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CEFL: A Year In Review, And A Prediction Of What’s Ahead

Summary 2015 has not been a good year for CEFL unitholders: income declined by 20% while price declined by 33%. This article presents a review of CEFL happenings in 2015, and a forecast of what’s ahead for 2016. Based on the publicly available index methodology, the CEFs to be added or removed are predicted. Introduction The ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Closed-End Fund ETN (NYSEARCA: CEFL ) is a 2x leveraged exchange-traded note [ETN] that tracks twice the monthly performance of the ISE High Income Index [symbol YLDA]. The YieldShares High Income ETF (NYSEARCA: YYY ) tracks the same index, but is unleveraged. CEFL is a popular investment vehicle among retail investors due to its high income (24.52% trailing twelve months yield), which is paid monthly. With 2015 nearly behind us, I thought I would review the characteristics of this year’s iteration of CEFL, and also look ahead at what might be in store for us in 2016. (Source: Main Street Investor ) 2015 portfolio YLDA holds 30 closed-end funds [CEFs], and is rebalanced annually. As I have previously discussed in my three-part “X-raying CEFL” series, this year’s iteration of CEFL (and thus also YYY) had the following characteristics: CEFL is comprised of approximately one-third equity and two-thirds debt, is effectively leveraged by 240% and has a total expense ratio of 4.92% per dollar invested in the fund (or 2.05% per dollar of assets controlled) (discussed in ” X-Raying CEFL: Leverage And Expense Ratio Statistics “). CEFL contained around two-thirds of North American (primarily U.S.) assets, with the rest being international. Moreover, the North American component of CEFL contains a higher allocation to debt vs. equity than the European component of CEFL (discussed in ” X-Raying CEFL (Part 2): Geographical Distribution “). CEFL is not very interest-rate sensitive as most of the holdings of CEFL are most-correlated with high-yield debt (discussed in ” X-Raying CEFL (Part 3): Interest Rate Sensitivity “). Actually, I might have been inaccurate in my last prediction. Over the last year, the price action of CEFL has actually moved in the same direction to interest rates, which is exactly opposite to what would be expected for a traditional bond fund. But this is not entirely surprising for CEFL, because high-yield debt usually tend to trade in tandem with equities and in the opposite direction to treasuries. Indeed, CEFL had a positive +0.71 correlation with U.S. equities (via SPDR S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) over the past year, but a negative -0.24 correlation with treasuries (via the iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF) (NYSEARCA: TLT ) (source: InvestSpy ). Thus, readers who worried that higher interest rates would lower the price of CEFL may actually have been pleasantly surprised that the opposite has held true this year. Decreasing yield Seeking Alpha author Professor Lance Brofman has done a wonderful job predicting the upcoming distributions for CEFL (see his latest article here ), while also providing expert commentary in his area of expertise. The distribution history for CEFL, which now has paid out 24 months of dividends, is presented below. Unfortunately, we see that the distributions paid out by CEFL have been in decline. In 2014, each share of CEFL paid out $4.74 of distributions, but in 2015, each share of CEFL only paid out $3.82 of distributions. This means that the distribution of CEFL has declined by 19.5% year on year. I believe that a large reason for the distribution decline can be attributed to the rebalancing debacle that occurred at the turn of this year (see below). CEFL has a current trailing twelve months yield of 24.52%. Rebalancing debacle The annual rebalancing in the index YLDA was disastrous for CEFL and YYY holders. The reasons for this have been summarized in my recent article ” Are You Ready For CEFL’s Year-End Rebalancing ?” In short, up to 10% of the net asset value of CEFL may have been lost due to traders (including, perhaps, UBS themselves) buying and selling the CEFs to be added or removed from the index ahead of the actual rebalancing date (a form of “front-running,” see this Bloomberg article for more information on this phenomenon). For further study on the rebalancing issue, consult my previous articles on this issue in the below links: Predicting the 2016 portfolio How might the portfolio of CEFL change upon the next rebalancing event, which is scheduled to occur in the next few days? As discussed in my most recent CEFL article, the index provider has decided that upcoming index will not be announced 5 days in advance. This was intended to prevent “front-running” of the index. However, with the index methodology published and available to all, I had little doubt that professional investors would be able to use the selection rules to determine which stocks would be added or removed from the index. Therefore, in an attempt to level the playing field for everyone else, I have tried to approximate the index methodology in order to predict CEFL’s portfolio for 2016. The selection methodology for the index is reproduced below (source: ISE ). 1. Restrict selection universe to closed-end funds with market cap > $500M and six month daily average volume > $1M. 2. Rank each fund by the following three criteria: i. Fund yield (descending) ii. Fund share price Premium / Discount to Net Asset Value (ascending) iii. Fund Average Daily Value (ADV) of shares traded (descending) 3. Calculate an overall rank for each fund by taking the weighted average of the three ranks with the following weightings: yield: 50%, premium/discount: 25%, average daily value: 25%. 4. Select the 30 funds with the highest overall rank. Using CEFAnalyzer , I obtained a list of the 141 CEFs with market cap > $500M. Unfortunately, I was unable to apply a volume filter because I was not sure what specific time period CEFAnalyzer reports volume data for. I then replicated the index methodology for the 141 CEFs on this list. The below table shows the top 30 CEFs for either distribution yield or discount among the CEFs with market cap > $500M. Rank Ticker Yield Rank Ticker Discount 1 GGN 17.14% 1 BCX -16.92% 2 PHK 14.58% 2 AOD -16.88% 3 KYN 14.44% 3 AWP -16.29% 4 NHF 14.23% 4 IGR -16.19% 5 HIX 13.06% 5 FAX -16.09% 6 TDF 13.03% 6 RNP -15.64% 7 IGD 12.67% 7 GLO -15.33% 8 RVT 12.40% 8 RVT -15.07% 9 CEM 11.73% 9 NFJ -15.04% 10 PTY 11.69% 10 DPG -15.04% 11 GLO 11.37% 11 UTF -14.93% 12 GAB 11.21% 12 ADX -14.92% 13 EXG 11.17% 13 TY -14.81% 14 BCX 11.12% 14 WIW -14.79% 15 CHI 11.11% 15 TDF -14.63% 16 ETJ 11.05% 16 NXJ -14.58% 17 EAD 10.94% 17 NHF -14.57% 18 DSL 10.89% 18 NIE -13.63% 19 CHY 10.89% 19 NQP -13.40% 20 PFN 10.75% 20 USA -13.32% 21 PCI 10.74% 21 FSD -13.31% 22 FEI 10.44% 22 BIT -13.04% 23 ETW 10.36% 23 GDV -12.81% 24 AWP 10.24% 24 JQC -12.70% 25 NTG 9.95% 25 CAF -12.50% 26 PCN 9.86% 26 IGD -12.41% 27 CSQ 9.81% 27 VTA -12.33% 28 PDI 9.62% 28 RQI -12.27% 29 NFJ 9.62% 29 BDJ -12.10% 30 EVV 9.59% 30 NQU -12.04% The yield ranking was then weighted by 50% while the discount ranking was weighted by 25% (the rankings are assigned to all 141 CEFs, and not only to the top 30). The ranking for volume is not shown above because I was not sure about the time period used by CEFAnalyzer to calculate volume, as alluded to earlier. However, because I did not have time to manually calculate the ADV for 141 CEFs, the CEFAnalyzer data was still used to obtain a volume ranking for the funds, which was weighted by 25%. The weighted rankings were then summed, and the top 30 CEFs with the highest overall ranking are shown below, along with their composite individual ranks. A quick check on Yahoo Finance indicated that the 3-month ADV of these 30 CEFs was above the $1M cut-off (which is actually for the 6-month ADV, but I did not calculate this). Rank Ticker Yield Discount Volume Overall 1 (NYSE: RVT ) 8 8 18 10.50 2 (NYSE: BCX ) 14 1 25 13.50 3 (NYSEMKT: GGN ) 1 42 16 15.00 4 (NYSEMKT: GLO ) 11 7 39 17.00 5 (NYSE: NFJ ) 29 9 15 20.50 6 (NYSE: IGD ) 7 26 48 22.00 7 (NYSE: EXG ) 13 50 13 22.25 8 (NYSE: PCI ) 21 39 11 23.00 9 (NYSE: HIX ) 5 79 12 25.25 10 (NYSEMKT: EVV ) 30 35 17 28.00 11 (NYSE: DPG ) 33 10 38 28.50 12 (NYSE: AOD ) 44 2 24 28.50 13 (NYSE: NHF ) 4 17 96 30.25 14 (NYSE: DSL ) 18 77 8 30.25 15 (NYSE: CEM ) 9 100 5 30.75 16 (NASDAQ: CSQ ) 27 52 19 31.25 17 (NYSE: KYN ) 3 119 2 31.75 18 (NASDAQ: CHI ) 15 96 1 31.75 19 (NYSE: TDF ) 6 15 104 32.75 20 (NYSE: AWP ) 24 3 83 33.50 21 (NYSE: USA ) 31 20 58 35.00 22 (NYSE: BGB ) 36 46 26 36.00 23 (NYSE: NTG ) 25 88 6 36.00 24 (NYSE: FEI ) 22 97 7 37.00 25 (NYSE: BIT ) 47 22 32 37.00 26 (NYSE: UTF ) 54 11 29 37.00 27 (NYSE: BOE ) 40 41 30 37.75 28 (NYSE: GHY ) 39 47 27 38.00 29 (NYSE: ETJ ) 16 56 71 39.75 30 (NYSEMKT: FAX ) 41 5 72 39.75 At this point, I would like to compare notes with reader waldschm85 : I’ve attempted to follow the index methodology and came up with the below holdings from largest to smallest as of the open. How does this compare to your list Stanford Chemist?: BCX, TDF, GGN, RVT, KYN, PCI, NFJ, NTG, IGD, NHF, EXG, CSQ, GLO, DPG, CEM, , FEI, CHY, DSL, CHI, USA, HIX, PHK, GAB, TYG, EAD, ETJ, PTY, ETW, PFN, PCN Comparison of our two lists show that we have 20 out of 30 CEFs in common, which is quite high considering that [i] we did our analyses every days apart and [ii] I used an unspecified volume figure for ADV ranking while waldschm85 may have used a more accurate method. While the weighting methodology is too complex to be reproduced here, it can be noted that last year’s rebalance produced the CEF distribution shown below. The methodology states that no CEF can comprise more than 4.25% of the index. Additionally, the top 15 largest CEFs after last year’s rebalance all had weights of above 4%. I expect the weighting distribution of the 30 CEFs after this year’s rebalance to be quite similar to the last. Additions and deletions (predicted) Here we get to the interesting part! Which funds are completely new, and which will be completely removed? Which CEFs are in both 2015 and 2016 (predicted) portfolios? The following will be performed with my list of top 30 CEFs – obviously results will differ using waldschm85’s list or that of another person’s. CEFs are presented in alphabetical order. Added CEFs: BCX, BOE, CEM, CHI, CSQ, DPG, ETJ, FEI, IGD, KYN, NFJ, NHF, NTG, PCI, RVT, TDF, USA, UTF Removed CEFs: BGY, CHW, EAD, EDD, ERC, ESD, ETY, FPF, HYT, IGD, ISD, JPC, MRC, MMT, NCV, NCZ, PCI CEFs that remain from last year: AOD, AWP, BGB, BIT, DSL, EVV, EXG, FAX, GGN, GHY, GLO, HIX. The information above shows that 18 CEFs will be added to the index and 18 will be removed. 12 CEFs will remain in the index. This is a relatively high turnover but it is not unexpected given the fact that both the distributions and premium/discount values of CEFs can vary wildly. Moreover, given that I did not calculate weightings for the 2016 portfolio, I was unable to predict which CEFs will undergo the highest increases or decreases in allocation. However, it should be stressed that the above lists are only approximate. This is because I only performed a crude replication of the index methodology (specifically, I did not use the six-month ADV for either screening or ranking), and also because of the fact that the actual selection and ranking algorithm will be performed on CEF data at year-end rather than from today. Therefore, I am hesitant to recommend the buying of the CEFs to be added and the selling of CEFs to be removed as a potential strategy to profit from the upcoming rebalance. Use the information above at your own risk. Summary 2015 has not been a good year for CEFL unitholders. First, the botched rebalancing mechanism cause permanent loss of value in the index. Second, CEFL holders received 19.5% less income in 2015 compared to last year (this may be related to the first point). Third, CEFL shifted from a 60:40 equity:bond split in 2014 to a 33:67 equity:bond split this year, just in time for the oil-induced credit contagion to wreck havoc with the high-yield debt CEFs in the index. Certainly, a -32.7% YTD price return and -18.4% YTD total return cannot be described as anything other than disappointing for CEFL unitholders. CEFL data by YCharts Will 2016 bring brighter skies for CEFL? This I cannot say for certain. However, it is interesting to note that the predicted portfolio for 2016 contains several MLP CEFs, namely KYN, CEM, NTG, and FEI, whereas this year’s index contained none. Moreover, a myriad of high-yield bond funds will remain or are newly added to the predicted 2016 portfolio. Thus, it remains likely that the fate of CEFL will remain closely tied with the fortunes of the high-yield credit market for the foreseeable future.

My ‘Preferred’ Preferred Closed-End Funds

Summary Closed-end funds provide a great way to invest in preferred securities. FFC and PDT have beaten the S&P 500 over the past 10 years. The Preferred CEFs outperformed the lower cost ETF iShares US Preferred Stock Fund. Traditional preferred stocks provide a fixed dividend payment and generally do not mature but can be called on or after a specified call date. Some preferred stocks can adjust to floating rates (LIBOR plus a given percentage). It is possible to invest in individual preferred stock or select a fund that invests in preferred stocks. I invest in both individual preferred stocks and closed-end funds that focus on preferred stocks. The CEF approach will be more volatile but can provide diversification and higher income due to the leverage. iShares US Preferred Stock Fund (NYSEARCA: PFF ) provides a lower cost ETF alternative but it has lagged behind its closed-end fund cousins in performance. Over the last 5 years, the S&P 500 has outperformed my preferred closed-end funds, but if you look at the past 10 years, the picture looks quite different. Assuming that the stock prices are a bit toppy, the next 5 years maybe favorable for collecting the nice income from preferred stocks without missing out on a super-hot stock market appreciation. Fund 5 yr Month End average annual return 10 yr Month End average annual return John Hancock Premium Dividend Fund (NYSE: PDT ) 11.86% 10.87% Flaherty and Crumrine Preferred Securities Income Fund (NYSE: FFC ) 13.56% 10.49% SPDR S&P 500 (NYSEARCA: SPY ) 14.29% 7.40% iShares US Preferred Stock 6.49% n/a Below is the investment objective summary for the three preferred stock closed-end funds from Fidelity: John Hancock Premium Dividend Fund: The fund will invest in common stocks of issuers whose senior debt is rated investment grade or, in the case of issuers that have no rated senior debt is considered by the Adviser to be comparable quality. 80% of funds total assets consist of preferred stocks and debt obligations rated A or higher. Leverage ratio 34.1% Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Securities Income Fund Inc: The fund invests normally at least 80% of its total assets in preferred securities that are mainly hybrid or taxable preferred securities. At least 80% of the preferred securities are investment grade quality. Up to 20% may be invested in securities rated below investment grade. It may also invest up to 20% of its assets in other debt securities and up to 15% in common stocks. Leverage ratio 34.65% First Trust Intermediate Duration Preferred and Income Fund (NYSE: FPF ): Under normal market conditions, the Fund will invest at least 80% of its Managed Assets in a portfolio of preferred and other income-producing securities issued by U.S. and non-U.S. companies, including traditional preferred securities, hybrid preferred securities that have investment and economic characteristics of both preferred securities and debt securities, floating rate and fixed-to-floating rate preferred securities, debt securities, convertible securities and contingent convertible securities. All three funds pay monthly distributions, have a positive NAV return, and a positive UNII Symbol 3 yr return on NAV 12 month return on NAV Distribution (Market) Discount Discount 52 wk average UNII Expense Ratio adjusted PDT 9.81% 3.42% 8.31% -9.95% -10.28% $0.0046 1.44% FFC 8.26% 3.13% 8.06% 8.35% 2.04% $0.0208 0.88% FPF n/a 6.00% 9.19% -9.32% -8.08% $0.1029 1.33% Year to Date, FPF’s NAV performance was quite a bit better than the S&P 500: Symbol YTD Price perf NAV perf PDT 5.25 2.86 FFC 14.21 3.95 FPF 2.41 6.21 SPY 3.02 2.95 Obviously, for long term investors a single year is not that meaningful. The table below shows the 5 yr and 10 yr returns of PDT and FFC compared to the S&P 500 index fund and the ETF preferred PFF. FPF does not have that much historic data available yet. Fund 5 yr Month End average annual return 10 yr Month End average annual return John Hancock Premium Dividend Fund 11.86% 10.87% Flaherty and Crumrine Preferred Securities Income Fund 13.56% 10.49% SPDR S&P 500 14.29% 7.40% iShares US Preferred Stock ( PFF ) 6.49% n/a Risks With Preferred Stock investments: Any investment carries risk and preferred stocks are interest rate sensitive. Preferred stocks are not appropriate if you believe that the rate increases by the Federal Reserve will continue or accelerate. Conclusion: The three preferred closed-end funds shown in this article may be a good addition to a diversified portfolio under the assumption that the interest rates will not rise drastically. They will not outperform the stock market in a bull market scenario but if the market drops or stays range-bound, the consistent income from the closed-end funds can then be channeled into other stock purchases or dividend reinvestments. FPF’s current discount is attractive. When looking at the 3 yr average discount, I would want to buy PDT at or below 13.44 and FFC at or below 18.97. FFC definitely has the best expense ratio of the three.

U.S. Stocks In 2016? Keep An Eye On The Global Economy

You may not want to risk capital in overseas stocks until foreign countries and regions begin to respond to stimulus via economic expansion. Right now, most are mired in stagnation, recession or depression. Absent a desirable revival abroad, 2016 could be tough sledding for the U.S. economy and the heralded S&P 500. During the previous bull market (10/02-10/07), financial media fawned over the critical importance of diversifying one’s equity exposure across the globe. And why not? Performance for foreign exchange-traded trackers like iShares MSCI EAFE (NYSEARCA: EFA ) and iShares MSCI Emerging Markets (NYSEARCA: EEM ) far surpassed anything the S&P 500 could muster up; developed international markets doubled U.S. capital appreciation while emerging economies catapulted 350%! Indeed, when I spoke at conferences 10 years ago, attendees rarely inquired about companies listed on the NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). They wanted to know if they should add a materials exporting giant like iShares South Africa (NYSEARCA: EZA ) to their portfolios or whether or not iShares Small Cap Brazil (NYSEARCA: BRF ) would be a sensible way to tap consumer purchasing power in Latin America. Accessing overseas markets dominated speaker presentations as well as listener curiosity. In 2000, the financial planning community typically rallied around a 20% equity allocation to foreign stock. By 2007, the 20% recommendation jumped to 50%. The reason? Well-diversified investors were supposed to account for the world’s market capitalization, where one-half of the world’s market cap belonged to non-U.S. securities. So what happened to the notion of a globally diversified portfolio? Worldly investor perspectives? Could it be that, since the eurozone crisis in 2011, U.S. stocks have crushed foreign equities? Maybe it is easier for CNBC and Bloomberg to praise U.S. stock price gains while ignoring bearish price depreciation in foreign equity holdings — significant positions in the static allocation of the buy-n-hold viewership. Mainstream financial commentators may choose to focus on the progress of the S&P 500 alone. They may choose to ignore c orrective activity in small caps via the Russell 2000, high yield bonds via SPDR S&P High Yield Corporate (NYSEARCA: JNK ) and transporters via the Dow Jones Transportation Average. Yet ignoring bearishness in asset prices around the world is particularly near-sighted, if for no other reason that global economic weakness is the biggest threat to the worldwide profits and the worldwide revenue of large U.S.-based corporations. The FTSE All-World Index may be particularly relevant. This benchmark covers the overwhelming majority of the world’s investable market capitalization. Its global perspective is heavily weighted toward developed regions, including the United States (52.5%), Europe with the United Kingdom (19.5%) and Japan (8.5%). Nine of the top 10 corporate constituents are U.S. companies. Some trends are easier to spot than others. For example, the FTSE All-World Index has not appreciated in price for nearly two years. Its 200-day long-term trendline currently slopes downward. And the benchmark is roughly 9% below its summertime peak. The good news? Prices are well above their October lows. It follows that the global benchmark may or may not have completed a 16%-17% correction several months earlier. Make no mistake about it, though. Large-cap U.S. companies like Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, General Electric and Wells Fargo are responsible for the “resilience” of the FTSE All-World Index. Either key economies around the world – Europe, the United Kingdom, China, Japan – pull out of their collective funk in 2016, or U.S. large-cap stocks will eventually buckle. Top-line revenue has already declined in every quarter of 2015; non-dollar denominate profits have also taken a toll on multi-national players. Equally worrisome, foreign demand has been noticeably weak in the export data. In sum, you may not want to risk capital in overseas stocks until foreign countries and regions begin to respond to stimulus via economic expansion. Right now, most are mired in stagnation, recession or depression. Absent a desirable revival abroad, 2016 could be tough sledding for the U.S. economy and the heralded S&P 500. Disclosure: Gary Gordon, MS, CFP is the president of Pacific Park Financial, Inc., a Registered Investment Adviser with the SEC. Gary Gordon, Pacific Park Financial, Inc, and/or its clients may hold positions in the ETFs, mutual funds, and/or any investment asset mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell or hold securities. At times, issuers of exchange-traded products compensate Pacific Park Financial, Inc. or its subsidiaries for advertising at the ETF Expert web site. ETF Expert content is created independently of any advertising relationships.