclosing this little problem. But it should make you step back and take pause. If you own that biotech fund or the oil and gas fund, the stats you are using to validate your purchase may, in fact, not be reliable. This issue can be found at open-end mutual funds, too, so don’t think ETFs are the only problem child. The best example comes from Morningstar. This research and data house is very open about the way it calculates most of its data, you just have to look. And when it comes to average P/E, they have a workbook available that explains, “If a stock has a negative value for the financial variable (EPS, CPS), the stock will be excluded from the calculation.” EPS is earnings per share and CPS is cash flow per share. So any site that uses Morningstar data will be impacted by this issue… like Fidelity (read the fine print at the bottom of the data page). The question is to what degree is there a problem. In some cases it’s a minor issue. In the case of IBB, roughly half of the ETF’s holding don’t make any money and are excluded from the P/E calculation, according to The Wall Street Journal . That makes the P/E figure provided by iShares pretty much useless in my eyes. And it points out yet another problem that ETF investors may not realize when they buy what is currently a hot Wall Street product. Know what you own For many investors ETFs are seen as a short cut. A punt option that doesn’t require much thinking. In many cases that’s true, but in many others it isn’t. Which is why knowing what you own is so important. Can you accept the average P/E for an S&P 500 Index fund at face value? Yeah, probably. But what about an ETF honed in on an industry that’s filled with money-losing companies, like biotech? I don’t think that passes the sniff test. You’d be better off doing a little more digging into the portfolio to get a good understanding of what’s in there. Again, I don’t hate ETFs. But they are so popular and have been pushed so hard by Wall Street that I fear investors don’t have any clue what they own. Too many people have been lulled into complacency by slick marketing and an avalanche of new products. I don’t think that’s a story that ends well. If you own an ETF, I recommend taking a deeper dive just to make sure you really own what you think you own.