Tag Archives: apple

Be A Proactive Investor

During volatile times in the market, like what we have been experiencing since May, it’s difficult to see through the disparaging news headlines (Oil is Collapsing! Bear Market in Stocks! US Is In A Recession!) and to not lose the forest for the trees. Investing is a long-term game with seemingly unlimited number of opportunities and it’s imperative as an investor to not get caught up in the day-to-day swings (and explanations) of the stock market. It’s times like this where a word like “casino” gets tossed around as a synonym for the stock market. And you know what, in the short run, the market is a lot like a casino. One day the market is up, the next day the market is down. Don’t believe me since it feels like the market has been down a whole lot more than it has been up lately? Well, would you be surprised to know that over the past 200-days developed world equities have been up 47% of the days and down 53% of the days. Pretty close to a 50-50 coin flip, right? Percentage Of Positive Performance Days For Stocks Proactive Investor But long-term investors know that the stock market isn’t really like a casino at all. The “payoff odds” in the stock market are not static like they are in a casino. Hitting the right number in roulette will always pay 35:1 but investing in the right stock could return 10% or it could return 10,000%. Therefore, it’s key to think of investing in terms of probabilities instead of binary outcomes. Investing is not about calling the top or bottom in the market exactly right. It’s about understanding if there are more positive investment opportunities in the market than there are negative opportunities (or vice versa). Put another way, it’s about properly identifying where the market currently falls on the risk/reward spectrum. This way, you as an investor can be proactive rather reactive to changes in the market. We have known for quite some time that this is the longest running cyclical bull market in a secular bear market , so a selloff like the one we are in now was bound to happen sometime. And in the long term, that is actually great news for investors because future returns have undoubtedly improved thanks to the opportunity to buy stocks on “sale.” But this is where investor psychology really comes into play. If your risk antennae was not tuned up to the fact that the probability of a selloff had increased (i.e. the opportunity set had shifted from more buying opportunities to more selling opportunities), then it’s really difficult to realize after a 15-20% decline that the opportunity set is ALREADY shifting again back into your favor. You are reacting to the declining market and when you are reacting, it’s hard to make the correct rational decision. To sell stocks into a declining market is always hard because in the back of your mind you know you missed out on the optimal time to get out and it’s so easy to tell yourself “I’ll sell out of stock XYZ just as soon as it rises 5-10%.” Of course, in a slide like we are in now, it’s very rare for the market to ever give you that 5-10% gain, and so you sit on the underperforming stock far longer than you would have liked. However, if an investor is proactive in identifying where we currently sit on the risk/reward spectrum, there is a very good chance that that investor had begun to shift his or her portfolio into more defensive sectors and perhaps into cash as well. While they would have been undoubtedly early and missed out on some of the gain back in May, they are already mentally prepared to begin to take advantage of some of the positive opportunities that are presenting themselves in this correction. This is why at Gavekal Capital, we focus so much on risk management. Yes, risk management is about protecting the downside. But more so, it’s about being proactive in your investment process so that when the risk/reward spectrum flips in your favor you are ready to take advantage of it and capture the gains in your portfolio. Disclosure: None.

The Altman Z-Score After 50 Years: Use And Misuse

By Larry Cao, CFA This is the second installment in my interview series with Edward Altman in which we discuss the most advisable and problematic applications of the Altman Z-score. For additional details of our conversation, check out the first installment. Larry Cao, CFA: It’s been almost 50 years since the Z-score was first developed. Would you suggest doing anything differently today? Edward Altman: Over the years, the so-called cutoff scores in the model has been retained by the people who applied the model. But in my opinion, that is not the best thing to do. Over time, I began to observe that the average Z-score of American companies mainly, but even global companies, began to get lower and lower. [The bond market] became more available for both investment grade and non-investment grade companies and companies periodically took advantage of low interest rates to raise their leverage. As a result, the financial risk of companies began to increase. Also with global competition, companies’ profitability began to diminish. And so the average Z-score became lower and lower, which meant that more firms would have been classified as likely bankrupt using the Z model if we kept the original cutoff scores. In order to modernize the model, we needed bond-rating equivalence of the scores, which changes constantly and adds on an updated nature to the interpretations of the scores. We now think the most important attribute of the Z model is the probability of default (PD), not the zone classification – safe, grey, or distress. We do it in a two-step process. We get the PD from the score of the company, whether it be from Z, or Z prime, or Z double prime. And then we look at the bond rating equivalent as of that point in time. For example, 2015 – the average B-rate company has a Z-score [of] about 1.6. That would be in a distress zone back in 1968. But today, B is a very common bond rating for many companies. In fact, globally it’s probably [the] most dominant junk rating category. If you rated all companies in the world, the average would probably be about B if they had a rating. And so we ascribe a probability of default based on a bond rating equivalent by looking at the historic incidence of default given a B rating at birth. Cumulatively, I can tell you, from one to 10 years, what the likelihood of default is given a bond rating equivalent. So no longer do we only look at the cutoff scores for the three zones of credit worthiness. Okay, bond rating equivalent is in and cutoff scores are out. What mistakes do you see practitioners making in using the Z-score today? To this date, I would say the vast majority of people are misusing the Z-score because they are applying it across the board regardless of the sector, the industry. And what we found over the years is that non-manufacturers, especially in certain industries like services or retail, have on average higher Z-scores than manufacturing companies. My advice for users is if you are outside the United States, and particularly if you are not a manufacturer, you should look at Z” and its bond rating equivalence approach for ascertaining a PD. Would you say the value of the Z-score is more in its methodology or the score itself? That’s a great question, Larry. Yes, I’ve always argued it’s better to use a local model rather than the original US model. And I’ve done it myself. I’ve personally built models in Brazil, Australia, France, Italy, and Canada. And you will find references to models almost anywhere in the world in the literature. It’s a pretty easy methodology for Ph.D students and practitioners to adapt to a different environment. But then again, even if it isn’t the best model that could be built for service companies or energy companies in 2016, it’s still a good benchmark and has retained its accuracy. If I had the time, I would build the model for Malaysian companies or Indonesian companies or Hong Kong companies or Asia all together. I suppose that there are good researchers there who might just attempt that! Will there be a data issue? For a lot of these countries, the history may not be there. They don’t have bond rating equivalence. That’s exactly right. That’s a very good point. The bond rating equivalence in almost all cases has to be derived from data from the United States. We have lots of defaults, lots of bankruptcies in the US, so you can get probability distributions based on ratings that have a fairly large sample. You can’t do that in emerging markets or countries like Australia, where they haven’t had a recession since the early 1990s. So yes, people said I should have continually updated the Z model but that means you have to keep publishing the updates. People have to find it. People have to use it and test it. It’s much easier to just periodically test the model, and to even build new models that incorporate the lot of data from the relevant countries and industries and combine this firm data with market value measures and possibly even macroeconomic data. What advice do you have for practitioners who want to build their own version of the Z-score model? For example, what’s your secret sauce for putting together the sample? Although the methodology is pretty straightforward, there are subtleties to it. You need a sample of healthy companies and unhealthy companies. There are issues such as sample size. Should [there] be [an] equal number in the two groups or should there be more representatives of the population – 99% non-default, 1%, 2%, or 3% default, depending on the time period? Should they all be manufacturers? Should they be a cross section of industries? Disclaimer: Please note that the content of this site should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute.

Income Investors In Risky, Energy-Related Products Get Creamed

Brokers who pitched energy based structured products during the recent oil boom to conservative clients will be flooded with phone calls from angry clients. As the price of oil has crashed from $100 a barrel less than two years ago to below $30 on Thursday, investors who bought structured products looking to generate income have been crushed. The pain felt by investors in the futures market, energy partnerships, high-yield corporate bonds and the shares of oil and gas companies is well known, noted Wall Street Journal columnist Jason Zweig last weekend. But the plummeting price of oil is also “wreaking havoc” on opaque and complex structured products tied to the price of oil, Zweig reported. In 2015, the biggest names on Wall Street, including Bank of America (NYSE: BAC ), Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS ) and Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS ), issued at least 300 so-called “structured notes,” which are short-term borrowings with returns linked to the price of oil or other energy-related assets. Remember those heady days, just a year ago? It was a perfect time for Wall Street to pump out high-risk products and sell them to Mom and Pop investors. The stock market had gone up in almost a straight line since March 2009, the depths of the credit crisis. The demand for commodities seemed vast, and the U.S. energy industry, with the boom in fracking, looked invincible even though oil prices had started to slide. Those structured securities issued last year total at least $1.3 billion, with most maturing later this year. Investors have a bit of time for oil to bounce back, however, if that bounce doesn’t happen, expect a flood of investor complaints to be filed against the brokers and broker-dealers who sold the structured notes. The allure of the notes and structured products is that investors can make a lot of money if oil goes up just a smidge, with some notes tripling gains at a capped rate. But in some cases there is no protection on the downside, so investors will see “dollar for dollar losses, without limit,” if the fund goes down, noted Zweig. But getting back to even will not be easy, noted one analyst cited by Zweig. “They vast majority of them are underwater,” said the analyst. “And a lot are materially underwater. On many of them, you’d need a 50% to 100% jump in the price of oil from today’s levels to get to break-even.” “This is not really an investment strategy so much as a wager on which way oil prices are going,” another analyst told Zweig. “And some of the risks and costs of that wager are masked by the complexity of it.” Hidden risks and costs, a complicated investment structure based on derivatives – readers, these are red flags in any market. “Many people who thought they were buying black gold on the cheap appear to own a black hole instead, with limited means of escape,” concludes Zweig. We couldn’t agree more. Zamansky LLC are securities and investment fraud attorneys representing investors in federal and state litigation against financial institutions. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.