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GSAM Makes The Case For Multimanager Alternatives

By DailyAlts Staff Record-low interest rates and historically high stock valuations have more and more investors considering liquid alternative investments, which Goldman Sachs Asset Management (“GSAM”) defines as “daily liquid investment strategies” that seek to deliver “differentiated returns from those of core assets” and the potential to mitigate overall portfolio risk and severe drawdowns. In a recent Strategic Advisory Solutions white paper, GSAM makes the case for a multimanager approach to liquid alternative investing – through single turnkey multimanager funds, allocations across multiple managers of the investor’s choosing, or a combination of both. Why Diversify an Alternatives Allocation? GSAM categorizes the liquid alts universe into five peer groups: Equity long/short Event driven Relative value Tactical trade/macro Multistrategy As shown in the table below, the median returns of each peer group have very little persistence from year to year. Therefore, by diversifying across peer groups, investors can avoid the highs and lows of any given year in any given strategy. Building from Scratch One approach to diversifying across liquid alternative peer groups is to “weave” several liquid alts into a “unified portfolio construction framework.” This approach may be best for investors seeking to express high-conviction market views of their own, or for those who possess deep knowledge of particular strategies and managers. But in GSAM’s view, the process of selecting liquid alts requires expertise in the asset class, knowledge of manager capabilities, and judgment of manager and strategy risks, among other things. This makes the “build” approach research-intensive, which may be a bit much for many investors. Turnkey Solutions On the opposite end of the spectrum is the “turnkey” approach – a pre-assembled package of alts, such as a multimanager alternative mutual fund. In this approach, investors effectively outsource the research-intensive process cited above to professional managers. On the downside, investors employing this approach don’t get a customized allocation, which means that their specific investment needs could potentially be better-served. What are some other risks to the multialternative approach? GSAM lists several, including: Performance may depend on the ability of the investment advisor to select, oversee, and allocate funds to individual managers, whose styles may not always be complementary. Managers may underperform the market generally or underperform other investment managers that could have been selected instead. Some managers have little experience managing liquid alternative funds, which differ from private investment funds. Investors should be mindful of these and other risks, according to GSAM. The Best of Both Worlds? GSAM calls combining the “build from scratch” and “turkey” approaches “Buy & Build.” This hybrid approach generally entails complementing a multialternative fund with one or more high-conviction managers the investor believes can potentially contribute to specific investment objectives. This “middle ground” between pure customization and an off-the-shelf solution gives investors additional flexibility with a fraction of the research-intensity. Conclusion In conclusion, GSAM states the company’s belief that multimanager strategies have the potential to help investors pursue additional sources of returns and to diversify their alternative investment allocations. In the firm’s view, investors who are new to investing generally opt for the single package approach to multimanager investing, while more experienced liquid alternative investors often consider building from scratch. The important thing, in GSAM’s estimation, is to understand the potential that liquid alts offer as an additional driver of portfolio returns. For more information, download a pdf copy of the white paper . Jason Seagraves contributed to this article.

Picking Stocks For The Long Term Is Harder Than You Think – So Don’t

Summary It is important to distinguish between stock picking and index investing, because they require different approaches. A common assumption with index investing is that, over the long term, indexes will rise. Often, investors make the same assumption when picking individual stocks, but they shouldn’t. It is extraordinarily difficult to find individual stocks that offer value, long-term predictability, and index out-performance. That doesn’t mean that we should abandon stock-picking. It just means that it is very important to take into account the medium-term prospects of a stock. Alpha is more likely to be achieved if one develops a medium-term investment thesis and then sticks to it. I generally try to avoid referencing super-investors for a variety of reasons, but this article will be an exception. There have been many, many articles and comments on Seeking Alpha that reference Warren Buffett’s investing advice. What is often not taken into account, however, is that Buffett’s advice is directed at two distinct categories of investors: active, knowledgeable investors; and passive, less knowledgeable investors. For passive investors, Buffett’s basic advice is to invest the majority of one’s capital into a low-cost S&P 500 index fund, and perhaps hold some capital in cash in case there is a downturn in which one needs money and does not wish to sell their stocks while the stocks are undervalued. The reasoning behind this is that over the long-term, a large basket of US stocks are likely to outperform other asset classes, and you can purchase a large basket of US stocks rather cheaply. As for investors who are active, intelligent, and knowledgeable, they should look for some combination of value and long-term predictability, and also have a high portfolio concentration, low turn-over, and if possible, aim to seek out companies with small capitalization. (This is summarizing a lot of what Buffett has said, done, and written over the years into one sentence. I would be happy discuss any reasonable objections of the summary in the comments section.) It is important to note that these two investing approaches are often mutually exclusive. You cannot have a high concentration and index at the same time. You also cannot assume that an individual stock that has a low correlation with its respective index will rise over long periods of time like you can with an index. In fact, I think that the relationships may be opposite one another. (Meaning the longer you commit to holding an individual stock, the more likely it is the stock will decline in value, while the longer you commit to holding a US focused index fund, the more likely it is that it will rise in value.) Not everything is mutually exclusive between the two approaches. You can buy a small-cap value fund that charges only small fees (but you can also expect more volatility if you do so). You can limit turnover when purchasing individual stocks, just as many indexes do. You can also try to find long-term individual stocks to purchase, but consider this: If Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger–two of the best investors in the world–can only find one or two worthy long-term picks in any given year, what makes you think that you can find more than that? So, while there is some potential overlap between the approaches, the areas that are mutually exclusive are often forgotten by investors, and the ones that aren’t mutually exclusive either have high volatility or are difficult to find. The mistake I see is that often times investors want to combine an indexing approach–and the assumptions that come with it–with a stock picking approach. Specifically, investors want to (1) be diversified beyond 3-10 holdings even though long-term value stocks are hard to find, (2) assume the historical bias toward long-term index gains applies to individual stocks, (3) assume that picking individual blue-chip stocks that have a high correlation with indexes will outperform indexes, and (4) assume that their goals are unrelated to the performance a benchmark. I will set assumptions 1, 3, and 4 to the side for this article, #1 would make this article too long, #3 is obviously a poor assumption, and #4 is simply a different topic altogether. So this article will focus on why investors have to be careful not to assume that the long-term historical upward bias of index funds also applies to individual stocks that are weakly correlated with the index. The Problem with Visibility: Visibility of the long-term future of individual stocks is more cloudy than people think. Quite often investors will assume that a company will perform well twenty years from now because it has performed well in the decades leading up to that point in time. If the investor purchases the stock and the stock price drops, quite often the investor will insist that the drop in price is okay because they are “holding for the long term”, and long term the company will be fine. It is absolutely critical the investors realize just how difficult it is to forecast out ten or twenty years on an individual stock. That is a key difference between an index and an individual stock. It might be okay to assume the S&P 500 index will be higher in twenty years than it is now. But if one were to pick an individual stock at random from the S&P 500, there is a greater than 50% chance that in twenty years the company will not even qualify as part of index. Half of the components of the S&P 500 in 1999 are not in the index today , only 16 years later. But, Cory, you say, I am not picking my stocks at random, I am picking only blue-chip stocks like Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ ), Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO ), Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM ), Procter & Gamble (NYSE: PG ), and Kinder Morgan (NYSE: KMI ) –I’m only partially kidding about Kinder Morgan. Your picks are probably not going to be perfect, right? My response is that if you only purchase huge, blue-chip, depression resistant companies, and you are going to diversify beyond ten of them just in case a couple of them turn out to be duds, then your performance will probably be similar to an S&P 500 index. You cannot assume that big, widely followed blue-chip companies will be available for purchase at value investor prices very often. And you cannot assume that value opportunities with small-cap companies will possess the same long-term visibility as big, blue-chips. It seems clear that those who purchase only the biggest and safest stocks are few and far between. Many stock-pickers might have a core portfolio of these companies, but they also branch out to other areas in search of alpha with regard to either yield or total return. In many cases what we have are stock-pickers who are moving beyond the confines of blue-chips in search of alpha who are carrying with them the assumptions that rightly apply only to indexes or the blue-chip stocks that are highly correlated with the indexes. Specifically, the assumption that if they just hold on to something long enough, it will rise or pay out steady dividends for the next ten or twenty years while also out-performing the market. This assumption can lead to under-performance or disaster. It is not an assumption that should be made. So, if one wants to seek alpha by picking individual stocks, what is it one could do to deal with the emotions and short term volatility in the stock market that compel investors to sell at the wrong time, without resorting to the fallback of aiming to hold for the long-term? I think the solution is to develop both a short and medium-term thesis while picking stocks, and only when a thesis comes to fruition should one consider holding a stock for the long-term. In my next article, I will explain the method I have been using recently with some success. Note: Please consider “following” me for real-time notification of my latest articles. My views are a constant work in progress and I am always interested in hearing other points of view, so if you have any thoughts, please feel free to share them in the comments section.

Proposed SEC Rules Could Shake Leveraged ETFs

Leveraged ETFs have been investors’ darlings this year thanks to stock market volatility. This is because these funds try to magnify returns of the underlying index with the leverage factor of 2x or 3x on a daily basis by employing various investment strategies such as swaps, futures contracts and other derivative instruments (read: 10 Most Heavily Traded Leveraged ETFs YTD ). Due to the compounding effect, investors can enjoy higher returns in a very short period of time provided the trend remains a friend. However, these funds are extremely volatile and are suitable only for traders and those with high risk tolerance. These run the risk of huge losses compared to traditional funds in fluctuating or seesawing markets. Further, their performances could vary significantly from the actual performance of their underlying index over a longer period when compared to a shorter period (such as, weeks or months). Despite this drawback, investors have been jumping into these products for quick turns. Will these allure continue in the months ahead if the new rules proposed by the SEC are enacted? Inside the New Proposed Rules Under the proposed rules , the fund has to limit its notional exposure to derivatives of up to 150% of the net assets or 300% if the fund actually offers lower market risk. Additionally, it should manage the risks associated with derivatives by segregating certain assets (generally cash and cash equivalents) equal to the sum of two amounts: Mark-to-Market Coverage Amount: A fund would be required to segregate assets equal to the amount that the fund would pay if the fund exited the derivatives transaction at the time of determination. Risk-Based Coverage Amount: A fund would also be required to segregate an additional risk-based coverage amount representing a reasonable estimate of the potential amount the fund would pay if the fund exited the derivatives transaction under stressed conditions. Apart from these, the fund would implement a formalized derivatives risk management program administered by a risk manager. ETF Impact These rules, if enacted, would shake the leveraged ETF world, in particular the triple leveraged funds. This is because the funds might be forced to increase exposure to low risk and low-return safe assets like cash and equivalents in order to offset the risk of derivatives exposure. This could eat away the outsized returns that the leveraged ETFs have been providing to investors (see: all Leveraged Equity ETFs here ). Notably, there are 135 leveraged products and 87 leveraged inverse products as per xtf.com. Of these, 46 leveraged and 36 leveraged inverse products have three times exposure to the underlying index and would be the most in trouble. In particular, the proposed rules would hurt the leveraged long and short ETFs structured via the Investment Company Act of 1940, potentially forcing providers to change the legal structure or leverage factor, or to close them. Notably, Direxion and ProShares are the two issuers that would be the most impacted as they have several equity and fixed income ETFs that rely on three times derivatives-based leverage and has been structured via the Investment Company Act of 1940. Some of the most popular ones are the ProShares UltraPro QQQ ETF (NASDAQ: TQQQ ) , the Direxion Daily Financial Bull 3x Shares ETF (NYSEARCA: FAS ) , the ProShares UltraPro S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA: UPRO ) , the Direxion Daily Small Cap Bull 3x Shares ETF (NYSEARCA: TNA ) , the Direxion Daily 20+ Year Treasury Bear 3x Shares ETF (NYSEARCA: TMV ) , the ProShares UltraPro Short S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA: SPXU ) , the Direxion Daily Small Cap Bear 3x Shares ETF (NYSEARCA: TZA ) and the ProShares UltraPro Short QQQ ETF (NASDAQ: SQQQ ) . However, some commodity leveraged ETFs providing investors’ triple exposure to the index could escape the new rules by virtue of their registration as commodity pools with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In Conclusion While the SEC proposal is a concern for leveraged ETF providers, it is not yet finalized or may fall apart. Even if the rules are adopted, it will take months or a year to have a full impact on the ETF world. Link to the original post on Zacks.com