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September’s Strong Competitive Wealth-Builder ETF Investment

Summary From a population of some 350 actively-traded, substantial, and growing ETFs, this is a currently attractive addition to a portfolio whose principal objective is wealth accumulation by active investing. We daily evaluate future near-term price gain prospects for quality, market-seasoned ETFs, based on the expectations of market-makers [MMs], drawing on their insights from client order flows. The analysis of our subject ETF’s price prospects is reinforced by parallel MM forecasts for each of the fund’s ten largest holdings. Qualitative appraisals of the forecasts are derived from how well the MMs have foreseen subsequent price behaviors following prior forecasts similar to today’s. The size of prospective gains, the odds of winning transactions, worst-case price drawdowns, and marketability measures are all taken into account. Today’s most attractive ETF… … is the Direxion Daily Healthcare Bull 3X ETF (NYSEARCA: CURE ). The investment seeks daily investment results, before fees and expenses, of 300% of the performance of the Health Care Select Sector Index. The fund creates long positions by investing at least 80% of its assets in the securities that comprise the Health Care Select Sector Index and/or financial instruments that provide leveraged and unleveraged exposure to the index. These financial instruments include: futures contracts; options on securities, indices and futures contracts; equity caps, floors and collars; swap agreements; forward contracts; short positions; reverse repurchase agreements; exchange-traded funds, etc. It is non-diversified. (Source: Yahoo Finance ) The fund currently holds assets of $351 million and has had a YTD price return of +3.95%. Its average daily trading volume of 520,259 produces a complete asset turnover calculation in 21 days at its current price of $31.71. Behavioral analysis of market-maker hedging actions while providing market liquidity for volume block trades in the ETF by interested major investment funds has produced the recent past (6-month) daily history of implied price range forecasts pictured in Figure 1. Figure 1 (used with permission) The vertical lines of Figure 1 are a visual history of forward-looking expectations of coming prices for the subject ETF. They are NOT a backward-in-time look at actual daily price ranges, but the heavy dot in each range is the ending market quote of the day the forecast was made. What is important in the picture is the balance of upside prospects in comparison to downside concerns. That ratio is expressed in the Range Index [RI], whose number tells what percentage of the whole range lies below the then current price. Today’s Range Index is used to evaluate how well prior forecasts of similar RIs for this ETF have previously worked out. The size of that historical sample is given near the right-hand end of the data line below the picture. The current RI’s size in relation to all available RIs of the past 5 years is indicated in the small blue thumbnail distribution at the bottom of Figure 1. The first items in the data line are current information: the current high and low of the forecast range, and the percent change from the market quote to the top of the range, as a sell target. The Range Index is of the current forecast. Other items of data are all derived from the history of prior forecasts. They stem from applying a T ime- E fficient R isk M anagement D iscipline to hypothetical holdings initiated by the MM forecasts. That discipline requires a next-day closing price cost position be held no longer than 63 market days (3 months), unless first encountered by a market close equal to or above the sell target. The net payoffs are the cumulative average simple percent gains of all such forecast positions, including losses. Days held are average market rather than calendar days held in the sample positions. Drawdown exposure indicates the typical worst-case price experience during those holding periods. Win odds tells what percentage proportion of the sample recovered from the drawdowns to produce a gain. The cred(ibility) ratio compares the sell target prospect with the historical net payoff experiences. Figure 2 provides a longer-time perspective by drawing a once-a week look from the Figure 1 source forecasts, back over two years. Figure 2 (used with permission) What does this ETF hold, causing such price expectations? Figure 3 is a table of securities held by the subject ETF, indicating the manner in which a 3X leverage on the healthcare index is accomplished. The ETF’s ratios of current market price to various accounting measures are also shown. Figure 3 (Source: Yahoo Finance) Since the value of the index being leverage-tracked is driven by the intermediate unleveraged ETF, the Health Care Select Sector SPDR ETF (NYSEARCA: XLV ), it is useful to know the concentration of its top ten largest holdings and their percentage of XLV’s total value: Figure 4 (click to enlarge) (Source: Yahoo Finance) XLV concentrates 53% of its assets in its top ten commitments. This provides a responsive measure of the action of market prices of stocks in this essential sector. The major holdings are all established, dominant participants in the healthcare industry. Figure 5 is a table of data lines similar to that contained in Figure 1 for each of the top ten holdings of XLV, plus, for convenience, the XLV and CURE data itself. Figure 5 (click to enlarge) (Source: Peter Way Associates, blockdesk.com) Column (5) contains the upside price change forecasts between current market prices (4) and the upper limit of prices (2) regarded by MMs as being worth paying for price change protection. The average of +7.2% of the top ten XLV holdings is well above the market-average proxy SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF’s (NYSEARCA: SPY ) +5.3%. Diversification of XLV’s other 47% of holdings damps its overall upside (as MMs see it) to only +5.3%. But in the same stroke, the risk side of the equation in (6) for XLV is brought down to worst-case price drawdowns of -3.2%, below the defensive SPY norm of -3.6%. In an environment many consider imbued with high market risk, XLV may provide a very attractive balance. The ability of XLV holdings to recover from those worst-case drawdowns and achieve profits (8) was shown in 85% of experiences. The equity population only recovered less than two-thirds of the time, and while the SPY experiences were more consistent, the achieved gains were much smaller. SPY has had only +3.1% gains previously from like forecasts of +9.4%. CURE provides an exciting history of price gains derived from the XLV experiences at times (like now) dictated by the MMs expectations for it, as measured by its current Range Index of 18. Each of the rows of data in Figure 5 is a sample of prior forecasts at the same level of RI as today’s in column (7). XLV has a RI of 42, while CURE, because of its leverage, is at a much more extreme low RI level. Instead of having about one and a half times as much upside, it is seen to have nearly triple. The win odds (8) for CURE need to be taken as perhaps a function of their small proportion of the available forecasts (16). But in every prior case, they have been profitable. And the typical holding periods of about two weeks are remarkable. Their size of +12% gains are quite competitive with the 20 best alternatives in the whole population, even should it take seven weeks to achieve. Conclusion CURE provides attractive forecast price gains, supported by its equally appealing largest underlying holdings and 3X operating or structural leverage. Both the ETF and many of its major holdings offer very attractive prospects in near-term price behaviors, demonstrated by previous experiences following prior similar forecasts by market-makers. But it may be considered a defensive commitment in the face of widespread anticipation of further market weakness. The blue summary row of Figure 5 labeled 20 Best-Odds Forecast Price Ranges tells what the current top-ranked wealth-building opportunities are offering, as a comparative competitive norm. YTD in 2015, 2200 of these 20-a-day list members have reached closeouts in an average of 2-month holding periods, providing an annual rate of average price change gains +24% better than SPY. CURE seems to provide an even more superior opportunity. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

How I Created My Portfolio Over A Lifetime – Part III

Summary Introduction and series overview. Allocating within an asset class. Allocating stocks across sectors. Summary. Back to Part II Introduction and Series Overview This series is meant to be an explanation of how I constructed my own portfolio. More importantly, I hope to explain how I learned to invest over time, mostly through trial and error, learning from successes and failures. Each individual investor has different needs and a different level of risk tolerance. At 66, my tolerance is pretty low. The purpose of writing this series is to provide others with an example from which each one could, if they so choose, use as a guide to develop their own approach to investing. You may not choose to follow my methods, but you may be able to understand how I developed mine and proceed from there. The first article in this series is worth the time to read, in my opinion and several of the many comments made by readers, as it provides what many would consider a unique approach to investing. Part II introduced readers to the questions that should be answered before determining which assets to buy. I spent a good deal of that article explaining investing horizons, including an explanation of my own, to hopefully provoke readers to consider how they would answer those same questions. Once an individual or couple has determined the future needs for which they want to provide, he/she can quantify his/her goals. If the goals seem unreachable, then either the retirement age needs to be pushed further into the future or the goals need to become attainable. I then explained my approach to allocating between different asset classes, and summarized by listing my approximate percentage allocations as they currently stand. In this article, I will explain how I determine how I allocate investments within each asset class and why. The answer to that last part [why] may be different for each investor and will affect how each one allocates. The reason for avoiding an asset class may be as simple as not having the time or adequate understanding of real estate rental properties or fixed income. I started small in real estate, just I did in every other asset class. I learned on the job, so to speak, and kept the amount that I put at risk low until I gained adequate understanding. That is not to say I didn’t make mistakes. I did, probably in every asset class. But I am happy with where I am today, and continue to add systematically. How I add new assets is also explained in the previous article, as well as what I would have done differently if I could start over again today. Once again, just to be clear, this is an explanation of how I do things, and is not meant to be a one-size-fits-all solution for everyone. Some of you may like it, others, I suspect, will not. That is life. But if you can find something of use in one or more of the articles in this series that helps your understanding and improves your approach to investing, then I have done my job. This article covers so much ground that, even though I tried to keep things brief, I found it necessary to chop it into two parts – this one and Part IIIa. This article will focus on how I am allocated within equities, which account for about half of my overall portfolio. The continuation piece will address my allocations within the fixed-income, real estate and precious metals portions of my portfolio. I intend to delve deeper into examples of when and why I bought some specific stocks, why I continue to hold and how I protect those asset against significant losses in future articles of this series. Allocating within an asset class The purpose of allocating across an asset class is to reduce risk through diversification. If an investor concentrates too much of their portfolio in any one asset or category within the asset class, they could find themselves suffering significantly greater losses than if they had spread those investments against several unrelated holdings. The same is true for allocating across multiple asset classes. While there were very few places to hide during the financial crisis, appropriately called the Great Recession, some assets held up better than others. Thus, proper diversification did help reduce losses for some. But even then, there were losses in just about everything, and what mattered most was holding onto the assets that rebounded the fastest. That would be bonds, especially Treasuries, then commodities (including precious metals), next stocks, and finally, real estate. But all rebounded from the depths of the crisis, and this was the most important lesson. Please do not sell when all seems lost. “Buy when there’s blood in the streets, even if the blood is your own. ” The quote is credited to Baron Rothschild during the 18th century. He made a fortune buying during the panic that followed Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo. Allocating Stocks There will be those who will not like my method of allocating stocks (and probably the other asset classes as well), but this is just how I do and the logic behind my (seeming to some) madness. I rarely buy a stock of a foreign company that is not traded on one of the U.S. exchanges. I am of the opinion that one can achieve plenty of international exposure by purchasing multinational companies with operations around the globe. If you want exposure to currency fluctuations, it is also included within the results reported by the big multinationals. Think about it. Now that the U.S. dollar is strengthening again, U.S. multinationals are blaming lower earnings on foreign currency translations. Of course, when the dollar was weakening, the earnings added by foreign exchange (FX) were not reported in the headlines, but those earnings were helped significantly. Some will say that I risk missing huge potential gains in China and other emerging markets, but I say I am avoiding the outsized risk by not investing directly in companies for which the accounting standards may vary greatly from U.S. generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP). Being a CPA, I have an adequate understanding of GAAP, and I am aware of the many different accounting standards followed by other countries (and the standards all change over time in each country). I prefer sticking to what I understand, since even in the U.S., some companies tend to stretch the standards as far as possible to achieve the desired results. I have five basic rules that I try my best to follow in allocating my stock portfolio. Rule Number 1 – I allow myself no more than ten percent of my total stock portfolio (not the total portfolio, but just that portion allocated to stocks) to be tradable, in order to take advantage of special situations. One purpose that I use these funds for is to purchase hedge positions to protect the rest of my stock portfolio from significant loss. I never use more than two percent in any given year for this purpose. I have been hedged for most of the last two years, but have been able to do so at a cost of less than one percent per year, as it turns out. My reasoning is that even if it costs me an average of 1.5 percent per year for five years, or a total of 7.5 percent, I prefer paying for the “insurance” than risking a loss of 30 percent or more if a bear market hits. At the same time, I continue to collect my dividends, and since I only buy what I consider to be high-quality stocks with sustainable competitive advantages that increase dividends every year, why would I want to sell? I like the income. Occasionally, there is a company that I believe has significant appreciation potential over the short-to-intermediate term. I want to be able to take advantage of such opportunities, and will do so, but only from within this small portion of my portfolio. Setting a limit this way keeps me from taking on too much risk and from making too many bonehead mistakes. I do not buy a stock on the recommendation of anyone else without doing my own due diligence to make sure I understand the potential risks and rewards. I even keep the funds segregated in a separate account and adjust the amount only once a year. It often sits mostly, if not totally, in cash or VFIIX waiting for something to intrigue me. Rule Number 2 – I try to own stocks of companies from at least eight different sectors. I do this because of sector rotation. It happens all the time, and I prefer to have at least some of my stock positions going as the respective sectors lead the market, while other sectors are falling behind. Too much concentration in any given sector can cause more pain than is necessary. Just ask anyone who has an overweight position in energy stocks from over a year ago. Or ask someone who holds a lot of stocks concentrated in other resource commodities, like precious metals, iron ore, or industries that serve the companies in the resource industries. Many are already down by 20 percent or more, and some are down more than 50 percent. Too much concentration, especially after a long bull run, can kill a portfolio. Rule Number 3 – I only invest in those industries that I can understand. This does not mean that I have to be an expert on the industry, but rather that I can decipher the accounting methods used and be able to compare one company to another or against industry averages. In other words, I want to have the confidence that I can identify the best companies in the industry, and maybe even more importantly, to identify the worst companies in the industry. Rule Number 4 – I only invest in quality companies with a consistent record of increasing dividends even in the worst of economic times. This rule does not apply to my tradable account mentioned under rule 1. But it does apply to every other stock that I own. I only want to own stocks of companies that have sustainable competitive advantages, strong balance sheets, a consistent track record of raising dividends annually and the cash flows to continue to be an industry leader and continue raising dividends. If you would like to understand more of how I develop my candidate list for further research, please consider reading my article, ” The Dividend Investors Guide to Successful Investing .” It is dated (written in 2012), but the principles still make sense. Rule Number 5 – I do not allow myself to invest more than 20 percent of my stock portfolio in any one sector initially. If the stocks in the sector appreciate faster than my overall portfolio, I will adjust the weight down once a year, but only if it exceeds 25 percent at the time of my annual review. I think that one is self-explanatory. Everyone has their own limits. These are mine. Yours can be different. But at least put some thought into this one and get comfortable with how much you hold in any one sector. Remember, concentration can lead to excessive risk. Now, as to how I allocate between the sectors and how I weight them. I start with the S&P 500 weighting of sectors, since when I measure how I am doing, I generally use that index to compare against. But this is just a starting place. I then adjust the weights according to my personal preferences and expectations. S&P 500 Index Sector Weights Information Technology 20% Financials 16.6% Health Care 15.2% Consumer Discretionary 12.9% Consumer Staples 9.7% Energy 7.3% Utilities 3.0% Materials 2.9% Telecommunication Services 2.4% (Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices ) Ever since the financial crisis, I have found myself unable to invest in banks. No one knows what the real value of assets on those balance sheets should be with certainty. We do not even know what the banks hold for sure. My portfolio weight for financials is less than five percent. I know I have missed a great run, but I see another problem coming in the near future that dwells within this sector, and I would prefer to miss it, thank you very much. I currently do not hold any positions in the materials sector; however, I will again at some point in the future, as prices for mining and metals companies have been beaten down, with resource prices in a downtrend since the peak in 2011. There is an oversupply problem that needs to be worked out, probably by some consolidation and some closures. As that begins to happen in earnest, I will get interested again. It is a cyclical sector, and understanding the cycles (that can last 30 years from one peak to the next, or from trough to trough) is a key to taking advantage of the opportunities that can be captured. Since we are near a peak in stocks, in my opinion (and near is a very relative and debatable term since for me it means probably within two years), I am also underweight in the consumer discretionary sector and industrials. My weighting for energy has fallen, not because I sold companies, but because I rarely sell and we are only now nearing my last purchase prices on the stocks that I own. I realize these may go lower, and then I will buy more at even better bargain prices. Remember, think long term. So, here is my current sector weighting table: Health Care 18% Consumer Staples 18% Information Technology 17% Utilities 14% Energy 9% Telecommunication Services 8% Industrials 8% Financials 4% Consumer Discretionary 4% I had intended to halt the discussion on this topic here until I split the article. So, at the risk of getting long-winded again, I will try to explain how I ended up with this allocation, at least in general terms. I will get into more of the detail further into the series. To begin with, I should point out that my stock portfolio is fully hedged against calamitous loss in the case of recession, should one occur. If it were not, my portfolio would represent a more defensive nature. Speaking of which, Consumer Staples, Utilities and Telecommunication Services are generally regarded as defensive in nature, because the products and services offered by companies in those sectors tend to the ones we buy regardless of the economic climate. Who is going to do without food, electricity, water, phone service or toilet paper (unless you live in Cuba)? Fortunately, our stores rarely run out of the necessities, and we rarely choose to not buy such items. But because I hedge, I can partially ignore the inconvenience of shuffling my portfolio in an attempt to match the “risk-on” or “risk-off” gyrations due to changes in the perceived economic environment. All the adjustments to portfolios are great for Wall Street, because it increases trade volume, which increases its revenue – but for investors, all that activity just increases expenses. Think of it this way: Every time an investor reallocates investments within his/her equity or bond portfolio, what they really do is shift a small portion of their assets to a brokerage firm (Wall Street). Why else would they tell us to do that at least once a year? Sure, there is sound reasoning for reallocation based upon financial theory supported by empirical data, but the result is still the same. Wall Street wins. The house always wins, especially when we listen to house advice and follow house guidance. Thus, instead of trying to be in the right sector at the right time, I try to be in the right stock for the long haul, knowing that there will be speed bumps and setbacks along the way, but also knowing that the laws of time and compounding will eventually work out in my favor as long as I have selected well. That is one of the key underpinnings of investing as far as I am concerned. Selectivity, compounding, rising dividends and value. Combine those four concepts, and you end up in a good place somewhere down the road. What do I mean by selectivity? I start by developing a list of companies that I would like to own if the prices of the respective stocks ever reach extreme value levels. If you want to understand how I create my list, please consider reading my articles in the series, ” Dividend Investors Guide to Successful Investing .” The initial article explains how I rate companies within industries to identify those that qualify for further consideration. Basically, what I look for are companies that stand head and shoulders above the competition. Companies on my list pay dividends with a yield equal to or higher than average for the industry, while maintaining a payout ratio at or below the industry average. One should not look at one of those factors without the other. I also want my list companies to have debt-to-capital ratios at or below the industry average, consistently rising dividends and higher-than-industry-average growth in both revenue and earnings (not just on a per share basis). To land on my list, a company must maintain a credit rating of investment-grade or have no debt, and it must have positive free cash flow. Once I have the list from all industries that I at least think I understand, I consider qualitative aspects of management and business model. I also consider the long-term sustainability of the industry, and try to shy away from those industries that are under attack (or likely to be so) from disruptive technologies or changes in cultural/societal perceptions. Think coal, nuclear utilities or processed foods. Public perceptions change over time. Identifying the shifts can help avoid some pain. On the positive side, I look for companies that have developed a moat to defend their position against competition. Some moats are stronger than others. Patents are great for as long as they last. Consistently staying ahead of competition through innovation is also great for as long as it lasts. Corporate culture can be a huge advantage or a huge barrier. A brand that is recognized the world over and is associated with positive images and values that consumers admire can be a powerful way to differentiate, and can provide a competitive advantage. When a brand gets tarnished, it is hard to rise back to a dominant position. But companies that have exhibited the ability to do so in the past are likely to be able to do so again in the future, and when things look really bleak for such companies, there is often great value. International Business Machines (NYSE: IBM ) is a great example. Some readers will not remember how badly IBM managed the shift from mainframe computers to minicomputers to desktop computers. The company’s products had been considered top-of-the-line for some time, but competition caught up and passed it by in many areas. The culture that had made the company successful in the past was holding it back from entering the future at full speed. It fell behind the curve, and the brand was tarnished relative to its previous position. Then management was caught using aggressive accounting practices to book revenue on systems that had been built and shipped to distribution warehouses as part of sales, having not yet found buyers for the product. This practice finally caught up to it, and the company had to adjust it financial reports and accounting practices. But IBM finally reorganized itself and focused on services and software instead of hardware. It took time, but the transformation was a huge success. The brand was back. Today, the company is going through some more problems, and the question of whether it will be able to transform again is still unanswered. The problems will probably get worse before they get better from here. So, IBM, which made my list a few years ago, is now back on probation until it proves that it can do the phoenix thing again. I will get into more examples later in the series, and hope that the details will be instructive. The bottom line is that, because of my overall investing strategy, I rarely pay much attention to how much I have in any one sector or industry. In truth, I just wait for what I consider to be bargain entry points, and buy what I believe will provide reliable income growth over the long term. Summary This concludes my explanation of how I allocate within sectors inside the equity portion of my portfolio. In Part IIIa, I will go through the rest of my portfolio. Part IV, as promised, will provide an explanation of my understanding of flash crashes and how the various parties interact to exacerbate the problem. As always, I welcome comments and questions, and will do my best to provide details and answers. This is one of the best aspects of the SA community. We can learn from each other and share our perspectives so that other readers can benefit from the comprehensive knowledge and experience represented here. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

International Small-Cap Equity: 3 Options And 2 Theories

Summary SCZ has a much higher expense ratio than SCHC or VSS. SCZ also has a smaller volume of holdings than either of the other companies. Despite those drawbacks, it thoroughly outperformed the peers over the last several years. When using daily numbers, it appears that SCZ is a riskier investment. If investors switch to using monthly numbers, SCZ becomes less volatile than the other two. When investors are considering adding some international small-cap equity exposure to their portfolio, three of the first names to come up may be the iShares MSCI EAFE Small-Cap ETF (NYSEARCA: SCZ ), the Schwab International Small-Cap Equity ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHC ), and the Vanguard FTSE All-World ex-US Small-Cap ETF (NYSEARCA: VSS ). These three ETFs all have well over a thousand international small-cap holdings to offer investors to a less developed part of the equity market that may be expected to have decent returns on the basis of limited analysis in foreign small-cap equity markets leading to companies trading at low valuations due to higher risk premiums. If the investor can diversify away a significant portion of the risk and rely on those markets to become more developed, it could be expected that the companies will trade at higher valuations when lower risk premiums are demand. That can make this exposure fairly attractive for an investor that is using ETFs to establish very large amounts of diversification within their portfolio. Expense Ratio The first metric for comparing these ETFs is simply looking at the amount of value that will flow out of the fund to pay for the management expenses. When it comes to expense ratios SCHC and VSS are extremely similar but SCZ struggles with a dramatically higher expense ratio. If investors assumed that markets were fairly efficient the lower expense ratios would make SCHC and VSS very easy picks over SCZ. However, if the investor assumed that markets were that efficient, it is unclear why they would also believe that international small-cap equity was going to warrant much higher risk premiums and therefore be expected to outperform over a long time period. It would simply be contrary to only look at the expense ratio and argue for efficient markets while selecting the sector on the basis of inefficient markets. Holdings A larger volume of holdings can reduce idiosyncratic risk by reducing the importance of each individual holding. The following chart shows the number of holdings within each ETF. It might be reasonable to think that the number of holdings would be correlated with the expense ratio, but that assumption would be faulty. With less holdings and higher expense ratios, it would seem that SCZ should be riskier and produce lower returns. However, that concept is about to be challenged. Portfolio Test I ran a portfolio test using returns since early 2010 through Investspy: (click to enlarge) Looking from left to right, everything appears to be about right. SCZ has the highest annualized volatility and the greatest risk contribution of the three international ETFs. To adjust for the fact that it would be absurd for an investor to only hold international small-cap equity, I used a 70% allocation to the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) as the core of the portfolio. SCZ also suffers from a higher beta than the other funds, but when investors look at the total return it should seem very curious that SCZ substantially outperformed the other two ETFs. It appears that SCZ actually beat the costs of more expensive management and more portfolio volatility by delivering materially stronger returns. Switching to Monthly I changed the strategy for comparing the ETFs to running the numbers through my own spreadsheets to test monthly data. By switching to monthly data it is possible to get a different picture from looking at longer term data which may do a better job of showing the volatility in the value of the underlying holdings rather than focusing on swings in the share price on a single day. When I run correlation on the monthly numbers the resulting data is very similar but it shows SCHC as having a slightly high correlation. Of course, the numbers are still within a reasonable margin of error. The more interesting numbers come when I run standard deviation on the monthly numbers. When the numbers are ran on a monthly basis the volatility of returns for SCZ are actually lower than for the other two funds. Given that the correlations appear to be fairly similar, the natural conclusion is that perhaps the required return on SCZ should be slightly lower rather than the slightly higher assumption made from the previous conclusion of a higher beta being assigned to SCZ. Conclusion SCHC and VSS appear to be the natural choices, but SCZ has done very well and assuming that the performance is simply luck and that expense ratios will drive the long term performance may be assuming that markets are too efficient. If the markets are that efficient, what is the point of investing in this segment? When I’m covering the mREIT sector my goal is to rapidly spot market failures and those seem to occur most frequently with smaller companies. When those smaller companies also have investors that are less familiar with how the company works, they are prime candidates for deviating from intrinsic value. If SCZ is able to deliver superior performance through paying for some high quality analysis to determine where to allocate more of their money, it may be possible for them to continue delivering strong performance. On the other hand, it could simply be a matter of choosing to make larger allocations (by luck) to the right areas or the right sectors within those areas which would be less likely to lead to stronger performance in the future. This is an area where investors may want to look deeper in determining which small-cap ETF is the best fit for their portfolio. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: Information in this article represents the opinion of the analyst. All statements are represented as opinions, rather than facts, and should not be construed as advice to buy or sell a security. Ratings of “outperform” and “underperform” reflect the analyst’s estimation of a divergence between the market value for a security and the price that would be appropriate given the potential for risks and returns relative to other securities. The analyst does not know your particular objectives for returns or constraints upon investing. All investors are encouraged to do their own research before making any investment decision. Information is regularly obtained from Yahoo Finance, Google Finance, and SEC Database. If Yahoo, Google, or the SEC database contained faulty or old information it could be incorporated into my analysis.