Tag Archives: author

Small-Cap Stocks Are Ready To Rumble

Summary The backdrop for small-capitalization stocks looks compelling right now. A strong seasonal pattern for the small-cap sector is at hand. Small-caps tend to do most of their business in the US and should benefit from the improving US economy. The first half of December is historically weak performance-wise; mid-December is the time to accumulate. During times of stronger economic growth and rising interest rates, small-capitalization stocks have outperformed their large-cap counterparts. Add to the mix an approaching strong seasonal pattern, and you have the recipe for small-cap outperformance. The small-cap sector of the market will likely post a year-end rally and outperform large-caps over the next six months, if history is any guide. Small-caps have actually trounced large-caps by about 7% this year until they peaked on June 23rd of this year. Since then, large-caps have “turned the tables”, with the S&P 500 ahead by approximately 4% year-to-date. However, it’s time to overweight small-caps in your portfolio as history clearly favors stocks of small companies at this juncture in time. Much has been written over the years confirming the seasonal tendency for small-caps to outperform from January to June. Let’s take a look at a chart, which illustrates the seasonal pattern: (click to enlarge) Source: Jeffrey A. Hirsch, Stock Trader’s Almanac When the line on the chart is descending, large-caps are outperforming small-caps; when the line on the chart is rising, small-caps are moving up faster than large-caps. Based on this strong historical seasonal pattern, it may be prudent to trim your exposure to large-cap stocks and overweight small-caps for the next six months or so. Smaller companies tend to do most of their business within the U.S. and should benefit particularly from the modestly improving U.S. economy. With all the tax-loss harvesting going on this month, mid-December would be an appropriate time to begin buying the sector. There are a few ways to potentially capture the small-cap seasonal phenomenon. The Vanguard Small-Cap ETF (NYSEARCA: VB ) is a solid choice with the lowest expense ratio in the space, at just 0.09%. The SPDR S&P 600 Small Cap ETF (NYSEARCA: SLY ) is limited to just 600 or so small company stocks. The selection universe for this fund includes all U.S. common equities listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ Global Select Market, NASDAQ Select Market and NASDAQ Capital Market with market capitalizations between $250 million and $1.2 billion. The iShares Core S&P SmallCap 600 ETF (NYSEARCA: IJR ) is an ETF which offers inexpensive, superior performance. Its expense ratio is just 0.12%. If you’re looking for a more widely diversified fund spread across sectors and the growth-value spectrum, the iShares Russell 2000 ETF (NYSEARCA: IWM ) fits the bill. It’s the largest ETF in the small-cap sector and carries an expense ratio of 0.20%. Lastly, the PowerShares DWA SmallCap Momentum ETF (NYSEARCA: DWAS ) is an interesting choice. Dorsey Wright & Associates, an internationally recognized firm for its work in tactical asset allocation and technical analysis, selects securities pursuant to its proprietary selection methodology, which is designed to identify securities that demonstrate powerful relative strength characteristics. DWA has an excellent track record and a wide following. Its expense ratio is the highest of the group, coming in at 0.60%. Year-to-date, IJR, DWAS and SLY have performed similarly and all three are outperforming VB by approximately +1.97% and IWM by +2.33%. (click to enlarge) Here is a longer-term chart going back to June of 2012: (click to enlarge) IJR and DWAS, again, have performed similarly and have outperformed VB by +5.86%, SLY by +8.27% and IWM by +8.78%, respectively. IJR has edged out most of the other ETFs over various time periods and combined with its very low expense ratio, makes it a very attractive choice in the small-cap space. Conclusion The outlook for small-cap stocks looks favorable right now. One of the most important factors powering the performance of small-cap stocks is economic growth. Studies involving past rates of return have shown that during times of improving economic conditions and rising interest rates, small-cap stocks tend to outperform large-caps. One possible reason for the strong performance of small-caps relative to large-caps in rising rate environments is that rates tend to go up in response to better economic conditions, which tend to provide a positive backdrop for small-cap companies. We would use the weakness we’re seeing in early December to accumulate small-caps via low-cost ETFs through year-end.

How To Find The Best Sector ETFs: Q4’15

Summary The large number of ETFs hurts investors more than it helps as too many options become paralyzing. Performance of an ETFs holdings are equal to the performance of an ETF. Our coverage of ETFs leverages the diligence we do on each stock by rating ETFs based on the aggregated ratings of their holdings. Finding the best ETFs is an increasingly difficult task in a world with so many to choose from. How can you pick with so many choices available? Don’t Trust ETF Labels There are at least 44 different Financials ETFs and at least 196 ETFs across all sectors. Do investors need 19+ choices on average per sector? How different can the ETFs be? Those Financials ETFs are very different. With anywhere from 24 to 561 holdings, many of these Financials ETFs have drastically different portfolios, creating drastically different investment implications. The same is true for the ETFs in any other sector, as each offers a very different mix of good and bad stocks. Consumer Staples ranks first for stock selection. Energy ranks last. Details on the Best & Worst ETFs in each sector are here . A Recipe for Paralysis By Analysis We firmly believe ETFs for a given sector should not all be that different. We think the large number of Financials (or any other) sector ETFs hurts investors more than it helps because too many options can be paralyzing. It is simply not possible for the majority of investors to properly assess the quality of so many ETFs. Analyzing ETFs, done with the proper diligence, is far more difficult than analyzing stocks because it means analyzing all the stocks within each ETF. As stated above, that can be as many as 561 stocks, and sometimes even more, for one ETF. Any investor worth his salt recognizes that analyzing the holdings of an ETF is critical to finding the best ETF. Figure 1 shows our top rated ETF for each sector. Figure 1: The Best ETF in Each Sector (click to enlarge) Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings How to Avoid “The Danger Within” Why do you need to know the holdings of ETFs before you buy? You need to be sure you do not buy an ETF that might blow up. Buying an ETF without analyzing its holdings is like buying a stock without analyzing its business and finances. No matter how cheap, if it holds bad stocks, the ETF’s performance will be bad. Don’t just take my word for it; see what Barron’s says on this matter. PERFORMANCE OF ETF’S HOLDINGS = PERFORMANCE OF ETF If Only Investors Could Find Funds Rated by Their Holdings The PowerShares KBW Property & Casualty Insurance Portfolio ETF (NYSEARCA: KBWP ) is the top-rated Financials ETF and the overall best ETF of the 196 sector ETFs that we cover. The worst ETF in Figure 1 is the Fidelity Covington MSCI Utilities Index (NYSEARCA: FUTY ), which gets a Dangerous rating. One would think ETF providers could do better for this sector. Disclosure: David Trainer and Blaine Skaggs receive no compensation to write about any specific stock, sector, or theme.

AMLP Shareholders Beware

By hidden design, the ALPS Alerian MLP ETF (NYSEARCA: AMLP ) robs shareholders of 37% of their upside gains. It was the first ETF do this, and when I revealed AMLP’s dirty little secret to owners and potential buyers, many did not seem to care. “It’s all about the dividend,” they emphatically stated. “Plus, in a down market, AMLP will only fall 63% of the underlying index,” they crowed. AMLP clips 37% of performance because it is a C-corporation that is liable for federal and state taxes, estimated to be about 37% of any capital appreciation and taxable income. The supposed “benefit” of this horrendous tax drag is that it would act as a buffer during down markets, limiting declines to just 63% of those experienced by the underlying index. However, AMLP is failing to live up to those expectations. The fund has been falling like a rock the past ten weeks. Shareholders missed out on the lion’s share of gains on the upside, and now they are getting screwed again as the fund loses more than its underlying Alerian MLP Infrastructure Index. The promise of smaller losses in a down market is now history. Evidence of this can be found on AMLP’s website , where the one-month performance of the fund was -7.96% for November, while the underlying index is showing a 7.95% loss. The problem began in mid-September, so the three-month performance of -13.36% doesn’t reveal this discrepancy, yet. The performance table also shows that since inception, AMLP has had a cumulative return of +14.63%, while its index returned +34.56%. AMLP has returned less than 38% of the underlying index return. The other 57% has been eaten up by taxes and fees. Owners of AMLP are blinded by the yield. Based on its fourth-quarter distribution of $0.299 and Friday’s (12/4/15) closing price of $10.91, this C-corporation disguised as an ETF has a seductive yield of 10.96%. What many owners do not comprehend is the degree of principal being robbed in order to support the illusion of a high yield. Fortunately, the UBS ETRACS Alerian MLP Infrastructure Index ETN (NYSEARCA: MLPI ) tracks the same Alerian MLP Infrastructure Index, making it easy to see AMLP’s shortcomings. Using data and software from Investors FastTrack , I was able to produce charts making a revealing comparison. Please note that MLPI uses an exchange traded note (“ETN”) structure with its own drawbacks , but its performance helps to understand the flaws of AMLP. Here is a long-term performance graph comparing the two. AMLP is in red, MLPI is in green, and the light-blue line in the lower half shows the relative strength of AMLP to MLPI (a rising line indicates AMLP is performing better than MLPI). From AMLP’s inception on 8/25/2010 through its performance peak on 8/29/2014, it had a total cumulative return of 67.4%. During the same period, MLPI had a total cumulative return of 110.5%. During this rising market, AMLP only returned 61% of what MLPI captured. (click to enlarge) During that up market, MLPI’s price went from $26.74 to $46.22, resulting in 72.8% capital appreciation. Meanwhile, AMLP’s price went from $14.98 to $19.31, resulting in just a 28.9% capital appreciation, or only about 39.7% of what MLPI delivered. One of the unwritten promises of AMLP was that while it lagged on the upside, it would shine in down markets because its deferred tax liabilities would become assets, greatly reducing the downside impact. However, AMLP’s price fell 43.5% from 8/29/2014 through 12/4/2014, while MLPI’s price fell 48.6%. The ratio of AMLP’s price decline to MLPI’s was 89.4%-much worse than the “promised” 63% and nowhere near the 39.7% of the upside it captured. From a total return perspective, AMLP fell 43.5% to MLPI’s 48.6% decline. For the entire cycle, AMLP’s price went from $14.98 to $10.91. This principal erosion of 27.2% is the cost of supporting the 10.96% current yield. Since inception, AMLP has returned 3.8% (0.71% annualized), and MLPI has returned 15.4% (2.75% annualized). AMLP had an upside capture of 61% (39.7% based on price) and a downside capture of 89%. It won’t take too many cycles like this to completely obliterate AMLP’s principal. Zooming in reveals AMLP’s most recent problem. During falling markets, AMLP is supposed to fall much slower than MLPI. That was true from mid-May through mid-September of this year, and it can been seen in the rising light-blue relative-strength line. However, beginning around September 11, that changed. The relative-strength line went flat as AMLP plunged 19.54% between 9/11/2015 and 12/04/2015. Over this same period, MLPI dropped slightly less-19.49%. (click to enlarge) AMLP’s touted downside buffer has disappeared. Presumably because it used up all of its deferred tax liabilities/assets, exposing the more than $6 billion of shareholder assets to the full brunt of the MLP market decline. History has shown that AMLP investors don’t care. They only care about the yield. The erosion of principal helps to exaggerate the current yield while robbing long-term holders of principal. Owners who bought their shares on in 2014 at $19.31 per share do not receive the new 10.96% yield. They are getting a 6.2% yield on their initial investment, and it has cost them 43.5% of their principal. Maybe now they will start to care. Note: In early trading today (12/7/2015), AMLP plunged another 9% to a price of less than $10. Disclosure: Author has no positions in any of the securities, companies, or ETF sponsors mentioned. No income, revenue, or other compensation (either directly or indirectly) is received from, or on behalf of, any of the companies or ETF sponsors mentioned.