Tag Archives: alternative

Oil Prices- The Asset Allocation Perspective

We see meaningful contagion, should an unexpected decline in oil prices spill over to equity and credit markets. We usually see lower energy prices as a net positive for riskier assets such as equities and high-yield bonds. Despite the recent declines in energy prices, we maintain our modest overweight to equity and high-yield bonds. With oil prices continuing to fall we have been spending an increasing amount of time analyzing and debating the impact of lower energy prices on our portfolios. In the short term our main concern is that we see meaningful contagion, should a sharp and largely unexpected decline in oil prices spill over to equity and credit markets, resulting in a significant “risk-off” event. To some extent we have seen that happen over the last few months, but considering that West Texas Intermediate (NYSE: WTI ) Oil has declined 40% since June 30, the impact on U.S. equities and credit markets has been relatively modest so far. The closing of a mutual fund last week – Third Avenue’s Focused Credit Fund – received a significant amount of media coverage and has continued to spook the markets this week. But we must be careful not to apply what happened to this specific fund to the broader credit markets. Specific to the Third Avenue fund, it was modest in size and held a significantly greater amount of distressed assets than the vast majority of dedicated high-yield bond funds. So while risks are no doubt elevated, we think the probability of a full-blown credit crisis remains relatively low. But if oil falls further from already low levels, the potential for contagion increases. As asset allocators with a long time horizon (strategic time horizons of 10+ years and tactical horizons of 12 to 18+ months), we usually see lower energy prices as a net positive for riskier assets such as equities and high-yield bonds, particularly for countries that are net importers such as the U.S. and most of developed Europe and Asia. The argument is that gasoline prices act like a consumer tax: when prices decline consumers will spend more, stimulating the economy. Yet the speed of the decline is increasingly concerning, as is the fact that the credit market is structured differently than it was during other periods when oil dropped quickly. Two of these structural differences in the credit markets concern us. First, dealers are holding significantly less inventory as a percentage of total issuance. This is the result of post-crisis regulation that limits dealers’ ability to be the source of liquidity to the extent they were in the past. Secondly, the credit sector is much more exposed to energy today than in the past. This is the result of the availability of cheap credit over the past several years, combined with expectations that energy prices would remain well above the marginal cost of production. Despite the recent declines in energy prices, we maintain our modest overweight to equity and high-yield bonds. We believe the higher interest rates offered by high-yield bonds compensate investors for this risk. But we remain focused on this issue and re-evaluate our view daily, given the increased volatility in energy prices and the broader markets.

Hedge After Reading

Summary A JP Morgan study found that 40% of stocks since 1980 have suffered “catastrophic losses”, meaning declines of 70% or more without recovering. Although JP Morgan calls for diversification in response, the statistic suggests diversification’s ability to ameliorate stock-specific risk is limited: what if 40% of your stocks suffer catastrophic losses? Hedging can prevent catastrophic losses, but its cost raises questions about when it makes sense to hedge. We offer two rules to clarify the tradeoffs and a sample hedged portfolio. Why Consider Hedging Why consider hedging securities at all? Why not just weather declines and wait for prices to recover? One answer is that often security prices never recover. According to a JP Morgan (NYSE: JPM ) report shared by Wall Street Journal reporter Morgan Housel (“Falling from grace: catastrophic losses in Russell 3000 prices”), since 1980, 40% of stocks have suffered permanent, catastrophic losses, meaning they fell at least 70%, and never recovered (Morgan Housel is pictured below; the illustration is from his Twitter (NYSE: TWTR ) profile page ). As the pull-quote below, taken from the JP Morgan report, notes, catastrophic losses aren’t confined to recessions; they happen all the time. The report goes on to note that different sectors suffer higher percentages of catastrophic losses at different times. For example, the oil price collapse of the early 1980s led to more than 40% of energy companies suffering catastrophic declines during that period, as the graph below from the report shows. Bear in mind that the graph above goes to the end of 2014. If the recent rout in oil continues, it’s possible we’ll see another spike in catastrophic loss rates for energy companies going forward. Hedging, Diversifying, or Holding Cash Given how common catastrophic losses in stocks have been, the first answer that may come to mind when considering when it makes sense to hedge is, “when you want to avoid catastrophic losses”, but that’s a bit too facile. After all, you can limit such losses without hedging: for example, by holding high levels of cash. Another way often mentioned to limit stock-specific risk without hedging individual holdings is to diversify; in fact, the JP Morgan report itself suggests this in the pull-quote below. If you’re confident that diversification can sufficiently limit your stock-specific risk, then you could simply diversify, and focus your risk management on ways to limit your market risk, which diversifiction doesn’t ameliorate. We discussed ways to do that in a previous article, How To Limit Your Market Risk . But, after having read the JP Morgan paper, we’re left with this question: what happens if you’re diversified and 40% of your stocks suffer catastrophic losses? It would seem that diversification alone might not protect your portfolio against a decline you would find unacceptable. So, we’re back to considering hedging individual positions, or holding cash. Holding Cash as an Alternative to Hedging Holding cash has the advantages of being simple, and cost-free (not counting opportunity cost). If, for example, the maximum drawdown you’re willing to risk is 10%, and you have 90% of your money in cash, then if everything you own with the other 10% suffers catastrophic losses, in the worst case scenario, your portfolio won’t be down more than 10%. Seeking Alpha contributor William Koldus, CFA, CAIA suggested a 90% cash portfolio in a recent article (“Why A 90% Cash Portfolio Will Likely Outperform”), but investors seeking higher returns may not want to hold such a high cash position. For those investors, a portfolio where each position is hedged may be preferable, so we’ll look at a couple of rules to guide their hedging and security selection decisions in constructing such a portfolio. Then, we’ll offer a sample hedged portfolio. These rules may seem obvious in hindsight, but could prove to be useful additions to your ” latticework of mental models “. Rule #1: Count The Cost Of Hedging Recall the example we mentioned above of an investor unwilling to risk a drawdown of more than 10%. We’ll refer to that 10% as his decline “threshold”. Let’s say that investor was using put options to hedge. Put options, for those who may benefit from a refresher, are contracts that give an investor the right to sell a security for a specified price (the strike price) before a specified date (the expiration date), regardless of where the market price of the security is at that time. For example, if you have a put option with a strike price of $10, and the price of your underlying stock drops to less than $5, you can still sell your stock for $10 per share.* Given the time frame over which he was looking to hedge, our hypothetical investor would want to find the put options that would protect him against a greater-than-10% decline at the lowest cost. When doing so, he’d need to take into account the cost of the hedge as it applies to his threshold: for example, let’s say there was a put option with a strike price 10% below the current market price of his stock, but it would cost 5% of his position value to buy it. If he bought that bought option, he’d actually be risking a 15% drawdown, taking into account the cost of the hedge. If the investor were using Portfolio Armor’s hedging app to find the optimal puts for a 10% threshold, the app would do this automatically, so, in the worst case scenario, the market value of the investor’s underlying stock, plus its hedge (minus the initial cost of the hedge) would total no less than 90% of the starting market value of his underlying stock position. The cost of hedging can also be used as a way to screen out some potentially bad investments, as we elaborated on in a recent article, 2 Screens To Avoid Bad Investments . Rule #2: Potential Return Must Exceed Hedging Cost Potential return here refers to an estimate of how well the security will perform over the time frame of the hedge. Let’s say that time frame is 6 months, and your threshold remains 10%, that is, you are unwilling to risk a drawdown of more than 10% over 6 months. And let’s you found a hedge that will limit the decline in your underling security to no more than 6%, and the hedge costs 4%, so it fulfills Rule #1 (you won’t be down more than your threshold, 10%, in a worst case scenario). So far, so good. But what if you estimate your underlying security has a potential return of 2% over the next six months? Then this hedged position fails Rule #2, because the potential return is less than the hedging cost: you’re potential return, net of hedging cost (your net potential return) in this case would be -2%. At a minimum, you would want your net potential return to be positive, but, ideally, you’d want to assemble a portfolio of hedged positions where the net potential returns are as high as possible, given your threshold (all else equal, the larger your threshold, i.e., the larger the drawdown you are willing to risk, the cheaper it will be to hedge, and the cheaper it is to hedge, the higher your net potential returns will be). Putting It All Together To implement this approach, for every security in your universe, you’d want to calculate the cost of hedging it against your decline threshold, eliminating all that are too expensive to hedge in that manner. Then you’d want to estimate potential returns for all of the securities that weren’t too expensive to hedge, and subtract the hedging costs from your potential return estimates, to get net potential returns. Then, you’d rank the securities by net potential return, and buy and hedge round lots (numbers of shares divisible by 100) of a handful of the ones with the highest net potential returns. That’s essentially what Portfolio Armor’s hedged portfolio construction tool does, though it adds an additional fine-tuning step. After rounding down dollar amounts to allocate to round lots of a handful of securities with the highest net potential returns in its universe (which consists of every optionable stock and exchange traded product in the US), it searches for what we call a “cash substitute”: that’s a security collared with a tight cap (1% or the current yield on a leading money market fund, whichever is higher) in an attempt to capture a better-than-cash return while keeping the investor’s downside limited according to his specifications. You could use a similar approach, or you could simply allocate left over cash to one of the securities you selected in the previous step. A Sample Hedged Portfolio Below is a hedged portfolio designed for an investor with $500,000 to invest who is unwilling to risk a drawdown of more than 10% over the next 6 months. This hedged portfolio was generated by Portfolio Armor using data as of Monday’s close. Why Those Particular Securities? After it applied its “2 screens to avoid bad investments” to its universe, eliminating inauspicious ones, the site sorted the remaining securities by potential return, net of hedging costs, or net potential return. It included Amazon (NASDAQ: AMZN ), Activision Blizzard (NASDAQ: ATVI ), Ctrip (NASDAQ: CTRP ), NVIDIA (NASDAQ: NVDA ), and Public Storage (NYSE: PSA ), because those had the highest net potential returns when hedged against > 10% declines. In its fine-tuning step, it added Regeneron Pharmaceuticals (NASDAQ: REGN ) as a cash substitute, because it had one of the highest net potential returns when hedged as one. Let’s turn our attention now to the portfolio level summary. Worst-Case Scenario The “Max Drawdown” column in the portfolio level summary shows the worst-case scenario for this hedged portfolio. If every underlying security in it went to zero before the hedges expired, the portfolio would decline 8.6%. Per Rule #1, that 8.6% maximum drawdown is inclusive of the 3.1% hedging cost, i.e., the portfolio value would only be down 5.5% not including the hedging cost, in a worst case scenario. Best-Case Scenario At the portfolio level, the net potential return is 12.74%. This represents the best-case scenario if each underlying security in the portfolio meets or exceeds its potential return. A More Likely Scenario The portfolio level expected return of 4.6% represents a more conservative estimate, based on the historical relationship between our calculated potential returns and actual returns. Each Security Is Hedged Note that in the portfolio above, each underlying security is hedged. Public Storage is hedged with an optimal put; Regeneron is hedged as a cash substitute, with an optimal collar with its cap set at 1%; and the rest of the securities are hedged with optimal collars with their caps set at their potential returns. Here’s a closer look at the hedge for Public Storage: As you can see in the screen capture above (image via the Portfolio Armor iOS app ), the cost of the PSA hedge was $2,280, or 4.55% of position value. To be conservative, the cost here was calculated using the ask price of the puts. In practice, an investor can often buy puts for less (at some price between the bid and ask), so the actual cost to purchase these puts would likely have been less. The cost of the other hedges in the portfolio was calculated in a similarly conservative manner. —————————————————————————– *Using a put option to sell an underlying security at the strike price is called “exercising” the option. In practice, you can often get the same level of protection, or better, by selling your underling security and your put option at their respective market prices than by exercising your put option. Depending on how far out the expiration date of your put option is (how much “time value” it has, in options terminology), the put option will trade for at least its “intrinsic value”, which is the difference between the option’s strike price ($10, in our example above) and the market price of the stock ($5, in the same example). So the option will trade for at least $5 in this scenario. But it may trade for more, if options market participants believe the underlying security may drop further (increasing the intrinsic value of the option) before the option expires.

Are You Ready For CEFL’s Year-End Rebalancing?

Summary The index for CEFL/YYY was last rebalanced in December 2014, and changes to the index were made public a few days before the event. Last year, heavy buying or selling pressure in particular index components forced CEFL/YYY to buy-high and sell-low, causing significant losses to CEFL/YYY unitholders. How will CEFL’s rebalancing be handled this year? Introduction The ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Closed-End Fund ETN (NYSEARCA: CEFL ) is a 2x leveraged ETN that tracks twice the monthly performance of the ISE High Income Index [symbol YLDA]. The YieldShares High Income ETF (NYSEARCA: YYY ) is an unleveraged version of CEFL. CEFL is popular among retail investors for its high income, which is paid out monthly. (Source: Pro Spring Team ) YLDA holds 30 closed-end funds [CEFs], and is rebalanced at the end of every calendar year. The changes were publicly announced on the ISE website on Dec. 24, 2014, or about five days prior to the rebalancing event. According to YYY’s prospectus (emphasis mine): Index constituents are reviewed for eligibility and the Index is reconstituted and rebalanced on an annual basis. The review is conducted in December of each year and constituent changes are made after the close of the last trading day in December and effective at the opening of the next trading day . As CEFL is an ETN, it is not forced to buy or sell the constituent ETFs, but one would imagine that the note issuer, UBS (NYSE: UBS ), would be inclined to do so to hedge its exposure of the note. Rebalancing shenanigans Unfortunately, CEFL/YYY unitholders were hurt by the rebalancing mechanism last year. I first noticed that something was wrong when CEFL fell -2.96% (and YYY -1.25%) on Jan. 2nd, 2015, a day where both stocks and bonds held relatively steady, and where the comparable PowerShares CEF Income Composite Portfolio ETF (NYSEARCA: PCEF ), an ETF-of-CEFs that tracks a different index, rose +0.21%. A bit of detective work on my part revealed that the CEFs that were to be added to the index received heavy buying pressure in the days between the index change announcement and rebalancing day, while the CEFs that were to be removed came under tremendous selling pressure. This caused the prices of the added CEFs to rise significantly during that period, which was topped off by an upwards price spike on rebalancing day, while the prices of the CEFs to be removed declined markedly in price, culminating in a downwards spike on rebalancing day. As a consequence, the index and hence YYY were forced to “buy high and sell low” on rebalancing day, causing about 1.3% of the net asset value [NAV] of YYY to be vaporized in an instant. This findings were presented in my Jan. 4th article ” Frontrunning Yield Shares High Income ETF YYY And ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Closed-End Fund ETN CEFL: Could You Have Profited ?” However, the pain was not over for CEFL/YYY holders. The upwards price spike of the CEFs to be added on rebalancing day occurred on top of the artificially-inflated prices caused by the buying pressure days before the actual event. After rebalancing, the added CEFs possessed premium/discount values dangerously above their historical averages, as I warned in ” Beware Reversion In YieldShares High Income ETF And ETRACS 2x Closed-End Fund ETN ,” leading to further losses as the premium/discount of those CEFs reverted back to their original levels. How much were CEFL/YYY investors hurt? How much were CEFL/YYY holders hurt by last year’s rebalancing mechanism? It is impossible to provide an exact number, but here is my estimate. The 10 added CEFs with the largest increases in allocation rose by 2.96% in one week, while the 10 with the largest decreases in allocation declined by -3.38% in one week (as presented in my Jan. 4th article). Assuming that CEFL is equally-weighted*, these events would have caused an overall 2.11% decline in asset value. Up to a further 1.25% was lost on rebalancing day due to price spikes. Moreover, the 10 CEFs that were added to the index declined by 1.26% two weeks after rebalancing as mean reversion possibly took place (as discussed in ” 2 Weeks Later: Did Mean Reversion Of CEFs Take Place? “), contributing a further 0.42% decline of the index, again assuming equal-weight. This sums to a 3.8% loss for YYY holders, or about a 7.6% loss for CEFL holders, not an insignificant amount. Note that this number is likely to be an underestimate because only the top 10 CEFs undergoing the highest increases and decreases in allocation were considered. In actuality, 19 funds were added, and 17 were removed. *(CEFL is actually not equal-weighted, but it is not entirely top-heavy either. See my Jan. 4th article linked above for details to the index weighting methodology). An alternative methodology for calculating the underperformance of CEFL/YYY is to simply compare the performance of YYY to PCEF, as both are ETFs-of-CEFs, but track different indexes. As analyzed in ” Has CEFL Done As Badly As It Looks? ” YYY underperformed PCEF by a total of 5.3% in the months of December and January, i.e. the months surrounding the rebalancing date. Although this approach is only approximate (as the exact composition of the two funds differ), it does produce a number that is on a similar order of magntitude as the 3.8% loss calculated with the first approach. Either way you cut it, a 4% or higher loss for the index/YYY (double that for CEFL, due to leverage) because of factors outside of “normal” market behavior hurts. Moreover, the fact that the index was forced to buy high and sell low necessarily results in a lower income for the fund going forward, as the fund would not have been able to purchase as many shares of the new CEFs than it “should” have been entitled to. Indeed, each share of CEFL paid out a total of only $4.03 in 2015, down from $4.40 in 2014, representing a 8.5% decrease in income paid for the year. I lost…so who won? So if CEFL/YYY unitholders were hurt during rebalancing, who profited? Most likely, it was the savvy investors who purchased the CEFs to be added to the index and shorted the CEFs to be removed as soon as the index changes became public. This could, in fact, include UBS themselves, who are free to adjust their hedges for CEFL anytime they like (because CEFL is an ETN rather than an ETF), and not only on rebalancing day. This creates an ironic situation in which the act of UBS adjusting their hedges at more favorable prices before rebalancing could have actually and directly hurt investors in their very fund. Why is this a problem for CEFL and not other funds? The main problem appears to be the lack of liquidity for CEFs, as well as the fact that arbitraging price differences for CEFs can be risky as they often trade at premium or discount values around their intrinsic NAV, meaning that it would be difficult for arbitrageurs to determine the “true” value of a CEF. An insightful comment from a reader in my previous article reveal that this has happened to other funds as well, and also illustrates a possible solution to this problem: [We] also had a FTSE 100 tracking fund run externally by a well known global indexing house. I recall at one index rebalance, said fund had a MOC order to buy one of the new index constituents, and ended up paying about 25% MORE than the prevailing market price was 1 minute before. All index tracking funds got completely shafted as guess what, the next day the stock was back down to the price it was before its index inclusion. … Some index managers get friendly brokers to ‘warehouse’ stocks (take them onto their own book) for a few days, buying them up ahead of inclusion in a particular index, the fund then takes an average price, and doesn’t get the shaft with a MOC order. It can lead to a bit of ‘tracking error’ mind you. This time it’s…different? As a CEFL unitholder and with the end of the year rolling around, I thought I would refresh myself on the rebalancing mechanism of the index YLDA to confirm exactly when the CEF changes would be announced, so that I could…uh…you know…get in on the frontrunning action and profit at the expense of fellow CEFL/YYY holders. Just kidding, I would have definitely shared this information with all my loyal readers! (Please do click the “follow” button next to my name if you haven’t done so already if you enjoy my ETF analysis.) So I fired up the YLDA methodology guide and looked for the rebalancing date… and looked, and looked…only it wasn’t there! I then checked the date of issue of the methodology guide: December 4th, 2015. So this couldn’t have been the guide I was reading when I was writing my earlier CEFL articles this year. Luckily, I had a version of the guide stashed in my downloads folder, and the relevant section (4.3) is dutifully reproduced below (emphasis mine): 4.3. Scheduled component changes and review ( OLD v1.2 ) The ISE High IncomeTM Index has an annual review in December of each year conducted by the index provider. Component changes are made after the close on the last trading day in December , and become effective at the opening on the next trading day. Changes are announced on ISE’s publicly available website at least five trading days prior to the effective date . How does this compare with the current version of the methodology (emphasis mine)? 4.3. Scheduled component changes and review ( NEW v1.3 ) The ISE High IncomeTM Index has an annual review in December of each year conducted by the index provider. The index employs a “rolling” rebalance schedule in that one third of component changes are implemented at the close of trading on each of the first, second and third trading days in January of the following year and each change becomes effective at the opening on the second, third and fourth trading day of the new year, respectively. No prizes for spotting the difference! Not only has the statement about the announcement of changes been removed, the rebalancing is now not performed all at once at the close of the last trading day in December, but is now equally spread through the first, second and third trading days of the following year. I then used the free PDF comparison tool ( DiffPDF ) to scan for any additional changes to the methodology between last and this year’s. Besides being nearly foiled by the addition of two blank pages in this year’s edition, the software showed that, besides the aforementioned change in Section 4.3, a similar statement to the above had been removed from the index description in Chapter 2: Chapter 2. Index Description ( bold sentence in OLD guide only ) Companies are added or removed by the ISE based on the methodology described herein. Whenever possible, ISE will publicly announce changes to the index on its website at least five trading days in advance of the actual change . No changes were made to the constitution or weighting mechanisms of the fund. Appendix B of the current document lists the entirety of the changes as “Rebalance revision (4.3).” What does this mean for investors? Analysis of the old and new methodology guide reveals two major changes: The changes to the index will not be public beforehand. Instead of rebalancing the components all at once, the rebalancing will be conducted in three equal parts spread across three days. What does this mean for investors? I believe that the first change is well-intended, but may ultimately prove fruitless. The methodology for index inclusion and weighting is relatively complex, but is publicly available (it’s found in the methodology document), and I have no doubt that professional investors will be able to determine the changes even before they happen. In fact they may be doing this right now as I am writing this, and also later, when you are reading this. The second change is, I believe, a positive one, but only if it means one of two possible ways that one could construe “one-third.” The guide states that ” one-third of component changes are implemented… on each of the first, second and third trading days in January .” So if 10 CEFs have to be added to the index, does it mean that 33.3% of the total dollar value of the 10 CEFs will be purchased on each of the three days? In this case, the liquidity situation will be improved because each CEF will be purchased over three days. This would decrease the likelihood of a price spike occurring upon rebalancing (presumably by YYY, the ETF), which ameliorates the buy-high sell-low situation faced by the index last year. If instead, it means that 4 CEFs will be 100% purchased on the first day, 3 on the second, and 3 on the third, then unfortunately I don’t think that the liquidity situation will improve, as the trading in each CEF is still going to be concentrated in a single day, despite the fact that different CEFs may be spread out on different days. What do readers think about how this sentence should be interpreted? So, it appears that this time may actually be different. However, personally, I’m not waiting around to find out. I’ve recently sold all but a single share of CEFL to keep my interest in the fund, and replaced it with several better-performing CEFs (such as the PIMCO Dynamic Income Fund (NYSE: PDI )), as recommended in Left Banker’s article here .