Category Archives: oud

4 Tactical/Momentum ETFs: A Disappointing 1-Year Anniversary

Summary Four ETFs, introduced late last year, have the ability to switch between stocks and bonds, on a tactical/momentum basis. How did these four funds fare during the August correction? Since inception, only one of the four ETFs has outperformed the global market portfolio. Introduction In a Nov. 2014 article entitled ” Comparing 4 Tactical/Momentum ETFs “, I introduced four newly-debuted tactical/momentum ETFs that have, at the minimum, the ability to switch between stocks and bonds depending on tactical factors such as momentum (thus equity-only momentum funds are not considered). I later provided a short update on the performance of the four ETFs in a Aug. 2015 article entitled ” An Update On 4 Tactical/Momentum ETFs “. In that article, I noted that while the four ETFs averaged only -1.19% over the preceding nine months, underperforming U.S. stocks (via the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY )) at +5.35%. However, that update article was published just before the S&P 500’s first 10% correction in several years. The last few months of market action has been…interesting, to say the least, and with the 1-year birthday of these four tactical/momentum ETFs having just recently elapsed, I thought that now would be a good time to review the performance and allocation of these four funds. The funds The four funds included in this analysis listed below. For more detailed information regarding these funds, please refer to my previous article . Cambria Global Momentum ETF (NYSEARCA: GMOM ). GMOM invests in the top 33% of a target universe of 50 ETFs based on measures of trailing momentum and trend. The fund rebalance monthly into ETFs with strong momentum and are in an uptrend over the medium term of approximately 12 months with systematic rules for entry and exit. Global X JPMorgan US Sector Rotator Index ETF (NYSEARCA: SCTO ). SCTO invests in a portfolio of one to five ETFs selected out of a pool of ten U.S. sector ETFs and the iShares 1-3 Year Treasury Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: SHY ). The fund rebalances monthly to invest in a maximum of 5 U.S. sectors that have demonstrated the strongest positive recent performance. If less than 5 sectors have demonstrated positive performance over this time period, the remainder will go to SHY. Global X JPMorgan Efficiente Index ETF (NYSEARCA: EFFE ). EFFE invests in any combination of 13 ETFs drawn from 5 asset classes. The fund rebalances monthly, constructing an “efficient frontier” by calculating the 6-month returns and volatilities of multiple hypothetical portfolios based on different combinations of the index component universe, then selects the combination of assets that resulted in the highest return over the 6 month observation period with an annual realized volatility of 10% or less. Arrow DWA Tactical ETF (NASDAQ: DWAT ). Implements a proprietary Relative Strength Global Macro model developed by Dorsey Wright & Associates, holding approximately 10 broad-based positions. Assets include long/short exposure to domestic, international and emerging market equities and bonds (government, corporate, agency), real estate, currencies and commodities. Details of the four funds are shown in the table below (data from Morningstar ).   GMOM SCTO EFFE DWAT Yield [ttm] 2.33% 0.50% 0.68% 0.39% Total expense ratio 0.94% 0.86% 0.86% 1.52% Management fee 0.59% 0.69% 0.69% 1.22%* Acquired expense ratio 0.35% 0.17% 0.17% 0.30% Inception Nov 4,2014 Oct 22,2014 Oct 22,2014 Oct 1,2014 Assets $25.92M $13.47M $8.11M $7.80M Avg vol. 12K 11K 12K 7.6K Annual turnover 16% 63% – 111% *Composed of management fee 1.00%, other expenses 0.22%. All four funds have low but not negligible volume, and should provide sufficient liquidity for ordinary investors. Additionally, all four funds have increased in assets since a year ago. GMOM increased slightly from $23.85M to $25.92M, while SCTO increased from $11.54 to $13.47. DWAT showed a sizable increase from $5.18M to $7.80. However, the biggest winner over the pats year appears to be EFFE, which more than tripled in size, from $2.58M to $8.11M. Performance Let’s now take a look at the performance of the four tactical/momentum ETFs in 2015, with the U.S. market (via SPY) included for comparison. GMOM Total Return Price data by YCharts The analysis of this total return price chart reveals some interesting features. Firstly, none of the tactical/momentum ETFs were able to keep pace with SPY in the first eight months of the year, i.e. before the August correction. This might not be surprising for GMOM, even EFFE and DWAT, as these draw ETFs from a wide pool of asset classes and not only U.S. equities, which has been one of the best-performing markets during this difficult year. However, the egregious performance of SCTO is concerning. The fact that SCTO underperformed SPY by the largest margin over the first eight months of 2015 is especially surprising given that its investment universe is restricted to only U.S. industry sectors and what is essentially a cash proxy! How on earth did it lag SPY by nearly 10% over the first eight months of the year if its mandate is to “invest in a maximum of 5 U.S. sectors that have demonstrated the strongest positive recent performance.” Global X provides a monthly allocation report for SCTO. We can see from the report that has had significantly allocations to SHY (i.e. cash) during the first eight months of the year, ranging from 20% in Feb. 2015 to 80% in Jul. 2015. (click to enlarge) Can we understand the reasons for SCTO’s serious underperformance compared to both SPY as well as the other three tactical/momentum ETFs? Analysis of the monthly allocations of SCTO suggests that this may have been due to the ETF being too sensitive to fluctuations in the equity markets, causing it to switch very frequently between equity and cash. For example, SPY suffered a -2.96% loss in Jan. 2015, which caused SCTO to switch to 80% equities in defensive sectors such as REITs (NYSEARCA: RWR ), consumer staples (NYSEARCA: XLP ), healthcare (NYSEARCA: XLV ) and utilities (NYSEARCA: XLU ) and 20% cash at the start of February. Of course, SPY then posted a 5.62% return in February, led by high-beta stocks, and the defensively-positioned SCTO sorely lagged during this rally. Similarly, SCTO was 100% invested in equities when SPY suffered a -2.03% loss in Jun. 2015, then switched to 80% cash for July, during which SPY reversed course to the tune of a 2.26% gain. SCTO then switched BACK to 100% equities at the start of August, just in time for the correction. Talk about bad timing! But let’s step back and analyze all four of the ETFs during this period. Responding to the correction The following chart shows the total return performance of the four tactical/momentum ETFs as well as the U.S. equity market and the U.S. bond market (NYSEARCA: AGG ) from just before the August correction to the end of the year. GMOM Total Return Price data by YCharts All four tactical/momentum ETFs dropped sharply with SPY in August as the correction hit. This is not surprising given that most of these ETFs would be expected to have a sizable allocation to U.S. equities given its status as one of the better-performing markets in early 2015. However, what happens after the correction is illuminating. At the start of September, GMOM, SCTO and EFFE decrease suddenly in volatility, suggesting that they have shifted significantly to bonds or cash. This is confirmed at least for SCTO which showed a 100% allocation cash in September. This shift therefore allowed those three funds to avoid the equity market gyrations in September. On the other hand, the performance of DWAT tracked closely with SPY, suggesting that this fund had not yet made a switch away from equity holdings. As expected, none of four ETFs were able to capture the ferocious snap-back rally exhibited by SPY in October (+8.51%). DWAT increased by around half that of SPY, while SCTO also rose slightly due to its 18.6% allocation to REITs and 21.4% allocation to utilities, however, the rest of SCTO was in cash. Rather unfortunately, all four funds appear to have switched back into an equity-heavy portfolio in November and December, just as the rally subsided and choppy market behavior resumed. This can be deduced given that all four ETFs follow the ebbs and flow of the broader market during these two months. Discussion and conclusion To say that all four tactical/momentum ETFs have disappointed in their first year of existence would be an understatement. None of the four funds were able to avoid the August correction of 2015. Three of the four funds (GMOM, SCTO and EFFE) then switched to cash or bond-heavy portfolios in September, which caused them to completely miss the stock market rebound a month later. This phenomenon was more comprehensively analyzed for GMOM in my Nov. 11 article ” GMOM: Momentum Swings From Bonds Back To Stocks “. On the other hand, based on its price action compare to SPY, DWAT appeared to remain fully invested in equities in September, but reduced its equity exposure to approximately 50% in October. As DWAT is an actively-managed ETF, it is not clear whether the delayed reduction of equity exposure involved any discretionary decisions by the portfolio manager. The next chart shows the total return performance, over the past 13 months, of the four ETFs compared to both SPY and a global market portfolio (via the Cambria Global Asset Allocation ETF (NYSEARCA: GAA )) at -1.02%, which Seeking Alpha author GestaltU has proposed is a superior benchmark for global tactical asset allocation [GTAA] strategies than the S&P500. We can see from the chart below that DWAT has had the best total return performance of -2.77% out of the four tactical/momentum ETFs during this time span, followed by GMOM at -6.87%. EFFE and SCTO had the lowest total return performances of -8.02% and -8.96%, respectively. Thus, DWAT was the only ETF to outperform the global market portfolio GAA since last November, and all four ETFs underperformed SPY. GMOM Total Return Price data by YCharts Going forward, what can we expect from these ETFs? Currently, the four ETFs show very different equity/bond distributions (data from Morningstar). SCTO has the highest equity allocation at nearly 100%, followed by DWAT at 74%. GMOM has a nearly 50:50 split of equities and bonds. EFFE is the only ETF with more bonds (60%) than stocks (40%). However, given that at least three of the four funds (all except DWAT, whose schedule is unspecified) rebalance monthly, these allocations are likely to change in January. In terms of the North American (mainly U.S.) versus international allocation of their equity portion, all except GMOM are fully domestic. GMOM contains 87% U.S. equities and 13% international equities. On a personal level, I have sold my holdings of GMOM a few months ago. I have replaced this the iShares MSCI USA Momentum Factor Index ETF (NYSEARCA: MTUM ) (as described in Left Banker’s article here ). My existing holding of the First Trust Dorsey Wright Focus 5 ETF (NASDAQ: FV ) has also done very well. Both have outperformed SPY over the past year. MTUM Total Return Price data by YCharts Note that those two ETFs are momentum-based but are not “tactical” in the sense that they cannot switch to bonds or cash, and moreover they are purely U.S. based. If the U.S. market enters a bear market, it is likely that those two funds will underperform the tactical/momentum ETFs described above. I am simply performance chasing the U.S. market here? Perhaps, but I lost patience in watching the NAV of GMOM gradually decline as it got caught between whipsaws. With my sale of GMOM, this will likely be my last article on tactical/momentum ETFs for the time being, unless their performance improves to such an extent that they warrant consideration for investment.

10 Charts That Explained Markets In 2015… And Will Impact 2016

Summary 2015 will be remembered for weakness in commodity markets, which bled over into global equities and U.S. high yield debt. In 2016, the divergence between monetary policy in the United States and the rest of the developed world could shape global financial markets. Underpinning all global markets is the ongoing transition of the Chinese economy from one driven by fixed investment to one led by domestic consumption, an unrivaled economic experiment. Below are what I believe are ten of the most interesting charts of 2015. The topics depicted had outsized impacts on financial markets in 2015, and will continue to be important considerations as the calendar turns to the New Year. While oil stole many of the headlines in 2015, falling by nearly two-thirds over the past eighteen months, a broad commodity index moved to its lowest level since 1999. Industrial metals, precious metals, and agricultural commodities were all pressured by a slowdown in global growth. Global Commodities Trade at 16-Year Low (click to enlarge) Source: Bloomberg, (Data through mid-day 12/24/15) Stress in commodity markets was primarily blamed on moderating Chinese growth. While the Chinese growth rate has receded, the absolute change in the size of the Chinese economy was still roughly equivalent to its absolute growth in 2006 and 2007 when the economy was growing at double digit growth rates. In 2015, the Chinese economy grew in absolute terms by the size of the entire Swiss or Saudi Arabian economies. Said differently, the Chinese economy still grew in nominal terms by the size of all the goods and services produced in Switzerland in a year. The China effect on commodity prices has been less of a function of flagging growth rates, and more of a function of the party’s efforts at transitioning the economy from an investment-led to a more domestic consumption-driven economy. Chinese Economic Growth in Absolute Terms is Still Tremendous Source: Bloomberg, World Bank While China had an impact on commodity prices, the strengthening dollar also was a big story. When the value of a dollar rises, it takes fewer dollars to buy a given commodity. These global commodities traded in dollars also become more expensive in local terms, potentially reducing demand. As the graph below shows, the dollar is at its strongest points versus a basket of global peers in the last decade-plus. As the Fed normalizes monetary policy further, higher interest rates on dollar investments could also spur a rally in the greenback, which could further pressure commodity prices and U.S. exporters and multinationals with large foreign businesses. The U.S. Dollar Index Strengthens Against Global Peers (click to enlarge) Source: Bloomberg, (Data through mid-day 12/24/15) A key theme in 2016 could be the divergence of U.S. and European monetary policy. Lend money to the German government today for ten years, and they will pay you 0.64% per year. In April, that figure was an astonishing 0.075%. That figure is still negative for 10-yr Swiss government bonds at -0.09%, meaning investors pay for the privilege of the Swiss government to hold their money in Swiss francs. Higher interest rates in the United States could continue to rotate money from the low rates in the developed world (Europe and Japan) and more stressed emerging economies. Shifting capital flows will create volatility and opportunity. German 10-yr Highlights Ongoing European Economic Weakness Source: Bloomberg Speaking of volatility, U.S. investors may have been unnerved by an uptick in market volatility in 2015, but that volatility paled in comparison to the volatility on the shallower Shanghai exchange. Chinese Volatility Could be Part of New Normal (click to enlarge) Source: Bloomberg, Standard and Poor’s One of my key themes has been the long run risk-adjusted outperformance of lower volatility assets relative to their higher beta cohorts. I wrote an expansive series this summer on the L ow Volatility Anomaly , or why lower risk stocks have outperformed their higher risk brethren over time. That theme continued in 2015 as a low volatility component of the S&P 500 outperformed high beta stocks and the broader market gauge on an absolute basis. Low Volatility Outperforms (Again) (click to enlarge) Source: Bloomberg, Standard and Poor’s; (Data through 12/23/15) This preference for lower volatility assets also extended to the topical high yield bond market ( as described in this piece ). Driven by the underperformance of commodity-sensitive speculative grade bonds, the High Yield Index is under the most stress since early in the economic recovery in 2009. This stress can be seen by the sharp underperformance of lower rated riskier ratings cohorts versus the performance of the higher rated BB junk bonds. Chasing Yields Led to Bad Outcomes in High Yield Source: Barclays; Bloomberg While the last two graphs compared different quality classes within an asset class, the next graph depicts the volatility of the 30-yr Treasury versus the S&P 500. As one would expect upon the unwind of vol-suppressing extraordinary monetary accommodation, interest rate volatility increased in 2015 as shown by the variability of the performance of long duration Treasuries. For investors seeking shelter from equity volatility in fixed income, long duration securities with higher interest rate sensitivity may not be the haven for you. (This is a topic I have also covered in the past through an examination of the volatility of the bonds and equity of Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL )). Equity vs. Rate Volatility (click to enlarge) Source: Bloomberg; Standard and Poor’s; U.S. Treasury The Fed rate increase was in large part driven by a firming in the labor market that pushed the unemployment rate down towards its estimated natural rate of unemployment. A different perspective of the labor market shows that labor force participation is at its lowest level in nearly forty years. While we have seen a cyclical recovery in employment figures, the economy still faces secular headwinds from an aging population. Perhaps, there is more slack in the labor market than suggested by official employment statistics. If so, the failure of wage inflation to materialize could increase the risk of policy error by the Fed. How Healthy is the Labor Market? Labor Force Participation at Multi-Generational Lows (click to enlarge) Source: Bloomberg, Bureau of Labor & Statistics; (Data through 11/30/15) The weak economic recovery post-crisis has kept the U.S. economy from operating at its full potential. Limited investment by a necessarily more austere government after record cyclical deficits has pushed the average age of government fixed assets to its oldest age on record. Similarly, corporations have been more apt to invest in their own securities through record share buybacks than undertake capital investment in the real economy, extending the age of the private capital stock. Older fixed assets and infrastructure could be another structural headwind that pressures domestic economic growth. A Growth Drag from Aging Infrastructure? Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 2015 was a fascinating year in financial markets. Plunging commodities, flagging Chinese growth, ultra-low rates in Europe, and the underperformance of higher risk investments in the United States all were symptomatic of tumultuous global markets. Domestically with equity multiples still above historical averages and yields on investment grade assets still historically low, forward returns are likely to fail to compensate investors for a continued heightened volatility. Disclaimer: My articles may contain statements and projections that are forward-looking in nature, and therefore inherently subject to numerous risks, uncertainties and assumptions. While my articles focus on generating long-term risk-adjusted returns, investment decisions necessarily involve the risk of loss of principal. Individual investor circumstances vary significantly, and information gleaned from my articles should be applied to your own unique investment situation, objectives, risk tolerance, and investment horizon.

Consolidated Edison – An Unsettling Look At Shareholder Yield

In a prior commentary I looked at the “shareholder yield,” that is dividends and share repurchases, for Coca-Cola and Exxon Mobil. In both instances the shareholder yield was greater than the dividend yield. Alternatively, a company like Consolidated Edison has a shareholder yield that has been routinely lower than its dividend yield. In a previous article I compared the “shareholder yield” of both Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO ) and Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM ). The idea was to take it a step further than simply looking at dividend yield, and instead focus on funds used for both dividends and share repurchases. As a part owner, share repurchases are commonplace. Yet if you owned the entire business, there would be no need to repurchase shares and thus these funds could be diverted elsewhere. For Coca-Cola and Exxon Mobil, this meant that the “shareholder yield” – dividends plus buybacks – was reasonably higher than the ordinary dividend yield that you commonly see quoted. Exxon Mobil turned out to have a higher shareholder yield than Coca-Cola (it’s share repurchase program has more room and a lower valuation of purchased shares) but the takeaway was that both companies had the ability to send away more cash without impairing the business. Which brings us to a company like Consolidated Edison (NYSE: ED ). Unlike Coca-Cola or Exxon Mobil or any number of well-known dividend paying companies, Consolidated Edison’s share count has been increasing over the years rather than decreasing. Thus conversely the shareholder yield tends to be lower than the quoted dividend yield. Let’s look at the past decade to see what I mean: Year Divs Sh Re Shares Total / Sh Price Sh Yield 2005 $518 -$78 245 $1.79 $46.33 3.9% 2006 $533 -$510 257 $0.09 $48.07 0.2% 2007 $582 -$685 272 -$0.38 $48.85 -0.8% 2008 $618 -$51 274 $2.07 $38.93 5.3% 2009 $612 -$257 281 $1.26 $45.43 2.8% 2010 $640 -$439 292 $0.69 $49.57 1.4% 2011 $704 -$31 293 $2.30 $62.03 3.7% 2012 $712 $0 293 $2.43 $55.54 4.4% 2013 $721 $0 293 $2.46 $55.28 4.5% 2014 $739 $0 293 $2.52 $66.01 3.8% The first three numerical columns are in millions, while the next two represent a per share basis. On the dividend front we can see that Consolidated Edison has been paying more and more total dividends, as to be expected from a company with a long history of regularly increasing its payout . What’s not readily obvious until you take a closer look is that the company had been issuing a good amount shares during the 2005 through 2011 period. This makes sense when think about it – the business is inherently capital intensive – but it might not be something that you would instantly notice. As such, the share count has been increasing. The company had 245 million shares outstanding in 2005, which has now become 293 million. This makes a difference when you’re thinking like an owner rather than a small shareholder. Here’s a comparison of the shareholder yield and the dividend yield over the years: Year Div Yield Sh Yield Difference 2005 4.6% 3.9% 0.7% 2006 4.3% 0.2% 4.1% 2007 4.4% -0.8% 5.2% 2008 5.8% 5.3% 0.5% 2009 4.8% 2.8% 2.0% 2010 4.4% 1.4% 3.0% 2011 3.9% 3.7% 0.2% 2012 4.4% 4.4% 0.0% 2013 4.5% 4.5% 0.0% 2014 3.8% 3.8% 0.0% The first number is what you’re accustomed to seeing quoted on any financial website – a dividend yield in the 3.5% to 5% range. The next column – shareholder yield – illustrates what magnitude of cash is actually being returned to shareholders. Consolidated Edison was indeed paying the full dividend, but it was also receiving cash back from shareholders to increase the share count. If you owned Coca-Cola or Exxon Mobil or any number of other firms in their entirety, the amount of cash that would be available to you would likely be greater than the current dividend yield. When a company both pays a dividend and buys back shares, the shareholder yield is greater than the dividend yield. With Consolidated Edison you have the opposite effect take place. The amount of cash that can be extracted from utility-like business models (without impairment) is lessened when you think about owning the entire thing. Issuing shares is common practice in the utility world (and other worlds for that matter) but it likely wouldn’t be occurring if there was just one owner. (You wouldn’t buy more shares yourself, or you could, but that would simply be inputting more capital). Thus you have a couple other options: issue more debt or reduce the dividend payment. The second option is what is being illustrated in a “shareholder yield” way, but the first one is much more common. Incidentally, whether you own all of it or not, this is exactly what we have seen with Consolidated Edison in the past decade. Notice the difference in the 2005 through 2011 period and the 2012 through 2014 timeframe. In the first period you had an increasing dividend to go along with a good deal of shares being issued. In 2007 shareholders received $582 million in dividend payments, but gave back $685 million to add to the share count. You can call the dividend payment yield, but in the aggregate the company was actually a net beneficiary of cash received. The amount of funds available had been quite a bit lower than what the dividend yield alone would indicate. Notably, Consolidated Edison did not issue shares in 2012, 2013 or 2014. Which means that the shareholder yield was equal to the dividend yield in those periods. Yet there was still impairment during this time. The company had net debt issuances of $1.1 billion, $1.4 billion and $1.1 billion during those years. Instead of issuing shares, debt was used – much like what might be required if you owned the business in its entirety. The shareholder yield gives a reasonable gauge as to the type of cash flow that could be extracted from the business, but naturally it’s just a first step in the process. In this instance, it shows that while the dividend has been above average and increasing, the amount of cash than can be taken out of the business without impairment has been consistently lower than this yield. Warren Buffett had a particularly revealing commentary related to this concept (and incidentally Consolidated Edison itself) back in the 1970’s: “In recent years the electric-utility industry has had little or no dividend-paying capacity. Or, rather, it has had the power to pay dividends if investors agree to buy stock from them. In 1975 electric utilities paid common dividends of $3.3 billion and asked investors to return $3.4 billion. Of course, they mixed in a little solicit-Peter-to-pay-Paul technique so as not to acquire a Con Ed reputation. Con Ed, you will remember, was unwise enough in 1974 to simply tell its shareholders it didn’t have the money to pay the dividend. Candor was rewarded with calamity in the marketplace.” “The more sophisticated utility maintains – perhaps increases – the quarterly dividend and then ask shareholders (either old or new) to mail back the money. In other words, the company issues new stock. This procedure diverts massive amounts of capital to the tax collector and substantial sums to underwriters. Everyone, however, seems to remain in good spirits (particularly the underwriters).” Naturally today you can make a bevy of arguments (rock bottom interest rates, for one) that did not qualify back then. However, the concept is similar: the amount of money that can be taken out from owning the entire business is apt to be lower, not higher, than the stated dividend yield. Ideally you’d like to think in “owner’s earnings” terms, but the shareholder yield provides a short cut to get you started. Whereas a company that regularly repurchases shares has a bit of wiggle room (those repurchase funds could be diverted toward sustaining the dividend in dire times) a company issuing shares has the opposite effect occurring. A company that regularly issues shares has “negative” wiggle room. Now I’m not suggesting that Consolidated Edison is a poor business or that it’s bound for doom – far from it. Utilities tend to exist out of necessity and have been churning out cash for decades. However, looking at shareholder yield (and ultimately owner earnings) is a bit of a different way to think about it. If you owned all of Exxon Mobil you could pay yourself a 5% or 8% dividend in regular times and not put an added burden on the business. That is, the quoted dividend yield understates the amount of cash that could be extracted without impairing the company. With Consolidated Edison, this likely isn’t the case. If you owned all of Consolidated Edison, you’d be more likely to see a lower not higher percentage of cash being paid out. No longer would you be issuing shares and thus the focus would turn to added debt or a reduced payout. The debt could go on indefinitely, but the capital necessities are such that the current dividend payment coexists with other pressing requirements. When they say that you’re “buying it for the dividend” this could be even more applicable than it first appears.