Author Archives: Scalper1

Short IWM, SLY Or VB And Long GWX? U.S. Small Caps Likely Overpriced

Summary U.S. small caps seem overvalued relative to international small caps. The dominate way to exploit this fact would likely be short VB and long GWX with a Sharpe ratio of 1.93. Given uncertainty about the underlying valuations of the ETFs, expected returns are between 22-42%. On Saturday, I stumbled across what I believe to be irregularity in the pricing of small-cap stocks, which I thought was worth exploring for a trade during my daily commutes. Since I generally operate under the assumption that I am wrong and the market is right and I am not much of a trader, I thought it was worth publishing the idea for critique before I put any real Helvetic francs to work. As we all know the major averages have taken a beating and the small-cap stocks have been hit harder than the large caps as one might expect. The international small-caps now seem undervalued relative to the United States where foreign capital continues to pour into small-cap companies to take advantage of the rising dollar, while at the same time be insulated against large-cap foreign earnings currency translation. Are (U.S.) Small-Caps Fundamentally Overpriced? Pitching my thesis, someone asked whether U.S. small-caps fundamentally overpriced. There are a number of ways of answering that question, in terms of growth, historical terms, GDP expectations, or using a model of international financial integration. In terms of growth the U.S. stocks now have a FW PEG ratio of about 1.25x, which is fundamentally overpriced, whereas the international stocks are about fair value with a FW PEG of about 1. In historical terms, stocks are pricey in general, but the international stocks are more in line with history. But in general, since stock prices often have little tether to their underlying claim on future profits, so we often look to analogous assets for guidance. Since I am a macro-economist, this article answers that question of fundamental valuation from an international capital mobility perspective, and the answer is, “Yes, U.S. small-caps are dear.” Under complete capital mobility, efficient exchange rate discovery, then U.S. small-caps are fundamentally misvalued . The U.S. has nigh perfect capital mobility, and we shall see below the exchange rate discovery is efficient. International investors prefer a cheaper claim on future profits for similar asset classes, ceteris paribus . The expected change in the dollar that drove international investors into small caps is likely overdone, meaning U.S. stocks are likely overpriced. Figure 1: Recent trend of the SPDR S&P International Small Cap ETF ( GWX) ((blue)) vs. the iShares Russell 2000 ETF ( IWM) (red). Source: Yahoo! Finance (click to enlarge) As one piece of evidence of this thesis, there seems to be a large discrepancy in the valuation levels between the Russell 2000, and the other major U.S. small-cap ETF holdings, and State Street’s GWX. The other international small-cap indices, the iShares MSCI EAFE Small-Cap ETF ( SCZ) and the Vanguard FTSE All-World ex-U.S. Small-Cap ETF ( VSS), are also a bit cheaper than IWM / the SPDR Russell 2000 ETF ( TWOK), but GWX seems to be the cheapest, and thus is the focus of this arbitrage. The ETF’s undervaluation is a bit surprising because GWX’s index, the S&P® Developed Ex-U.S. Under USD 2 Billion, does not seem terribly underpriced vis-à-vis the Russell 2000. Further evidence is exhibited in Table 1, which shows the standard valuation metrics of the major U.S. small-cap ETFs against GWX. Table 1: Fund and Index Characteristics ETF: Vanguard Small Cap ETF (NYSEARCA: VB ) SPDR S&P 600 Small Cap ETF (NYSEARCA: SLY ) SPDR Russell 2000 ETF ( TWOK)/IWM GWX Earnings Growth 3-5 Year Growth 14.87%* 14.61% 15% 16.67% Weighted Average Market Cap 2018 1714 1908 1248 Number of Holdings 1494 600 1963 2303 Price/Cash Flow 10.6 10.74 10.46 3.12** Price/Earnings 29.5 21.6 17.94 15.62 Price/Earnings ratio FY1 19.19 19.6 18.78 16.52 Return on equity 11.8% 11% 6.84% 9.40% Price/Book Ratio 2.5 2.03 2.07 1.37 Dividend Yield 1.43% 1.31% 1.62% 1.66% Price/Sales*** 1.17 1.16 1.15 0.74 * Average of SLY & IWM. Not all fund information is available. Some of the values are taken from the underlying index. **Still listed on their website as of this writing, but SSGA responded in an email stating the fund’s current P/CF is 8.55x. ***Source: macroaxis.com. Data as of Saturday, 15th August 2015. Based the fund information, most of the key metrics indicate that GWX is cheaper than its U.S. counterparts. That discount for an analogous asset class opens up the possibility of a pair trade by going long GWX and short one of the small-cap U.S. ETFs. ETFs have been a great financial innovation allowing retail and institutional investors to cheaply invest. Yet, I do think they have a few weaknesses that became more apparent in this exercise. The first is that all the characteristics needed to rationally evaluate the ETF holdings are not entirely reported, nor are they comparably reported across providers. Moreover, the entire holdings lists are often not reported in a way that allows one to match with external data to fill that gap. A glaring example is that State Street reports a 3.12x cash flow for its benchmark index on its website for GWX, but the index provider reports 14.12. It is hard to know whether this is typo (doubtful because attributes are reported daily and hence are likely automated), or some value-factor “optimized sampling” (a term of art in the ETF industry), which the State Street uses to juice returns when selecting the 2303 stocks from the 3571 stocks from the benchmark index, or how negative cash flows are accounted for. All these small differences make a pure arbitrage play more difficult because the margin of error is slim already given the relative efficiency of the market. The other thing that became clear is that the funds often trade at a premium to NAV and their holdings seem to be slightly bid up vis-à-vis their benchmark (i.e. NAV premium drag on top of ETF drag on top of indexing drag). Both likely have some drag on returns; depending how you leg into the long and short side you might already be down 100 bps before commissions. Not a trade breaker, but an additional complication. As an additional caution for our investors outside the U.S., please be aware that this arbitrage strategy poses additional risks because foreign versions of these ETFs exist in highly fragmented regulatory environments, which are essentially legalized scalping operations with mile-wide bid-ask spreads, implied local currency premia, higher expense ratios, and stronger departures from NAV. Étude d’Arbitrage Now that we have a trading thesis in hand, the question is how to best operationalize it. While the spark of a trading idea came from the price of the Russell 2000, alternate ways to implement the strategy might be to short Vanguard’s VB or State Street’s IWM, two widely held small-cap ETFs. We thus need to ascertain the concomitant risk-return profiles for each possible implementation (a tedious feat, and why most arbitrage is done with computers). Since we are dealing with percentages, there are a few ways to calculate the returns depending on whether you think the trade will lean to one side. The assumption here is both legs will eventually regress toward their mean netting profit on both sides. Rather than rely on a single indicator like price to book, I calculate the average of them all in order to estimate the expected arbitrage for a leg. Table 2 shows the expected gains for each leg, which are calculated off the center point values of the legs. Table 2: Arbitrage ALTERNATE SHORT LEGS LONG LEG GWX AGAINST: VB SLY TWOK/IWM VB SLY TWOK/IWM Price/Cash flow* 12.5% 11.1% 12.7% -9% -9% -10% Price/Earnings -36.9% -13.8% -6.5% 19% 19% 7% Price/Earnings ratio FY1 -5.9% -7.9% -6.0% 9% 9% 7% Return on equity 18% 6% -16% -6% -6% 16% Price/Book ratio -32.0% -16.3% -16.9% 24% 24% 26% Dividend yield convergence -3.5% -11.8% -1.2% 11% 11% 1.2% Price/Sales -23.2% -22.1% -21.7% 28% 28% 28% 5-Year growth convergence -3.5% -4.7% -3.5% 4% 4% 3% Ex{Center point arbitrage on leg} 9.3% 7.4% 7.4% 10.1% 10.1% 9.7% Ex{Total gain} (3.12x CF) 19% (42%) 17.5% (39.7%) 17.1% (39%) *Assumed to be 13.12x not 3.12x. See text. Since, the expected gains may be sensitive to the cash/flow outlier, I conservatively assume the cash flow to be 13.12x rather than 3.12. Being short the U.S. small-caps and long foreign small-caps implies being short dollars and long foreign currency, which means currency is a concern. A fair assumption might that the spot rate is the correct rate, but currency translation has been a major headache for me this year (thank you SNB…), so I am especially cautious. In order to estimate FX effects, I use the standard economist’s model that domestic net interest and inflation rates equal net inflation interest and inflation rates abroad, where “abroad” I define as Japan and the Eurozone. Currency Risk USD (EUR+JPY) /2 Spread Inflation (IMF 2016 forecast) 1.49% 1.10% 0.39% Interest (forward 6-month LIBOR) 0.56% 0.24% -0.32% Net spread: 0.07% Estimated USD appreciation needed to eliminate spread: 0.29% What amount of currency appreciation would U.S. rates into line? About 0.3%, assuming an inflation/currency elasticity of -0.24 (Kim 1998, pg. 617). Bond and currency traders seem to be doing their job extremely well, so we probably should not worry about currency. Since the strategy is equally long and short, it should be market-neutral. Yet, despite the proposed trade having an expected beta of zero, it entails risk. Therefore, I estimate the portfolio standard deviation using 2 years of adjusted price return data from Yahoo! Finance as a proxy for the portfolio risk. Strategy Profiles Table 3 shows the strategy implemented either using 2 or 3 ETFs. Using more than one short leg held out the possibility of reducing risk. Table 3: Strategy Implementation Profiles Three Asset Two Asset -VB/+GWX -SLY/+GWX -IWM/+GWX -SLY/+GWX -VB/ +GWX -IWM/ +GWX -TWOK/ +GWX -SLY/ +GWX Ex{Sharpe}* (3.12x CF) [+ lending] 1.54 (3.57) [4.15] 1.40 (3.39) [3.61] 1.93 (4.31) [4.99] 1.43 (3.44) [4.01] 0.68 (2.54) [3.07] 0.82 (2.00) [2.34] Ex{Equity Arbitrage} 23.51% 22.15% 25.05% 22.32% 22.32% 21.97% Ex{Currency Delta} -0.29% -0.29% -0.29% -0.29% -0.29% -0.29% Ex{Borrow Costs} -1.24% -1.48% -1.00% -1.48% -9.11% -1.47% Ex{Lending Income} 6.29% 6.29% 6.29% 6.29% 6.29% 6.29% Ex{SD Portfolio} 10.9% 11.1% 9.4% 11.0% 11.9% 18.6% *Returns calculated without lending income and 13.12xCF. See text. I present 3 different Sharpe values. The most conservative version assumes a price to cash flow of 13.12x. The second uses the provider’s index information. And the third includes the market rate security lending income. If you are able to collect the market rate for lending GWX, the trade becomes almost a pure arbitrage play. With an expected Sharpe of 1.93, the dominant operationalization would appear to be short VB and long GWX. Conclusion It would therefore seem, even based on conservative calculations, the proposed long-short strategy dominates a long position in the S&P500, which has an expected Sharpe of about 0.47. All of the trades seem to meet the first test of rationality, and thus a decent risk-adjusted trading opportunity. For this reason, I like to know what you think. Is the data wrong? Have I made an error in calculation? Is there a problem with my deduction and/or conclusion? If not, how would you implement the trade and when? Based on your feedback I shall make a determination to open a small position. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Consider Adding Some CRAK To Your Portfolio.

Summary The Market Vectors Oil Refiners ETF launched this week is a compelling play in the energy sector. I conduct a review of the ETF itself and the opportunities & risks associated with the ETF. I believe CRAK is worth considering because of its strong performance in comparison to other energy segments. In this article, I will be reviewing the new Market Vectors Oil Refiners ETF (Pending: CRAK ), which launched yesterday. I believe investors should consider adding some CRAK to their portfolio because the refiners have been the lone bright spot over the last year when oil prices have collapsed. The following chart from the CRAK fund profile page shows that refining and marketing stocks are the only sub-segment of the energy sector (NYSEARCA: XLE ), which has posted a positive return over the last year. Crack Spread One of the most important things to consider when looking at refining stocks is to look at the crack spread. The crack spread is the difference between the cost purchasing the crude oil and the price of the products that the crude oil is refined or “cracked” into. I created the following chart using the ThinkorSwim platform that has the crack spread plotted over the last two years, as well as the performance of Valero (NYSE: VLO ), which is one of the largest holdings in CRAK. The chart shows that over the last two years Valero’s performance [Blue Line] has been highly correlated to the crack spread. (click to enlarge) [Chart from ThinkorSwim Platform] Opportunity The opportunity for refining stocks is promising because crack spreads are higher than a year ago, which will show up in the form of year/year earnings growth. In a troubled energy environment where oil companies/drillers etc cannot earnings, the refiners stand out above other energy segments. Using Valero as an example, you can see in the chart below for the last four quarters, EPS has been trending upward, even as oil prices had fallen to near $40, went back to $60 and are now back at $40. As long as the crack spread remains somewhat stable at these elevated levels, the refiners will continue to outperform the rest of the energy sector. (click to enlarge) Risks The primary risk of CRAK is that it is highly concentrated within its top 10 holdings. The top 10 holdings account for nearly 65% of the portfolio, therefore when considering CRAK investors should be comfortable with this fact and the underlying companies that are in the top 10 holdings. Second, another item to watch for is currency risk. As the following chart from the portfolio analytics section of the CRAK fund page shows, CRAK has a large international currency exposure. With nearly 50% of CRAK priced in foreign currencies investors who are also, bullish on the dollar could potentially pair a purchase of CRAK with the small-hedged position in the PowerShares DB USD Bull ETF (NYSEARCA: UUP ) or the WisdomTree Bloomberg U.S. Dollar Bullish ETF (NYSEARCA: USDU ) to mitigate the foreign currency risk. Closing Thoughts In closing, because CRAK just launched this week and I believe it should be added to investors watch lists for a period to make sure there is interest in the product. If there is adequate volume and CRAK attracts assets the refiners are a compelling choice when considering investing in energy because they have performed very well during this tough energy environment in comparison to other energy sector segments. Disclaimer: See here . Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Share this article with a colleague

This Is What Happens When The Fed Tries To Leave ‘QE’

The S&P 500 moved from 857.39 when QE1 was first announced to 1982.30 when QE3/QE4 ran its course for an approximate gain of 131%. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that – since October 29th of last year when QE3/QE4 ended – the S&P 500 has garnered a modest 2.7%. Energy, materials, industrials, transportation – decliners have been pressuring advancers since the beginning of May. From my vantage point, the evidence that has been building up for several months has strongly favored reducing the risk of loss in one’s portfolio. Back on October 29, 2014, the Federal Reserve ended its largest round of quantitative easing (QE3/QE4). The unconventional policy of buying market-based assets with electronically created credits (dollars) first began in late November of 2008. Since that time, $3.75 trillion in stimulus forced interest rates downward and sent stock prices soaring. The S&P 500 moved from 857.39 when QE1 was first announced to 1982.30 when QE3/QE4 ran its course for an approximate gain of 131%. Equally intriguing, when the Fed backed away from its asset purchasing rate manipulation, stocks struggled mightily. The S&P 500 fell 16% in a sharp pullback shortly after the end of QE1. What’s more, in the period between QE1 and QE2, stocks essentially experienced flat returns. The same phenomenon occurred shortly after the end of QE2. The S&P 500 fell 19.4% in a bearish sell-off. It wasn’t until the Fed began selling short-term Treasury bonds and buying longer-term Treasury bonds that investors regained confidence in late 2011. Moreover, the period between the end of QE2 and the start of QE3/QE4 yielded very little in the way of gains. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that – since October 29th of last year when QE3/QE4 ended – the S&P 500 has garnered a modest 2.7%. Other areas of the U.S. stock market have had less success. The iShares Transportation Average ETF (NYSEARCA: IYT ) has already corrected nearly 11% since the end of QE3/QE4, while the Dow Jones Industrials is in the same place that it started. As I described in Tuesday’s ‘Market Top? 15 Warning Signs’ – as I discussed in numerous articles throughout May, June and July – extremely overvalued stocks and deteriorating stock market breadth create an unsavory concoction. Mix in a central bank that expresses a desire to hike borrowing costs when the global economy is decelerating, commodities are plummeting and credit spreads are widening, and even the mightiest success stories begin to get victimized. Time and again, history has shown that when more and more sectors are falling apart, the pressure on the remaining sectors becomes overwhelming. Energy, materials, industrials, transportation – decliners have been pressuring advancers since the beginning of May. Granted, one may wish to pay a premium price for earnings growth in Disney (NYSE: DIS ), Facebook (NASDAQ: FB ) and Netflix (NASDAQ: NFLX ). On the other hand, when the number of advancing stocks participating in the bull market continues to diminish (relative to decliners), even the most popular momentum stocks eventually witness a mad dash for the exits. I am not suggesting that investors should abandon all of their risk assets. On the flip side, history tends to validate the adage, “the further they climb, the harder they fall.” The media can try to pin all of the blame on China’s turmoil. As a catalyst, sure. Yet S&P 500 corporations with valuations at the 2nd highest levels in history are struggling to report earnings growth. Worse yet, revenues have declined for two consecutive quarters. If fundamentals matter, shouldn’t one expect some reversion to average price-to-sales ratios and/or average market cap-to-GDP ratios? And then there’s the global economy. Currency devaluation throughout Asia, Latin America and Europe certainly haven’t helped the 50% of profits that are generated by S&P 500 corporations abroad. Worse yet, the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR, has been rising for the better part of the last 12 months. Might this suggest that banks in the UK (as well as banks that use LIBOR for mortgages) are growing concerned about lending to one another? Does it hint that the world’s reliance on central banks to keep rates unbelievably low is now in danger of creating another credit crisis? From my vantage point, the evidence that has been building up for several months has strongly favored reducing the risk of loss in one’s portfolio. Should you run for the hills? No. Yet I continue to favor large-caps over small-caps, domestic over foreign. I continue to favor treasuries and investment grade over higher yielding bonds. Most importantly, I have been systematically raising the cash level in client accounts for months. 20%, 25%, 30%, depending on client risk tolerance. Having that cash gives my clients the opportunity to buy high quality stocks at more attractive prices when a pullback, 10%-plus correction, or 20%-plus bear shows signs of abating. Specifically, when market internals/breadth as well as valuations improve, cash will be redeployed. Disclosure: Gary Gordon, MS, CFP is the president of Pacific Park Financial, Inc., a Registered Investment Adviser with the SEC. Gary Gordon, Pacific Park Financial, Inc, and/or its clients may hold positions in the ETFs, mutual funds, and/or any investment asset mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell or hold securities. 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